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Sustainability of Farmer Managed 
Irrigation Systems in Nepal 
Propositions 
1. Any intervention that does not recognise the centrality of the social actors in 
development programs is bound to clash, rather than to fit, with the natural dynamic 
of socio-economic processes. (Michael M. Cernea, 1991) 
2. Experience shows that the self-reliance and motivation of indigenous management 
groups can easily be undermined by too much external assistance, and that is a real 
danger in the present situation of growing international interest in small scale systems. 
(H.W. Underhill, 1984) 
3. Intervention processes consist of a complex set of interlocking arenas of struggle, each 
characterised by specific constraints and possibilities of manoeuvre. (Norman Long, 
1997) 
4. Where external assistance occurs without corresponding local investment (such as in 
labour, materials and knowledge), dependency is reinforced and the benefits of the 
external investment are not sustained. (Douglas J. Merrey, 1997) 
5. It is now generally acknowledged that the 15 billion dollars that used to be poured into 
the irrigation sub-sector in less-developed countries annually have not produced more 
than 50 percent of tire anticipated output. (G. Diemer and F.S. Huibers, 1996) 
6. The degree of people's interest in, commitment to and willingness to invest in 
irrigation will depend on how it is perceived to enhance or diminish their lives. (I. 
Guijt and J. Thompson, 1994) 
7. Before intervention farmers were able and willing to maintain their irrigation system 
without outside support. However, after interventions there is growing dependency on 
external resources for the maintenance of irrigation system. (This thesis) 
8. The changes effected by the irrigation intervention in the governance structure 
contributed to the increasing anarchy in rules-in-use. (This thesis) 
9. The changes in physical infrastructure due to the introduction of new technology after 
intervention effected changes in the organisational control related to irrigation tasks. 
(This thesis) 
10. Not only the irrigation interventions, but also broader changes in political, social, 
economic and administrative set up have effected changes in the existing irrigation 
institutions. (This thesis) 
11. The institutions created by the interventions are not functioning after the intervention 
due to lack of a clear perception of their role by the government and the users. (This 
thesis) 
12. The simple technical design facilitated a strong communal linking loop in the interfaces 
among the users and they had a greater role in the decision for the design of the 
technology. (This thesis) 
13. The intervention for the construction of a new irrigation system has wider implications 
in terms of introduction of new technologies, financial resources and institutional 
requirement as compared to rehabilitation and improvement. (This thesis) 
14. The interface between the actors facilitated the strengthening of the 'communal linking 
loops' for the initiation of the intervention, which was not always very transparent due 
to the different and hidden agendas of all the actors involved. (This thesis) 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Nature of the problem 
Irrigated agriculture is seen as vital to both the welfare and economic development 
of Nepal and government policy has been to renovate and extend existing irrigation 
systems, as well as to build new ones. A recent estimate (APP; 1995) suggests that 
irrigation infrastructure has been developed to provide irrigation to 62 percent (1.1 
million ha) of country's potentially irrigable areas. But actual irrigated area is only 71 
percent of the developed potential. Out of this the farmer-managed irrigation 
systems (FMIS) cover 74 percent of the irrigated area and 26 percent is covered by the 
agency-managed irrigation systems. These farmer-managed systems are successfully 
managed and sustained well over time. Water users who are the owners of the 
system have formulated their own rules and regulations to regulate the behaviour of 
the members in relation to the functions of the irrigation system. This is largely due 
to the ownership feeling by the users and effective organisation in terms of water 
delivery, operation and maintenance, resource mobilisation and resolution of 
conflicts (Shrestha, 1987; Gautam, 1987). The protection of individual and communal 
rights over the resources (Pradhan, 1989b) is an important feature of these irrigation 
systems. However, these systems were operating far below the production level that 
they could potentially achieve (Pant, 1985; Tiwari, 1986). The limitation of resources 
contributed by each member or group was one of the principle reasons, among 
others for this situation. 
The importance of FMIS in Nepal was not realised by the government until the 
Water and Energy Commission under Ministry of Water Resources conducted a 
study and drew attention towards them in 1981, although some independent 
researchers had highlighted the importance of FMIS before. The Asian Development 
Bank study estimated that about 60 per cent of FMIS in Nepal required major 
rehabilitation and upgrading works in order to utilise their optimum potential 
(ADB/M, 1988). A large number of FMIS were not receiving any kind of support 
from the government (Pradhan, 1989a) as government laid emphasis on the 
development of agency-managed irrigation system (AMIS) which were large 
irrigation projects. In 1989 the government drafted a policy to support FMIS after 
realising the importance of farmers' participation in managing irrigation systems in 
the country. 
The government assistance programme was to promote equitable and flexible 
irrigation water distribution through changes in the infrastructure and institutions. 
This was to be achieved through the mobilisation of technical and financial resources 
of the government. Since then, the Department of Irrigation (DOI) is providing 
technical and financial assistance to FMIS. However, some Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), International Non-Governmental organisations (INGOs), 
District Development Committees (DDCs) and Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) were and are providing financial and technical support, although on a 
limited scale. 
2 INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 
The broader political and administrative changes1 in the country have had an 
influence on the implementation of the government intervention programme and its 
outcome on the local government village at level. This was largely due to the changes 
brought about in the government policy and the changes in the role of the local level 
institutions, which were directly or indirectly involved in the irrigation management 
vis-a-vis the role of the users of the irrigation system. 
In FMIS, the processes by which farmers obtain, accumulate and use resources are 
more or less institutionalised, because these practices have existed for a long period 
of time. Resources required for their maintenance were internally created and 
gradually accumulated, commensurate with the inherent capability of the socio-
economic structure of the community to generate, absorb and use surplus. In this 
respect institutions were playing an important role in the mobilisation and use of 
internal resources according to the need and capacity of its members. Further, 
institutions were important in increasing the absorptive capacity of their members, 
which is required to use additional resources made available to improve irrigation 
systems. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the structure and functions of such 
institutions. If this factor is not taken into account infusion of financial resources 
brought in along with technological intervention might create conflicts among the 
users or old institutions may be abandoned. When these conflicts are not resolved 
amicably, the very purpose of intervention could be defeated and the processes, 
which in the past have been sustained by the members, could be disrupted. In the 
process of intervention it is believed that either new institutions are created or 
existing institutions are transformed to be adapted to the new situation. 
Nevertheless, the sustainability of these institutions was largely dependent on how 
people perceived the emerging new institutions. In some cases it was found that 
government institutions replaced the old institutions but that people had not 
accepted new institutions. The result has been the disruption of the processes by 
which institutions were created and sustained for over a period of time. 
The realisation of the full potential of irrigation in the hills to increase agricultural 
production and productivity however is also largely dependent on various other 
factors such as inaccessibility, fragility, marginality and diversity 0odha, 1992). The 
production choices of the household are determined by these specificities. As a result 
the crops and cropping patterns vary widely within the agro-ecological regions 
depending on topography, the altitude and availability of irrigation water, which 
determines the land use intensification (Abbington, 1992). The pressure on the land 
due to population growth (Horberry, 1990) has also encouraged the land use 
intensification to meet the household needs. The irrigation assistance programmes 
are aimed at encouraging innovation in agriculture also. However, the farmers' 
willingness to take the risk and the benefit from it are important factors for 
innovation (Rigg, 1986) beside, the opportunity made available by irrigation and 
agricultural technology (Vincent, 1995). Thus, the irrigation intervention may make 
possible the intensification and extensification of land use but not the innovation in 
production in all cases. Nevertheless, lack of technological knowledge, financial 
constraints and lack of infrastructure were the main causes considered by the 
intervening agencies as reasons for support to FMIS. 
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Interventions can be made to create new schemes and improve existing FMIS. 
These schemes can become agency managed irrigation system (AMIS) or remain 
FMIS. The reasons for the difference include that the government manages the newly 
developed schemes through its employee called Dhalpa and also provides annual 
maintenance support. The existing FMIS is left to the farmers for its management 
after improvement and government does not provide annual maintenance support. 
Bromley (1982) argues that all farmers face some sort of uncertainty over the timing 
and quantity of water receipts. Uncertainty is caused by their physical 
interdependence (technological externalities) to other farmers and breaking of rules 
and convention (institutional uncertainty) by some farmers. This will constrain his 
investment in land improvement, as the farmer is a cautious optimiser. Any 
intervention in this regard should be made with due considerations to farmers' need, 
as it may help in removing the uncertainties. This in essence means that farmers 
should have some sort of control over the use of resources. 
The study of FMIS in the hills of Nepal has been of interest to the researchers due 
to variations in the management practices of these FMIS. Most of the studies on FMIS 
in the hills completed so far in Nepal have focused on analysing the existing situation 
of FMIS. Some of these studies were able to document the processes applied by 
farmers in managing the irrigation systems in relation to property rights, resource 
mobilisation, and organisational structure. Studies on the intricacies of intervention, 
which are shaped by the interaction pattern between actors and its effect on the 
management of hill irrigation systems, are scarce. Even the officials from the 
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank admit that the effects of World 
Bank supported intervention programmes in irrigation are not fully analysed and 
documented (view expressed during a seminar at the Department of Irrigation, 
WAU on 8 Nov. 1995). Similarly, Coward and Levine (1987) have also pointed to the 
need for studies on government intervention in farmers-managed irrigation systems. 
Shivakoti (1992) has highlighted the differences in results achieved as a result of 
differences in approach applied by different agencies while providing assistance to 
the FMIS. Similarly, the study (Benjamin etal., 1994) prepared for the United States 
Agency for International Development have examined the governance structure and 
its effects on the performance of agency-managed and farmer-managed irrigation 
systems in Nepal. One of the findings of the study was that the governance structure 
of a farmer-managed system is conducive to better performance of irrigation systems 
as compared to agency-managed systems. This was due to the differences in 
institutional dimensions of these irrigation systems. Hence, there is a need to 
understand the complexities of processes of agency intervention and its objectives of 
empowering local people to act in development processes in relation to the 
emergence of institutions for irrigation management at local level. Also, there is need 
to understand how actors interact. The present study is an effort to bring new 
understanding in this area. 
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1.2 Research focus: Intervention, rural transformation and 
institutions 
The need for intervention is felt both by the government and the farmers. The stated 
concern of the government has been to maximise the benefit to the users through 
improvements in the existing irrigation systems. Likewise, the users require agency 
support in improving existing conditions of irrigation systems which they cannot do 
on their own. With the support from various donors, the Government of Nepal has 
implemented support programmes with a view to transform water availability and 
agricultural production, and increasing the institutional capabilities of farmers to 
develop and sustain efficient, equitable and reliable irrigation management practices 
in irrigation systems in Nepal. 
With the growing commitment of the government in various sectors of public life 
and also due to the responsibility to provide its services efficiently at low cost, the 
tendency of government policies is towards supporting groups and organisations at 
local level (Marsden, 1994) and decentralising management. The programmes thus 
designed are said to improve the existing situations of peasant production systems. 
Whatever may be the forms of support from the government it entails the interaction 
between the farmers and agencies and decision making at various levels directed 
towards achieving stated objectives. 
In general, the stated objective of the interventions in irrigation in Nepal is to 
increase the food production through improvements in the irrigation systems and 
their management practices. The main activities of these projects in management 
improvement have been: a) to strengthen the capability of Water User Associations 
to assume greater responsibility and authority for the operation and maintenance of 
the irrigation system; b) to assist FMIS in improving their systems and c) to 
document the lessons learned which are to be applied in future research and training 
for improvement in water delivery and production (IMC, 1987). These intervention 
programmes aimed at: 
• Reducing frequent breakdowns of the system to increase reliability of irrigation 
water. 
• Increasing irrigated areas through better regulation of water at the river intake, 
reduction of water delivery losses and more efficient use of water. 
• Encouraging multiple cropping through the availability of adequate amounts of 
water in time. 
• Ensuring less 'scarcity' of water limiting rotations to support new high yielding 
varieties. 
• Reducing resource mobilisation in terms of human labour for maintenance 
requirements, which can be diverted to intensive agriculture practices. 
• Bringing in new technologies for better water control and management. 
• Strengthening users' capability to manage irrigation system through their own 
resources. 
• Organising new institutions for the sustainability of the irrigation systems 
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The changes in government policy at various times have resulted in differences in the 
intervention strategies designed for various programmes. Moreover, there was no 
consistency in the intervention policies for various programmes occuring at the same 
time2. As a consequence different institutional mechanisms were introduced for 
various programmes resulting into the variations in resource use, system design 
procedures and implementation mechanisms. Thus, there were differences in the 
intervention processes and organisational requirements of various programmes. This 
in effect led to the variation in responsibilities of the users and agencies at various 
stages of irrigation development, more particularly on the ownership of irrigation 
system, which had implications on the governance and management of irrigation 
schemes involved. Also, there was a difference in gains and benefits received by 
different farmers. 
Government intervention programmes to support these FMIS have affected the 
existing institutions at local level. In this process, some existing irrigation institutions 
were reorganised and some new ones were created on the initiative of the 
government. In some irrigation schemes the users took the initiative to form farmers' 
organisations. This has brought about changes in management of irrigation tasks viz. 
water acquisition and system development, water allocation/distribution, conflict 
management, resource mobilisation and system maintenance. In some cases this has 
created a situation of conflict and in some apathy towards the irrigation system. 
Thus, assessing the effect of external intervention on existing institutions is of 
importance in the present context. In this context the present study is an effort to 
understand the social, acirninistrative and political processes involved and changes 
brought about by development interventions in the management of AMIS and FMIS 
through the construction of new schemes and rehabilitation of old FMIS schemes and 
farmer's adoption to them. Knowing these processes is essential for efficient, effective 
and sustainable institution building at local level. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis has seven chapters. This first chapter has discussed the nature of the 
problem, research focus and research objective. The various concepts and the 
theoretical framework applied in the study along with the various methods used in 
generating information at the field level and for desk top study is presented in the 
second chapter. The characteristics and types of hill irrigation systems and the 
importance of irrigation in agriculture development under different plan periods are 
discussed in the third chapter. The third chapter also provides information on the 
general background of the country and the poHtico-adrninistrative structure of the 
country. Four case studies are discussed in chapters four to six. The case studies 
consist of the description of the general environment along with the presentation of 
the individual irrigation schemes. Each presentation is followed by the analysis of the 
case with the use of the concepts in the theoretical framework. The final chapter 
includes major findings of the case studies and conclusions. 
Notes 
1 For detail see chapter 3. 
2 See chapter three for the discussions on intervention policies and strategies for irrigation 
programmes. 
2. Concepts, theoretical framework and research methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The emergence of local institutions in the past has been due to the initiatives taken by 
the people themselves to access resources for livelihoods. Government efforts for 
institution development appropriate to new production opportunities and 
technology use has been slow to recognise the importance of these institutions. 
Sometimes this is due to the ignorance but is also due to the unwillingness to 
delegate power and control over resources by the central authority to the local level. 
Uphoff (1982) and Tang and Ostrom (1993) have observed that the existence of local 
institutions and their use for generation and mobilisation of local resources were 
overlooked in the past. The role local people are playing and could play in their 
development was not recognised in initial programmes of development assistance. 
The main reason for this was that planning and implementation of activities for rural 
development programmes focused on technical innovation and thus were located in 
agencies that also conceived planning and implementation in technocratic 
approaches, and that local people did not have any knowledge in this respect. The 
programmes designed were also sometimes far removed from reality and lacked 
flexibility to adapt them to the local situation. Another reason is that the 
development programmes were planned to serve the political and economic 
objectives of the government. Participation was sought only to fulfil government 
objectives (Hall, 1988). As a result the bureaucracy failed to deliver the goods and 
services that were asked for by the people living in the rural areas. In recent years 
however, the role of local institutions and the capacities of the people to steer their 
own development are being recognised and their involvement in development 
initiatives is increasing. Besides, pressure from the donors, who provided the bulk of 
the development resources, has also brought about this shift in the government 
policy. Nevertheless, there was bureaucratic neglect in understanding and analysing 
the local situation and the users' role in problem solving and using new 
opportunities. Therefore, there was always a gap in the design of the policy and its 
implementation. Moreover, the importance placed on achieving the physical target 
focused on administrative formalities at the cost of the real outcome. This has 
constrained the effective design and implementation of development programmes. 
As a result many of the development projects failed to realise their objectives. This 
has been a matter of discussion and concern among development practitioners. 
Current thinking on 'development', which is viewed as an orientation towards 
progressive change (Thomas, 1999), in the developing countries has emphasised a 
lessening role of the government and the creation or development of 'intermediaries' 
between people and the government. The term intermediaries refer to institutions 
created either by the people or the government at the local level, to encourage and 
support local initiative. The process of transformation will be affected or influenced 
by economic, social and political changes occurring at national and local level. 
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However, the importance of these intermediary institutions lies in their efficacy in 
addressing the problems for which they came into existence. 
The public resources and their use in the developing countries are controlled by 
the central government. Theoretically, resources from the government should be 
used in combination with mobilised local resources through the development of 
institutions at local level. However, the development strategies applied by the 
government did not pay attention to strengthening informal institutions in 
traditional societies so that they could evolve into stronger formal institutions at their 
own pace. Although these types of institutions have a greater chance to survive than 
those created from outside (Bagadion and Korten, 1985; Cernea, 1985; Freeman and 
Lowdermilk, 1985; Uphoff, 1992). Also, the institutional dimensions of technology 
and the social action that can take place around changes in technology were not 
taken into account. 
The massive resource investments in the rural areas have not produced the 
desired results due to lack of a participatory approach to technology development 
(Ashby, and Sperling, 1994). Besides, there was a 'knowledge gap' about the 
potential of rural institutions and the lack of assessment of their importance for 
development (Uphoff, 1982). As a result the group action required to carry out 
development tasks was not forthcoming. Besides, the development programmes in 
the past seldom gave attention to building up grass-root institutions (Cernea, op cit.). 
But there have been gradual changes in the intervention processes applied by the 
government to overcome these problems. Nevertheless, the result of this shift in 
development intervention strategies, which laid emphasis on creation of institutions, 
also was not as expected. However, some individuals and groups of individuals 
were able to create new opportunities for their benefit due to these changes. 
Hereafter the concepts and theoretical framework will be discussed. 
2.2 Intervention as a process 
Intervention is an external action with knowledge and resources to bring major or 
minor changes in an existing situation. Various actors participate in the design and 
implementation of the intervention. However, their role in the design and 
implementation are governed by the opportunities provided to them. The users play 
effective roles in some of the interventions. While in the others, the government 
agencies and the local elected institutions play an important role in the design and 
implementation of the interventions. In general, in Nepal the government staff and 
the local elected representatives were found to be active in the design and 
implementation of the project during the early eighties. However, users participation 
in the intervention processes since the later part of eighties was made mandatory. 
Thus, the processes of interventions are important in understanding its outcome. In 
this respect development intervention can be seen as arenas of struggle for scarce 
resources in which the actors involved will try to manipulate the situation for 
fulfilling their individual objectives (Dusseldorp, 1993). This implies that several 
individuals or groups of actors will compete for the control over the use of resources, 
in a way which promotes their interest. Thus, the outcome of the development 
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intervention is shaped and reshaped through the process of interaction between the 
actors involved in the process (Long, 1989). In this process some individuals or group 
of actors becomes successful in taking more benefits than the others take. In recent 
years development intervention is regarded as a process of consensus and coherence 
building among actors for public action (Wield, 1999). This approach recognises the 
existence of various actors rather than the supremacy of one single agency, which is 
the government. This is because multiple actors are promoting the public interests 
through the implementation of various development programmes. However, in 
Nepal most of the government interventions are implemented through a single 
agency and are task oriented rather than concerned to bring together the various 
actors to achieve the objectives of the intervention. As a result most of the 'projects' 
implemented by the government fail to achieve the objectives of the intervention 
because of limitations in understanding of livelihood strategies and related 
institutions (Vincent, 1995). Therefore, for the intervention to succeed, area specific 
strategies and actions are required due to the diversity in socio-institutional, physical 
and environmental conditions of the areas. 
In order to look into the development intervention process, the 'communal linking 
loop' of the rationale decision making model will be used in the present study. This is 
defined as "the interrelated decisions and activities individuals have to make and 
perform, when they want to realise certain objectives, by conceptually and actually 
linking of their objectives, given their perception of the present situation and their 
(scarce) resources" (Dusseldorp, op cit). This model facilitates systematising the 
processes of the intervention. 
To complement the analysis based on this model, the interface approach of Long 
(1989) will also be used as it facilitates to analysis of the interaction pattern 
developed among various actors and its outcome during the process of programme 
intervention. 
These two approaches are found to be useful for this study because, the 
combination of these two approaches will help in analysing and understanding the 
problem to be studied more systematically. As pointed out by Dusseldorp, " ... no 
development will take place, whatever action is undertaken by organisations or 
institutions, unless individuals (actors) have decided to act" (Dusseldorp, op cit). 
2.2.1 Rational decision making and 'communal linking loop1 
A decision is a goal-directed behaviour and decision making is a process of choosing 
among the alternatives, and the important determinants are the needs of an 
individual and his perception of the environment 0abes, 1982: 53). The normative 
and descriptive schools of thought, led by economists and behavioural scientists 
respectively, view decision making differently in terms of rationality. The former 
argues that the individual has access to all the information to make a decision. The 
latter emphasises that one may not have access to all the information or is not able to 
process all the available information (see Abell, 1992; Etzioni, 1988; Jabes, op cit.; 
March 1986 for various forms and conditions of rationality). Thus, decisions are not 
always optimal as argued by the economists. The rational decision model 
(Dusseldorp, op cit.), which is based on a system of logical thought within the world 
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views and knowledge system of the actor or deliberations (Etzioni, op cit), assumes 
that given the available information all people want to achieve their goals and 
objectives at the least possible cost. The 'basic linking loops' as described in this 
model are the interrelated decisions and activities individuals have to make and 
perform, when they want to realise certain objectives. When 'basic linking loops' of 
several actors are combined to attain certain objectives, then it becomes a 'communal 
linking loop'. This happens when individuals realise that the objective is not 
attainable individually and there needs to be a combined effort of all. 
In order to combine the efforts, the actors will have to agree on the same set of 
objectives and they will have to negotiate over the resources. But conflicting 
individual objectives sometimes make it difficult to construct a 'communal linking 
loop'. Because, the conflicting objectives and the value preferences of the individual 
participants affect the communal decision making (March, op cit.). However, 
individual limitation in achieving an objective is the driving force, which brings 
people with identical objectives together to join a 'communal linking loop' that 
results in the realisation of the common objective. Communal linking loops are rather 
fragile constructs for the following reasons (Dusseldorp, op cit.): 
• Objectives of actors and their perception of the present situation, or the means 
they have can change during the period a communal linking loops functions. 
• Actors do not only have explicit objectives, which they openly express. They have 
in many occasions also implicit objectives. 
Besides, the conditions for new opportunities of action through a linking loop can be 
episodic and highly dynamic. Their use requires also conscious recognition of 
options and use of resources, which may also be unpredictable in nature. 
Consequently, in the development of their 'communal linking loop', actors are 
pursuing their own self interests and manipulate their social networks to realise their 
objectives. These social networks might consist of religious groups, kinship and other 
social groups, which could have critical influence both on creation of new networks 
and new institutions. 
2.2.2 Interfaces 
The interaction of various actors at different points in time is termed as a 'social 
interface' which is defined "as a critical point of intersection of linkage between 
different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural 
discontinuities, based upon differences in normative value and social interest are 
most likely found" (Long, 1989:1-2.). The importance of the analysis of interfaces lies 
in understanding the outcome of any planned development programme. The design 
and implementation of a development programme is generally thought to be a linear 
process. But in reality, different actors involved at various levels in the process of 
planned intervention influence the implementation and its outcome. Thus, there is 
always a differential response to the programme as various actors have different 
interests backed by different resources (Long, 1984) and actors involved would 
define the situation based on their own experience and apply various strategies to 
shape the event. 
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The interaction pattern among individuals and institutions is dynamic in nature 
and provides a venue for shaping and reshaping the outcome of development 
intervention. This shaping and reshaping of a development outcome is the result of 
power, negotiation and compromise among various individuals and institutions. 
Thus in development interface situations, a central issue is the way in which policy is 
applied and, often, in the process transformed (Long, 1984). In the process the policy, 
objective and strategies of development programmes are modified to accommodate 
the opinions of various actors or the development programme is likely to fall short of 
its intended achievement. The actor-oriented approach is an appropriate tool, in 
order to understand these processes in the intervention programme, as it recognises 
the central role played by human action and consciousness (Long, 1992). 
2.2.3 Intervention and technology 
In many interventions, new technologies are introduced to bring changes in the 
existing situation. Technology is defined 'as the production and use of artefacts, and 
artefacts as materials altered through human agency' (Feibleman, 1982). The 
development and application of technology is a socio-technical process as it involves 
human interaction with infrastructure. The technology includes the material and 
equipment needed for construction. The other aspect of the technology is the 
intellectual as well as managerial, organisational, administrative and economic 
arrangements needed for the use and maintenance of the system. Intellectual, 
material and institutional elements are the constitutive parts of any technology 
(Swantz, 1989). Several different technologies may require to be combined together to 
take advantage from the introduction of new technology. For example intervention 
in irrigation needs to take into account the agricultural technology and its social and 
organisational dimensions as well. Therefore, the technology needs to be viewed in a 
broader social context of its social use, social construction and social effects 
(Mollinga, 1998) which is significant for the success of any technology in relation to 
its acceptance by the people. 
The actors could influence the change process by acceptance, rejection or through 
modification of the technology introduced, or reduction of resources allocated for 
technical intervention. The cultural differences between the external agents and the 
actors will have an effect on the transfer and adoption of technology and the control 
of resources. Therefore, the success of any technology developed and disseminated 
by the government depends on participation of people. Further there needs to be a 
snared view among the individuals at different levels of organisation who are 
engaged in planned intervention. The success of intervention is measured in terms of 
the benefits it provides to all the people. 
2.2.4 Intervention and participation 
Dusseldorp (1993:48-49) views participation as the realisation of the common goal by 
the set of individuals and the group through the formation of a 'communal linking 
loop'. He discusses various forms of participation. It could be direct and complete or 
indirect and partial. The size of the group may influence the forms of participation. 
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The smaller the group the more direct and complete can be the participation. Besides, 
involvement in the community activities is also based on customary participation. 
The necessary conditions for the participation are that the people concerned have to 
organise themselves, they control the resources and make decisions for the use of 
resources at their disposal (Gow and Vansant, 1983) for realising the goal. But at the 
same time participatory technology development and its implementation entail 
accountability among the actors involved in it (Ashby and Sperling, 1994:756). 
Participation in government-implemented programmes is often related to the 
material or labour contribution from the people but not on the control over the entire 
resources and the decision making for its use. Low participation in resource 
contribution (Chand, 1994) has been found in the government-designed and -
implemented programme due to the processes applied in it. While interventions are 
often used as a means to link people and state (Vincent, 1995:130), this does not mean 
that participation is present. 
The knowledge of local culture and the commitment of the people for personal 
investment and assurance of benefit are required to stimulate increased participation 
of the local people. Individuals are by and large motivated by personal benefit and 
they try to maximise it. But their activities have to conform to the norms set by the 
community, which is regulated by various sanctions applied by the community. 
Nevertheless, conformity to those norms is dependent on weighing of benefits to 
costs. This is one of the reasons why an individual is always keeping open his option 
to remain in the institution or to leave it. This is of importance for continuing the 
activities of the institution. In essence, any intervention programme should take into 
account the likely effect on role, rules, authority structure, and decision making of an 
existing institution and community. 
Participation is translated in the form of role expectation and its performance, 
which requires a defined authority structure between the institutions, and within the 
institutions (Bagadion and Korten, 1985). Classification of the activities each 
individual and each institution are supposed to carry out will delineate the authority 
among them. This will reflect the domain of the power among institutions and 
among individuals. This sort of delineation is possible through the interaction of the 
people involved. 
2.2.5 Intervention and knowledge 
The nature of interaction between multiple knowledge systems determines the 
outcomes of innovation. Basically, it is the utilisation of knowledge and skills of the 
people to be affected, which requires greater interaction between local people and 
outside agency. Appropriate studies for the analysis of existing situations and the 
discussion with the actors to find out their perspectives and what they want are 
important aspects for successful technological interventions, which are often multiple 
in nature. The approach followed in the development and transfer of technology is 
influenced by exchange of knowledge that takes place between the people from 
different cultural settings. Actors in that set up are seen as active participants or 
passive recipients, in other words whether use is made of their knowledge or not, 
outside intervention determines whether the approach is 'top down' or 'bottom up'. 
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That is crucial for the success or failure for the transfer of technology. Studies (Van 
der Zaag, 1992 and Paudyal, 1994) have shown that actors used to disregard the 
arrangement created by the introduction of a new technology if it is against their 
interest and they will develop new arrangements that will lead to the solution of 
their problems. One of the implications of this finding is that introduction of a new 
technology may create new problems instead of solving existing problems if local 
processes are not understood properly. 
2.2.6 Intervention and agency 
Agency is used here to mean a government agency such as Department of irrigation 
(DOI). The intervention policies and strategies of government agencies are dynamic 
in nature. Consequently, there have been changes in government policies and 
programmes. The current emphasis is on promoting the self-help capabilities of the 
people while confining the state's role to facilitator. This shift in focus at present is 
due to the emphasis on the reduced role of the government in order to cut the costs 
and to make clients more responsible towards their development. Besides, the 
proliferation of multiple agencies providing support at the local level and the 
changes in the local government and agencies have created new space in their 
interaction with the people thereby changing the role of the government in the 
development activities. The change in the role of the state in the development 
programme however, is recognised as the process of démocratisation and local 
empowerment (Vandergeest, 1991). 
The differences in the intervention policies and strategies among the agencies 
involved in development intervention could be observed at two levels. The first is 
within the agency and the second is across the agencies. The changes within the 
agencies were found in terms of the programme focus, in which special programmes 
are designed by targeting a special group of people. The other is more general in 
nature, which is applied without any focus on a specific target group. Thus, in recent 
years various implementation strategies were applied to promote self-help. The 
variations in the intervention strategies within and across the agencies have a 
differential impact in the output as reported by Shivakoti (1992) in the study of 
intervention in FMIS in Nepal. This is because, the programmes had different 
requirements in terms of resource contribution, rules in its application and the policy 
requirement to be demand driven. Moreover the crucial factor was the interface 
between the community and the agency and how these shaped the formation of a 
linking loop at the local level. That would have implications in the design and 
implementation of the intervention. 
2.2.7 Intervention and project environment 
The environment in which it is operating influences the outcomes of development 
projects. Dusseldorp (1993:27) has identified four sets of environments- economic, 
social and cultural; institutional, political and legal; physical and ecological and 
technological. Thus, the present emphasis by the government on development 
projects which are designed to achieve specific objectives in a given period of time 
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are also influenced by these environments. However, depending upon the project 
environment these could be further categorised into controlled environment, 
influencing environments and appreciated environments (Smith et al., 1981 cited in 
Wield, 1999:36). The government's role at present is viewed as to create an enabling 
environment for the clients to take up their own activities. In this context, Thomas, 
(1999) however, has presented a balanced view. He argues that the prime objective of 
a development programme should be successful completion of tasks at hand, which 
requires a mix of both 'command and control' and 'empowerment and enabling' 
environments. 
2.3 Institutions 
We can find variation in the definition of the term 'institution' as used by different 
writers but we can see some commonality in the usage of the term. Some definitions 
of 'institution' will help in finding these commonalties and identifying the 
ingredients of an institution. 
An institution is the rules actually used (rules-in-use or working rules) by a set of 
individuals to organise repetitive activities that produce outcomes affecting those 
individuals and potentially affecting others (E. Ostrom, 1990 cited in Tang and E. 
Ostrom, 1993). 
An institution is also defined as complexes of norms and behaviour that persist 
overtime by serving collectively valued purposes. Meaning that an institution is a 
combination of roles, rules, procedures, a practice, and a system of relations (Uphoff, 
1986a). 
An institution is "... an enduring, complex, integrated, organised, behaviour 
pattern through which social control is exerted and by means of which fundamental 
social desires and needs are met". (Fairchild, 1955 cited in Dusseldorp, 1993:56) 
These definitions emphasise different elements of institutions as rules constituted 
in a group requiring a complex of practices and control. Besides, these definitions 
discuss the performance of the role by an individual and the rules that regulate 
actions of the individuals/groups. The action is always guided by the role expected 
by other members of the community and one is judged by the performance 
associated with the role. Coward (1985) opines that this role expectation and role 
performance are the institutional and organisational dimensions respectively which 
are regulated by the rules. It has to be realised that institutions are not functioning in 
a vacuum. Changes in the political environment and opening up of the villages are 
changing the strength of social control, which is of great importance for the 
functioning of the institutions. The well functioning institutions will have greater 
control on the use of the resources and its distribution. 
It can be said that an individual's role performance is based on his social 
construction of reality. Social construction of reality may differ among individuals 
and among groups also. It is also influenced by the knowledge they acquire through 
various means. One of the means to acquire it is through the interaction and dialogue 
between specific actors and it involves aspects of control, authority and power that 
are embedded in social relationships (Long and Villareal, 1994). The knowledge one 
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2.4 Institutions, organisations and the process of irrigation 
A number of researchers have developed conceptual frameworks for the study of 
institutions and organisations involved in the delivery of irrigation water. These 
enable the study of rules and practices in the different areas of irrigation water 
management, particularly for governance and property rights developed to ensure 
access to water, execution of management tasks and the control needed for assured 
water delivery. These concepts are presented here as a means to identify particular 
has and his construction of reality may have significant influence on the interaction 
pattern among the people, which ultimately will affect the performance of the 
institution through decision making at various points. 
Institutions could be classified into two types: formal and informal. A government 
agency is a formal institution as it has rules, which are officially laid down in a 
written form. Farmers' institutions could be both formal and informal. An institution, 
which has written rules, is termed as formal, whereas an institution, which does not 
have written rules, is an informal institution. In general, government-recognised 
institutions are formal. In many of the informal institutions the rules are not in 
written form but they are practised for a long period of time. They serve as a rule in 
their day to day interaction. 
Another important aspect of the definition is legitimacy, which is acquired 
through the recognition of its authority. The organisation needs some sort of 
authority to enforce the rules. (Freeman and Lowdermilk, 1985; Bagadion and 
Korten, 1985). Authority not in a legal sense but of acceptability from its members is 
required and which becomes a practice (Curtis, 1991) among its members. 
In the process of transfer and adoption of technology, the various institutional 
dimensions that it may encompass need to be considered. Need may arise for the 
creation of new institutions or existing institutions have to be adjusted to facilitate 
the introduction of a new technology. The important thing to take into account is the 
institutional capability required to manage the technology, which encompasses levels 
of knowledge, skills and cultural practices of the people concerned besides specific 
task demands of keeping technology operational. Institutions are not only shaped by 
operational needs and tasks but also by preferences on organisation and financial 
arrangements, which also shape the linking loop. 
Long (1977) opines that the success of the government intervention programme 
for building local institutions lies in democratic participation and self determination 
by the people concerned, whereas increased participation by bureaucrats and party 
officials will hinder the development of community or organisations. Increased 
involvement of the people in the affairs affecting them will also help in distributing 
the benefits more evenly among the participants provided it takes place in a true 
democratic context and under honest leadership. From the discussions however, it 
becomes clear that the formation and strengthening the capability of the local 
institutions can create the social capital1 for the common good. New organisations 
create new roles and networks. They demand new skills, but training can also give 
local actors new skills. These all affect the linking loop. 
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areas of possible institutional change in the irrigation systems studied, their 
relationship with the intervention process and particular features of the linking loops 
involved in the intervention. 
2.4.1 Governance and property rights 
Ostrom (1992) provides an analytical framework of institutions for governance of 
irrigation systems, with three nested sets of rules which are necessary for the 
effective functioning of the irrigation system (Kiser and E. Ostrom, 1982 cited by 
Ostrom, 1992:44-45). The operational rules govern the daily use of water, monitoring 
the activities of others and rewards and sanctions for the combination of action and 
outcomes. Collective choice rules confirm how schemes should be operated and 
managed. Constitutional choice rules determine who is able to participate in a scheme 
and who will draw up the operational and collective choice rules. Ostrom (1992:67-
78) also has identified several conditions for long enduring irrigation systems. These 
include: a clearly denned set of users with shared cost and benefit, equal 
participation in the decision making; proper monitoring of the behaviour of the 
members and an effective sanction procedure applied from within the group; and 
minimal external intervention in the design of the rules. The formulation and 
implementation of these rules could be formal or informal but they are essential. 
However, the external intervention in an irrigation system may bring changes in the 
formulation and implementation of these rules. One of the likely causes of the 
changes in these rules could be due to the change in the property rights in an 
irrigation system. 
These governance rules are often related with the property rights governing access 
to water. Studies have looked at the nature of rights (whether water rights may be 
owned, and inherited or sold, or be rights of use only) and how they can materialise. 
The concept of 'hydraulic property rights' as developed by Coward (1977) has been 
found operating in many farmer-managed irrigation systems, where rights to use 
infrastructure and receive water are related to the contribution made in construction 
and/or maintenance of a system. The rights are expressed in terms of access to the 
use of resources, which is specified in terms of water quantity and also responsibility 
towards maintenance of the system (Martin, Yoder and Groenfeldt, 1986). In most of 
the cases the right over use of water belongs to those who have invested in its 
development. However, other forms of tenure found in irrigation systems are 
discussed in Vincent 2(1995). From the study of traditional irrigation systems in India, 
Coward (1990) observed that shared property rights among the users provide social 
glue for operating and sustaining the hydraulic works and patterns of distributing 
water to different users. Cowards' work triggered interest in the responsiveness of 
irrigation to change. Dani and Siddiqui (1987) suggest irrigation institutions do 
respond to economic change and externalities, but this change will usually reflect 
underlying property arrangements and pre-existing institutions. Thus external 
interventions might only succeed to the extent that they build on existing 
institutions. Lack of due consideration to these aspects could increase dependence on 
government resources, alienate users from the system and weaken the traditional 
organisation and affect equity (Chand, 1994:26; Curtis, 1991:122-123) due to the 
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changes in property right and the tasks carried out by the users (Vincent op cit). 
Thus, the development assistance needs to take into account the complexities of local 
institutions, as it may affect the institutional practices (Ambler, 1989) pertaining to 
the water right. Thus, protecting the right of the old users and guaranteeing the right 
of new users, who have formed 'communal linking loop' to access external resources 
is important in achieving the objective of intervention. These changes in the roles and 
status entail a new set of behaviour by the actors, which is dependent on 
enforcement of rules, which requires social control. The degree of social control 
exercised by the community is affected by homogeneity of the group and existing 
social structure and the power relations within it. 
Farmer's concern over water rights may have implications in the implementation 
of the programme and realisation of stated objectives of intervention in terms of 
inclusion of new users and expansion of irrigated area. The objective of the 
government may not coincide with the objective of the farmers. For instance present 
users may be reluctant to include new members as it may affect their use of water 
and control over it. Thus, it is interesting to note whether the government via the 
intervention will facilitate consolidation of farmers' right over the water or will try to 
take control of water in its own hand. As Coward (1990) has pointed out government 
interventions in existing irrigation networks are not likely to be successful if they 
attempt to erode rather than enhance the existing water rights. Benda-Beckmann et al 
(1997) reported that the old users felt that their interests and rights were not 
considered during the rehabilitation of an irrigation system in Nepal. 
The security of the system's water rights may vary from system to system. In some 
cases, the community of users may have the sole right over water sources. However, 
in many cases the users of a water source may be from more than one irrigation 
systems. If more than one community is using the same source there must exist some 
rules for the allocation of water so that the each system obtain their fair share of 
water. In such cases, the water may have to be divided at the source itself. Irrigation 
institutions have to represent the water users to obtain their share of water, which 
may include proving their right to use from that source and obtaining a fair share. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the users of down stream irrigation system have been 
able to establish their right due to the opportunity provided by new intervention. 
This was largely because they were able to obtain government resources before the 
intervention in up stream irrigation system by influencing government decision 
making through their linkages at government bureaucracy. This could have 
implications in terms of irrigation tasks as mentioned below. 
2.4.2 Management of irrigation tasks 
Uphoff (1986b) described irrigation as a 'socio-technical process', where both human 
and physical aspects interact continually and profoundly. Uphoff studied 
management of irrigation systems in three dimensions, which was based on group 
actions performing important irrigation tasks. These were actions related to: the 
control structure (design, construction, operation and maintenance), water use activities 
(acquisition, allocation, distribution, drainage), and organisational activities (decision 
making, resource mobilisation, communication and conflict resolution). 
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Institutional arrangements are necessary in order to accomplish irrigation tasks. 
But the preferences for the institution are subjective to the local group. Some 
irrigation systems have a formal organisational structure whereas others have 
informal structures to enforce the institutional arrangement of irrigation practices. 
Studies have revealed that area covered by an irrigation system has direct effects on 
the type of organisational structure. The larger the area coverage the more formal a 
structure it would be and vice versa (Martin and Yoder, 1987). However, some sort of 
organisational structure does exist in any irrigation system. Organisations may exist 
at different levels or there could be tiers of these organisations. Organisations exist 
within the group of farmers and across the group of farmers within an irrigation 
system. However, there could be one single organisation (institution added) at the 
apex of all (Coward, 1979; Pradhan, 1989a). 
Government agency's involvement in the form of financial and technical support 
to indigenously managed irrigation systems requires also a process of institutional 
building or institutional strengthening. Institution building implies creation of new 
institutions according to the need perceived by the government agency at the cost of 
existing ones. Supporting the existing institutions or tiansforming them to cope with 
the new situation is institutional strengthening. The organisation of irrigation 
systems however, involves negotiation and co-ordination, which has been described 
as a transaction cost (van Steenbergen, 1997:26-27). Thus, the changes in the 
institutional arrangement will also affect the transaction cost. Therefore, adherence to 
the new institutional arrangement by the user will depend on the transaction cost 
and the likely benefit from it. Nevertheless, the benefit from the change should 
exceed the cost in order to encourage the user to invest in institutional change (van 
Steenbergen, op cit.). In this context, acceptance of farmers' institutions as a resource 
for better management of irrigation systems is necessary to achieve the expected 
output from technological and financial intervention. Thus, intervention should take 
into account the institutional strength of farmers managed irrigation systems. 
Uphoff's three-dimension analysis has a particular utility for studying the inter-
relationships between different dimensions, to show how technology may be related 
to management. However, the purpose of this study is to look more at the 
institutions and practices, which allow the process of irrigation water delivery to take 
place. For this reason, the following areas of task execution are selected for further 
study. 
Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 
This refers to the securing of water rights for the system within the allocation across 
the catchment, and the building of intake and the system capable to supply water to 
the plants. System development consists of construction of headwork, canals and the 
field channels capable of supplying water reliably, with an allocation of water 
accepted by all other affected users in the catchment. Basically the topography, water 
requirement, water availability and water rights all shape this development. The 
technology involved in these constructions may vary from system to system due to 
variations in design choices (Vincent, 1995:115) which also shapes the management 
requirements of an irrigation system. It means the size of the system, topography to 
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be covered and the number of users it has to serve will have an effect on system 
development. 
The physical infrastructure e. g. the headwork, the canals and the field channels of 
a system may be permanent constructions. The components may also be temporary 
constructions, which have to be maintained regularly. This determines the activities 
to be carried out in a year or seasonally. This will greatly affect the operation and 
maintenance of the system and resource mobilisation for it. The physical structure, 
particularly the headwork of most hill irrigation systems is of temporary nature as 
the resources available to the farmers may not be sufficient to construct a permanent 
weir. Consequently, farmers have to put more resources in its maintenance 
seasonally. 
The area under irrigation and types of crop and cropping calendar determines the 
water demand in an irrigation system. However, the water delivery and its use are 
determined by the supply (availability) of water in the catchment. The difference in 
the supply and the demand could be one of the reasons for the occurrence of 
disputes as there could be some scarcity in supply and inequitable distribution of 
water across the system. One of the strong arguments behind any intervention 
programme is to raise the production and productivity through improved supply of 
water thereby making more water available for use to the system. However, the 
performance criteria of the agency and the farmer may be different. This in essence 
requires understanding the local conditions and opinion of the users to come to an 
appropriate design. This will help in mobilising local resources for system 
development and its continued operation. 
In the past FMIS have devised their own set of rules for the system water 
allocation, installation of technology and use of resources. Differences can be 
observed due to the size and location of the system, the number of users the system 
has, the distance of the water source, and whether there is only one source or 
whether there are multiple sources of obtaining water. This determines the nature of 
the work and the resources required. These arrangements are often changed by 
interventions (Vincent, 1995:99). 
User allocation, system operation and water distribution 
This refers to dividing and distributing the water available in the system to its users. 
Bringing water from the source involves a lot of work, which an individual may not 
be capable of doing on his own. For this task group action is required and it is the 
institutional arrangements which mobilises the individual members for this task, 
without which the task of obtaining water for the irrigation system through regular 
or extraordinary means is not possible (K.C. and Pradhan, 1992). The primary work 
in any irrigation system is to obtain water from its source for the distribution to 
plants in fields. 
The role of institutions is to establish rights, allocate and to distribute water to its 
members. The allocation and distribution could be based on the share purchased by 
the user, in proportion to the area to be irrigated and through special arrangements 
in periods of scarcity. The arrangements made by the institution to allocate and 
distribute water could be formal or informal. The role of an institution is to ensure 
that all members follow the agreed rules. The larger the system, the more complex 
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arrangements it would have. This means there could be tiers of organisations within 
an institution. 
The abundance or scarcity of water also determines the tasks of these institutions. 
Also, the relative importance of tasks of resource mobilisation and maintenance, 
versus secure delivery of water supplies, also shapes water management 
organisations (Parajuli, 1999). Studies (Martin and Yoder, 1987) of various FMIS in 
Nepal have shown that in irrigation systems where water supply is abundant 
institutions may not have a formal organisation, but when there is water scarcity the 
involvement of these institutions in water distribution increases which demands a 
more formal organisation. This is largely due to the necessity to enforce rules. 
Further, irrigation water has a seasonal importance. This means that farmers would 
like to ensure that they receive adequate water and in time. The arrangement is 
particularly required to address the problem of tail enders who are always at the 
disadvantage when there is scarcity of water which could be the source of conflicts 
(Uphoff, 1986b). Thus, the institution plays an important role in applying rules to 
ensure that the user receives adequate amounts of water on time, and the system 
stays functional. This is necessary to avoid conflicts among users. Thus, the 
operational and institutional complexities (Vincent, 1995:116) determine the 
management requirement which is fundamental to maintain the processes by which 
resources are allocated and distributed among the members, and this is of 
importance in the design of intervention programmes. 
Conflict management 
Broadly speaking, conflicts can be categorised into three groups in an irrigation 
system. They are: conflicts between irrigation systems, conflicts between water users 
within a system and conflicts between the water users and the agency concerned. The 
first type of conflict is about rights over the source of water. The second type of 
conflict arises when the needs of individuals or groups of farmers are not addressed 
properly. The third type of conflict may arise due to conflicting goals or interests of 
the water users and agency concerned. The agency's concern could be efficiency in 
water distribution and minimising water losses whereas the farmers' concern could 
be unhindered access to water without any concern over water losses. 
However, irrespective of the type of conflict, there will be institutions developed 
for the specific goal of managing conflicts and they may change with the nature and 
level of conflict. 'Legal pluralism'3, which refers to existence and use of a mix of state 
law and customs and conventions, is often applied for the resolution of conflicts by 
these institutions depending on the type and intensity of conflict. Internal conflict in 
most of the cases will be resolved based on the 'convention and customs', whereas 
the external4 conflict resolution may be through the state. For the resolution of 
internal conflicts generally, rules are developed and applied by the institution 
created by its members. The rules could be either in a written form or simply based 
on customary practices. Each individual as a member of the group is expected to 
conform to group rules. Also, the institution possesses power rendered to it by the 
members of the group, which it can enforce in mamtaining the rules. It can also 
enforce sanctions to make one conform to the group rules. It can manage conflicts 
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occurring outside the system through the strength of the group so that the access to 
water is ensured. 
The situation of conflict may occur primarily due to the scarcity of water for which 
there are several competing parties. Conflict or dispute management by the 
institution is an attempt to solve the problems so that the institution can achieve ends 
approved by its members. 
An institution cannot be created without the involvement of the individuals in a 
group and without the association of groups. Common interest and protection of 
individual rights are two important factors for bringing people together. 
Resource mobilisation 
Resources are necessary to make an irrigation system function effectively. In most 
FMIS resources are mobilised internally while some irrigation systems obtain 
resources from external sources also. One of the functions of these institutions is to 
determine how much resources are required and how to generate them (Pradhan, 
1989a). The types of internal resources mobilised are mainly cash and labour. In 
times of great calamities external resources are necessary which include cash, 
material and technical support. Beside cash and labour, other resources are also 
necessary to operate and maintain the system if required and to pay people involved 
in water distribution if necessary. Collection of forest products like trunks and 
bushes and mobilisation of local expertise are also part of resource mobilisation. 
Also these institutions establish linkages with outside agencies and external 
resources are mobilised. The type of external resource mobilisation may consist of 
available technical services and direct financial support. External sources could be 
from government offices at district or national level, NGOs and donors, who could 
support the institutions to manage and improve the irrigation system. Reliance on 
external support also depends on the nature of technology used and the size of the 
system. External resources are sought when internal resources are inadequate or 
major rehabilitation works are to be carried out requiring financial and technical 
inputs, which are beyond the means of the farmers. 
System maintenance 
Maintenance is an integral part of any irrigation system. Maintenance is affected by 
the size, agro-ecological factors like topography and climate, and the technology 
used in the system. Those who have exclusive rights on the use of water contribute 
for the regular and emergency maintenance. However, in case of emergency 
maintenance the other users, who do not have exclusive rights may be called upon 
for help and external help also may be sought. However, the participation in 
emergency maintenance does not guarantee the rights for the use of water (Benda-
Beckmann et al, 1997:233). Institutions in an irrigation system mobilise required 
resources for system maintenance. The maintenance of the system could be 
categorised as follows: 
• Regular maintenance 
• Emergency maintenance 
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Regular Maintenance 
In an irrigation system regular maintenance is necessary. Farmers get involved 
collectively in the maintenance of headwork, canals, field channels and bunds before 
the start of the cropping season. The task of maintenance is divided among the users' 
groups and individuals within the group. The tasks to be carried out by groups are 
regulated under certain rules. The structure of the institution whether it is formal or 
informal plays an active role in assigning the tasks to individuals and groups. The 
work is also divided on the basis of sex in Nepal. Usually, women are assigned the 
weeding of the canal and other less hazardous tasks, whereas men are assigned 
complex tasks like headwork maintenance. This is because the work requires more 
physical strength and may require work far from the house or from the village. 
Emergency Maintenance 
Emergency maintenance is required when the system is damaged by natural 
calamities like floods or landslides. In this situation it is the institution which assigns 
the tasks needed to repair the damaged part. The institution takes into consideration 
the resources required to maintain the system and decisions regarding task 
assignment. Some individuals in the group may be more knowledgeable and may 
possess the skill to carry out certain activities. These factors are also considered while 
assigning the tasks. Often the mobilisation of external resources by the institution is 
necessary. The vulnerable systems often incorporate a process where farmers or 
water guards check the system daily and inform the users when maintenance is 
required. 
2.4.3 Water control 
Mollinga (1998) further developed the concept of irrigation as a socio-technical 
process, whose processes and outcomes could be studied through the social 
construction, social conditions of use and social impacts. Technological intervention 
can also be studied through this framework. He also employs the concept of control 
as a means to study irrigation processes in their wider context. In this perspective the 
three dimensions of water control - technical control, organisational control and 
socio-economic and political control (Mollinga, 1998:25-30) are significant for the 
understanding of the complexities of irrigation development and its management in 
the context of interventions in farmer-managed irrigation systems. The technical 
control refers to the manipulating and mastering of physical processes, 
organisational control refers to the commanding-managing of people's behaviour 
and the socio-economic and political control refers to the domination of people ('s 
labour) and regulation of social processes. The changes in the physical structure by 
intervention programmes through the use of a new technology and financial 
resources could be viewed as the politico-administrative control of the water 
resources as it entails redistribution of resources as deemed necessary by the 
government agency. As a result new linking loops will be formed between the 
agency and the users and other local institutions depending upon the mode of 
intervention. The changes in the physical structure and the redistribution of the 
resources due to the alteration in the physical layout and inclusion of new users 
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would alter the existing pattern of social behaviour in relation to irrigation 
management. Nevertheless, the competition for the access to and use of water 
resources may result in changes in the existing linking loops among the users after 
the intervention. The formation of new linking loops could result into either co-
operation or struggle among users, which could have both positive and negative 
effects on the existing irrigation institutions. 
In Nepal, the type of intervention, which had significant effect on control 
mechanisms, also affected the evolution of the irrigation institutions. The creation of 
an AMIS had wider implications in terms of technical, organisational, and socio-
economic and political control. This was largely due to the role of the agency, which 
is more embedded in terms of financial and organisational control in the 
management of AMIS. The financial and organisational control was necessitated by 
the technical control in place and the policy of the government at that time. At the 
same time the role of agency in the FMIS intervention was to facilitate functioning of 
the irrigation system through the introduction of appropriate technical and 
organisational control. However, the focus was more on technical control although 
stated government policy placed due importance to the organisational control. 
2.4.4 A framework to study irrigation processes and interventions in the hills of 
Nepal 
Based on the discussions in this section, the following set of activities is selected by 
the researcher for particular study in the field, as a framework to study the inter-
relation between intervention and change in institutions shaping irrigation processes 
i.e.: 
• water acquisition, system development and system allocation 
• water allocation, system operation and water distribution 
• conflict management 
• resource mobilisation 
• system maintenance 
• governance and property rights 
• relationships of control 
2.5 Research questions 
The focus of the study is on the actor involvement in intervention and the outcomes 
of government interventions on irrigation systems. The various initiatives used to get 
the intervention and related resources will be described and analysed. Also the effect 
on the irrigation institutions and their rules and power base is an issue. That is 
closely related with the communal linking loop that people have established inside 
and outside the institutions. The changes in property rights and the consequences for 
ownership feeling among the users will be examined because it has considerable 
consequences for the resource mobilisation necessary for the regular maintenance. 
That had led to the following research questions: 
CONCEPTS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 23 
1. What were the forms of intervention and what strategies were followed in the 
design and execution of public interventions in irrigation systems? 
2. What actors participated in the interventions, how, and what effect did they have 
on the outcomes? 
3. What institutional arrangements for irrigation emerged after the interventions and 
how were they different from former arrangements? 
4. What implications did the new institutional arrangements have on water 
management in practice? 
2.6 Methodology 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Broadly speaking there are five major research strategies (Yin, 1984) used in social 
science study. They are - experiments, surveys, archival analysis, histories and case 
studies. The choice of an appropriate strategy is largely determined by the nature of 
the study and the kind of information to be generated. The information to be 
acquired could be both qualitative and quantitative. Most of the information 
generated for this study was qualitative. Thus, the qualitative method was employed 
to receive information through case studies. The rationale for choosing this method is 
that it facilitates the interpretative study (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Yin, 1984). 
Various approaches in qualitative research have been discussed by different writers 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1989) and more particularly about the 
case study (Stake, 1994). Out of various approaches used in qualitative research the 
study combined both secondary and primary sources of information for the case 
studies. The case study approach was useful to understand complex social 
phenomena to answer the question of why and how (Yin, 1984) in relation to the 
effects of interventions on management practices of farmer-managed irrigation 
systems. 
The case study method has been increasingly used in the study of socio-technical 
characteristics. The importance of this method as discussed by Yin (1984:19-20) is: 
Case study is suitable in examining the contemporary events but when the relevant behaviour 
cannot be manipulated. ...it provides direct observation and systematic interviewing. Case 
studies' strength lies in its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence. 
Stake (1994) argues that case study is useful, if the object of the study is a specific, 
unique, bounded system, because a case study in itself is a process of learning and a 
product of learning. 
Since this study is of an evaluative nature, detailed study and analysis of many 
aspects of intervention in relation to institutions is essential, as there is a variation in 
the size, agrarian condition, technology, agro-ecological conditions and governance 
and management of each of the irrigation systems. Different actors and arenas came 
into the intervention process. Interventions had different impacts on each of the 
systems and gave actors different room for action. In-depth analysis of the intricacies 
involved in intervention and its effects were possible through this method. In 
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evaluative research the actors who are the supposed users of the programme have a 
major role to play in the outcome of the study which is different from the 
conventional approach of evaluation wherein the actors or users have little role to 
play (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). This is to emphasise the generation of information 
through the interaction of the researcher and the actors. The effort was on generating 
the broadest set of information in order to make in-depth analyses of the cases. 
One of the difficult tasks in developing a case study is to get people's confidence. 
Otherwise, there is every chance' of distortion of information. The researcher 
however, did not have much problems to persuade the community in giving 
information. Nevertheless, there was some difficulty in accessing the quantitative 
information due largely to the primitive way of record keeping by the agencies 
concerned. 
2.6.2 Unit of observation 
The units of observation in this study were four irrigation systems. Also the 
government officials at various levels who were involved in the design, planning and 
execution of the intervention programme in farmers-managed irrigation systems, 
individual farmers, groups of farmers, contractors and selected key informants were 
units of observation. 
2.6.3 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis of the irrigation systems consisted of the following: 
Irrigation Systems and Water Users' Association or Organisation involved and the 
intervention processes that took place in them. 
Since the intervention had effected changes in the irrigation system, the system as 
a whole was the unit of analysis. The analysis at this level emphasised the effect of 
intervention on the existing institutions of FMIS. 
The farmers groups at head, middle and tail end were other units of analyses in 
order to prepare micro level analyses to observe the changes produced by the 
intervention process within the group and across the group. This enabled the 
researcher to know how the farmers look at the intervention process and what 
changes it has brought. 
2.6.4 Methods and techniques of information generation 
The information collection during field work was through secondary materials, 
interviews, observation and various types of personal histories. The information 
from the field was supplemented by previous studies, official documents and 
personal experience. Survey and Rapid Appraisal methods were also used to 
generate area-specific and irrigation system-specific information. 
One of the issues to be addressed in this study was to obtain information related 
to significant events that occurred during the process of intervention. For this, 
information was collected from multiple sources. 
CONCEPTS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 25 
Secondary data 
Information from official documents with respect to the irrigation systems from the 
government agencies concerned was obtained through desk-top study. This method 
was also useful in the collection of information from the records kept by the users 
such as minutes and the decisions or resolutions on different aspects of irrigation 
management e.g. resource mobilisation and conflict resolution. 
Personal observation 
The information on the functioning of the irrigation system, and existing status of the 
physical system of irrigation was recorded through personal observation. The 
physical system was observed by walking from the headwork to the tail end and the 
field channels. This method was useful to look into the different practices of the 
farmers in carrying out the irrigation activities. 
Interviews 
Interviews with the project officials, individual farmers and groups of farmers and 
contractors were the major source of information on different aspects of irrigation 
systems. A checklist was used for this purpose. However, some of the discussions 
were unstructured. The researcher however, was unable to talk to all the officials 
who were involved in the execution of the intervention due to the time lag between 
the intervention and the research study. Instead, the information collection was 
supplemented by talking to the officials who were involved in intervention in other 
schemes. Information was also obtained through key informants. 
Water users' organisation (WUO)5 and farmers 
The members of WUO were the major source of information. Almost all the members 
of the users' group shared information, which centred on the interface situation 
between farmers and the government officials and among the farmers. The emphasis 
was on how these interfaces affected various aspects of decision making processes 
and decisions taken. The implication of these decisions on different aspects of 
management of irrigation systems was also looked into. Their knowledge about 
government policy and the processes applied in the intervention, who started 
intervention, their interest in the intervention, what was their intention in having 
intervention, when the intervention took place and their view on the situation after 
intervention were assessed. Besides, the farmers from head, middle and tail-end gave 
their opinion, which was useful in cross-checking information provided by various 
actors. Also, other respondents who did not have a direct stake in the irrigation 
system but could provide valuable information were also interviewed. 
Group interview 
Group interviews of the farmers were also held to cross-check the information 
provided by individual farmers and to generate additional information. 
Interviews with officials 
Government officials at different levels viz. Department of Irrigation, Regional 
Directorate and at district level provided information on the policy and objectives of 
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2.7 Method of analysis 
The analysis is mainly qualitative because the purpose of the study is to look into the 
complexities of human interaction at different levels, which requires interpretation of 
meaning assigned by different actors to a set of activities and its resultant effect in 
their daily and community life. The compilation of information is at two levels for 
the analysis. The first level analysis is at the canal reach (head, middle and tail) of 
individual systems and groups of farmers within that reach. Because of differences in 
agro-ecological conditions, the physical system and their requirements, the 
arrangement may be different at various levels. The second level analysis is at the 
system level. Special attention is paid to decision-making processes at various levels 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) have argued that the qualitative research, emphasises 
the processes and meanings that are not examined, or measured (if measured at all), 
in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. Whereas quantitative study 
intervention, selection criteria used for choosing of FMIS for intervention, processes 
followed in intervention, and their personal observation or reaction to the situation 
after the intervention. 
Rapid appraisal 
This method was used to generate background information about the system. This 
method was helpful in selecting appropriate irrigation systems for the study. This 
technique was used again but in more detail for the generation of background 
information after the site selection. The following information was collected using 
this rapid appraisal technique (Pradhan and Yoder 1987). 
- Area overview 
- History of the system 
- Description of the system 
- Operation and maintenance of the system 
- Institutions and project environment 
Process documentation of information 
The informal discussions and observations during field visits were recorded in the 
field diary. The information recorded were farmers' accounts of intervention 
processes and irrigation management tasks. That included water acquisition, water 
allocation/ distribution at different reaches of the system, resource mobilisation, 
operation and maintenance, conflict management and interaction pattern among the 
groups of farmers, as this information may not be available through the checklist. 
Histories 
The past history of irrigation systems was recorded through informal discussions 
with the knowledgeable persons in the community by taking their life history. Key 
informants in the community were identified to collect information on or about the 
system. 
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emphasises the measurement and analysis of casual relationships between variables 
but not processes. 
2.8 Selection of study area and sites 
The irrigation systems for the study were selected in the Western Development 
Region (WDR) of Nepal. The hills in the WDR have the second highest potential for 
the irrigation development (Table 2. 1) in the country (DOT 1997a) and have a high 
incidence of FMIS. This region has received the second highest priority for agency 
investment in relation to the total irrigated area also. Because of this, potential 
various intervention programmes such as The Hill Irrigation Project (HIP) of Asian 
Development Bank, Hill Food Production Project (HFPP), Irrigation Line of Credit 
(ILC) and National Irrigation Sector Project (NISP) of the World Bank were 
implemented in this area. This enabled to look into the intervention strategies of 
various programmes. 
Table 2.1: Irrigation in the hills by development regions (area in ha) 
Development Region Total irrigable Total irrigated Agency 
assistance 
Eastern 72,325 (19) 40,893 (56) 13,653 (33) 
Central 110,014 (30) 46,465 (42) 22,058 (47) 
Western 99,084 (27) 40,695 (41) 16,847 (41) 
Mid-western 50,962 (14) 24,919 (48) 6,331 (25) 
Far-western 36,156 (10) 10,993 (30) 4,256 (38) 
Total 368,541 (100) 163,965 (44) 63,145 (39) 
Other reasons for selecting this region were: 
a) This part of the country is relatively accessible. 
b) The topographical and environmental conditions of this area are suitable for the 
study of farmer-managed hill irrigation systems as many indigenously developed 
systems of varying sizes are found. There were examples of systems, which had 
been transformed from FMIS to AMIS by intervention. 
c) This region is not neglected in terms of government investment. Therefore, the 
effects of interventions could be observed. 
Based on the outcome of the Rapid Appraisal of ten irrigation systems, three FMIS 
and one AMIS were selected for the study. An agency system was selected as its 
development had incorporated part of one of these FMIS: thus AMIS also had an 
increasing level of farmer management. Of these four systems, two were river valley 
systems, and two were slope off-takes6. The river valley systems were close to the 
town and the main market centre of the districts. Whereas, the slope off-takes were 
within a distance of two hours from the market. Besides, the following criteria were 
applied in order to have a comparative analysis of systems having different 
management. 
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Table 2. 2: An overview of the irrigation systems 
Name of 
the system 
Location 
VDC/ 
district 
Irrigated 
area (ha) 
System 
type 
Management 
type 
Most recent 
intervention 
Cost in 
NRs 
(US$) 
million 
Most recent 
intervention 
Programme 
Chaurasi Hemja/ 
Kaski 
154 River 
valley 
FMIS 1998* 9.284 
(0.136) 
NISP 
Annapurna Hemja/ 
Kaski 
300 River 
valley 
AMIS 1983 10.41 
(0.147) 
HIP 
Ghachowk Ghachowk/ 
Kaski 
60 Slope off-
take 
FMIS 1991 3.368 
(0.049) 
ILC 
Tarkughat 
(Dhand and 
Birta Kulo) 
Tarkughat/ 
Lamjung 
6.0 Slope off-
take 
FMIS 1987 
and 1989 
0.715 
(0.010) 
HFP 
Note: The costs of the projects are converted into 1999 prices in US $ (exchange rate: US $ 1 = 
NRs 68.3). 
"The intervention in this irrigation system was going on in December 1998. 
Each of the sites had a history of receiving government assistance besides the 
intervention from major programmes. Besides, both agency-managed irrigation 
system (AMIS) and the FMIS are operating in the region. The scheme selected under 
HIP is an AMIS, whereas other three are FMIS. This enabled the researcher to select 
at from the irrigation systems implemented and rehabilitated under each of these 
different programmes (see table 2). The intervention strategies applied were also 
different. The irrigation schemes under HIP were bigger in terms of command area 
(more than 200 ha). The scheme selected Annapurna, was a new construction 
implemented by DOI by taking over part of the FMIS and its management is under 
DOI. However, the users of the schemes are taking interest in its management since 
1992. The improvement of minor irrigation schemes on a participatory basis was part 
of the project under HFPP along with other agricultural support services. Thus, the 
selected scheme was small and the farmers played greater role during its 
improvement. The other two schemes were less than two hundred ha and 
modernisation works were implemented under more participatory approach in the 
programmes. Thus, the region was ideal for the study to look into the variation in the 
intervention strategies of different programmes. 
a) The schemes selected for the study were less than 40 ha and more than 200 ha. 
b) The most recent technical intervention of the irrigation systems was different, 
which can be due to the differences in the agro-ecology, indigenous knowledge 
and intervention strategies. These can be stated as follows: 
• Improvement of the system with a participatory approach of intervention -
Tarkughat (HFPP). 
• Rehabilitation of the system and its management with a participatory 
approach - Ghachowk (ILC) and Chaurasi (NISP). 
• Completely new construction with a higher level of technology without a 
participatory Approach- Annapurna (HP) . 
c) All the sites were close to the motorable road for reason of accessibility. 
An overview of the cases are presented below in Table 2. 2 and the locations of study 
are presented in Figure 2 .1 . 
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Figure 2 .1 : Location of irrigation systems selected for the detailed study 
2.9 Execution of the Research 
The field study was conducted during the period April 1996 to June 1998 including 
several follow-up visits after the intitial information collection. At first the researcher 
visited the area to identify the potential irrigation systems. Two systems were 
selected initially. The studies in two systems were carried out simultaneously as they 
were at a distance of one hour. During the study period the researcher made frequent 
visits to the area and stayed at least fifteen days in each visit. The period when the 
researcher was not staying in the area was used in Kathmandu for processing the 
information in the computer and the collection of the secondary information from the 
agencies concerned. The draft write up of the case studies for the two systems was 
completed before the selection of the other two systems. The same processes were 
followed in the study of the remaining two systems also. After the completion of the 
field study, the draft case study reports were revised and work on other chapters 
were completed during the period May 1998 to January 1999. 
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Notes 
1 Is defined as the aspects of the structure of relationships between individuals that enable 
them to create new values (Coleman, 1988 cited by Ostrom, 1992:13). 
2 These include conferred tenure and claimed tenure. 
3 For a detailed discussion on 'Legal pluralism' see Franz von Benda-Beckmann (1997). 
4 External conflict refers to the conflict with people, groups and institutions outside the 
irrigation system. 
5 They are also known as Water Users Association, Water Users Society and Users 
Committee (UC). Usually there is more than one organisation in large irrigation systems. The 
federation of these organisations is called Water Users Association or Water Users 
Organisation, which refers to the higher level of organisation. Only one organisation is found 
in most of small irrigation systems. They are called UC. The use of these terms is presented 
according to their use in official documents and research reports cited in this study. 
However, the government recognises them as UC. 
6 The former has the entire command area within the same valley as off-take, whereas the 
water is conveyed from the streams at a distance across and down slope in the latter. 
3. An overview of the country and its development policies 
3.1 The country and the study area 
An overview of the country in general with a focus on geographical and socio-
economic characteristics is presented in this chapter. An attempt is also made to 
provide a glimpse of the two districts where the case studies were conducted. The 
purpose is to provide the reader macro- and meso-level information that has 
relevance to the cases. Besides, a review of the various development policies with 
emphasis on agriculture and irrigation development is presented in this chapter. 
3.1.1 Location 
Agro-ecologically the country is divided into three regions namely, the mountain 
region, hills and the terai. The resource availability and their uses are different in 
these regions, which dominate the production regime and the livelihood of the 
people (Metz, 1989). The land use pattern of the country is presented in the Table 3. 
1. 
Table 3 .1 : Distribution of land use in Nepal 
Land use Area (%) 
1. Agricultural land (cultivated) 20.1 
2. Agricultural land (uncultivated) 6.7 
3. Forest (including Shrub) 42.8 
4. Pasture land 11.9 
5. Others 18.5 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1997 
The elevation of the country varies between 60 m in the south-east corner and about 
8,848 m high, at Mt Everest, locally known as Sagarmatha, in the North. As a result of 
the wide altitudinal variations within such a small area, the country has extreme 
variations in physiography and agro-ecology. 
In Nepal, climatic conditions vary from freezing cold in the high Himalayas to 
sweltering heat in the Terai. Mainly altitude and its resulting aspects are responsible 
for such a wide range of climatic conditions. Shrestha (1992) notes that the mean 
temperature decreases by 5.5 degree Celsius for every 1,000 m rise in altitude. Based 
on altitude, Carson et al (1986a) categorised Nepal into five climatic zones ( 
Table 3. 2). 
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Table 3 .2 : Relationship between elevation and climatic zones in Nepal 
Altitude "from mean sea level Climatic zone Mean annual air temp 
(metres) (in degrees Celsius) 
Less than 1000 Sub-tropical 2 0 - 2 5 
1000-2000 Warm temperate 1 5 - 2 0 
2000-3000 Cool temperate 10 -15 
3000-4500 Sub-alpine, alpine 3 - 1 0 
Greater than 4500 Arctic-like less than 3 
About 80 per cent of the annual rainfall in the county occurs during four months 
(June-September) due to the summer monsoon. The summer monsoon advances 
from east to west and withdraws west to east. Thus the duration and the amount of 
the summer rainfall decreases from east to west. The average annual rainfall in the 
eastern parts of the country is about 1,736 millimetres (mm), while its value in the 
west is about 1,440 mm. 
The east-west aligned mountains also create localised effects on the annual 
rainfall. In some parts of the country, slight rain shadows occur in the North of the 
Mahabharat mountain range, while the high Himalayas obstruct the entire monsoon 
and create complete rain shadows to their north. Three of the case study sites were in 
sub-tropical climatic zone and one site was on warm temperate climatic zone. 
3.1.2 Population, ethnicity and religion 
The population of Nepal for 1998 was estimated at 21.84 million. Out of this, 90.8 
percent live in the rural areas. The population distribution over the regions are 7.8 
percent, 45.5 percent and 46.7 percent in the mountains, hills and the terai regions 
respectively (CBS, 1998). The average annual growth rate of the population during 
the period 1981 to 1991 was 2.5 percent. 
The majority of the populations (86.5 percent) are Hindu followed by Buddhist 
(Z8 percent). Other religions practised in the country are Islam, Christian, Jain and 
others. The country is multi-racial with various ethnic groups and languages. The 
caste structure in the country is based on the Hindu mythology, according to which 
the population is divided into four caste groups. They are Brahmins, Chhetri, Vaisya 
and Sudra. Originally the caste division was based on the occupation. Later on it 
became hereditary and the caste structure is rigid, although formally abolished by 
the Muluki Ain (civil code) of the 1963. The rigidity is more prevalent in the rural 
areas. The upper castes' control over the economic resources has placed them higher 
in the power structure. The unequal opportunity for the use of economic resources 
has also constrained social mobility. 
The ethnic origin of the population can be divided into two: the Tibeto-Burmans 
and the Indo-Aryans. The Tibeto-Burman ethnic group consists of Gurung, Tamang, 
Rai, Limbu and others. The ethnic origin has influenced the settlement pattern and 
the religious beliefs as well. The people of Tibeto-Burman origin are the earlier 
settlers in the hills and mountains and practise both Hinduism and Buddhism. The 
majority of them are found in the high hills. Livestock rearing is the main occupation 
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of these ethnic groups, besides agriculture. In the later years, some of the families 
have resettled in the river valleys. 
The Indo-Aryans was the latest settlers in the hills, and this ethnic group consists 
of the Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar and the occupational castes. The majority of them 
are Hindus. The late settlers are settled in the lower hills and river valleys. The 
people of this ethnic origin are more involved in the irrigated agriculture. The 
settlement pattern in the hills and mountains are clustered with a majority of one 
caste group due to inheritance of paternal property by the brothers. The kinship 
relationship is very strong among the people. The strong kinship relation is also the 
dominating factor in economic and political relationships. In a mixed community, 
usually one caste group is in the majority. The caste group in majority usually holds 
most of the productive resources. The same is the case with the representation in the 
local institutions such as the VDC and UC. 
3.1.3 The economy 
The economy of the country is predominantly agricultural. A little over 80 percent 
(81.1 percent) of the total population in the country is engaged in subsistence 
farming. About 20.1 percent of the total land are under cultivation. The agricultural 
sector contributes 42 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80 percent of 
the total export comes from the agricultural sector. Nepal is one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a per capita income of $ 200 per annum. According to the 
National Planning Commission (NPC), 42 percent of the population are below the 
poverty line. During the period 1990-1995, the average annual growth rate of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated at 5.1 percent and the average annual 
growth rate of agriculture during this period remained 1.5 percent (World Bank, 
1997a). 
Seasonal migration from the hills to the cities and nearby towns for wage 
employment is a common phenomenon. The off-farm seasonal and permanent 
employment contributes considerably to the household income of the people in the 
hills. The employment opportunities available in the industrial sector are limited due 
to the weak industrial base. 
There has been a gradual decline in the rate of increase of grain production, 
whereas the population growth rate remains increasing. The revised estimates of the 
average annual growth rate of food grain was 2.3 percent and the population growth 
rate was 2.5 percent during the period 1980/81 to 1991/1992 (NPC, 1994a cited in 
APROSC and John Mellor Associates Inc. 1995:33). The discrepancy in the growth 
rate has a serious implication in the overall development of the country. The Ministry 
of Agriculture estimate shows that the annual food grain deficit in the country is 
34,351 metric tonnes. (Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), unpublished data). This is one 
of the reasons that the country was importing food grains in recent years in contrast 
to being an exporter of food grains in the past. This suggests that serious efforts are 
required to boost agricultural production in the country. Small-scale traditional 
farming dependent on the climatic conditions is considered to be one of the reasons 
for low productivity. The application of modern techniques of farming is lacking due 
to inadequate irrigation facilities and constraints in the availability of agricultural 
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inputs in time. The development of irrigation systems therefore would contribute in 
meeting the demand for food. The importance of irrigation is more important in the 
hills where an acute food shortage is prevalent. The development of irrigation in the 
hills is challenging due to the rough terrain incurring high investment costs. 
Nevertheless, it is all the more important for the livelihood of the people in the area 
where the opportunities for off-farm activities are very limited. 
3.1.4 The landownership, land tenure and water rights 
Landownership 
The farm sizes have been declining overtime. The agricultural census of 1991/1992 
reported that over a period of 30 years the agricultural holdings in the country 
increased to 2.74 million from 1.54 million holdings in 1961/1962. Of the total 
holdings, 2.70 million holdings were with land and the rest without land1. The 
average size of a holding in 1961/62 was 1.11 hectare. In 1991/92, the average size of 
a holding decreased to 0.96 ha due to the law of inheritance (CBS, 1994:11). Thus, the 
cultivated land is fragmented into smallholdings and the majority of the farming 
population has less than one hectare. The national average shows that the per hectare 
cultivated land will have to support 6.45 persons. For the hills, the figure is 9.5 
persons. In 1991/92, the average holding size for the mountains was 0.68 ha, for the 
hills it was 0.77 ha while the holding size for the terai was 1.26 ha (ibid: 11). 
Land tenure 
The majority of the holdings are owner-operated. The owner-operated holdings 
constitute 83 percent of the total. Likewise, 15 percent of the land were partly owned 
and partly rented, whereas 2 percent of the holdings were under full tenancy (CBS, 
ibid)2. The Land Reform Act of 1964 established the right of the tenants to one fourth 
of the land ownership they cultivated. This dual ownership is more prevalent in the 
terai than in the hills and the mountains. Further, the Land Reform Act was 
instrumental in the abolishment of the right of the fimmawals3 who were the village 
heads and the representatives of the government for maintaining the land records 
and collecting land taxes. The Jimmawal however, continued to function in some 
places until the cadastral survey was completed, which was implemented in phases. 
Three types of renting are prevalent in the country, according to the agricultural 
census of 991/92 (CBS, 1997). Share cropping (47%) is the most common form of 
renting followed by fixed quantity of produce (30%) and mortgage arrangement 
(18%). Share cropping is more common in the terai than in the hills and mountains. 
The agricultural census notes that mortgage arrangements along with share cropping 
are the common forms of renting in the hills and mountains as compared to fixed 
quantity of produce. The small size of holdings in the hills is one of the reasons for 
the smaller numbers of tenants in the hills. In addition, the land is used as capital for 
taking loans to meet the expenses for emergency and social events as the informal 
sector provides nearly 80 percent of the credit in the rural areas. In the mortgage 
agreement the lender keeps the produce as interest. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTRY 35 
Water rights 
The Water Resources Act of 1992 and its by-laws in 1993 was introduced to regulate 
the use of water resources in the country. According to the act, the ownership of all 
the water resources in the country is vested in the government. A government license 
is required for the development of the water resources other than the water resources 
on the land of a landowner. Consequently, it rejects the customary right of the citizen 
to use the water resources but the Muluki Ain4 has recognised the prior 
appropriation and customary right (Khadka, 1996; Pradhan, 1994). It does not 
however, say any thing about the control and uses of already developed water 
resources such as for irrigation, drinking water and watermills. It is presumed that 
previous legal rules and principles for the control and use of water resources are still 
valid (Benda-Beckmann et al, op cit.). The other prevailing practices of customary 
rights are: water share based on investment, water right purchased from others 
(Pradhan, 1989a:21) and water rights proportionate to the land in irrigated area 
(Pradhan, 1989a). 
The Act sets priority for the use of water in which drinking water received the first 
priority and irrigation was second. The Act envisaged the formation of water users' 
committees for the implementation of irrigation programmes in the country. The 
irrigation policy of 1992 categorised the irrigation schemes into small, medium and 
large. It also defined the role of the DOI and the farmers for the new construction 
and rehabilitation of schemes. The official registration of users' committees was 
required as it provides a legal entity. It can make its own rules, which have to be 
submitted to the government at the time of the registration. The government policy is 
to turn-over the management of the irrigation schemes to the users' committee in the 
hills where the system size is under 500 ha. 
3.2 The hill fanning system 
The hill agriculture is mainly based on subsistence farming. Crop production, 
livestock raising and off-farm employment are the major sources of income for the 
household. The farming system varies with altitude due to variation in the climatic 
conditions in the different agro-ecological zones. The farming system is rice-based in 
the terraces in the lower hills and the river valleys. Both rainfed and irrigated 
agriculture are present. Maize is the main crop in the high hills where irrigation is 
not available. Barley and buckwheat are the main crops in the mountains. Livestock 
raising is an important activity in the mountains. Rice and other cash crops are the 
main produce of the terai. 
The share of each region in agricultural production shows that the contribution of 
the hill region in food production is significant. The hill region has 40 percent of the 
total area of holdings in the country, as compared to the 53 percent in the terai (CBS, 
1998). 
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Table 3. 3: Agricultural Gross Domestic Product (AGDP) share by region and 
product group, 1991/1992 (percent) 
Product group Mountains Hüls Terai Total 
Food crops 3.4 18.8 23.6 45.8 
Horticulture crops 1.1 5.3 6.5 12.9 
Livestock 2.8 16.7 12.0 31.5 
Forestry 0.7 4.1 4.0 8.8 
Fisheries 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Total 8.0 44.9 47.1 100.0 
Source: Based on NPC revised estimates of AGDP. Adapted from APROSC & J. Mellor Ass. 
Inc. 1995:42 
3.3 The hill irrigation systems 
The main challenge of the hill agriculture is to increase the food production to feed 
the growing population and to absorb the increasing labour force in the country for 
many years to come. In this perspective, hill irrigation can significantly contribute to 
the agricultural production. The following table shows the status of the hill irrigation 
in the country. 
Table 3. 4: The contribution of FMIS in the hills 
Total area (ha) Total irrigable area (ha) Irrigated area (ha) 
'000 '000 '000 
7,250 428 FMIS AMIS 
188.8 21.03 
Source: Land System Report, Land Resources Mapping Project (LRMP), prepared by Carson 
et al. (1986b) Canadian International Water and Energy Consultants (CIWEC, 1990). 
Database for irrigation development in Nepal (DOI, 1997a) 
The table indicates the potential for hill irrigation and the importance of FMIS in the 
hills. It is evident that the existing potentials have not been fully harnessed and it 
could be doubled. Therefore, the development of the hill irrigation is important for 
sustaining the hill economy. 
3.3.1 Classification of hill irrigation systems 
Various authors have proposed different typologies of irrigation systems. The hill 
irrigation systems have been categorised by Pradhan (1989a) into two and they are 
river valley and hill irrigation. The typology is based on the physical characteristics 
of the irrigation systems. Vincent (1995:37) categorised hill irrigation systems into 
eight different forms. Among them the river valley off-take and slope off-take are 
more applicable in classifying the hill irrigation systems in Nepal. The former has the 
entire command area within the same valley as off-take, whereas the water is 
conveyed from the streams at a distance across and down slope in the latter. Parajuli 
(1999) categorised the hill irrigation systems into three: a) foot-hill irrigation; b) 
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slope-hill irrigation and; c) river-valley irrigation. This definition argues that the foot-
hill irrigation is different from the slope off-take. The foot-hill irrigation consists of 
small systems with a small command area, which are scattered along the riverside. 
These types of systems are generally away from the settlement. Therefore, the 
cropping intensity and its pattern are different from the slope off-take, which has 
implications in terms of management practices. Further, from the management point 
of view there are two types of irrigation system operating in the hills. They are 
agency managed irrigation system (AMIS) and the farmer managed irrigation system 
(FMIS). The AMIS are constructed, and operated by the DOI through its employees. 
The FMIS are built and operated by the farmers themselves. 
3.4 The districts of research sites 
3.4.1 Area, population and ethnicity 
Both the districts Kaski and Lamjung are hill districts in terms of agro-ecological 
regions. The Pokhara municipality in Kaski district is also the regional headquarters 
and an important tourist centre in the country. It has a good road network 
connection with other major towns and the district head quarters, including 
Kathmandu. The road to Lamjung was under construction and it was not in all-
weather condition during the study period. The area, population and ethnicity of the 
districts are presented in table 7. The population of Kaski district is higher than that 
of the Lamjung district. The male to female ratio of population in both the districts is 
almost equal. The distribution indicates that in the Kaski district the Brahmin and 
Chhetri constitute the majority, whereas the Gurungs form the majority in Lamjung. 
The average family size, is higher (5.9) in Lamjung than in Kaski (4.8). The 
population density is higher in the southern part of the district as compared to the 
northern part. The availability of arable land and access to other services are the 
reasons for this type of population distribution. The distribution of the ethnic and 
caste groups varies between the VDCs. 
However, The Brahmin and Chhetri are mostly settled on the lower hills, which 
occupy the southern part of the district whereas the Gurungs are settled on the high 
hills in the northern part of the district. The other caste groups are found to be 
scattered all over the district. In some cases, one particular settlement contains the 
majority of one caste group. Thus, one particular caste or ethnic group could 
constitute the majority within the VDC or village. 
Table 3. 5: Area, population and ethnicity 
Districts Area Household Population Ethnicity 
(km 2) Brahmin Chhetri Gurung Others 
Kaski 2,017 60,505 293,009 90,759 43,148 55,744 103,294 
(31.0) c (14.7) (19.0) (35.3) 
Lamjung 1,692 29 ,955 . 177,265 28,704 27,928 60,349 60,284 
(16.2) (15.7) (34.0) (34.1) 
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a) The population figures are based on the District profile of DDC, Kaski 1995 and 
the ethnic distribution is derived from the annual report, District Agricultural 
Development Office (DADO), Kaski 1996. 
b) Figures based on the GIS report, Integrated Centre for International Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD), 1995. 
c) The figures in the parentheses are percentages. 
3.4.2 Labour use pattern 
The agricultural census of 1991 (CBS, 1998) shows that 71 percent of the economically active 
population in Kaski district are engaged in agriculture, whereas for the Lamjung district, the 
figure is a little over 90 percent. This indicates that more employment opportunities in other 
sectors are available in the Kaski district as compared to the Lamjung district due to the 
development of towns. This could be attributed to several factors. First of all, more 
employment opportunities in the tourism sector are available in the Kaski district. Besides, 
there are several industries in this district, which provide employment. Being a regional 
head-quarter, several government and semi-government offices are providing employment 
to the local people. The Lamjung district does not have that advantage. Therefore, only 
limited employment opportunities are available in other sectors in the district. However, 
seasonal migration for the wage employment is a common phenomenon for both the 
districts. 
3.4.3 Land ownership and land tenure 
The district's average holding size for the study area in 1991 was 0.68 ha and 0.57 ha 
(CBS, 1998:49) for Lamjung and Kaski respectively. These figures are less than the 
national average (0.96) and the average for the hill (0.77) as well. The reason for the 
decline in the holding size is due to the increase in the population and fragmentation 
of the land. The average number of parcels per holding is an indication in this 
respect, which are 2.9 and 4.6 for Kaski and Lamjung respectively. The majority of 
the farmers hold 2 to 3 parcels of land per holding, in both the districts (CBS, 1997). 
The tenure status for the districts (CBS, 1997) shows that 89 percent and 95 percent 
of the total land holdings are owner-operated for Lamjung and Kaski respectively. 
The higher number of parcels per holding in Lamjung district could be one of the 
reasons for the higher number of renting. The most prevalent form of renting for 
both the districts is share cropping. Share cropping is a contractual arrangement 
between the owner and the cultivator to cultivate the land on 50/50 share basis, in 
which the owner provides the land and the cultivator provides the labour. However, 
the owner and the cultivator share other inputs equally. The cultivator however, 
does not have the legal tenancy right over the land. There are mortgage 
arrangements also. 
3.4.4 Food grain production 
The major cropping patterns in the districts for the land with perennial irrigation are 
rice-wheat-rice, rice-vegetable-fallow, rice-wheat-maize. For the rainfed area the 
cropping pattern is rice-maize-fallow. According to the estimate of the DAO, both the 
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districts are food deficient. Only one quarter of the total number of households are 
food sufficient for the whole year. The average crop yield for the paddy is 2.5 and 
2.09 mt. per hectare for Lamjung and Kaski respectively (DADO, Kaski and Lamjung, 
1995:32 and 16). 
3.5 The institutional landscape 
3.5.1 The politico-administrative structure 
There were small kingdoms before the unification of the country some 200 years ago 
by the late Prithivi Narayan Shah. The Rana family took the secular power from the 
shah and ruled the country autocratically for 104 years since 1846. The king was the 
titular head and the power was with the Rana Prime minister. This regime was 
overthrown in 1950 and a multi party democracy was established in the country. 
Between 1951-56 an effort was made to create different ministries in the country. The 
first elected government of 1958 under the multi-party system was overthrown in 
1960 through the royal take-over and a Partyless Panchayat System was introduced 
through the constitution of 19625. The Local Administration Act of 1965 divided the 
country into 14 zones, 75 districts and villages at the lower level. The Act envisaged 
involving the District and Village panchayats in planning and implementing 
development programmes and the Chief District Officer was made the member 
secretary of the District Panchayat. The rationale was to bring co-ordination between 
the administration and the local elected body. The government amended the Local 
Administration Act in 1972 and the Chief District Officer was relieved from the post 
of the member secretary of the District Panchayat. The local panchayats were made 
responsible for carrying out small-scale development works in their districts and 
villages with financial support from the government. District and Village Panchayats 
were also responsible to look after the management of the public property (see 
chapter 4 and 5 for discussion on irrigation system management by Village 
Panchayats). However, the government used to implement development 
programmes through the ministry or department, when it was beyond the capacity 
of the local panchayats. 
The District Administration Plan of 1974 was more bureaucratic in nature, which 
placed the district level offices of line ministries under the office of chief district 
officer for integrated planning and co-ordination of the various development 
activities. The District Panchayats received grants from the government for the 
village level projects. This effort towards decentralisation could not work due to a 
lack of support from the line ministries to delegate authority to the Chief District 
Officer. Nevertheless, the District Panchayats were providing financial assistance to 
Village Panchayats in carrying out small projects, which were quite successful (see 
chapter 5 for first irrigation intervention by District Panchayat). 
In 1978 the government introduced yet another document called 'Integrated 
Panchayat Development Design', which aimed at promoting the sustained 
advancement of the economic and social well-being of the people on the basis of their 
felt needs and participation through the development of the Village and District 
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Panchayats. This step also failed due to a lack of strong commitment both by the 
politicians and bureaucrats for decentralised and co-ordinated activities at the local 
level. 
The Decentralisation Act of 1982 assigned a key role to the District Panchayats 
(DP) for the formulation and co-ordination of the development plans in the district. 
All the offices of the line ministry at the district level were made sections of the 
district panchayats. The approval of the District Panchayat was mandatory for the 
submission of the annual plan to the planning commission. However, the line agency 
offices at the district level were to implement the programme. Adequate attention 
was not paid to strengthening the planning and co-ordinating capabilities of the 
District Panchayats. Consequently, the Decentralisation Act did not work as 
envisaged. In a study, Paudyal (1992) noted that the decentralisation act was more a 
political rhetoric because the final decisions pertaining to the selection of the 
programmes and allocation of funds for the districts level programmes were made in 
Kathmandu. Besides, the DP used to receive an annual lumpsum grant from the 
government to implement the small-scale village level projects such as track and 
trails, irrigation and drinking water. These projects were selected and approved by 
the DP on the request from the village panchayats. The DP overseers and sub-
overseers used to provide technical support for these projects under the guidance of 
the DP engineer. The users were responsible for the implementation of these projects 
under the supervision of DP overseers. The users implemented these projects 
through the Users' Committee (UC). The projects were implemented reasonably well, 
as UC's activities were transparent and they were accountable to the users (See 
second intervention in Chapter 5). 
All these efforts in decentralising the development functions to the local level 
however, did not affect the big new projects in different sectors like roads, irrigation 
and agriculture. The big projects in terms of investment, which were time bound, 
were generally categorised as the central level projects6. These projects were 
implemented under the direction of the Ministry or the Department through the 
Regional Directorate/ District offices or through a separate project office. The 
irrigation systems presented in the case studies (chapter 4-5) were implemented as 
central level projects and the case study (chapter 6) as district level project by 
Department of Agriculture (DOA). 
The multi party democratic system with a constitutional monarch was reinstated 
in the country, following the popular movement of 1990. The first elected 
government was sworn in 1992. There are now four major parties in the country - the 
Nepali Congress, the United Marxist-Leninist, Marxists-Leninists and two Rastriya 
Prajatantra parties. There are other smaller parties also. The various parties at the 
centre have an influence on village level politics also. Four coalition governments 
have already been formed since the mid term election of 1993 due to a hung 
parliament. However, the Nepali Congress party formed a majority government after 
the general election in May 1999. The elected parliament and the cabinet are the 
important decision making institutions at the centre. 
The National Planning Commission (NPC) is the lead institution for the 
formulation of the periodic development plans in the country, besides monitoring 
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and evaluation of the programmes. The annual programmes of the government are 
classified into central level programmes and district level programmes. 
The line ministries at the central level are the important institutions for 
formulation of sectoral policies and the implementation of development activities. 
Some of the sectoral rninistries have regional offices at each of the regions for the co-
ordination of development activities at the regional level. Their district level offices 
are responsible for the implementation of the district level development 
programmes. The office of the Chief District Officer at the district level is for 
mamtaining law and order. 
Following the restoration of the multi-party system in the country, the Village 
Panchayat and District Panchayat were dissolved and renamed Village Development 
Committee (VDC) and District Development Committee (DDC). The first election of 
the VDC and DDC took place in 1992 and the new office bearers assumed the office. 
The change in the political system was conducive for undertaking various activities, 
as there was no political restrictions. This helped to shape development of new local 
organisation (see chapter 4 for the formation of WUS by the farmers of Annapurna 
Kulo). The districts are the centres of development activities. The District 
Development Committee (DDC) is an elected representative body. The first elected 
government after the restoration of democracy amended the decentralisation act of 
1982 in 1992. The Decentralisation Act has assigned a key role to the DDC in the 
formulation, co-ordination and monitoring of the development activities in the 
district. The line agencies at the district level have to assist the DDC in the 
formulation of annual plans based on the guidelines provided by the NPC at the 
centre. The district annual plans have to be approved by the DDC before subrnitting 
them to the NPC. The DDC is also implementing small-scale activities from its own 
resources. For these small projects, the formation of users' committees is compulsory. 
The resources of the DDC consist of the annual grant from the government, share of 
the land taxes collected by the government and the local taxes as authorised under 
the Decentralisation Act. The selection and implementation of programmes by the 
DDC is rather poor in absence of competent technical staff in adequate numbers. The 
parliament in 1998 enacted the Local Self-Governance Act with a view to delegate 
more power to the local bodies to enhance local autonomy. 
The Village Development Committees (VDCs) were poor in financial resources, 
until the government began to provide annual grants to them since 1994. For the first 
year the annual grant was NRs. 300,000 (US$ 4392). The following year it was 
increased to NRs. 500,000 (US$ 7320). Before, the VDCs had to depend on the annual 
grant provided by the DDC, now they receive direct grants from the government. 
They used to receive small amounts from the DDC, which was not sufficient to cover 
even their administrative expenses. The annual grants have been particularly 
beneficial to the VDCs in the hills and mountains, since generating cash locally is not 
possible for them. The annual grant has enabled them to implement small-scale 
projects like construction, improvement and maintenance of small irrigation 
schemes, drinking water schemes and trails. Some of the VDCs have spent them as 
matching funds for the new projects assisted by the donors. Thus, the grant has 
enhanced the possibility of starting new projects, which was not likely in the absence 
of matching funds. Besides, the member of parliaments also receive NRs. 500,000 for 
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implementing small-scale development projects in their constituency, which they 
distribute in their constituencies for repair and maintenance of small projects like 
irrigation, trail and drinking water. The influence of these small funds can also be 
seen in the case studies. 
The increasing role of NGOs in the implementation of development programmes 
has been witnessed since the beginning of the eighth plan when the government 
acknowledged the importance of these Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). A 
large number of national levels NGOs are working in different parts of the country. 
The target groups are the poor in the villages who are deprived of meaningful 
participation in the development programmes launched by the government agencies. 
These NGOs receive funds from International Non-Governmental Organisations 
(INGOs)7 and other donors. In recent years, the activities of these NGOs are in 
expansion, as donors have also preferred to work through the NGOs. The strength of 
the NGOs is that they work directly with the farmers. Group formation for various 
activities is the strategy employed by the motivators stationed in the village. The 
activities of NGOs in this respect are important for social capital formation. 
3.5.2 Agencies and programmes directly involved in irrigation support 
Until 1987, there were four agencies working in the development of irrigation in the 
country. They were: The Department of Irrigation, Hydrology and Meteorology 
(DLHM), Farm Irrigation and Water Utilisation Division (FIWUD) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Panchayat and Local Development (MPLD). DIHM 
implemented medium and large-scale irrigation projects (500 ha to 2000 ha). The 
medium-scale projects were largely constructed using Government resources while 
large-scale projects mostly through external funding. Farmers' involvement in 
planning, design and construction of irrigation projects was lacking. As a result, the 
operation and maintenance cost had to be borne by the government and there was no 
cost recovery mechanism. 
FIWUD was involved in the development of small-scale irrigation schemes and 70 
per cent of these schemes were located in the hills and the remainder in the terai. 
Most of the schemes developed by FIWUD were generally identified and 
implemented by the potential users. They were handed over to the users for 
operation and maintenance after completion of the schemes. The users would 
contribute about 25 per cent of the total cost, 5 per cent of which was in cash and 20 
per cent in terms of labour. The average costs of FIWUD schemes were low (about 
NRs. 6,600/ha as compared to the unit construction cost of DLHM schemes estimated 
at between NRs. 40,000 to NRs. 80,000/ha). 
ADBN has been involved in financing the development of small-scale gravity 
irrigation schemes under the Small Farmer Development Programme (SFDP) 
through their own technical staff. The SFDP received financial assistance from 
CARE/Nepal and other donors. There is 50 per cent grant assistance while farmers 
contribute the remaining costs of the schemes in the form of a loan from ADBN (30 
per cent), which they had to repay, and labour (20 per cent). The farmers under the 
supervision of Bank's technical staff implemented the small-scale irrigation schemes. 
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MPLD was involved in the development of small-scale gravity irrigation schemes 
at the district level under the decentralisation policy. Under this policy District 
Panchayats were given a lump sum grant by the government to undertake various 
development programmes including the construction and rehabilitation of small-
scale irrigation schemes. The irrigation development programme was also 
undertaken with the financial and technical support of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) under the Special Public Work Programme (SPWP) through 
District Technical Offices (DTO) attached to the District Panchayats. The Programme 
aimed at promoting employment of unskilled labour in rural areas, particularly in 
remote areas. The users' contribution toward the capital cost was only 15 per cent in 
the form of labour (no cash contribution involved) as compared to 25 per cent in the 
FIWUD-assisted schemes. The average size of the schemes was less than 50 ha, while 
the average unit cost of construction was about NRs. 26,000/ha, which was higher 
than the average cost of the schemes implemented by FIWUD and ADBN, probably 
because the MPLD schemes were located in the remote areas. 
In December 1987 the government reorganised DIHM. Consequently, the 
Department of Irrigation (DOI) was created and the activities and staffs of FIWUD 
and the MPLD were merged into DOI. The DOI has five divisions at the centre, five 
Regional Irrigation Directorates (RID) and District Irrigation Offices (DIO) in each 
districts. The DOI is responsible for policy making, programme formulation, 
directing and supervising the work of RID and DIO. The RID is responsible for 
approving the programmes within its jurisdiction, supervising and co-ordinating the 
activities of DIO. The DIO is responsible for project formulation and implementation 
at the district level. Besides, there are project offices at the centre to co-ordinate the 
project activities funded by multilateral agencies. The involvement of ADBN in 
irrigation development was confined to the construction of Shallow Tube-Wells 
(STW) and small-scale community gravity irrigation schemes. The second major 
decision taken by the Government was that the development of small and medium-
scale irrigation schemes including STW was given higher priority than the 
development of large-scale irrigation. The main feature of the development strategy 
was farmers' participation. 
The change in the institutional structure was the result of a change in the policy 
focus from large and medium scale to small irrigation schemes. The donor influence 
in this respect was quite obvious as the donors funded most of the irrigation 
schemes. The following statement clarifies this: 
"Given the limited resources of the Government and the heavy burden of the 
operation and maintenance (O and M) 8 budget, the most logical and effective 
approach in irrigation development is to work together for a common objective of 
increasing agricultural productivity and farm incomes. In the past there were too 
many agencies involved in irrigation development, each of them using different 
participatory approaches and cost-sharing arrangements. The bulk of the resources 
for irrigation development was given to DOI for the development of large-scale 
irrigation schemes; and very little attention and resources were given to activities 
and programmes to build up the farmers' capability to operate and maintain the 
completed irrigation schemes" (Asian Development Bank (ADB/M), 1988) 
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Irrigation Management Project (IMP) (1986-1994) 
The project came into effect with the technical and financial assistance of the USAID. 
The main objective of the project was to improve the institutional capability of the 
DOI, other line agencies and the farmers for efficient irrigation management 
practices. Two institutions were created under this project. The System Management 
Division (SMD) was responsible for initiating operation and maintenance 
procedures, formation of Water Users Associations (WUA) in DOI-managed 
irrigation systems and monitoring and evaluation of the activities. The Irrigation 
Management Centre (IMC) was responsible for conducting teaming for agency 
personnel and the farmers. It was responsible also for conducting action research in 
DOI and farmers-managed irrigation systems. 
Irrigation Management Transfer Project (IMTP) (1995-2002) 
The Asian Development Bank financed the project. The project came into effect to 
translate the government policy of transferring the management of public irrigation 
schemes to the users. 
The project has three components: 
• Establishment of 14 sustainable and effective WUAs through formal and informal 
training courses: 
• Rehabilitation and improvement of irrigation and drainage facilities in about 
67,800 ha in 11 schemes including emergency maintenance, flood damage repair, 
essential structural maintenance and system improvement works: 
• System calibration, improvements of canal service roads and farm to market 
roads and repair and procurement of equipment and vehicles (IMTP, Project 
Aclministeation Memorandum 1995). 
3.5.3 Internationally funded research programmes 
Various institutions for example LTMI9, the Ford Foundation, Winrock International, 
Institute of Agriculture and Animal Sciences (IAAS) and ICIMOD have been 
engaged in funding and conducting fundamental research, action research and 
teaming programmes in the country. They have been supporting national and 
international institutes for conducting research and teaming in various aspects of 
irrigation in the country. Besides, they have been supporting individuals through 
grants to conduct research on irrigation. The IAAS has also undertaken research 
supported by international universities and agencies. These studies have generated 
wide interest among the researchers and government officials involved in irrigation 
management. Action research (WECS and LTMI, 1990) has helped to increase 
understanding of FMIS and AMIS, their organisation and appropriate technology for 
the hills. Besides it helped the government to identify the issues and to design an 
appropriate intervention strategy in the FMIS. The Ford Foundation support for 
debate on policy, design and legal issues (Shivakoti et al, 1997) is expected to 
contribute to appropriate policy reforms. Importantly, these organisations are 
facilitating the interaction between professionals from various disciplines to 
contribute to the knowledge and understanding of irrigation issues in Nepal. A 
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number of bilateral organisations have also assisted in irrigation as part of wider 
development programmes, which are outlined in the following section. 
3.6 The planned development policies and programme approaches 
3.6.1 Development plans (1956-1975) 
The First five-year plan (1956-60) introduced the Village Development Programme. 
The programme was well conceived as various activities were implemented in an 
integrated manner to address the issues at the village level. Besides, land tax at local 
level was an important mechanism for local resource mobilisation (Pradhan, 1982). 
However, it was based on a top-down approach since the government agencies took 
a leading role in the planning, design and implementation of the programmes 
without much consultation of the people. 
The approach adopted in the first plan was discarded during the second plan and 
the development plans followed a sectoral approach with the introduction of a 
Panchayat sector for local development. The third and fourth plan also followed the 
sectoral approach with emphasis on the development of infrastructure. The focus 
was on the consolidation of the local panchayats, which came into being as a result of 
the new political system in the country. 
3.6.2 The Fifth Five-year plan (1975-80) 
Agriculture 
There was a major policy shift during this plan, which prioritised agriculture and the 
social sector for investment. Besides, this plan emphasised co-ordinated action in 
three sectors viz. forest, agriculture and irrigation through the active involvement of 
the farmers. The plan emphasised farming based on agro-ecological zones by 
promoting horticulture in the hills, livestock farming in the mountains and food 
grain production in the terai (NPC, 1975). 
The Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDPs) were also initiated during this 
plan period, as donors were interested in this approach. The LRDP projects were 
viewed as a package of actions, which covered a series of inter related activities 
aimed at resolving the various problems of rural life (MPLD, 1988). The main thrust 
of IRDP projects was to contribute to the household income through increased 
production and to extend other facilities to the people living in the rural areas. 
Hence, IRDP activities were concentrated on the hill districts. The service centre 
concept10 was introduced to provide services to the farmers. The activities under 
IRDPs were implemented through the line agencies. Irrigation was one of the 
activities offered in the IRDP. One of the most serious problems encountered in the 
implementation of the IRDPs was the lack of vertical and horizontal co-ordination 
between the line agencies (Centre for Integrated Rural Development for Asia and 
Pacific (CIRDAP, 1982) which, in fact was the key to achieving IRDP objectives. 
IRDPs funded by the bilateral donors implemented some of the village level 
programmes directly as they had strong technical inputs due to the presence of 
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advisors in various fields (Pradhan, op cit). This approach contributed to the 
development and transfer of technology needed by the farmers, which otherwise 
would not have reached the farmers. 
Irrigation interventions 
The main objective of irrigation intervention during this five-year plan was to 
remove the uncertainty in agriculture, which was based on the monsoon, by 
providing reliable irrigation facilities. The plan target was to extend irrigation 
facilities to an additional 146, 000 ha area with a total outlay of NRs. 910.44 million. 
The DIHM was mainly responsible for the implementation of medium and large 
projects (500 ha to 2000 ha) in the terai. However, DIHM also implemented projects 
of more than 50 ha in the hills, which were not under the jurisdiction of MPLD. With 
respect to the construction of new irrigation schemes in the hills, the fifth plan gave 
priority to extending irrigation facilities to the flat land in the river basins, small 
irrigation schemes in the hills and the mountains, and support to improvement of 
FMIS. The plan mainly aimed at the labour intensive technology (NPC, 1980). 
Both multilateral agencies and bilateral donors were involved in the development 
of irrigation projects in the country. They provided technical and financial assistance 
to the study and the implementation of the projects. However, most of the financing 
from multilateral agencies was through loans. In addition there were a number of 
other agencies and countries that had been supporting the irrigation development in 
the country. Most of this assistance was for bilateral projects and implemented under 
grant assistance. Besides, the DP were providing small-scale support to the VP for 
the maintenance of the irrigation schemes (See chapter 5). 
(Special Public Works Programme (SPWP) (1980-87)) 
During this plan period the International Labour Organisation (ILO) had been 
implementing SPWP in Nepal which continued until the middle of the sixth plan 
period. During this period it had been responsible for the construction and 
rehabilitation of small and medium-scale hill irrigation schemes. The SPWP 
emphasis was on establishing farmers' groups and developing users' participation in 
the irrigation sector. It used labour intensive technologies and the selection of the 
project was based on popular participation. The water users' committees played an 
important role in the construction, maintenance and operation of the irrigation 
system. The local labour was partially paid through voluntary labour (HMGN/ILO, 
1989). 
(Irrigation under Integrated Rural Developments (IRD) projects) 
Both new construction and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes were implemented 
under the IRD projects. Various donors - Overseas Development Administration 
(ODA) of the British government, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) of the 
Canadian government, SNV of the Dutch government, the European Economic 
Commission, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank-supported the 
implementation of the projects. Two types of procedures were followed in the 
implementation of the irrigation schemes. The medium sized irrigation schemes were 
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implemented through the DOI (DOI, 1997a), which were based on DOI norms. The 
contractors were involved in the implementation of the schemes, which were 
identified during the appraisal of the project. The District Panchayats through the 
users committee implemented the small-scale construction and rehabilitation based 
on the request of the farmers. The DTO technician and the consultant employed by 
the project assisted the users for the planning and implementation of the project 
(Pradhan, 1982:26). 
3.6.3 The Sixth Five-year plan (1980-85) 
Agriculture 
The main thrust during this plan was to improve the household consumption level 
through increase in the agricultural production. The plan envisaged to boost the 
cropping intensity to increase production and to decrease the under-employment in 
the hill regions by introducing the pocket programme11 in the hill regions where 
irrigation facilities was available. 
Irrigation interventions 
The main objective of this plan was to develop irrigation facilities for the fulfilment 
of the agricultural production target. For the first time the plan emphasised to enlist 
maximum mass participation in the field of irrigation development. The plan gave 
priority in determining areas suitable for irrigation in the hilly regions, which had 
food supply problems. The preference was on the projects, which would benefit 
small and marginal peasants, and stressed the use of local skills and materials with 
local participation. It emphasised low cost projects with unit cost of NRs. 15,000 per 
hectare in the Terai and NRs. 25,000 in the hills. 
The plan however, could only achieve 74 percent of the physical targets whereas 
the expenditure was 96 percent of the total budget. Various problems were identified 
in the implementation and the plan recommended to follow the basic procedures 
such as project targets to be based on financial resource allocation, and the 
preparation of feasibility studies by specifying the rate. Also analysis of on-going 
irrigation projects was emphasised to identify the constraints (NPC, 1985). 
(Hill Food Production Programme (HIPP) (1982-90)) 
This project was launched with the assistance of the World Bank. The project was 
implemented to increase the food production in the four hill Districts - Gorkha, 
Lamjung, Syangja and Tanahu of the Western Development Region. Irrigation was 
one of the main components of the project along with construction of agricultural 
service centres, trails and bridges. The activities under the project suggest that there 
was recognition of other support services along with the development of the 
irrigation schemes. The FIWUD procedure was followed for the selection and the 
approval of the project since the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) executed 
the project. A separate project office with one project co-ordinator was established 
and it had its own engineer, overseers and other administrative staffs from FIWUD 
who worked alongside the district agricultural office staff. A regional co-ordinating 
committee under the chairmanship of Regional Director of MOFA was constituted to 
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conduct planning and implementation of the projects. The members of the committee 
were Chief District Officers of four districts and representatives of MLD, Nepal Food 
Corporation, Agriculture Input Corporation (AIC), Department of co-operatives and 
ADB/N. This committee was also to ensure co-ordination of project activities with 
the annual District Development Plans (DDP) prepared by the respective District 
Panchayats. The activities selected under the project were part of the DDP, which 
was provisioned under the Decentralisation Act of 1982. In that respect this was a 
district level project. There was provision of the District Co-ordination Committee 
under the chairmanship of DDC president. The other members of the committee 
were the representatives of DADO, AIC, ADB/N and DTO. 
Requests from the farmers were a pre-condition for the initiation of the project. 
Usually, the assistance was provided for headwork construction, lining the main 
canal and the construction of retaining wall to stabilise irrigation infrastructures 
(Shivakoti, 1992:14) in the hills. The project target was to develop and improve 
irrigation service to about 3000 ha of land. The project achievement was extension of 
irrigation facilities to 3,200 hectare. The total estimated project cost was US$ 9.7 
million. Twenty eight percent of the total cost was for the development of minor 
irrigation projects. 
The Dhand and Birta Kulo in Tarkughat irrigation scheme, which is one of the case 
studies (see chapter 6) was implemented under this programme. 
(The Hill Irrigation Project (HIP) (1981-1989)) 
The project was implemented with the assistance from the Asian Development Bank 
to increase food production in food-deficit hill areas by improving the existing 
irrigation schemes and developing new ones with more stress on extension services 
and improved methods of water management. 
The objectives of the project were: 
• To increase the production of food-grains and other agricultural products 
through irrigation development. 
• To improve agricultural support services, thereby raising the income and 
standard of living of the people in the project area. 
Five irrigation systems in the Western Development Regions were included under 
the project with a total allocation of $16.7 million. All the five systems were 
completed under the project with a cost of $12.5 million. The reason for the lower 
expenditure than the allocation was due to the deletion of one irrigation system, 
which was appraised but rejected because of the high costs. The intervention had 
limited people's contribution as it was implemented by DOI as central level project. 
Farmers' participation and management turnover to the farmers were not envisaged 
during the execution of the project. However, the present policy of the government 
has stressed the management turnover to the farmers. The project continued till the 
last year of the seventh plan. 
The Annapurna Kulo (Hemja), which is part of the case studies, was one of the 
schemes constructed under this project (The case study is presented in part III of 
chapter 4). 
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3.6.4 The Seventh Five-Year plan (1985-90) 
Agriculture 
The approach during this plan was to fulfil basic needs of the people through the 
increase in foodgrains and rural employment creation to increase the household 
income. The plan envisaged concentrating on the agricultural services in the areas 
receiving priority in production programmes. The reason was to maximise use of 
limited resources (NPC, 1985). 
Irrigation interventions 
The objective of the plan was to ensure certainty and permanency of agriculture, 
which depended only on the monsoon rainfall. In this connection it emphasised the 
implementation of hill irrigation projects with the assistance of the Asian 
Development Bank in order to fulfil self-sufficiency of food stuffs in these areas. The 
plan for the first time recognised the under-utilisation of the available irrigation 
facilities (which was estimated at 42 percent) and emphasised the use of their full 
capacity through improvements in the management and distribution of irrigation 
water. 
The physical achievement was only 73 percent of the total target. The two agencies 
(FIWUD and ADB/N) 1 2 under ministry of Agriculture exceeded the target by 3 
percent, whereas the DOI could achieve only 48 percent of the target (Source: DOI 
record). This shows the importance of the small-scale irrigation both in the terai and 
in the hills as FIWUD and ADB/N were implementing small irrigation projects. The 
expenditure however, was exceeded by 42 percent. This scenario reveals the 
management inefficiency of the DOI and it points to towards the structural problem 
in terms of implementation capability. 
The major problems identified in the execution of the seventh plan were: 
• Farmers' inability to derive the expected benefits from the projects owing to the 
technical deficiency in the project. This was caused by the government agency's 
lack of direct accountability towards the people. 
• Unsustainability of the projects owing to the lack of necessary attention towards 
the institutional aspects during the execution of the programme by the 
government agency. 
The mitigating measures proposed for the future were to complete the irrigation 
projects within the allocated time through the use of appropriate technology, 
including irrigation management improvement with farmers' participation (NPC, 
1992). 
(Irrigation Line Of Credit Project (ILC) Pilot Project (1988-1997)) 
The project was implemented with the financial assistance from the International 
Development Agency (IDA) of the World Bank. The activities included under the 
project were expansion or rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems, and 
improvement in the efficiency of existing irrigation facilities through effective 
operation and maintenance (O & M). Besides, it emphasised the provision of 
adequate agricultural support services and institutional development. Training of 
50 INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 
DOI officials was an integral part of the project for organising water user groups. The 
farmers' participation in planning, construction, and management of the operation 
and maintenance of the irrigation projects was emphasised. 
In the past, the bank lending was for large and medium projects. But construction 
and rehabilitation of new and existing small schemes were considered under this 
project. One of the objectives of this project was to learn lessons on 'participatory 
approach' in order to provide long-term support to small schemes. The selection 
criteria of the project were as follows: 
• To be responsive to a specific request by a Farmer Irrigation Association 
• To be economically viable with an economic rate of return of at least 10 % of 
project costs. 
• To include a timetable for farmers' contribution. 
• To include a written agreement of the Farmers' Irrigation Association benefiting 
from the project indicating that the Farmers' Irrigation Association shall be 
responsible for (1) the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation 
scheme under the project and (2) the requested contribution to the capital costs of 
the project (The World Bank, 1988). 
The project covered all the districts of Western, Mid-Western and Far-Western 
Region except the Dhaulagiri Zone. The estimated total cost of the project was US$ 23 
million, including the groundwater irrigation schemes aimed at providing irrigation 
water to an additional 15600 hectares. It was reported that the project extended 
additional irrigation facilities to 33,800 ha only from the surface schemes. However, it 
should be noted that the progress report might have included not only the extended 
area but the area under irrigation by old schemes also, which have been rehabilitated 
under the project. 
The Ghachowk irrigation system, which was part of the case studies (see chapter 5) 
was implemented under this project. 
(The Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project (DIDP) (1989-1996)) 
This project was supported by the ILO with the objective of ensuring security in basic 
foodstuffs, self-reliant irrigation systems, and generation of income in the project 
area. The project was targeted to benefit vulnerable groups such as landless people 
and women by increasing employment opportunities. The Project activities 
concentrated on development and rehabilitation of irrigation systems with emphasis 
on environmental aspects in the Dhaulagiri Zone of the Western Development 
Region. The project paid more attention to the development of organisational aspects 
such as institutionalisation of Water Users Groups and cost recovery for 
Organisation and Management (O and M) (HMGN/ILO, 1989:6,9,12). The project 
aimed at providing additional irrigation to about 2400 ha with total project costs of 
US$ 5,076,000. The project however, was able to provide additional irrigation 
facilities to 2271 ha only. 
(Irrigation Sector Project (ISP) (1989-1997)) 
The objectives of the project were to support the government's basic needs 
programme in increasing food production to meet the growing domestic demand 
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through the development or improvement of irrigation facilities covering the total 
area of about 25000 hectares. Besides, the project aimed at increasing agricultural 
productivity creating rural employment opportunities and improving farm incomes. 
The focus of the project was on (i) rehabilitation and improvement of existing farmer-
managed surface irrigation schemes, (ii) construction of new small and medium scale 
surface water schemes and (iii) strengthening of the regional and district irrigation 
offices of the DOI in the project area. The estimated total project cost was US$ 26.468 
million aimed at providing irrigation facilities to 64,000 ha of additional area. It is 
reported that the plan target was fully achieved. 
3.6.5 The Eighth Five-year plan (1992-1997)13 
Agriculture 
The major objective of this plan was to increase agricultural production and 
productivity to meet the growing food demand based on geographical specification 
(NPC, 1992). Naturally, the focus was on strengthening hill agrioilture, as it was the 
hill districts, which had a food deficit. The stress was on making extension services 
more effective by making them more accessible to the farmers. The policy also 
assigned priority to crop diversification. 
The development of the agricultural sector was not encouraging despite the efforts 
made in the previous plans. The following were the main reasons for the lack of 
progress in this sector: 
• Under-achievement in extending irrigation facilities. 
• The lack of co-ordination among the agencies in this sector. 
• The failure of agricultural research to address the need of the farmers (NPC, 1980-
1985). 
• The implementation of the priority programme was not effective. 
• The extension services and the agricultural credit did not reach the farmers in 
time (NPC, 1985). 
• The Programmes were not adapted to the need of agro-ecological zones (NPC, 
1992). 
These problems could be attributed to the frequent reorganisations within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the failure of the farm research centres and extension 
services to cater for the need of the farmers (Basnyat, 1995). As compared to the 
government research stations, which concentrated on commodity-based research, 
however the two agricultural research stations in Lumle and Pakhribas funded by 
the ODA have been able to cater to the need of the farmers. Their approach of 
Samuhik Vraman (visit to the farmers' field by an interdisciplinary team) to identify 
the problems and farmers' field trials through out-reach sites (APROSC, 1982) have 
helped in the identification of an appropriate technology and encouraged farmers to 
adopt it. This was evidenced during the field study of Annapurna Kulo by this 
researcher. 
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Irrigation interventions 
The five-year development document laid emphasis on decreasing government 
involvement and increasing farmers' participation in the planning, implementation, 
operation and maintenance of the irrigation schemes by using appropriate irrigation 
technologies suited to varying geo-physical and climatic conditions. 
Farmers' request was made a pre-condition for the survey of potential projects, 
and projects with lower cost per hectare received priority for implementation. The 
policy was to promote small-scale irrigation systems with the increased participation 
of the farmers. Naturally, there was a policy shift from new construction to the 
rehabilitation of the existing schemes. The farmers' contribution in construction was 
obligatory and the policy was to turnover the completed systems to the farmers. For 
this purpose the formation of users' committees was a precondition for new 
construction and rehabilitation. A written agreement with the users was also made 
compulsory. The plan made detailed policy guidelines for the execution of the 
project. It stressed to make farmers more accountable for the management of the 
irrigation systems with a view to make them more sustainable, and also to reduce the 
government investments in annual maintenance. 
The achievement however, was only 72.9 percent of the target. 
(Nepal Irrigation Sector Project (NISP) (1997-2002)) 
This project was an extension of the ILC pilot project, which had been successful 
according the IDA. The objective of the project was to assist the Government in 
planning and utilising its water resources in a harmonised, effective and sustainable 
manner and to increase productivity and sustainability of irrigation systems in the 
selected districts of the three western regions (The World Bank, 1997b). Elaborate 
guidelines were prepared for the selection, implementation and monitoring of the 
projects. Among others farmers' request for survey had to be accompanied with up 
front cash deposit to ensure that the demand for intervention was genuine. The 
elaborate procedures seem to have been developed to ensure effective 
implementation of the project and also to overcome the shortcomings of the pilot 
phase of the project. The total estimated project cost was $103.02 million to extend 
the irrigation facilities to 59,600 ha, including system improvement and turnover of 
DOI-managed irrigation systems to the farmers. The Chaurasi Kulo (see part II of 
chapter 4) was rehabilitated under this project. 
(Second Irrigation Sector Project (SISP) (1997-2002)) 
The project objectives were to contribute to the government's goals of raising the 
socio-economic status of small farmers, reducing poverty, and generating 
employment opportunities in rural areas. It emphasised the strengthening of Water 
Users' Associations (WUA), improvement and construction of Farmer-Managed 
Irrigation Systems (FMIS) and provision of agricultural extension service. The project 
covered all districts of the Eastern and Central region. The project aimed at providing 
irrigation to 41,000 ha of land through new projects and rehabilitation of old 
schemes. The total estimated cost was US$ 33.3 million. 
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3.6.6 The Ninth Five-Year plan and the Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP) 
The major thrust of the ninth plan (1997/98-2002/2003) is on poverty alleviation. The 
government with the assistance from the Asian Development Bank/Manila has 
prepared a 20 year plan for the agricultural sector. The APP envisages reducing the 
poverty to 14.0 percent in 20 year time i.e. a 5 percent reduction in each year. The 
agricultural sector has to grow by 4 percent annually to achieve this target. However, 
the overall economic growth in the first year of the plan period was only 1.9 percent. 
The plan has prioritised delivering packages of inputs in the terai, hills and 
mountains to increase agriculture production. The priority inputs identified are 
irrigation, road and agricultural technology. For the hills the APP admits that an 
increase in food crops alone will not be sufficient for the reduction of poverty. Thus, 
the priority is in the diversification of the hill agriculture. In this respect, the plan 
emphasises the production of high value crops. The plan notes that the irrigation 
investment in the hills needs to concentrate on improvement of small irrigation 
systems (APROSC and John Mellor Associates Inc. 1995:xv-xviii). The stress is on 
providing a year-round irrigation facility. However, the plan recognises that the 
achievement of the plan targets will depend on a better co-ordination among 
different agencies at all levels and decentralised delivery of the services according to 
the need of the farmers. 
The target of this plan seems to be very ambitious in view of the past performance 
in the agricultural sector. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the socio-economic situation of the country 
and its districts, which shows that agriculture plays a dominant role in the economy 
of the country. The development of the agricultural sector is vital for the 
improvement of the majority of the farmers. For this, the development of the hill 
irrigation, which has great potential, could contribute substantially. The 
characteristics of the hill irrigation and farming systems reflect the nature of 
subsistence farming in the hills. 
The discussion on the development strategies and the politico-administrative 
structures provides a picture of the intervention priorities, which have evolved over 
time, and showed how administrative structures were designed to meet the 
development priorities. It further shows that the desired results have not been 
achieved despite many experiments, due to poor project implementation because of 
the lack of administrative and political commitments. The discussions on the 
agriculture and irrigation policies indicate that despite the effort these two sectors 
lack co-ordinated efforts to achieve the plan targets due to sectoral orientation in the 
formulation and implementation of the plan. Besides, it also reflects their inability to 
address problems in financial and technical execution. 
The various donors have applied different intervention strategies in the past. It 
was clear that multilateral agencies paid more attention to the development of 
medium and large-scale irrigation projects, which was heavily top-down. In contrast 
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to that, the bilateral agencies focused on the development of small irrigation systems 
in the hilly regions, through bottom-up approaches, and farmers actively 
participated in them. The government involvement in the irrigation sector has 
witnessed the major policy shift as more attention is paid to the development of 
small-scale irrigation in recent years. Besides, it is also reflected that the appropriate 
mechanism for the development of the irrigation systems is still evolving. This was 
evidenced through the emphasis placed on the involvement of District Panchayats 
(DP), Village Panchayats (VP), District Development Committees (DDC) and Village 
Development Committees (VDC) in the rehabilitation of small scale irrigation 
schemes. In recent years, technology transfer based on participatory approach aimed 
at institution strengthening at local level has been emphasised. In this respect, the 
interaction between agency staff and village representatives was important in 
deterniining changes in irrigation and shaped different kinds of project approaches. 
Nevertheless, the training to users, agency officials and preparation of manuals for 
participatory approach of irrigation development has not brought expected 
bureaucratic reform towards solving the existing problem. 
The social cohesion in the villages is declining. Where in the past many villages in 
the hill areas were often isolated, now due to the improved road system they are 
drawn into the regional and national economy. This is partly due to the necessity of 
seasonal migrations needed to obtain additional income because the population has 
outgrown the carrying capacity of the land in the villages and pursued standard of 
living has increased. The changes in the local government structure and their 
functions in the past have affected the institutional practices carried out in the past in 
irrigation. Besides, the village populations are to some extent divided along political 
lines after the introduction of the multi party system. This has resulted in a decline of 
social control, essential for among other things- good management of small irrigation 
systems. Paudyal (1995: 146-163) observed that lack of social control will negatively 
affect the realisation of the benefit from the intervention. However, it has also given a 
number of political opportunities to local actors, which have also had an impact on 
linking loops to achieve intervention and on irrigation management. New powers 
and financial resources of VDCs are bringing new dynamics of action in FMIS. 
Notes 
1 The 1991 agriculture census defined 'holding with land' are those who cultivate more than 
O.Olha of land and 'holding with no land' are those who have two or more heads of cattle. 
2 Out of the total cultivated land two percent of the holdings were fully rented out i.e. 
owners did not cultivate any parts of the land themselves. 
3 In some places they were called Ditthawal also. 
4 'Muluki Ain' is the civil code of the country. 
5 There were three tiers of Panchayats under the Partyless Panchayat system. The National 
Panchayat was the highest legislative body and District Panchayat at the district level and 
Villlage Panchayat at the lowest level. 
6 The final selection, approval and financial allocation for the central level projects are done 
either at the department or the ministry level. However, the district offices can select and 
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recommend for the implementation of the projects at the district level. The DIOs are also 
involved in the implementation of the central level projects. 
7 They are non-profit making organisations involved in wide range of activities-health, 
education and income generation in the developing countries. They receive fund from their 
respective government or they obtain fund from various international agencies. 
8 O and M expenses are those expenses incurred by the DOI for the salary of the staff 
involved in the operation of the canals and in the repair of the canals annually to keep the 
canals operational. 
9 This institute has been renamed into International Water Management Institute 
10 The idea was to extend agriculture-related services in a package in a decentralised manner 
to make it more accessible to the farmers. For this the district was divided in Ilaka (areas) 
and service centres were established to provide services to the VDCs covered by the Ilaka. 
11 The programme was to provide package of agricultural inputs and extension services in 
certain geographical area for intensive agriculture. 
12 The ADB/N is under Ministry of Finance now. 
13 The interim government after the restoration of multiparty democracy in the country in 
1991 drafted the new constitution and held a general election. Thus, there was a gap of two 
years between the seventh and eighth Five-Year Plan. The subsequent elected government 
re-drafted the eighth Five-Year Plan. 
4. Chaurasi Kulo and Annapurna Kulo 
Parti 
General description of the village 
4.1 Introduction 
The irrigation systems lie in the area administered by Hemja Village Development 
Committee (VDC)1 of Kaski District in the Western Development Region. It was a 
single system before the construction of Annapurna Kulo. It was one of the oldest 
Farmers' Managed Irrigation System (FMIS) in the western region of the country, 
before the intervention. The management of the irrigation system over a period of 
time has changed. Now there are two irrigation systems and they are Chaurasi Kulo 
and Annapurna Kulo. The intake point of these two systems is also different. At 
present the Chaurasi Kulo is theoretically under the management of a VDC. But in 
fact, there are no operational rules i.e. no rules-in-use (Ostrom, op cit.) exist. 
The Annapurna Kulo is still under the management of the Department of Irrigation. 
There are several overlaps between the two schemes that have effects on the overall 
management of these two systems. This aspect is important to look into the 
differences in management of these two systems. Further, the differences in the 
hydraulic structure of these two systems have major effects on the management of 
these two systems. It was also important to get a view of the farmers who are water 
users of both the systems and the farmers who are water users of only one scheme. 
These were the prominent reasons for the selection of these systems for the case 
study. Therefore, Chaurasi Kulo and Annapurna Kulo are presented separately in part 
LI and HI respectively. 
The information for the case studies was collected from actors who were 
associated with the irrigation systems. They were: the past and present VDC officials, 
the User's Committee (UC) officials, the farmers from different reaches of the 
irrigation systems, the engineers from the District Irrigation Office (DIO), the 
contractor, the former Ditthawaf, Mukhiyas3 and the Dhalpas4. The information was 
collected through administering a check-list, personal observation and unstructured 
interviews5. The information from the secondary sources was collected from the 
official records, evaluation studies and findings of other studies in the area. It was 
not possible however, to locate the engineers who implemented the intervention of 
Annapurna Kulo due to the time lag between the intervention and this research. 
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4.2 The environment of the system and the context of the intervention 
4.2.1 The general environment 
The village 
The Hemja VDC area of Kaski District is along the Pokhara-Baglung Highway, 10 km 
further north-west from Pokhara-the Regional Headquarters of the Western 
Development Region. The VDC is 827 metres above sea level and lies on 84°00' 
longitude and 28°13' latitude. The mean annual temperature in the area is 20.7°C and 
the annual rainfall is 3,306 mm. The moisture regime in the area is humid. The 
topography of the area is gently sloping from north to south. The settlement in the 
village is on the both sides of the highway. The total area under the VDC is 1734 
hectares6. The land use pattern is as follows. 
Table 4 .1 : The land use distribution in the VDC area 
Types of land Area (hectare) 
Khet 594.37 
Pakho/Bari 272.91 
Minaha 867.0 
Total 1734.28 
Source: District Development Committee (DDC), Kaski, 1995 Cadastral Survey Office, Kaski 
The figure indicates that the irrigable area as indicated by Khet in the VDC area is 
substantial. It also shows the potential for irrigation development in the VDC area. 
Population and ethnicity 
The VDC area has 1528 households. The total population is 8468. The wardwise 
distribution of population is presented in table 4. 2. The female population is slightly 
higher than the male population. The table indicates that the average family size is 
5.5. The economically active population (15-60 age group) is about 65.0 % of the total 
population (NPC/MLD/UNDP, 1997). By ethnicity the village is a mixed 
community. Ethnically, the upper two castes Brahmin (40%) and the Chhetri (30%) 
constitute the majority. Other castes are Newar (5%), Magar and occupational castes-
Kami, Gandherba and Sarki make up 25 percent of the total. The settlement pattern is 
clustered among the ethnic groups. 
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Table 4. 2: The wardwise distribution of households and population with ethnicity 
Ward no. Households no. Population Male Female Major ethnic* groups 
1 311 1689 830 859 Chhetri, Brahmin, 
Tibetan refugees 
2 204 1101 542 559 Chhetri, Brahmin 
3 142 857 417 440 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Newar 
4 111 677 319 358 Brahrnin, Sarki, 
5 81 490 230 260 Kami, Sarki, Chhetri 
6 261 1357 701 656 Brahmin, Magar, 
Chhetri 
7 120 613 311 3 0 2 . Brahmin, Chhetri 
8 132 872 451 421 Brahmin, Chhetri 
9 166 812 396 416 Chhetri 
Total 1528 8468 4197 4271 
Source : District D e v e l o p m e n t Commit tee , Kaski, 1995 (info obtained f r o m V D C ) 
Occupation 
The main occupation of the people is agriculture. Almost 50 percent of the 
households however, are not food sufficient according to the VDC estimate. Nearly, 
70 percent of the households draw income from other sources according to the VDC 
estimate. Maskey (1994) also noted that 74 percent of the total households draw 
income from the off-farm activities and that constitutes 53 percent and 75 percent of 
off-farm cash income in Chaurasi and Annapuma Kulo respectively. These include 
earnings from salaries, shops, wages, pensions and remittances. Poultry raising on a 
commercial scale is becoming an important source of income for some households. 
Those engaged in this activity are making a good profit according to the VDC vice 
chairperson. By being close to Pokhara there is no constraint on markets for the 
product. Besides, the farmers can obtain necessary technical advice from the 
technician in Pokhara. The information concerning the income from other sources are 
presented in the following table. 
Table 4. 3: Household income from other sources 
Categor ies Percent of total h o u s e h o l d 
1. Service 4 0 
2. W a g e earning 10 
3 . Remit tances 10 
4 . Pension 5 
5 . Business 5 
Almost two-third of the upper caste households has one member working in public 
offices, in India or overseas countries. The occupational caste people are working as 
wage labourers and are also engaged in other non-agricultural activities since the 
available land is not enough to support the family. The main agricultural and non-
agricultural activities performed by the occupational castes are ploughing during the 
agricultural season, carpentry and stone masonry. A group of occupational caste 
people said that there is enough work for skilled and semi-skilled workers 
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throughout the year. Only seasonal work is available for unskilled workers. The 
skilled workers in construction work have to remain idle only for two months during 
the monsoon. 
The land holdings and land tenure 
Almost all the farmers are owner cultivators. The average size of a holding for the 
household according to the VDC record is about 0.49 ha, which is slightly less than 
the district average (see chapter 3). However, this could be less due to division of 
land among brothers, which is not officially registered. There is no legal tenancy in 
the village. Share cropping is also not prevalent in the command area of the Chaurasi 
Kulo. Interestingly, the lands that do not have good irrigation facilities are rented out 
for share cropping. The concern of both the parties is not on the grain crop 
production but the by-product, i.e., rice and maize straw that are important for 
livestock feed. In this arrangement the owner provides the land and the tenant 
provides the labour, seed and the fertiliser. The product sharing is on a fifty-fifty 
basis. The share cropping is a contractual agreement between the two parties and it is 
usually for one season. Nearly 3 ha of land is under share cropping by 12 families in 
Annapurna Kulo according to the VDC estimate. Share cropping is not very common 
due to the small holdings owned by the majority of the farmers. For the big owners 
also, it is more profitable to employ a wage labourer than to provide land for share 
cropping because the land is productive. The prevailing agricultural daily wage rate 
in the village is NRs. 35-40 with a meal. 
Offering land as collateral for taking a loan is prevalent in the area. This is a 
contractual arrangement between the farmers and the creditor for some period of 
time. In that case the farmer who lends the money does not receive interest, instead 
the earning from the land is the interest. 
The upper castes hold large portions of the irrigated land. However, some 
occupational castes also have small pieces of land in the irrigated area but the income 
from agriculture is not sufficient to support their family. Nearly 255 households in 
the whole VDC do not have agricultural land but they have a small piece of land for 
their homestead. These people are mostly from the occupational castes. 
The farming system and the principal crops 
The type of soil in the irrigated area is alluvial which is suitable for rice farming and 
vegetable production. The cropping pattern in the area is rice based. The cropping 
pattern for Pakho/Bari is different from that in the Khet. The crop grown in Pakho is 
Khar that is mainly used for roof matching and as fodder for cattle. The crops grown 
in Ban are maize, pulses and millet. The farmers also plant different types of 
vegetable in the Bari land in order to generate cash income. The crops grown are 
cucumber, pumpkins and other leafy vegetables. The vegetables have been a good 
source of cash income for small land holders. Pakho/Bari is also suitable for growing 
fodder grasses as the availability of the fodder grasses is a constraint in the area due 
to the establishment of the community forests. 
The main cropping patterns for Khet land in the Chaurasi Kulo are rice-wheat-
maize, rice-wheat-fallow, rice-fallow-maize whereas for the Annapurna Kulo the 
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cropping pattern is rice-wheat-maize, rice-wheat-fallow, rice-vegetable-fallow, rice-
vegetable-vegetable. The present cropping pattern practised is rice during the 
summer. Wheat covers 40 percent of the lands. Farmers plant both improved and 
traditional varieties of rice in the area7. The improved variety matures early as 
compared to the traditional variety. This means that farmers could plant it late if the 
monsoon is not early. This has implications in terms of irrigation water as the crop 
may require less water and lessens competition for water in spring when rivers are 
very low. Most of the farmers preferred the traditional variety for their own 
consumption although the yield is less in comparison to the improved variety. 
Besides, the rice straw of the traditional variety is long, which is important from the 
point of view of livestock feed. 
Vegetables are grown on thirty percent of the land during the winter in the 
command area served by Annapurna Kulo. This means that the winter crop does not 
cover all the land. The farmers reported that they leave the land fallow because 
vegetable planting is labour intensive and it also requires more compost, which is not 
sufficiently available. Also some farmers were of the opinion that the soil fertility 
decreases if they have three crops in a year. However, vegetable is the main crop for 
the farmers with small holdings (0.05 to 0.25 ha). The availability of the irrigation 
water has been mostly beneficial to these farmers for off-season vegetables. Vegetable 
farming is most lucrative to the farmers and a good source of cash income. Marketing 
of the vegetables is not a problem as Pokhara is the main market. The main 
vegetables grown are potato, cauliflower, cabbage, radish, cucumber and other leafy 
vegetables. 
In case of vegetables, farmers plant only the improved variety. The use of chemical 
fertilisers is mostly for the vegetables along with compost. The use of insecticides is 
common for vegetable crops. The availability of chemical fertilisers and insecticides 
is not a constraint due to the easy access to the market in Pokhara. Farmers do not 
consider these inputs costlier as they are using it for cash crops. However, the size of 
the farms, the extent of the use of compost and availability of the chemical fertilisers 
determine the use of these inputs. 
Livestock plays an important role in the household. The use of livestock manure is 
important for crop production as it reduces the use of chemical fertilisers. Some of 
the households have a biogas installation. The slurry is used as fertiliser. However, 
the farmers reported that there is shortage of livestock feed. Some of the farmers buy 
the rice straw from the adjoining villages. 
The service from the agricultural sub-centre of the government - although it has an 
office in the village - is minimal due to its limited capability in terms of personnel. 
The farmers requiring services will have to go to the office. Farmers were critical 
about the level of services provided by the office. Nevertheless, the farmers can avail 
the services from the office in Pokhara. The office of the Agricultural Service Centre 
in the VDC provides services to four adjacent VDCs as well. 
Innovation in agricultural practices 
The Lumle Agriculture Research Centre8 played a crucial role in the development of 
the agriculture in the VDC area. Lumle had an out-reach station in the area for 17 
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years (1979-1996). It has imparted the knowledge on improved agricultural practices 
to the farmers. Farmers acknowledge that technical services provided by Lumle had 
a great impact in creating awareness among farmers. Consequently, farmers have 
been adopting improved agricultural technologies. The demonstration farm of Lumle 
was instrumental in introducing new crop varieties especially in horticulture — 
vegetables, oranges, improved fodder varieties and agro-forestry. 
A national level NGO with aid from SNV/Nepal is supporting farmers with 
vegetable growing to generate cash income. The response of the farmers is very 
positive towards the programme. The NGO is organising farmers into groups. The 
services rendered are technical advice on the production of off-season vegetables, 
seed distribution and establishing contacts between the farmers and government 
agencies. 
Migration 
According to the VDC, nearly 10 percent of the total households have one of their 
members gone for work to India and overseas countries. However, this figure does 
not include the seasonal migration. The people who have gone overseas are from the 
upper castes, as it involves large amounts of cash payment to the broker. The 
occupational caste people are seasonally migrating to Pokhara, Chitwan and other 
nearby towns for porterage and for working in shops and hotels during non-
agricultural seasons. In recent years there is no permanent out-migration from the 
village. The local people attribute this to the construction of the Pokhara-Baglung 
Highway and the construction of the Annapurna Kulo, which enhanced the economic 
opportunities for the local people. The completion of the highway has encouraged 
some in-migration into the village for residential purposes. Also, for the 
establishment of petty shops by the people from adjoining villages. 
Physical facilities 
The VDC area is developing into a 'town' due to the availability of the necessary 
infrastructure. The completion of the Pokhara-Baglung highway in 1991 has 
contributed to this aspect. The road links the VDC with the nearby town of Pokhara. 
Economic activities especially trade is growing in the village centre along the 
highway. The shops in the centre are catering for the needs of the people from nearby 
villages. 
There are one private campus, three high schools, five primary schools and three 
private boarding schools. A total of 2158 boys and girls are attending the school, 
which is 25 percent of the total population (DDC, op cit.). According to the VDC 
estimate, more than 90 percent of the school going age of children are attending the 
school. Most of the students from the upper caste families attend high schools and 
colleges. The drop out among the children from poor families and the occupational 
caste families is quite high. 
All the wards in the VDC area have piped drinking water facilities. All the wards 
except some villages in ward 6 and 8 have electrical facilities. Also there is one health 
post. The health post provides primary health care. The people go to Pokhara for 
major treatment and in case of emergency. There is also one Post Office. The services 
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of the Small Farmer Development Programme9 and the recently opened office of the 
Grameen (Rural) bank have been able, to some extent, to address the problems of 
marginal farmers and the women. There is one co-operative society formed by the 
farmers. It was rendering service, especially the supply of agricultural inputs to the 
farmers. During the time of this study in 1997 the co-operative was not functioning as 
it was incurring losses. 
There is one Tibetan Refugee Camp. Nearly 165 households of these refugees are 
in the area. The villagers have mixed reactions towards the refugee camp. The 
refugee camp is providing employment to some of the women in the village in carpet 
weaving. At the same time the camp is occupying nearly 50 ha of land and there is 
pressure on other natural resources - drinking water and forests as well. 
Existing social relationships 
The people in the VDC are satisfied with the relationship among various caste 
groups due to the interdependence among each other. The relationship between the 
people in the VDC can be classified into social relations, economic relations, political 
relations and caste relations. In the social relationship, kinship relation is the 
strongest one. The social and economic relationship between the descendants of the 
same family is based on close co-operation. The immediate help in any social event 
and economic matters comes from the family members, although the nuclear family 
is replacing the traditional extended family. At the same time the co-operation 
among various ethnic groups in any social event is the characteristic of the village 
life. 
The caste system is still prevalent, although officially abolished by the Muluki Ain. 
It was evident from the separate places assigned to the upper caste and the 
occupational caste people in a local tea shop. The occupational castes will have to 
wash the dishes from which they eat or drink whereas upper caste people do not 
have to do this. Nevertheless, the occupational castes can also have tea in the local tea 
shop. 
Higher castes are still dominant as exemplified in an event wherein one evening a 
Kami (occupational caste) was bitten by the dog of a Chhetri. The Kami hit the dog 
and in reply the owner hit the Kami with a stick. The Kami came to complain the VDC 
chairperson and the VDC chairperson had to settle the dispute by bringing together 
both the parties. The matter was settled when the man of the upper caste said that he 
will not repeat this sort of behaviour in future. 
The people of the occupational castes feel dominated as narrated by one Kami. 
Once he was irrigating his field from the nearest outlet, when one Brahmin asked 
him 'Why are you irrigating from the lower outlet as the outlet assigned for your 
field is a little further'. According to him he did not argue at that time. He continued 
to divert water to his field when the Brahmin left. His argument was why should he 
comply with what the upper caste person said since there were no rules in that 
regard. He also feels that he has the right to the nearest outlet as it increases the 
water use efficiency and the time required to bring water to his land is also less. 
These examples however, indicate changes in the social relationship. The 
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occupational caste people are also feeling more powerful so that they can argue with 
the upper caste people and defy the norms set in the past. 
The economic relation among various caste groups is based on the exchange of 
goods and services and borrowing money for social events and for the economic 
activities- This type of relation is more prevalent between the rich and the poor than 
among the people of same economic status. This economic interdependence is 
helping to maintain the ties among the various caste groups. Labour exchange, for 
example, which is known as Parma is common in the village. This is practised 
between all the people irrespective of their economic and social status. The exchange 
of a pair of oxen against the equivalent of four wage labourers is also in practice. 
However, during the time of planting the ratio is six wage labourers to one pair of 
oxen. 
Political relationships were becoming more vivid after the restoration of multi-
party democracy in 1990. It would be an exaggeration to say that all the people are 
active in party politics. The political relationship becomes more open during the local 
election, which is contested on party ideology. The educated and the identified party 
workers are more active in local politics. The general mass however, bases their 
selection of the candidate on merit basis and kinship relation. The elected 
representatives for the VDC are from high socio-economic strata. The representatives 
in the VDC at present, are 6 Brahmins, 4 Chhetris and one woman member from the 
Newar caste. The political representation in the VDC in fact does not reflect the social 
composition of the VDC as none of the occupational castes had their representation 
although, they constitute 25 percent of the population. The representation however, 
is an indication of the dominance of particular social groups in the decision making 
affairs of the VDC. The differences in the political ideology in general, have not 
affected other social and economic relationships between the communities according 
to the people. Nevertheless, in some cases the individual relations between the 
people are affected by the political affiliation. The political factor prevails also during 
the allocation of the VDC budgets for development programmes. The local leaders 
however, say that there is consensus among the representatives of the various parties 
in the selection of projects and the budget allocation for it. 
On-going development activities in the VDC 
The VDC is implementing other development projects through the development 
grant from the DDC and also through its own resources. The selection and 
investment in the projects (VDC record, 1997) suggest that great emphasis is put on 
the implementation and construction of village roads, culverts, drinking water 
improvements, construction of sub-health post buildings and maintenance of the 
schools. These projects are implemented through the Users' Committees (UC) 
formed by the VDC. The VDC provides partial expenses and the users will have to 
bear part of the costs. These small-scale projects are implemented on a wage basis. 
The contribution from the users ranges from 25 percent to 40 percent depending on 
the nature of the projects. The users' contribution is usually in the form of labour. 
Part II 
Chaurasi Kulo 
4.3 Environment of the irrigation system 
4.3.1 The irrigation system 
This irrigation system is one of the oldest in Kaski district of the Gandaki Zone in 
Western Development Region. The Bagale Thapa family who migrated from another 
part to this region built this system almost 150 years ago. The forefathers of this 
family had a reputation for constructing canals in other parts of the country also. 
This family, according to the villagers, requested permission of the ruler of Nepal of 
that time for the construction of the canal since an irrigation facility was not available 
in the area. 
This is a river valley irrigation system. The Yamdi Khola is the source for irrigation 
water and the discharge capacity of the temporary canal intake was 1.4 m 3/second. 
The length of the main canal is 4.30 km. There are 10 outlets at present, which 
delivers water to the field channels. There is no canal lining in the field channels. 
The field channels provide irrigation water to the terraced fields. The main canal has 
five foot bridges. There are 8 culverts, two drain inlets and four aqueducts (see figure 
4.1). The headwork of the main canal is temporary. There is lining on some parts of 
the main canal. Farmers construct the temporary intake of stones, bushes and twigs 
on the left bank of the Khola near Suikhet Bazaar. People used to construct the 
headwork during the monsoon season. The place for headwork construction changes 
almost every year as the river changes its course. The type and magnitude of work by 
the villagers depended on the changes in the water course. Sometimes the villagers 
had to make more effort in headwork construction as the distance between the canal 
and the water course increased, while other times it was less. Thus, the labour 
contribution and the type of work varied from one season to another. 
Until 1972 a goat was sacrificed before the start of headwork construction. The 
Jhankri (local healer) used to receive a goat to ensure the successful completion of the 
work and to protect the crop from inadequate rain in that year. Villagers contributed 
money to buy the goat. Worship was performed at the temple of 'Mai' (goddess) 
situated in the middle of the irrigation system in order to protect the crop from hail 
storms. However, this practice is discontinued now since villagers do not contribute 
and the Village Panchayat and VDC also were not interested in it anymore. The 
construction of a new irrigation system at the tail end of this scheme10 in 1989/90 
divided the scheme into two (see figure 4.2). 
4.3.2 The irrigated land and its distribution by ethnicity 
There were differences in the reported command area of the irrigation system. The 
previous study (Shivakoti, 1992) recorded that the command area was 100 ha and the 
number of farmers was 285 indicating that the average land holding would be 0.35 
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Figure 4.2: Layout of Chaurasi and Annapuma Kulo Irrigation System 
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ha per household. The survey by the District Irrigation Office (DIO) estimated that 
the gross command area was 205 ha and the net command area in 11 settlements was 
187 hectares. The VDC in 1997 estimated that the user households from the irrigation 
system were 350 and the net command area was 154 hectares (12320 mato muri). 
This indicates that the average size of holding within the command area would be 
0.44 hectares (VDC, 1998)". The VDC figure is considered more accurate as it collects 
land taxes also. 
The VDC chairperson said that there has been a reduction in irrigated area by 8000 
mato muri (100 ha) in Chaurasi Kulo and in the number of farmers by 250 after the 
construction of Annapurna Kulo (see figure 4.3 in part HI). The PBME review report 
(GEOCE, 1991) however, indicated that only 4320 mato muri (54 ha) previously 
irrigated by the Chaurasi Kulo was within the command area of Annapurna Kulo. In 
this respect the PBME review report is more accurate as the previous command area 
of Chaurasi Kulo was around 1600 mato muri (200 ha) according to the villagers. The 
distribution of land and the size of holdings among the various ethnic groups are 
presented in the table 4. 4. The names of the farmers have been counted only once 
even if they had several parcels of land in different locations of the command area. 
The number of farmers having more than one parcel of land is 74. 
Table 4. 4: The distribution of size of holding by ethnic group 
Ethnic group (numbers) 
S.no Size of 
holding 
(hectare) 
Brahmin Chhetri Newar Gurung, 
Magar and 
other castes 
Occupational 
castes 
Total 
1 <0.25 70 (62.5) 28 (25.0) 5 (4.5) 1 (.89) 8 (7.14) 112 
(32.1) 
2 0.3-0.5 89 (66.4) 37 (27.6) 4(2 .9) 3 (2.2) 1 (0.74) 134 
(38.2) 
3 0.55-1.0 46 (68.6) 20 (29.8) 1 (1.4) - - 67 (19.1) 
4 >1.0 28 (75.6) 6 (16.2) 3 (8.1) - - 37 (10.6) 
Total 233 (66.5) 91 (26.0) 13 (3.7) 4 (1.14) 9 (2.5) 350 
N o t e : T h e figures in parentheses are percentages 
The distribution of land holdings in the irrigated area is highly skewed in favour of 
the higher caste groups, mainly Brahmin. The occupational caste groups who 
constitute 25 percent of the village population hold only 2.5 percent of the irrigated 
land. The information also indicates that 90% of the farmers own less than one 
hectare of land. The majority of the farmers have between 0.3 and 0.5 hectare. 
Ethnically, the majority of the farmers holding more than one hectare are from the 
upper castes. Among this Brahmin caste group also, one particular clan group holds 
most of the land. This is because they are the descendants of the family who were the 
early settlers in the area. The poor families, who work as agricultural labourers, are 
economically dependent on them. Besides, they are also active in the local politics 
and other local affairs. They hold most of their land in the head and middle of the 
irrigation system. They are the ones who make most of the decisions related to the 
irrigation, since they hold most of the land in the command area. Thus, any decisions 
related to the irrigation cannot be implemented without their participation. The 
68 INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 
4.4 The process of interventions and change 
4.4.1 Irrigation under the Ditthawal up to 1960 
The first person I met was a former Ditthawal who was a descendant of the family 
who constructed the irrigation canal. He described that the government appointed 
one Ditthawal from their family. The system of Ditthawal was hereditary. The 
Ditthawal also acted as the head of the village. The Ditthawal had the authority to 
keep the land record and collect land taxes from the people on behalf of the 
government. The Ditthawal was in-charge of collecting land revenues as well. If he 
failed to collect the revenue, he had to pay them by himself. 
In earlier days the management system for the operation of the canal was 
hierarchical. There were 15 Mukhiyas12 under him to supervise an area that was 
allocated to them. The Mukhiya had to collect the land revenue for the government 
for which they were paid NRs. 5 for every NRs. 105 deposited to the government. 
Under the Mukhiya there was a Talukdar for a specific area to assist him in the 
collection of land taxes and to mobilise the people for the operation and maintenance 
of the irrigation system. 
The former Ditthawal told me that the government took over the management of 
the irrigation system from them. In fact the Land Reform Act of 1964 which took 
away the land tax collection function from the Ditthawal curtailed his power related 
to land adrninistration. In other words he could enforce no sanctions with respect to 
land and water. Besides, the Panchayat System introduced a new politico-
administrative structure in the country in 1962, which abolished the traditional 
system of local governance in which the Ditthawal had a key role in village 
administration. This was also the reason for the change in the management of the 
irrigation system. The Village Panchayat (VP) came into existence at the village level 
and this institution became responsible for managing public property at the local 
level. Nevertheless, the Ditthawal continued to adrninister the system as part of wider 
local administrative functions till 1966 under the supervision of the Village 
Panchayat13. 
The Birtau land of 2100 mato muri (26 ha) was kept as Guthi15 for the maintenance of 
the canal according to the villagers. The earning from 300 mato muri (3.75 ha) of land 
was given to the Ditthawal to pay for his services. The Birta system was utilised to 
extend the agriculture land and to maximise the agricultural production in order to 
collect more revenue (Regmi, 1978) and in the past there were various kinds of Birta 
systems in the country. This was because the main source of the government revenue 
at that time was the land tax. Therefore, the maintenance of the irrigation system was 
necessary to increase the land revenue as collection of the taxes was on the basis of 
present situation in the irrigation system is due to lack of their co-operation in 
devising the operational rules (see discussions on section 4.6). This shows the 
feudalistic characteristics of the village society. In this respect, this group of farmers 
has a key role over the irrigation water distribution. 
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production. In this respect, the primary function of Ditthawal was to operate the canal 
with the help of the farmers. Thus, basically the function of the Ditthawal was to 
manage resource base of the area including the proper management of the irrigation 
system. 
The Ditthawal was receiving the earnings from the Birta land, which was for 
managing the irrigation system. At present the Ditthawal has got the legal entitlement 
of the land. There was contradiction in the opinion of the villagers with respect to 
this legal entitlement. Some were of the opinion that he obtained the legal 
entitlement of the land without the knowledge of the villagers. Some others were of 
the opinion that the Village Panchayat and the villagers recommended the legal 
entitlement in 1977. It seems that the second version is more valid than the first 
version. It is not possible that the registration of land will go unnoticed in the village, 
where everybody is aware of the smallest of events in the village. In fact most of the 
villagers did not like to discuss this matter as the chapter was already closed. The 
former Ditthawal also avoided the question about this and said he did not know 
anything about the Birta land converted into private ownership. It was not clear 
whether the land was kept as Guthi or Birta. 
It was clear that the legal ownership of the land was not the reason for the 
Ditthawal to give up the management of the scheme as one of the Mukhiya at that time 
said. The abolition of the Birta system, the land reform designed to bring agrarian 
transformation in the country and politico-adrninistrative changes were instrumental 
for the disintegration of their traditional institution. The issue of the legal ownership 
of the land and the problem in the management of the scheme at present was the 
result of these three interventions. There were no known serious management 
problems in irrigation when the position of Ditthawal was in existence. 
4.4.2 The irrigation system under the Village Panchayat from 1964 up to 1990 
The Village Panchayat (VP) took over the management in 1964 after the intervention 
by DIHM in 1962. The DLHM continued to provide funds for the operation and 
maintenance of the scheme for 7 years (1964-1971). The officials of the Village 
Panchayat, according to some of the farmers, were interested in the annual 
maintenance funds coming from the government and did not mobilise internal 
resources. Besides, people were not interested in contributing to the maintenance 
since they knew that the funds were coming from the government. Hence, the VP 
could not enforce the strict norms for mobilising the resources for operation and 
maintenance. 
In 1980 the king called a referendum to choose between two political systems: 
Existing Partyless Panchayat System vs. a Multi-Party system. This affected the 
management of the irrigation system according to the former Pradhan Pancha 
(Chairman of VP). The VP could not enforce most of its decisions during the 
referendum period. Most of the educated people in the village persuaded other 
villagers not to obey the decision of the VP since they were in favour of the Multi 
Party System. 
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When asked about it, one farmer said that "why should they obey the Village 
Panchayat as it did not have legal authority to enforce any sanctions?" At this time 
the VP requested the DOI to take over the management of the irrigation system. In 
other words the VP wanted to transfer the ownership of the scheme to the 
government. This indicated the inability of the VP and its intention to get rid of the 
management of the system. However, the VP continued managing the irrigation 
system, when it could not persuade the DOI to take over the management. 
The Village Panchayat formed a Kulo Samiti to manage the irrigation system 
consisting of Village Panchayat members according to the former Pradhan Pancha, 
after the Partyless Panchayat system won the election. The study conducted by 
Shivakoti (1992:18)16 confirms this fact. The study indicated that the Kulo Samiti 
consisted of 11 executive members and 30 members at the branch level. A Pale was 
employed to allocate water to the branch canals (see section 4.6.2). He used to work 
under the direction of the Kulo Samiti. Besides, the Kulo Samiti used to look after the 
repair and maintenance of the canal. The committee used to make collective 
decisions for the type of work to be carried out. The nature and volume of work was 
determined through spot checking by these committee members. The effectiveness of 
the VP was gradually dimimshing after the referendum as the village was politically 
divided, although the committee was functioning. Hence, the VP could not enforce 
the rules. However, it did manage the system till 1990. The introduction of the Multi-
Party system in the country in 1990 brought changes in the local institution and the 
Village Development Committee (VDC) came into existence in 1992 in place of VP. 
The Kulo Samiti during the time of the VP dissolved with the abolition of Panchayat 
system, since majority of the members of it were VP officials. 
4.4.3 The irrigation system under the VDC since 1992 
The VDC is responsible for the management of the canal since 1992. It prepared a 
management plan for operating and mamtaining the canals. The works for canal 
maintenance were divided among the wards1 7, according to the former VDC 
chairman. The allocation of labour requirement was on the basis of the land to be 
irrigated in each ward. The plan did not work well in absence of necessary rules for 
the governance of the irrigation system. The reasons cited by the farmers were the 
following: 
• The government had commissioned a preliminary study through local 
consultants in 1992 for the rehabilitation of the canal, and had assured to provide 
assistance. Farmers were hopeful that the rehabilitation would take place. 
Therefore they were not interested in contributing to the maintenance. 
• Water availability for the farmers at the head and middle was sufficient at 
present. Because of this, they were not interested in any operational rules and 
they were also not interested in spending their resources for the maintenance of 
the canal. Only the farmers at the tail end who did not receive sufficient water 
wanted operational rules. Their efforts were not sufficient for carrying out 
maintenance activities. They do only occasional maintenance. 
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The farmers were of the opinion that the management under the VP was better, with 
an exception of the period during the referendum in which its authority was 
undermined, as compared to the management by VDC at present. This was because 
the people were afraid of the VP and used to report for Jhara (labour contribution)18. 
This was not strictly enforced during the time of VDC management. This shows that 
an authority of an institution was necessary to maintain social control, which could 
enforce necessary rules. This is important for the fair distribution of resources, which 
is important for mamtaining the linking loop among the users. 
One of the former Mukhiyas gave the following reasons for the break-down in 
traditional management practices. 
• The conversion of Birta land into Raikar (individual ownership) land to the 
Ditthawal. 
• The people did not like to contribute their resources, as they became dependent 
on government resources after the intervention in 1962. 
• The VP expected voluntary labour contribution from the people, while the VP 
officials misused the money available from the government. 
• Reduction in the number of users after the construction of the Annapurna Kulo at 
the tail end. 
The tail enders cited following reasons for the break-down of the traditional 
institutional practices. 
• ' The conversion of Birta land into Raikar land. 
• The elected village representatives were concerned only with votes instead of 
mobilising and preserving public resources for the common benefit. 
• The decline of Jhara practices. 
» The respect for agricultural work was dirninishing, in absence of education 
related to their vocation. 
• The norms and values in the society were deteriorating due to the vices 
(alcoholism and cards playing) among some of the villagers. 
4.5 The interventions in the irrigation system 
4.5.1 The intervention of 1962 
Parts of the canal were completely washed away due to a big landslide in 1960 
according to the villagers. The villagers petitioned the king during his royal visit to 
the region for a complete rehabilitation of the system as it was beyond the capability 
of the villagers. The king directed the DTHM to assist with their rehabilitation. The 
DIHM assisted the farmers with the rehabilitation in 1962. This shows how the 
combined objective of the users helped to form a linking loop between the users and 
the agency. The objective of the assistance was to restore the operation of the main 
canal. Parts of the main canal in the head and middle were lined using stones. 
During the time of rehabilitation the DIHM was operating the main canal. The 
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rehabilitation was completed in two years time. After the completion of the 
rehabilitation of the system, the DIHM left the village because it did not construct the 
canal and it assisted in the rehabilitation only. This means the interface between the 
users and the DIHM lasted for two years. In other words the loop between the users 
and the DIHM disintegrated at this time. 
Farmers however, wanted the DIHM to continue the operation and maintenance 
of the system because they did not have to contribute for its maintenance. TheVillage 
Panchayat took over from the DIHM. This means the organisational control of the 
irrigation system was transferred to the local institution. Thus, the management of 
the irrigation system at this time was in transition. This also indicates that the 
disintegration of the loop had an effect on the organisational of irrigation system. The 
VP, which came into existence in 1962, was not in a position to continue the old 
practices that were lost during the DIHM management. The Ditthawal also could not 
enforce the past norms as his position was not any more legally recognised. 
According to the opinion of some of the elders in the village, the traditional system of 
management was lost during this time. The changes in the interface between the 
existing institution and the users and the establishment of a new interface due to the 
emergence of new institutions were the causes for this situation. 
The farmers constructed a checkdam at the headwork in 1997 through the 
financial assistance from DDC and the material support from the DIO. The 
construction of the checkdam became necessary to divert water to the canal as the 
headwork was washed away by the flash flood. This indicates that the farmers were 
quick to form a linking loop to obtain necessary external support. However, the 
formation of linking was temporary. 
4.5.2 On-going Intervention in 1998-1999 
The Government, at the request of the VDC did a detailed survey and prepared the 
cost estimate in 1994 for the rehabilitation of the scheme. The objective of the 
rehabilitation was to increase agricultural production through the increased and 
reliable supply of irrigation water. The survey estimate was revised in 1998. The 
estimated cost of the project is NRs. 9.284 million. The government will provide NRs. 
7.934 million and the farmers will have to provide NRs. 1.114 million as labour 
contribution amounting to 12 percent of the total cost. The farmers will have to do 
earth excavation, collection and transportation of stones to the construction sites. 
Besides, farmers will have to contribute about NRs. 47,000 in cash which is 0.5% of 
the total cost. The farmers will have to deposit up-front money at the rate of NRs. 
2.50 for each 0.05 ha of land19 before the implementation of the intervention. This is a 
requirement for the rehabilitation under National Irrigation Sector Project (NISP) 
criteria. This is to ensure the users' participation and local involvement in the 
development programme as outlined in the eighth-five year plan. 
The rehabilitation work began in September 1998. The rehabilitation includes 
construction of weir of gabion wires with random rubble (RR) masonry core walls. 
The intake at river will be 1.0 mVsecond with one head regulator and one escape. 
The intake capacity is less than the capacity of the temporary intake, as there will be 
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control of the leakage due to construction of permanent weir. The capacity of the 
intake was found to be sufficient for the area to be irrigated, which was 154 ha. This 
is the only major construction proposed in the rehabilitation scheme. The main canal 
will have a partial lining. The rehabilitation also includes repair of six existing 
culverts and there will be two drain inlets. The proposed intervention will benefit 
particularly the tail enders in ward 2, 4 and 9, who were complaining about 
insufficient availability of water. This is because the VDC is expected to devise 
operational rules. 
The researcher visited the irrigation system in January 1998 to see the on-going 
rehabilitation work under NISP. It was learnt from the VDC officials including the 
chairman of the Users' Committee that the contract for the work was awarded for 
NRs. 7.2 million to a contractor from Pokhara. However, the main contractor had 
sub-contracted out the work to other contractors on a piece rate basis. This implies 
that the profit margin would be extended also to the sub-contractor. However, the 
sub-contract is for the labour only as the main contractor is providing the 
construction materials. During the visit the lining of the main canal was on going. 
Since there was no provision for the complete canal lining, the places for the lining 
were decided through discussion between the irrigation officials and the users. 
However, some resentment were observed during the talk with the users, as every 
farmer wanted to have the canal lined with a permanent outlet in his part of the land. 
Some farmers were exerting pressure on the contractor for lining. Besides, some of 
the users were putting polythene pipes on the outlet to their land at the time of lining 
to assure supply of irrigation water. Some of the farmers were demanding an 
additional outlet to their land. This was creating confusion for the contractor. 
According to the supervisor, who is a local person hired by the contractor, there was 
no unanimity among the UC members as some members tried to make some changes 
in canal lining whereas others wanted it according to the approved design. This 
made the task of the contractor difficult. The overseer at the site however said that he 
was trying to accommodate the users' demand as far as possible but only to the 
extent that it did not affect the original design substantially and the cost. For example 
he said that he had directed to the contractor to make additional provisions for the 
canal crossing for people and cattle also as was demanded by the farmers. The 
engineer in DIO confirmed this when he said that he had directed the contractor and 
the overseer to accommodate the farmers' need as far as possible. This indicates the 
flexible approach adopted by the officials, which would have a positive effect on 
accomplishing the task. There did not seem to be problems between the officials and 
the farmers but there were problems among the farmers as everyone was trying to 
pursue his own interest. This shows that the loop formed for the intervention was 
gradually dismtegrating due to the desire to fulfil individual objective, as every one 
was trying to take control of the irrigation water. The irrigation officials have also 
compromised with the attitude of the users as their primary objective is to 
accomplish the task without any hindrances. 
It was learnt from the engineer that they have maintained the transparency in their 
activities. For example they have notified the UC about the contract agreement in 
writing, which specifies the contract amount, responsibilities of the contractor, the 
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responsibilities of the users and the role expected from them with respect to the work 
performance of the contractor. This according to him would facilitate the 
communication between the contractor and the farmer, which is essential for the 
successful completion of the project. However, he expressed some scepticism with 
respect to the task that farmers would have to accomplish as they were lagging 
behind in fulfilling their part of the work. 
The role of VDC and UC in the rehabilitation that began in 1998 
The VDC on behalf of the farmers was taking the initiative for the rehabilitation of 
the scheme. The role played by VDC was encouraging as it was mamtaining the 
momentum, which started in 1992, when the government did preliminary survey of 
the system. It became more active in interaction with the DIO engineers when the 
fund for rehabilitation was included in government annual budget. The VDC 
collected the information from the farmers and submitted it to the DIO, which is a 
prerequisite for the intervention. At the same time the VDC was informing the 
farmers. All the farmers reported that they were aware of the rehabilitation work. 
Thus, there was a good communication between the users and the VDC. Besides, the 
VDC provided the cash amount, which was required along with the farmers' 
demand. This exemplifies how keen the VDC is on the rehabilitation of the scheme. 
The VDC vice-chairman however, said that the VDC would collect the money from 
the farmers afterwards. This seems to be unlikely as the amount was from the annual 
development grant of NRs. 500,000 provided by the government. The farmers from 
ward 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 and 9 may have successfully negotiated with the VDC to provide the 
money for rehabilitation work. In return, they will not ask for other development 
projects in their wards. 
One cannot overlook the initiative taken by the water users especially from the 
water scarce area of ward 4 and 9, and also the representatives from these wards 
were taking a keen interest. They seem to have persuaded the VDC for providing 
cash on behalf of the farmers, which was important for early initiation of the 
intervention. Whatever may be the case, the involvement of VDC to obtain resources 
for the rehabilitation of the irrigation system was significant. It also indicated how 
the intensive interface between the people and the VDC would facilitate the 
development work at local level. 
The VDC in consultation with the farmers had constituted a Users' Committee 
(UC) in August 19982 0 comprising nine members. The UC comprised a chairperson, 
vice-chairperson, the secretary and six members. The nomination to the UC had 
ensured the representation from all the wards within the command area of the 
irrigation scheme. The composition of the UC showed that seven of the members are 
Brahmin and two were Chhetri. Besides, out of the total members, six were elected 
members of the VDC from wards 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. The remaining three were not the 
elected members. The representation in the UC implied that the VDC was aware of 
the need to maintain close linkages both with the DIO and the farmers. Negotiations 
with the DIO officials would be easier for the elected officials. The representation 
from the farmers would help to ensure farmers' commitment towards the 
rehabilitation. Further, the representation from each ward would help in mobilising 
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farmers' labour contribution from the users in each ward. The UC had not yet 
become effective as the VDC was taking the lead. The VDC chairperson however, 
believed that UC would take over from the VDC by the time the construction work is 
finished. During the construction period also the UC members were not as active as 
was expected. 
Farmers' contribution 
The farmers as part of their labour contribution of 2.5 percent were to collect the 
stones and to do earth excavation, worth NRs. 180,000. The farmers were to provide 
1100 square metre (sq.) of stone. The VDC vice-chairman told that they already 
provided 300 sq. m of the stone worth NRs. 60,000. He said that the farmers did not 
collect the stones but provided the money to buy. During the discussion with the 
users it was learnt that they did not contribute the money but the VDC paid for them. 
The VDC secretary confirmed this. The VDC vice-chairman further revealed that, 
since people would not like to contribute labour, they were tliinking of negotiating 
with the contractor for the transportation of the stones from the nearby river, for 
which the UC would provide the money. The word 'negotiation' seems to have an 
underlying meaning, which is to request the contractor to bear partially the cost for 
stone collection. Besides, it seemed to be unlikely that the farmers would contribute 
the cash for stone collection. Instead, it is more likely that the VDC will have to 
contribute from its own resources as it paid 0.5 percent for the deposit also. This was 
adjusted from the savings made out of the fund made available by DDC for the 
emergency maintenance of the canal in 1997. The newly elected VDC officials were 
instrumental in securing the fund from the DDC, as majority of the members in VDC 
and DDC, including the chairperson are from the same political party. The labour 
mobilisation from the farmers for stone collection is unlikely for the following 
reasons. 
• The stones are not available in the nearby river. They have to be collected from a 
distance of nearly 3-4 km. 
• The availability of transportation facilities would not encourage the farmers to 
make labour contributions for stone collection and they will have to pay in cash 
for its collection and transportation. 
• The farmers were able to avoid cash contribution before as they saw the 
opportunity. 
• The VDC chairman has an interest in the completion of the project, as he comes 
from the area which is deprived of sufficient irrigation water since the 
construction of Annapurna Kulo. Besides, the completion of the project would be 
beneficial politically, and as such VDC is keen to accomplish the project. 
The discussion above shows that the users did not have the complete and direct 
participation in the intervention. This was due to the differences in the 'project ideal', 
and 'users interest'. The 'project ideal' was to ensure users' commitment of cash 
contribution before the initiation of intervention whereas 'users interest' was to avoid 
it. Thus, the DOI-UC loop was not functioning. But UC-contractor-VDC loop was 
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functioning well. It reveals that the loop formed before the intervention is not 
functioning taking into consideration of the users' participation. 
The intervention took place at the initiative of the VDC. It is important to note that 
the first VDC chairperson, who was elected in 1992, was able to persuade the DOI to 
conduct preliminary survey for the rehabilitation. The preliminary survey laid the 
ground work for the rehabilitation. However, the intervention did not materialise, as 
the government did not have the fund for the rehabilitation at that time. However, 
the government was committed for the rehabilitation, as it was holding discussion 
with the World Bank for the NISP. Because, of that it conducted the detailed survey 
in 1994. Thus, the link between the DOI and the VDC was maintained in the process 
of rehabilitation. The expected availability of the fund was important in this 
connection. The new officials of the VDC, who were elected in 1997 did play an 
important role in mamtaining the link with DOI by fulfilling the obligation required 
for the rehabilitation. As a result of this, the rehabilitation began when the 
government obtained the fund from the World Bank. However, the users did not 
fulfil their part of contribute. It is a general tendency that users would not like to 
contribute to the government programme, as they feel that the government has an 
obligation to fulfil towards them. This is largely due to failure in following the 
processes required for the participatory approach of the development, in which the 
users and the implementing agency have a direct contact. The gap was fulfilled by 
the VDC as an intermediary between the DIO and the users. This shows that the loop 
was effective at local level to miriimise direct costs to local people while getting work 
done. In this respect the outcome of the intervention was shaped through the role of 
the VDC. 
4.6 Management of irrigation tasks 
4.6.1 Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 
The irrigation system was developed long ago. The work related to water acquisition 
begins in middle of May every year. The villagers gather to collect materials to 
construct temporary head works. The users can receive the amount of water they 
require as the water available at the source (Yamdi Khola) during monsoon is 
sufficient and it does not affect the water availability to the Annapurna Kulo system 
down stream. There are no other systems operating nearby at the upstream. The 
materials include stones, twigs and sometimes gabion wire. The gabion wire is 
usually obtained from the DIO. The work is carried out under the supervision of the 
VDC. It takes 15 to 20 days for the construction of headwork. There have been some 
changes in the use of local materials in recent years. Previously, the boulders were 
used in sufficient quantity to construct the headwork. However, the use of boulders 
are declining due to lack of sufficient manpower as most of the farmers from the 
head and middle do not report for headwork construction. As a result the headwork 
used to be washed away by floods very frequently. Thus, the farmers have to 
construct it repeatedly in a year. This situation will be changed after the construction 
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of the permanent weir during the on-going intervention. However, this will lead to 
changes in administrative and political control, as the farmers may have to depend 
on government resources for its maintenance. 
The canal is operated usually from the second of June after the first monsoon 
begins. The water to the fields is released through the outlets. The water release to 
the outlet depends on the volume of water available in the main canal. In the 
beginning of the monsoon the first three outlets receive irrigation water. With the 
increase in the water in the main canal, the other outlets also receive water one after 
another. In this respect, the fields near the canal receive irrigation water first. When 
the water is at full supply in the main canal, all the outlets receive water 
simultaneously. The water level in the canal goes on decreasing from the end of 
September. At present the canal is not operated during winter, as the water is not 
available for winter irrigation. 
4.6.2 User allocation, system operation and water distribution 
The Ditthawal period 
Water allocation during the time of Ditthawal, was up to the outlet only, according to 
one of the Mukhiyas. In practice, according to another Mukhiya, there were no 
distribution rules at the head and middle of the canal. This was due to the sufficient 
availability of water in the canal as far as they were concerned. The allocation of 
irrigation water for each field channel at the tail end was proportionate to the 
irrigated area and the water distribution was on a rotation basis based on the mato 
muri. 
The farmers from the tail end confirmed the allocation rules during the time of 
Ditthawal. The water allocation was based on mato muri only up to the branch level. 
For example, the land at the tail end in ward 4 (see figure 4.1), which has 4000 mato 
muri (50 ha) was divided into two parts of 2000 mato muri each. The irrigation water 
was provided to 2000 mato muri each on a 24 hour rotation basis from the two branch 
canals. The distribution at the field level was the responsibility of the farmers, which 
the farmers decided through mutual consultation. The user receiving irrigation water 
from that field channel used to decide the rotation collectively based on the mato 
muri. The rotation used to be generally for 24 hours according to the farmers. 
According to them, some of the users did not like to adhere to the rotation. Usually, 
the farmers from upper caste with big holding used to dominate other farmers. This 
was the reason for occasional disputes among the farmers also at that time, which 
did not have serious impact on the overall management of the irrigation scheme. 
The VP period 
During the management period of the VP, the water allocation was also up to the 
branch canal on a rotation basis, according to the former Pradhan Pancha. He said that 
the VP used to invite farmers from each outlet to prepare a water distribution 
schedule at the beginning of the irrigation season. If there was any disagreement, 
that was solved through discussion among the farmers in order to avoid any conflict 
afterwards. The VP initiated the position of Pale for water distribution, according to 
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the former Pradhan Pancha. There were three Pales working at that time. The VP paid 
the Pale for his services. The Pale used to monitor whether each farmer was 
complying with the rotation schedule. 
One of the Pales who worked for 5 years (1966-1971) mentioned the following 
about the management at the time of VP. A proportioning weir of bamboo and wood 
was used to allocate water. One Bitta (6 inches) volume of water was provided to 200 
Mato Muri when sufficient water was available. This volume of water was the 
maximum given when enough water was available in the canal. Thus, the water 
allocation was controlled according to its availability through the adjustment of the 
notches in the weir. The agreement between the members of different branch canals 
was required for the allocation. The Pale used to regulate the water from the main 
canal to the branch (distribution) canal and from branch canal to the field channels. 
He used to inform the farmers about their rotation schedule after allocating the water 
from the branch canal to field channels. Angul (the width of a finger) was the 
measurement for deterrnining volume of water for each field channel based on the 
mato muri. One angul of water was provided to the 66 mato muri when sufficient 
water was available. Then the farmers used to prepare the rotation schedule 
collectively. The rotation was for 24 hours. The Pale system continued till 1990, when 
the multi party system was introduced in the country. According to this Pale, the 
water right was defined during the time of Ditthawal and for some time of the VP 
management also. The land at the tail end known as Bais khet received water for 
planting only during that time. They received water for a specific period of time and 
they had to finish their planting during that period. Those who could not finish the 
land preparation and transplanting by that time would have to leave their land 
fallow. This was the main reason for farmers to take initiatives for the construction of 
the Annapurna Kulo at the tail end. The discussion with them revealed that water 
allocation and distribution was based on the principle during the time of Ditthawal 
and for some time under the management of VP. The allocation to the branch canals 
and distribution from the field channels were according to the mato muri. There were 
no written rules, however. Nevertheless, the norms were established and farmers 
agreed to it. 
The VDC period 
Several narratives from local water users show the changes and presence of water 
management in the contemporary period. Water requirement for paddy is high 
during July to September. Usually, the land preparation begins at the end of March. 
Seed bed preparation begins in April. The transplanting starts at the beginning of 
June. Since the planting is dependent on the availability of irrigation water, it could 
be either earlier or delayed by one to two weeks due to the monsoon. There is water 
scarcity during this time at the tail end. The farmers at the tail end start their planting 
two weeks later as compared to the farmers at the head and the middle due to the 
insufficient availability of water. Regarding the allocation practice at present (during 
the time of the field study in 1996-97), one woman named Devi Sharma from the tail 
end said: "better not talk about this, who listens to us?" She was a widow and head 
of the household. She had a family of 6 with a land holding of 0.6 ha at the tail end of 
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the irrigated area. She had a married son who was away for employment and study 
as well. She was managing the household and farming with the help of her daughter-
in-law. She was narrating how difficult it was to manage the farming in absence of 
able male members in the house. She continued saying that there were no allocation 
and distribution rules. Therefore, physical presence is necessary for getting water 
during the peak period. Males go to the field during the night but females cannot, 
even if there were problems in getting the water. Women do not go out from the 
house after dark. The strongest dominates the others. Sometimes the neighbours 
used to divert the water to their fields and she could not quarrel with them. The 
farmers at the beginning of the tail end use more water when there is an increase in 
the volume of water in the field channels. Others could not get the water that they 
needed. In the past she was saying, the kin used to help in irrigation at night but 
these days nobody cared. The traditional system of kinship relationship was also 
disintegrating. The need for irrigation water was so important that the kinship 
relation was becoming secondary. 
The changes in the dimensions of the social relations were related also to the 
changes in the layout of the irrigation system. It was due to the construction of 
Annapurna Kulo. This part of the land used to be in the middle of the original Chaurasi 
Kulo. The water availability at the tail end at present is not sufficient for all the land 
in planting period. In that case it was natural that the farmers having land near the 
field channel would not allow it to flow to other fields unless there is enough for 
their land. Thus, the timely monsoon was very crucial for the farmers at the tail end. 
Besides, as the Pale said there were allocation rules in the past that do not exist now. 
Ram Prashad with a family of 7 from the tail end also had the same view about the 
practices at present. He has 0.45 ha of land in the command area of Chaurasi Kulo and 
0.15 ha of land in the command area of Annapurna Kulo. According to him, the 
farmers at the head unite to allocate water among themselves. They do not consider 
the needs of farmers at the tail end. He said that the farmers from the head and 
middle let the water flow from their field to the river. If they use it prudently more 
water would be available to the tail end. They were misusing the available water 
according to him. This was more acute in the middle of the irrigation system and 
these lands were inundated. The excess water then flowed to the river. The overflow 
occurs during the night as the farmers do not go to check the field in the night. One 
of the reasons for this was that the farmers from the middle used to block the canal in 
order to raise the water level so that the water flows to their fields, because the land 
at that place was higher than the canal. This meant the disruption of the normal flow 
of water to the tail end. He was also talking about water stealing at night especially 
during the planting season when the monsoon was late. As a consequence, last year 
he had to spend two nights in the field to irrigate his land. According to him there 
were no strict rules for water distribution at present as there were in the past. Those 
having able members in the house would divert more water to their fields. Thus, a 
good monsoon is a blessing to the tail ender. This year he did not have to spend the 
night in the field because, the monsoon was good. 
The group of farmers from the tail end21 was telling that there were no rules in 
allocating irrigation water. The tail enders had to satisfy themselves with the water 
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available in the canal. They complained that the farmers at the head and middle, 
whose lands were above the canal, used to construct temporary blockages of bush 
and mud to raise the water level. For the tail enders it was OK as long as they used 
the water for irrigating their land. Instead after flooding their fields they let the 
overflow from the field to the river. 
The dismantling of the blockage after use would have increased the water volume 
in the lower reaches of the canal. During the field trip it was observed that some of 
the farmers at the middle reaches were using temporary blockages of tree trunks and 
bushes to raise the water level. The deposition of silt in the canal was also increasing 
for the last ten years due to these temporary blockages. Some of the farmers, whose 
land were higher than the canal level was levelling their fields to bring it to the canal 
level. Earth is in demand in Pokhara for filling up the building sites. By doing this 
they could earn the money and they also could access the irrigation water more 
easily. 
The person who was helping me in my field study said that since every farmer 
needed water, nobody thought of others and there was no sanction for misusing the 
water. He had 1.5 ha of land in the middle reaches of the canal. The farmer did not 
get appreciation for not constructing a blockage, according to him. Instead he was 
considered to be a fool. He opined that the tail enders did not go to dismantle any 
blockage at present. He was recalling that in the past people from the tail end used to 
go several times in a week to dismantle the blockages. This sort of action would have 
made farmers from the middle reaches of the canal realise their incorrect behaviour. 
This was their weakness, according to him. The number of farmers using water at the 
tail end had decreased after the construction of the Annapurna Kulo. Therefore, they 
were not inclined to quarrel with the farmers at the head and middle22 reaches. At the 
same time the water availability should have been sufficient for the rest of the land, 
as the command area of the Chaurasi Kulo also had decreased. But it is ironic that the 
available water is sufficient only for 1/3 (24 ha) of the presently irrigable land at the 
tail end during planting period according to the farmers estimate. Also, the water at 
the intake is less due to the temporary headwork. This affected the production also. 
Production was down by 2/5th due to unavailability of the water according to the 
others present at the tea shop. This is due to the excessive use of water by the farmers 
in the head and middle parts. These farmers are from one clan group and they would 
not like to devise any operational rules. In this connection it is important to note that 
the majority of the farmers from the middle come from one clan group from upper 
caste. Thus, they unite to fulfil their group need. The rules will restrict their 
unlimited access to the irrigation water. 
Krishna Sharma from the head had a different opinion. He had 0.45 ha of land at 
the head of the irrigation command area. He had a family of three. Regarding water 
availability he said that water was adequate for his field. At the same time he opined 
that the VDC was not effective in formulating and implementing the allocation rules. 
He admitted that the farmers at the tail end had problems in absence of allocation 
rules. 
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According to the VDC vice chairperson there are possibilities of increasing the 
water availability from Chaurasi Kulo if properly managed. His definitions of proper 
management were: 
• Control of water stealing by the farmers at the middle and the head end. 
• Control of leakage by properly mamtaining the canals and field channels. 
• Control of wastage (by avoiding that water from the canal flows via the field to 
the river) by the farmers at the head and middle reaches. 
• Proper allocation of the irrigation water on a rotational basis for, which there was 
no mechanism to enforce it at present. 
The VDC chairperson said that it was natural to have conflicts when there was less 
water in the canal. There was no incentive to the farmers from the tail end to 
contribute to improvements in the scheme that will increase the water volume to the 
tail ender because, the first benefit from the increase of the water would go to the 
farmers at the head and middle. The farmers from the tail end requested the farmers 
from head and the middle in this respect but they were not willing to co-operate. 
From the discussions it seems that the issues related to water allocation and 
distribution are complicated in the absence of authority to devise rules for it. This 
was also due to the lack of collective decision making processes, which are important 
in common property resource management. 
Everyone, except the tail ender, would like to maintain the status quo, including 
the VDC members and local respected people. Clearly, the farmers from the head 
and the middle would not like to give up the benefit they were enjoying until now. 
The VDC was not co-operating in this respect for political reasons. The elected 
leaders did not like to make the voters unhappy. Evidently, both the former and the 
current VDC chairpersons opined that the allocation rules would be enforced after 
the rehabilitation. The current VDC chairperson who comes from the tail end in ward 
4 is also waiting for the rehabilitation to take place. This suggests that devising rules 
was not an easy task without the co-operation of all the users. Also, the intervention 
creates special conditions when rules become abused or ignored. His expectation to 
solve the problem after the rehabilitation seems to be based on the following reasons: 
• The constitution of the UC would be mandatory to all, as it will become a legal 
entity. 
• The VDC would assert its role since it provided the cash from its funds for 
farmers' contribution. 
• The water users from all the reaches would have an equal say if they contributed 
proportionately for the rehabilitation. In that case, the farmers from the tail end 
would be able to exert pressure on the farmers from the head and the middle 
reaches. 
• The construction of the permanent headwork and partial canal lining would 
assure more water in the canal that would increase the water availability at the 
tail end. 
• The grievances of the farmers at the tail end would reduce since they would not 
have to contribute for temporary headwork construction any more. 
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The proposed intervention would be beneficial to the farmers from ward 4 and 9 at 
the tail end of Chaurasi Kulo. This is because the permanent headwork will augument 
more water in the canal and also VDC is expected to devise the allocation rule. 
Nearly 30 ha of land are not receiving irrigation water at present after the 
construction of Annapurna Kulo. Previously, Chaurasi Kulo served these areas. Now 
they did not receive irrigation water either from the Annapurna Kulo or Chaurasi Kulo. 
These lands are at a higher level than the Annapurna Kulo. The water from Chaurasi 
Kulo does not reach these fields due to leakage in the head and middle reaches. The 
volume of water in the canal also was not sufficient due to absence of the annual 
canal cleaning and maintenance. This was because, the farmers at the head and 
middle were receiving enough water at their fields without any contribution. Thus, 
they did not like to get involved in the annual contributions for cleaning and 
maintenance for providing irrigation water to the users at the tail end. Furthermore, 
the farmers at the head and middle reaches did not allow the construction of separate 
canals to serve the lands at the tail end, which did not receive irrigation water. 
The discussions above suggest that the principles of user allocation and 
distribution have undergone fundamental changes since the time of Ditthawal. This 
was due to the erosion of operational rules caused by changing institutional control. 
Besides, the farmers at the middle are in social control due to their higher position in 
the social structure, as well as their location in the system. 
4.6.3 Conflict Management 
The VP period 
There was a problem in water distribution during the management by VP also. Some 
of the farmers used to steal water usually at night according to the Pale. Some used to 
remove the proportioning weir at the branch canals. Some of the farmers used to 
divert the water to their field from others' fields, even though it was not their turn. 
The blockage by farmers at the middle reaches of the canal could lead to fighting 
among the farmers. During the time of Ditthawal these very people used to carry 
water in a bamboo basket from the canal to the field, as the canal was 3-4 feet below 
the level of land. According to them the depth of the canal had reduced to half since 
1960 due to the deposition of silt23. This had been an unexpected benefit to those 
whose lands were higher than that of the level of the canal. Now they did not have to 
put so much effort in irrigating their fields. 
The Pale was authorised to detect where the water stealing was taking place and 
he had to report this to the VP. The farmers also could report to the VP, if someone 
did not comply with the rules for water allocation and distribution. If the information 
was true, the VP would penalise these concerned. The sanction procedure was to 
warn the offender for the first time. If he repeated the action again then the penalty 
inflicted was to cut off the water to his fields. 
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The VDC period 
During the time of VDC the farmers at the head and middle used to divert all the 
water to their fields when the monsoon was not good, according to the view of a 
farmer from the middle. The farmers at the tail end used to quarrel with the farmers 
at the head and middle. This farmer mentioned an incident in 1993 when the farmers 
from the tail end went to remove the illegal blockage constructed by the farmers in 
the middle of the night. They were carrying shovels, axes, sticks and Khukris (native 
weapons). While they were trying to destroy the blockage, the farmers at the upper 
reaches of the canal came out to make trouble and a scuffle ensued between them. 
The farmers from the middle and head brought the farmers from the tail end with 
their weapons to the VDC chairperson's house. The farmers from the head and 
middle reported that people from the tail end came to destroy the canal and tried to 
hit them with their weapons while they were preventing it. The VDC chairperson did 
not believe it. He asked them to disperse and assured them to listen to their 
grievances when the VDC office opened. 
The VDC chairperson at that time confirmed the incident. The following morning 
the VDC invited the local leaders and the farmers from the tail end and the middle to 
discuss the issue. The farmers from the middle agreed to the amount of water to the 
tail reaches by reducing the height of the blockage. According to him, this issue came 
up only once in the last four years. These showed that the farmers from the head and 
middle reaches were aware of their misbehaviour. This indicates that the social 
interface is important in applying social control. However, the episodic incident of 
this kind has not been effective for permanent solution of the disputes. 
One of the old men who admired the old practice of canal operation and water 
allocation said that such a conflict occurred at present also. According to him the 
solution should be in line with the old norms in which the land holding is the basis 
for water allocation. This exemplifies how the disregard of the old norms results in 
disputes among the farmers. The conflict at present was also due to the change in the 
hydraulic configuration of the scheme after the construction of Annapuma Kulo. 
4.6.4 Resource mobilisation 
The Ditthawal period 
The labour mobilisation during the time of Ditthawal was proportionate to the size of 
the land holding inside the irrigation scheme, that is, more land more labour 
contribution in mandays. The nature of the work deferrnined the contribution. The 
Mukhiya in consultation with the farmers used to decide this. Annual canal cleaning 
was a regular activity. Each farmer irrespective of his caste and location of his land 
had to contribute labour. The Ditthawal used to fix the working days for the 
maintenance of the canal and the Mukhiyas and Talukdar were responsible for 
mobilising the people from their respective areas. Those not reporting to the work 
had to pay in cash (32 paisa for 0.05 ha, NRs 1=100 Paisa). This amount would 
double each day. The Ditthawal had the authority to confiscate the land if someone 
did not report for five days and he would report it to the land revenue office. There 
was a penalty for the Talukdars also if they could not mobilise people for the 
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maintenance. In extreme cases, it was physical torture. Some of the villagers told that 
the Talukdar used to be tied up at a tree in the sun for the whole day, which was 
known as Choke. It could be said that the labour mobilisation at the time of Ditthawal 
was based on strict sanctions. In other words it was a customary participation and 
not voluntary. People did participate for fear of losing their land. 
The VP period 
In 1962 the DIHM provided NRs 61,00024 and farmers mobilised 18000 mandays of 
labour for the rehabilitation of the canal according to the former Pradhan Pancha. This 
means the cash contribution was NRs. 203 per hectare (300 ha) and the labour 
contribution was 6 mandays for one hectare. The water users contributed one 
manday of labour for four mato muri for the rehabilitation work according to the 
former Pale. According to this statement the labour contribution from the farmers 
becomes 6000 mandays. This figure provided by the Pradhan Pancha seems to be 
accurate given the magnitude of the damage as described by the people. 
VP used to mobilise the labour contribution for the annual canal cleaning during 
February and March to get the canal ready for irrigation. The Village Panchayat used 
to make decisions and the Katuwal25 had to inform the people. People had to report to 
the work and mark their presence by signing the Panchayat register. The nature and 
extent of tasks determined the work load. Each ward would have to clean certain 
lengths of the canal. The division of work was proportionate to the use of irrigation 
water by the wards and the irrigated land holding of each farmer in the ward. The 
ward members were responsible for mobilising the people for the work assigned to 
their ward. Mobilisation of 600 to 700 hundred persons was required for the annual 
maintenance according to the Pale. This means that a little more than two persons per 
ha were required for canal cleaning in the command area of 300 hectare. According 
to the villagers the VP was effective in carrying out necessary maintenance work but 
was not effective in the allocation and distribution of water. Farmers reported that 
the users from the Chaurasi Kulo had to contribute twice the amount for the 
construction of the headwork after the construction of Annapurna Kulo due to the 
decrease in the number of users because the maintenance requirement did not 
change. However, there was no cash contribution and there has been no change in 
the labour contribution for annual cleaning. Shivakoti (1992:19) however, reports that 
the labour contribution before the construction of Annapurna Kulo was 3 mandays for 
one hectare of land. That was equivalent to two persons from the household in a 
year. The differences in the figure could be due to the differences in the tasks 
accomplished each year. He also reported that the cash contribution had almost to be 
doubled and three times of the labour had to be mobilised for annual maintenance of 
Chaurasi Kulo after the construction of Annapurna Kulo due to the decrease in the 
number of users. 
One of the Mukhiyas opined that some of the farmers at the middle reaches of the 
canal had no interest in canal cleaning in the past because their land did not receive 
irrigation water as it "was higher than the canal level. He said only 10-15 people 
turned up at present, if you call for Jhara. It was because water availability was the 
concern of only the tail enders. Those who required water made efforts to extract 
CHAURASI KULO AND ANNAPURNA KULO 85 
water from the river. Before, some of the people who used to command social respect 
also reported for Jhara because of the fear of "what others will say if they did not 
maintain the social norms", but now, the young educated did not like to do this 
work, which they considered menial. This attitude is a reflection of the influence of 
the towns and modern education. Moreover, some of them were working in the 
offices, which allowed them to pay for the wage of a labourer instead. Old people 
were not able to do heavy work and women are not asked to do heavy work. He 
believed that the traditional practice of labour mobilisation disappeared after the 
VDC took over the management. There was a penalty for those who did not report 
for work during the time of VP. The penalty was taking out the harrow from the 
plough. In his view leadership and control under one authority was lacking. 
According to him the Ditthawal system was effective for resource mobilisation and 
social work as they could enforce strict norms. This reflects the disintegration of the 
social fabric due to the break-down of social norms and preoccupation of farmers 
with other works. Plenty of stones were used in the construction of the headwork in 
the past according to him. Naturally, this required more labour. These day people 
diverted water by using tree branches and bushes only. This was an example of 
coping with challenges of labour shortage by adopting a new technology. But this 
technology was not very effective for water control and the water in the canal was 
declining because of the poor functioning of the headwork. This had affected 
especially the farmers at the tail end. That is why mainly farmers from the tail end 
were putting in more efforts. They also did most of the maintenance work such as 
repairing holes in the canal to reduce the leakage. 
The VDC period 
A woman from the tail end said that at present every one had to contribute labour for 
the head work construction. She complained that the male farmers came to quarrel 
with her for not contributing enough for the diversion of water at the" headwork. 
They used to say "why are you irrigating without increasing the volume of water in 
the main canal"?. "I had to send someone to work on wage since I cannot work on 
my own". At present the Katuwal indicated the time and date for the work. The ward 
member noted the presence of all those who provide labour at the time of the 
construction of the headwork. Those who did not report for the work would have to 
pay NRs. 70 for the labour. The people from the head and middle reaches in fact did 
not work for water diversion according to her. It was only the people from the tail 
end who had to contribute and still it was difficult to get enough water in time. She 
complained that they expected equal contributions but sharing of benefits was not 
equal. This exemplifies that labour contribution is no longer considered an obligation 
to the proportion of water right. 
A male farmer from the tail end said that previously all the farmers had to go for 
Jhara but these days only the people from the tail end made a contribution. In one 
season people should contribute 15 days of Jhara but not all the people from the tail 
end do this. Only 10-12 persons out of nearly 100 farmers at the tail end in ward 4 
used to go for the construction of the headwork. These farmers used to say that "we 
brought the water therefore we have the right to get it." He said that he had been 
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going to Jhara for 40 years but he had never seen any body from the head and middle 
reaches of the canal. This seems to be an exaggeration as he himself contradicted his 
first statement "all the farmers used to go for Jhara during the management period of 
Ditthawal and in the beginning of VP management". 
The farmers from the tail end requested the VDC to devise a new system for 
labour mobilisation. Their proposal was that the labour mobilisation should be 
proportionate to the land holding to make the contribution of labour more equitable. 
The VDC chairperson suggested that since the government support for rehabilitation 
was forthcoming, equitable solutions would be developed after the rehabilitation. 
There was no sanction imposed on those who did not report for work. Now the 
contribution is 'voluntary' unlike in the past when there was compulsion for 
contribution. 
In the planting season of 1997 the farmers had to put more labour for the 
construction of the headwork due to the damage caused by a flashflood. The VDC 
formed a UC to take necessary measures to operate the canal. The UC mobilised both 
external and internal resources to operate the canal. The district committee for 
natural calamities provided NRs. 150,000, the DIO provided 65 pieces of gabion wire 
and farmers contributed 2500 mandays of labour. The cash and the gabion wire were 
used to construct the checkdams near the head works. It indicates that the external 
resource mobilisation is an integral part for emergency maintenance. 
4.6.5 System maintenance 
The VP period 
The committee formed by the VP during its period of management concentrated 
mainly on the maintenance work. The work included were the construction of the 
head work and annual canal cleaning. The VDC did not do major maintenance work 
during its management. 
The VDC period 
According to the version of one of the Mukhiyas, the water flow in the canal has 
deteriorated since there was no annual cleaning. Sufficient irrigation water would be 
available for all the land when the canal was maintained regularly. He thought that 
the farmers from the head and middle reaches lost interest in maintenance as they 
got sufficient water. He further said that the norms in the village deteriorated after 
the multi party system was introduced in the country in 1990. This was because the 
party politics were affecting every aspect of life in the village. These day village 
officials do not like to disappoint any one because of the votes. That is why they 
cannot enforce strict rules for fear of losing votes. He said that the people from the 
tail end requested the VDC to construct separate branch canals directly from the 
source but the VDC did not respond to it. However, the construction of separate 
branch canals is not an easy option since the farmers at the middle would not like to 
cede their land as the canal would have to pass through their land. This argument 
was supported by the fact that the on-going intervention was also not making 
changes in the existing layout as it entails the issues of land acquisition. 
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One farmer from the head reach said that the head works construction is regularly 
required because of the flash floods that wash away the intake. Sometimes the people 
from the settlement on the left side of the canal damaged the headwork. They were 
afraid that the flood in the river would wash away their settlement. In that case they 
had to repeat the task. There was no settlement near the head of the river before. The 
settlement was established after the construction of Pokhara-Baglung highway. This 
in fact was an unintended consequence of the development intervention. The farmer 
seemed to be frustrated and was worried about the lack of adequate attention for the 
maintenance of the canal. He was wondering what would happen if major 
rehabilitation work were required to operate the canal properly. But this problem is 
not likely to happen as the government is imtiating the rehabilitation. People do not 
in fact realise the benefit of timely maintenance so that more water could go through 
the canal. Concerning the rules for the maintenance that the farmer also thought that 
the VDC was not effective in mobilising sufficient resources as in the time of 
Ditthawal. Further, he was saying that older people could not work as hard 
physically as in the past. The lack of interest amongst the young people with some 
education is also one of the reasons for the poor maintenance of the canal. Their 
interest is in finding a job in offices rather than staying in the village. This is because 
agricultural income is not sufficient to support the family. 
The decrease in the number of people at the tail end, who now receive irrigation 
water from the Annapurna Kulo, is another reason for low participation for the 
maintenance work. Farmers restored part of the main canal near the headwork 
during the planting season of 1997. The farmers were able to change the course of the 
river and made it possible to construct the headwork. This indicates that the farmers 
with the help of the VDC will take necessary action in time of needs. 
4.7 Governance and property rights 
During the time of Ditthawal there were established operational rules in the irrigation 
system due to the presence of rewards and sanction procedure. Thus, the 
management of the irrigation system was continuing without any hindrance. Two 
types of property rights were in existence in the irrigated area. The farmers at the tail 
end had water rights for the planting only whereas the water rights of other users 
was based on mato muri in the irrigated area. The Ditthawal decided the allocation of 
water for each branch canal in consultation with the farmers. The water availability 
in the canal and the area to be irrigated by each of the branch canal was the main 
criteria for the allocation of water. At the field level the farmers from the outlet used 
to decide the water distribution, which was also based on mato muri. Annual 
maintenance of the canal was also strictly enforced. Thus, the water right of the 
farmer was tied up with the labour contribution. The intervention by the DIHM 
brought changes in the governance of the irrigation system and the collective choice 
rules were lost during this period as farmers did not have to contribute for the 
regular maintenance of the irrigation system. However, there was no change in the 
operational rules, as Ditthawal was working side by side. The VP took over the 
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management and enforced the operational rules for some time, which was based on 
the norms during the time of the Ditthawal. However, strict sanctions for those not 
conforming to the rules were not enforced. Thus, there was gradual decline in the 
enforcement of the rules, which was a pre condition for the successful management 
of the irrigation system. Annual labour contribution for the operation of the canal 
was not compulsory for receiving irrigation water. The water right of each of the 
farmer was not respected. As a result, the farmer from the tail end suffered most. 
The governance during VDC management was not based on strict rules. The 
system was functioning but with greater inequity. The water rights based on mato 
muri were not strictly enforced in absence of the proper rules. Several conditions 
(shared cost and benefit, proper monitoring of the behaviour of the users and 
effective sanction procedure) for the successful operation of the irrigation scheme 
were violated. The water rights of the users at the tail end were not protected in 
absence of the operational rules. The users from the head and the middle continued 
to take benefit out of this situation. They draw the collective choice rules in the 
irrigation system for their benefit. This indicates how breaking of norms by some of 
the users could negatively affect the enforcement of rules. As a result the users lost 
the interest in the maintenance of the irrigation system. 
There were various perceptions on the issue of ownership of the canal. An old 
person who served as one of the Mukhiya from the head was of the opinion that the 
canal is government property. He opined that the canal was developed with the 
consent of the government. The government had provided the support in time of 
need. According to him the government should officially take over the ownership 
and will have to undertake the maintenance responsibility as well, since the people 
in the village were lazy. However, another Mukhiya said that the ownership of the 
irrigation system was with the farmers. But he said that most of the people in the 
village would be happy with the improvement of the structure through government 
assistance. 
On the same issue, one of the old farmers from the tail end said that the irrigation 
system is a government property. His reasoning was that they did not pay the taxes 
for the land occupied by the canal. Also, the group of farmers interviewed from the 
tail end was of the opinion that the irrigation system was public property. They 
expressed their worry about the deteriorating condition of the canal structure. The 
VDC should have looked into it but it was indifferent towards the situation. 
The former VDC chairperson was of the opinion that the ownership of the 
irrigation system was with the people. In his view the ownership would continue to 
be with the people even after the government intervention. Also the present VDC 
chairperson had the same opinion. According to him people will have to take over 
the management of the canal after the rehabilitation. This showed that the local 
leaders were aware of their responsibility in managing the system. This was a very 
positive aspect in ensuring the farmers' participation in the management of the 
irrigation system. But the local leaders will have to convince the farmers. 
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4.8 Water control 
The control structures in the irrigation system consist of temporary intake of stones, 
muds, twigs and gabion wire. There are no technical control structures like sluice 
gates. The irrigation water to the field channels is controlled through the outlets in 
the main canal. The adjustment in the volume of water to the outlets is through the 
use of mud and stones. At the field channels the distribution of irrigation water to 
different fields are also controlled through the use of mud and stones at the outlet of 
the field channels. The operation and maintenance of the control structures is done 
through the use of local skills and materials. However, the local people have to 
obtain some materials like the gabion wire from outside. There have been no major 
changes in the control structures since the construction of the irrigation system. 
However, the on-going rehabilitation will bring change in the control structure 
through the construction of permanent weir at the intake and permanent outlet in the 
main canal. 
The organisational control in the irrigation system has undergone major changes 
since the time of the Ditthawal and VP, which were discussed in the previous 
sections. The formation of UC in the process of intervention is likely to bring new 
organisational control. However, it very much depends on the effectiveness of the 
UC. The effectiveness of the UC lies in the linkages it could maintain with the users 
for regular operation and maintenance besides the irrigation office for emergency 
maintenance. 
The de facto hydraulic control in the irrigation system is deteriorating at present 
due to silt build up, and linked to the increased social control of mid-system users. 
The farmers at the tail end cannot effectively counter it due to lack of political control 
of the VDC, which was effective at the time of Ditthawal and for some period of VP. 
This is largely due to the dominance of one caste group with large land holding and 
their influence in local politics, which makes it difficult for the VDC to exercise real 
political control through the enforcement of effective sanctions as in the time of 
Ditthawal and VP. 
4.9 Analysis and conclusions 
This case is about the changes in the institutions due to the public interventions in 
various forms and their effect on the governance structure and irrigation practices. 
Up to 1962, the Ditthawal was working reasonably well as the irrigation system was 
under his administrative control. Besides there was a good organisational structure 
as the Mukhiyas and the Talukdar were helping him in discharging his duty. This was 
due to the then existing social control in the isolated village community and the 
possibility to apply sanctions when farmers were not following the unwritten rules. 
The abolition of the Birta system in 1959 provided the opportunity to the Ditthawal to 
claim ownership of the land, which was kept for the maintenance of the irrigation 
system. This was the beginning of the deterioration of the rules in the irrigation 
system. He was also not interested to perform, as he got the entitlement of land, 
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which before was his remuneration for the maintenance and management tasks of 
the irrigation system. 
The introduction of VP in 1962 as a lower level of poHtíco/administrative unit due 
to the political change in the country and the land reform in 1964 also weakened the 
institutional position of Ditthawal. This was largely due to the emergence of new loop 
between the institution at the local level and the government at the centre. Now VP 
was the state functionary at the local level instead of the Ditthawal, because his 
position was not recognised. This underrnined his power to enforce the customary 
law as he could not enforce sanctions against those who did not follow the prevailing 
norms. Despite this, the adherence to the norms was voluntary and the management 
of the irrigation system was based on customary participation, as the village was 
isolated. Due to the erosion of the Ditthawal system, the already existing communal 
loop weakened. 
The first intervention by the DIHM took place in 1962 due to the formation of new 
linking loop between the users, VP and the government. The intervention 
rehabilitated the irrigation system as the farmers could not cope with the situation 
brought about by the land slide. The existing linking loop was functioning for two 
years, as DLHM was providing resources and left the management to VP and 
Ditthawal in 1964. Thus, there was a change in the interface situation between the 
actors. Previously it was between the users, VP, DLHM and Ditthawal. Now it was 
between the users, VP and Ditthawal. This was an interim period when both VP and 
Ditthawal worked side by side, which continued till 1966 when the position of 
Ditthawal came to a definite end. 
The traditional management system began to lose its importance during this 
period due to the changes in the interface situation. It is because VP was not well 
established to take control of the irrigation system and farmers did not like to 
continue the old practices under the Ditthawal as the interface between them was 
autocratic in nature as he was in control of land tax and could impose sanctions. It 
was natural for the farmers to look for new relationships due to changes brought 
about by the new political system and the government support in rehabilitating the 
irrigation system. Besides, the users were not prepared to contribute their resources 
for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system, as the VP was successful 
in mamtaining the loop with DLHM till 1971 to obtain the resources for the operation 
and maintenance of the system. 
The political referendum of 1980 further undermined the position of VP and it also 
contributed to the social division among the farmers along political lines. This 
affected the interface situation between the farmers and the VP, which was basically 
based on a confrontation of power. This shows that not only the government 
interventions in the irrigation system but also other political and social interventions 
affected the irrigation institution due to the changes in the roles of individuals and 
the VP. However, the VDC effectively controlled the management till 1990, when 
Panchayat System won the election. This indicates that the political control is an 
important factor in strengthening the institutional capability for the management of 
irrigation system. 
CHAURASI KULO AND ANNAPURNA KULO 91 
The irrigation system was from the begirming overstretched with the result that 
the Bais Khet at the tail end were receiving water for planting only. This aggravated 
the conflict between the farmers at the head and tail end, which made the collective 
action weak. Thus, the farmers at the tail end with the support from the VP were able 
to form a new loop. The new linking loop of the farmers was able to convince the 
DOI to implement the Annapurna. Kulo in 1983 for the irrigation of the tail end of the 
Chaurasi Kulo. But it was not servicing the complete tail end. Thus, the formation of 
new linking loop for the intervention of 1983 had an effect on the existing weak 
equilibrium of the collective action in Chaurasi Kulo. The intervention further 
contributed to the disintegration of the social relationship existing between the old 
users due to changes in the interface situation. 
A new linking loop emerged when the users in the Chaurasi Kulo with the support 
from the VDC succeeded for the survey for the rehabilitation in 1994, and its 
implementation in 1998. This indicates that the VDC performed well in estabUshing 
the linking loop to obtain external assistance, which was important for the 
management of the irrigation system. 
The irrigation system was functioning well during the time of the Ditthawal in 
terms of management tasks. This was largely due to the existence of collective choice 
rules and his role in enforcing the operational rules. The allocation and distribution 
of the irrigation water was based on the mato muri. However, his adrninistrative 
control in irrigation system was dirninishing due to the lack of enforcement of 
operational rules during the intervention by the Irrigation Department. 
The change in governance structure took place as VP took control of the system in 
1964 from DIHM. The VP made an effort to develop the collective choice rule and the 
operational rule by involving the users. It maintained the organisational control for 
the allocation and distribution of the irrigation water through the employment óf the 
Pale. The VP was successful in enforcing the rules for allocation and distribution as 
long as it had the authority. Its authority was in question when there was a 
referendum in 1980. This shows how different forms of interventions had an effect in 
the implementation of the operational rules. It tried to revive the operational rules 
through the formation of the Kulo Samiti. That was not successful as in the past due 
to social division along the political ideology, which brought the changes in the 
interface situation between the actors. However, it continued the management 
through Kulo Samiti and Pale till 1990. Besides, the users were not represented in this 
committee. Thus, there was a communication gap between the users and the 
committee. This indicates users' participation in decision making is an important 
aspect in the management. Due to lack of their participation in the decision making 
there was absence of proper communication between users and the VP. Because of 
this the VP lost the political control of the irrigation system. As a result the mid-
system users increased their social control of the irrigation system. 
The VP however was not effective in mobilising resources from the people for the 
maintenance of the system, since it was receiving funds for maintenance of the main 
canal from the government till 1971. Farmers became less interested in the resource 
mobilisation of their own when they were receiving the funds from the DOI, which 
also affected the ownership feeling. When the government provided maintenance 
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support, the farmers got the idea that if the government can provide support why 
should they maintain the main canal. That took away the motivation to maintain the 
main canal that undermined the ownership feeling towards the system, which 
weakened the existing communal linking loop between the users due to their 
dependence on external resources. This led to further deterioration of the operation 
and maintenance of the Chaurasi Kulo. 
When in 1992 the VDC came into existence and replaced the VP, it also could not 
develop and implement the operational rules, as its position became weak due to 
being elected representatives. It shows the inherent weakness of the multi party 
system members who were not interested to take up unpleasant measures that may 
cost them votes. The farmers from the head and middle reaches continued to take 
benefits due to the weaker position of the farmers at the tail end. This was due to the 
decrease in the number of users of Chaurasi Kulo at the tail end as many of them were 
now in the command area of the Annapurna Kulo. In addition, the majority of the 
farmers at the head and middle are from one clan group, who has substantial 
influence in the village because they belong to higher socio-economic strata in the 
village. This is evident from the blockages they had put in the canal, which in the 
past led to conflicts between the farmers. The lower number of conflicts during the 
study period was due to a good monsoon. 
The initiation of the rehabilitation in 1998 had a consequence that neither the VDC 
nor the farmers were willing to develop the operational rules for the operation of the 
system before the rehabilitation was finished. As a result the management was not 
effectively working. 
There was no clear feeling among the farmers whether the government should 
take over the irrigation system or that farmers should manage it. There was a loss of 
feeling of ownership among the farmers as appeared by the lack of contributions to 
the on-going intervention in 1998. Farmers' lack of interest in contributing towards 
the rehabilitation at least during the time of this research poses a question whether 
they would take care of the future maintenance activities of the main canal, which is 
important for the sustainability of the system. The feeling among the users for not 
contributing is also due to availability of various sources of funding. The VDC has 
also shown greater maturity in obtaining the external funding in time of need, as 
evidenced by the fund received in 1997. 
It exemplifies that farmers would not like to accept the operational rules and the 
resource mobilisation, which in the past was based on customary participation. The 
conditions for participation were not based on the collective choice rule but were 
enforced on by coercion. Insufficient political and social controls currently exist to 
achieve the real hydraulic control that would bring equitable distribution. This was 
also due to the absence of clear property rights, which existed in the time of 
Ditthawal. 
There have not been major changes in the technical control of the irrigation system 
with respect to the water control. But there has been slow decline in hydraulic 
performance with siltation. The change in technical control is expected after the on-
going rehabilitation. This is likely to bring changes in the organisational and 
administrative control, as was evidenced from the fact that the some of the farmers 
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are trying to maintain their control in water use through the use of polythene pipes. 
However, there have been changes in the organisational and administrative control 
in the past due to various forms of interventions as discussed above. This indicates 
that the interventions are likely to bring changes in various aspects of water control. 
Inability of the UC, formed for the intervention to take the organisational control at 
this stage could have implication in the management of irrigation in future, as some 
of the users may increase their social control. However, that very much depends on 
how much political control the VDC can exercise. The VDC is relatively in a better 
position in this respect, as farmers may depend on VDC fund for future 
maintenance. There is a difference in the perception of the government and the users 
on the role of the UC. 
The opening of the village due to the construction of the road in 1992 provided 
new employment opportunities in Pokhara. This made it difficult to organise the 
farmer and their families for maintenance activities. It also eroded the social control 
related to the norms and values. Besides, lack of time among farmers owing to labour 
requirements for intensive cultivation, and disinterest of the youths in agricultural 
work had a negative effect on the maintenance of the communal linking loop 
activities needed for the management of the irrigation system. This indicates that the 
availability of alternative sources of income and dependence on external resources 
could negatively affect the investment in irrigation development. 
The changing of attitudes among the farmers with regard to the maintenance of 
the main canal of the irrigation system has to be seen in a larger context. In the past 
most villages were isolated and had little or no contact with the central government 
except for the collection of land taxes. In the past decades the role of the government 
has changed considerably. Via the expansion of the road system villages were less 
isolated and drawn into the national economy. This also undermined the hierarchical 
social structure and the social control in the villages. The government became active 
in the provision of education and health services and in the provision of resources for 
the rehabilitation of irrigation systems. This changed the view of farmers with regard 
to the role of the government and they were quick to ask and expect the government 
to take over the task performed in the past by them. This growing dependency on the 
government affects in a negative way the mobilisation of local resources and 
diminished the sustainability of the FMIS that have been rehabilitated by the 
government assistance. 
Timesheet - Chaurasi Kulo Irrigation System 
\ S t a k e h o l d e r s Farmers/ Ditthawal UC V P / VDC Pale D P / D D C DIHM/DIO Remarks 
Time 
1848 
(Farmers were 
not sure of exact 
date) 
Constructed the 
irrigation system 
1960 Farmers managed 
the system under 
Ditthawal and 
Mukhiya 
Part of the canal 
washed away due 
to the landslide. 
1962 Requested for the 
rehabilitation of the 
irrigation system 
VP Came into existence Rehabilitated the 
scheme. 
Operated 
irrigation system 
for two years till 
1964 
1964 Ditthawal 
continued the 
management 
Turned over the 
management to 
VP but 
continued to 
provide financial 
assistance. 
1966 Ditthawal ceased to 
function 
Once in a year during 
March/ April the canal 
cleaning was done by 
mobilising the farmers 
labour and materials. 
VP 
introduced 
the Kulo 
Samiti and 
Pale for 
water 
distribution 
and 
allocation. 
1971 VP continued the 
management through 
Pale 
functioning Continued to 
provide annual 
maintenance 
fund to the VP 
1971-1980 Continued to manage 
the system by 
mobilising the villagers 
Stopped 
providing 
annual 
maintenance 
fund for 
maintenance in 
1971 
1980 Did not obey the 
decisions of VP 
Could not enforce its 
decisions as its 
authority was in 
question due to the 
referendum. 
Ceased to 
function 
since the 
time of 
referendum. 
The king called the 
referendum to 
choose between 
the partyless 
system and the 
multiparty 
system. 
1981-1982 Formed a Kulo Samiti of 
VP members to manage 
the irrigation system 
but was ineffective in 
enforcing its decision 
and gave up the 
management 
1982-1990 Farmers were 
responsible for the 
management of the 
In 1983 the DIO 
started the 
construction of 
Ü 1 
scheme but there 
were no rules. 
Hence, only the 
farmers from the 
tail end were 
contributing. 
'Annapurna Kulo' 
at the tail end of 
this irrigation 
system. 
1991-1994 not contributing to 
the maintenance of 
the canal 
A n U C 
formed for the 
rehabilitation 
of the system 
VDC replaced VP after 
the introduction of 
multi party system and 
developed a 
management plan, 
which assigned 
operation maintenance 
responsibility to the 
wards, but it did not 
work. Persuaded 
government to 
undertake the survey 
for the rehabilitation 
Government 
undertook the 
survey for the 
rehabilitation of 
the system in 
1994. 
1997-1998 Contributed labour 
to repair the 
damage caused by 
the flash-flood in 
1997 
A n e w U C 
formed for the 
rehabilitation. 
Mobilised farmers' 
labour and external 
resources for the repair 
of the headwork. 
Liased with the DIO for 
the rehabilitation work 
and paid farmers 
contribution from its 
funds. 
Provided NRs. 
150,000 to the 
VDC for the 
repair of the 
headwork 
Provided 65 
pieces of gabion 
wire for 
headwork 
repair. Initiated 
action for the 
rehabilitation of 
the system 
Part III 
Annapurna Kulo 
4.10 Environment of the irrigation system and context of intervention 
4.10.1 The irrigation system in 1997 
This is a river valley irrigation system, and is jointly managed by the users and the 
DOI. Officially, this irrigation system is known as 'Hemja Irrigation System'. The 
farmers renamed it and now it is known as Annapurna Kulo. Yamdi Khola, a perennial 
one, is the source of irrigation water for this system. The headwork of the system is 
located at 2 km downstream from the temporary intake of Chaurasi Kulo. The head 
works comprises a 46 metres long weir with two under sluice gates and a head 
regulator. The height of the weir is 2.4 metres. The maximum design discharge of the 
head regulator is 2m 3 / s . However, the design capacity of the main canal is 1.5m 3/s. 
This is because the higher capacity of the headwork allows the expansion of the main 
canal in future, if the need for increase in command area arises. A headwork is a 
massive structure and it is not easy to increase its capacity at low cost when required. 
The total length of the main canal is 1.94 km. The first 23 m is open canal and after 
that 841 metres of the main canal are constructed as a covered canal. In this section 
the canal bed is about 3-4 meter deep from the natural ground level. This happened 
due to local topography. Thus, it is not practical to have such a deep open canal from 
the perspective of land required. Accordingly, this portion is covered and back filled 
with the soil. The remaining part of the canal is open and the length is lined with 
stone masonry. In the main canal there are 5 branch canal off-takes and 10 field 
channel outlets. The design discharge of the main and branch canals with irrigated 
area are as follows26. 
Table 4. 5: The discharge of main canal and branch canals with area 
Canals Discharge Chaînage 
(km) 
Canal bed 
width (m) 
Water 
depth 
Area 
planned (ha) 
Area 
irrigated (ha) 
Main canal 1.5m3/s - 2.00 0.85 50 30 
Branch canal-1 0 . 1 5 m 7 s 0.00-1.025 2.00 0.85 110 110* 
Branch canal-2 0 . 5 5 m 7 s 1.025-1.515 2.00 0.85 50 30 
Branch canal-3 0 .30m 3 / s 1.515-1.875 1.00 0.80 60 35 
Branch canal-
4a 
0 . 3 5 m 7 s 1.875-1.940 1.00 0.80 30 15 
Branch canal-
4b 
0.15m7s 300 220 
a) 50 ha receive adequate irrigation and the remaining 60 ha receive partial irrigation water 
according to WUS. 
Note: The bifurcation of canal 1,2, and 3 are at chainage 1.025,1.515 and 1.875 respectively. 
Table 4. 5 indicates that the capacity of the main canal reduces gradually towards tail 
end. The differences in the flow capacity of each of the branch canal are due to 
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differences in the area served by the branch canals as indicated in the above table. In 
the hills of Nepal, the water requirement for monsoon paddy is recommended at 3 
lps per ha (Jacob, 1995; MacDonald and Hunting Technical Services, 1982 cited by 
Parajuli, 1999:128). Therefore, the flow capacity of the each branch canal is sufficient 
to irrigate the area. 
The head works, except some leakage, is in good condition. The main canal is also 
in good condition. To maintain the design discharge on the branch canals, a cross 
regulator across the main canal and a head regulator on the off-taking canals have 
been provided at the off-take of each of the branch canals. The layout of the irrigation 
system is presented in figure 4.3 
The command area of this system lies to the south of the Chaurasi Kulo System. The 
planned gross command area is 330 ha and the net command area is 300 ha. 
However, the farmers reported that only 170 ha did receive irrigation water in an 
adequate way. Due to the inadequate density of the field channels, field to field 
irrigation is widely practised, resulting in low irrigation efficiency. Therefore, the 
irrigated area is much lower than planned. This is one of the bottlenecks for the 
complete turnover of the management to the farmers. 
The main canal provides irrigation water to the fields on its southern side only. 
However, some patches of lands on the southern side of the main canal between 
branch canal 1 and 3 do not receive irrigation water from this irrigation system. 
These lands receive water from old Chaurasi Kulo. Four RCC aqueducts have been 
constructed over the main canal of this system for this purpose (see Figure 4.2 in part 
II). 
The lands on the northern side receive water directly from field channels of the 
Chaurasi Kulo. According to the farmers' opinion, the irrigation water availability is 
better in areas served by the field channels as compared to the fields irrigated 
through the aqueducts of old Chaurasi Kulo. 
The irrigation system is under the management of the DOI and its employee 
known as Dhalpa27 (gate operator) that operates it. In the beginning there were five 
Dhalpas and all were locals. The government trained them for canal operation after 
the completion of the project. There was i5nly one Dhalpa since 1997. The reason for 
this was that the government curtailed its budget. This person happened to be from 
the village at the middle of the branch canal 2. He admitted that he was working in 
the irrigation field office previously, unlike the other four who were operating the 
canal. Now he was responsible for all canal operations. In the past he used to help his 
colleagues whenever they asked. Thus, he was less knowledgeable in canal operation 
compared to his colleagues. However, his smaller experience has not significantly 
affected the operation at present. This is because, in 1992 the farmers at the initiative 
of a local elected leader formed an UC2 8. The WUS decides on the allocation and 
distribution of irrigation water, and the Dhalpa follows the advice of the WUS. But he 
has to spend more time due to the reduction in the manpower. He faces difficulty 
during the summer when for distribution he has to open all the gates in the canal. 
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Branch canal 1 
This canal off-takes at Chainage 1.025 km of the main canal. The reported length of 
this canal is 1 km, out of which the first 100 m is lined. This branch canal is aligned 
along the old field channels of the Chaurasi Kulo. There are 16 earthen field channels 
according to one of the farmers at the middle of this branch canal. 
Branch canal 2 
This branch canal off-takes at 490 metres downstream from the first one. A cross 
regulator was provided at about 500 m downstream for stopping the water delivery 
during the night because of the land subsidence problem as this canal passes through 
the settlement. The irrigation water is not adequately available to the tail-enders, 
although this canal has been lined throughout. This is due to poor maintenance of the 
sidewalls, which often collapse due to weak foundations. Besides, the canal has a 
long lined portion that is costly to maintain. 
The WUS constructed a new sub-branch canal at about 50 m downstream from the 
off-take of canal 2. It provides irrigation water to 20 ha of the additional land 
belonging to 35 households lying on the eastern tail end of this branch canal. The 
length of this canal is 1400 metres. Besides, the WUS constructed another 90 metres 
of the field channels in the middle of this canal. 
Branch canal 3 
This branch canal off-takes at 360 metres downstream from the branch canal 2. 
Branch canal 4a 
This canal lies at the tail end of the main canal. The first half of this canal is also lined. 
However, this canal can use only 2 / 3 of the water and the remaining 1 /3 goes to the 
canal 4a. The discharge in the main canal at the off-takes of branch canal 4 and 4a is 
proportionally divided into 2 / 3 and 1 /3 respectively. 
Branch canal 4b 
This canal is the shortest of all the branch canals. About 50 percent of the canal length 
are lined. Both the canals 4 and 4a require maintenance in some places. There are 
some drop structures in these two branch canals. The physical features along with 
the number of households served by each branch canal have been provided in table 
4. 6. 
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Table 4. 6: Physical features of the branch canals with households 
Branch Canal Length of the canal km Lined Portion km Households 
1 1.0 0.1 120 
2 2.2 2.2 230 
3 1.5 0.75 150 
4a 1.5 0.75 70 
4b 0.5 0.25 30 
Total 6.7 4.05 600 
Source: WUS records and DOI information. However, the GEOCE (1991) stated 
that the ownership list prepared by the project office for the purpose of 
water tax collection had indicated 157 ha as the command area. 
4.10.2 The irrigated land and its distribution by ethnicity 
The land in the irrigated area is flat with a gentle slope from north-west to the south-
east. The land holdings among various ethnic groups with farm sizes have been 
provided in the following table. 
Table 4. 7: The distribution of size of holdings by ethnic groups 
S.no Size of 
holding (ha) 
Number of 
household 
Major ethnic group 
1 <0.5 420 Brahmin, Chhetri, Damai and Sarki 
2 0.55 to 1.0 115 Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar and Gharti 
3 l t o 2 50 Brahmin and Chhetri 
4 2 to 5 15 Brahmin and Chhetri 
Total 600 
Source: DIÔ report on turnover programme and the information from WUS. 
The above table provides an indication of the distribution of land holdings among 
various ethnic groups. The upper two castes Brahmin and Chhetris are the majority 
of the users, which is also evidenced by the composition of the WUS (see section 
4.11). Also the large land holding also belongs to them. Most of the large land 
holding is in branch canals 1, 3 and 4. Thus, the large land holders are dominant in 
decision making related to irrigation management in these canals. However, 
majorities of the small holders are in the branch canal 2 according to the farmers. 
Thus, decisions related to the irrigation water are done through consensus. There 
was a variation in the number of users as reported by the DOI, WUS and the 
previous study by Shivakoti (1992:6)29. Six hundred households had land in the 
irrigated area according to the WUS estimate (table 4. 7). WUS estimated that the 
majority of farmers had land holdings between 1-10 ropani (0.05-0.5 ha). The average 
size of the holdings was 0.5 ha assuming that 300 ha is under irrigation. The Project 
Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation (PBME) review report also indicated that the 
average farm size was 0.57 ha (GEOCE, 1991.). According to the WUS estimate, 40 
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percent of the farmers had more than one parcel of land. Most of these lands were in 
branch canals 2 and 3. 
4.11 The intervention in irrigation system 
4.11.1 The first efforts of the farmers 
The farmers at the tail end were not receiving sufficient irrigation water from 
Chaurasi Kulo. Therefore, they decided to construct the canal. First, they initiated the 
construction of the Annapurna Kulo in 1967, according to the Chairperson of the 
Water Users Society (WUS). One of the farmer who was an ex-serviceman took the 
initiative to convince the farmers to construct a separate canal for irrigation. The 
farmers received the help of a Peace Corps volunteer for the design of the project30. 
People tried to divert water from the river to the canal by constructing temporary 
headwork 20 metre upstream from the present weir. The farmers did not succeed in 
irrigating the field due to an inadequate amount of water in the canal. They 
abandoned the work due to a lack of technical and financial support from outside. 
The farmers requested for technical and financial support from His Majesty's 
Government (HMG/N), through the Village Panchayat. The government provided 
NRs 15,000 in 1968 and NRs 245,000 in 1976. The farmers contributed the equivalent 
of NRs 45,000 in labour. Farmers were able to divert water to the canal but the full 
operation of the canal was not possible due to the lack of a permanent headwork. 
Farmers kept on pressurising the government to undertake the construction, 
which the government could not refuse because of its involvement in the system. The 
then member of the Rastriya Panchayat (parliament) was instrumental in pursuing the 
government for this construction according to the farmers. Besides, the then Pradhan 
Pancha (chairman of Village Panchayat) also lobbied for the project as he had more land 
at the tail end than at the head and middle. 
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4.11.2 Intervention under the Hill Irrigation Project 
Planning 
The project objective was to increase the food grain production and to raise the 
standard of living of the people. The government initiated the project at the request 
of the farmers at the tail end of Chaurasi Kulo. These farmers were instrumental in 
forming the linking loop to get government assistance. Nevertheless, the VP backed 
their effort. In this respect, the VP was one of the main actors in the interface between 
the agency and the farmers. The Asian Development Bank in consultation with the 
DOI officials did the appraisal of the project. The National Planning Commission on 
the recommendation of the DOI and Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) approved 
the project. The design of the project was completed in 1982. The detailed design of 
the project was done by the government engineers under the technical supervision of 
the expatriate consultant (GEOCE, 1990) provided by the Asian Development Bank. 
The Regional Director of DOI in western region at that time admitted that the 
detailed technical design was not discussed with the farmers. According to the 
farmers, the people were not satisfied with the new design, as it did not take into 
account the existing alignment of the canal during the discussion with the project 
officials. However, this was not true as the canal used the existing canal alignment. 
The farmers not satisfied with the design were the one whose land was not covered 
by the alignment. 
KB, the former Dhalpa, who is a small farmer having only 4 ropani of land at the 
middle of the branch canal 2, said that the project was discussed with the farmers in 
a meeting. Farmers also said that the engineers from DOI had discussed the matter 
with them including the officials of the Village Panchayat. There were some changes in 
the alignment of the branch canals after the interface between the users and the 
irrigation officials. The farmers, who had to contribute the land for the canal but 
would not receive irrigation water for their land, were instrumental in incorporating 
the changes. Thus, the project took into consideration the farmers' demand and made 
necessary changes to accommodate their interests. The changes were also necessary 
to continue the use of the existing field channels of Chaurasi Kulo. The WUS chairman 
confirmed it during the discussion. A construction and supervision committee 
consisting of the then VP officials and farmers was constituted to oversee the 
implementation according to the DOI officials. This shows that the agency was aware 
of mamtaining the interaction between the project officials and the farmers during 
the initiation of the project. However, the interaction confined to between the 
committee members and the agency. The committee could not maintain regular 
interaction with the farmers. 
The government approved the tender for Annapurna Kulo in July 1983 under the 
Hill Irrigation Project. The project received a loan from the Asian Development 
Bank/Manila (ADB/M), according to the Western Regional Irrigation Directorate 
(WRIM). The project had agricultural components also. There were provisions for the 
construction of three warehouses, one teaming centre and the establishment of one 
agricultural demonstration farm of 0.4 ha The project had also the provision to 
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provide agricultural credit to the farmers through the Agricultural Development 
Bank/Nepal (ADB/N). 
Implementation 
Five separate project offices were established to implement five irrigation systems 
under this project. The project office consisted of one engineer and three overseers to 
supervise and guide the work of the contractor. The Western Region Irrigation 
Directorate (WRTD) provided necessary technical back stopping to these offices. The 
government awarded the contract for the construction of the scheme to a contractor 
from Kathmandu. The contract was awarded through a Local Competitive Bidding 
(LCB) as per the financial regulation of the government. The PBME report states: 
"The contractor sub-let most of the works to the petty contractor and the main contractor did 
not supervise the work of the sub-contractor31. As a result, the works were not up to the mark 
(GEOCE, 1990.)." 
The contractor, however, said that he implemented the project by establishing an 
office on the project site. According to him the project was implemented by hiring 
labourers. The labourers worked on a piece work basis i.e. the labourers were paid 
on the basis of the work, and not on a daily basis. 
The farmers did not have any say in the implementation of the project, according 
to the WUS chairperson. The Regional Director at that time contradicted this. He told 
that the people in the project area were very conscious and actively participated in 
the implementation of the project. He opined that the supervision committee 
monitored every activity and it was very helpful to the WRTD as there were no major 
complaints. The people complained about smaller details of the project 
implementation. For example, they used to complain about the sand quality and the 
WRID used to check it in their laboratory in Pokhara. Then the report was given to 
the farmers. Farmers used to monitor the use of cement and labourers every day. 
Later on it became the practice that the farmers used to certify the cement use and 
running bill of the contractor by signing the paper, which was to be submitted to the 
WRID by the project office. The project office did not have authority to pay directly 
to the contractor. The project office used to certify the work and running bills for 
payment to the WRTD. Thus, WRID was responsible for the payment of the bills. He 
argued, because of this, no major repair is required in the irrigation system after 
more than a decade of its completion. It can be concluded that the project officials 
maintained required transparency during the implementation of the project. This 
was largely due to the pressure from the users. This suggests that the linking loop 
between the users and the project officials did function, as users tried to maintain 
organisational control during implementation. 
Some of the farmers said that the contractor and the engineer did not made the 
changes suggested by the people. The contractor, however, said that the local people 
wanted to have one weir for both the Chaurasi and Annapuma Kulo. This was not 
possible due to the design. Besides, the contractor was bound by the contract. He 
said that he took the contract on basis of the approved design and his work was 
directed and supervised by the project office. He could not change any alignment 
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unless told by the project engineers. Therefore, the interface between the contractor 
and the users was minimal in respect to the implementation. According to him, the 
issues related to the design were a matter between the project officials and the 
farmers. 
KB, the former Dhalpa32, however, said that some of the farmers tried to change the 
alignment of the main canal in order to have irrigation for their lands. The engineer 
was under pressure from the local elite in this regard. According to the contractor, 
the engineers did not agree with their proposal and the main canal construction 
followed the alignment, which the farmers had already constructed. There was no 
extension of the length of the main canal. Only the existing canal was enlarged and 
lined according to the contractor. This shows that the powerful in the village could 
not influence the decision making due to the fact that the users have already 
constructed the alignment of the canal. 
The construction of the covered canal was one of the major problems encountered 
during the execution of the project. According to the contractor, he completed the 
construction of the open canal but he did not have the skill to design an arch-type 
covering slab. For this work, the contractor sub-let the contract to the Chinese 
contractors, who were constructing an irrigation cum hydro-power system nearby. 
This is an indication of the lack of construction capability at local and national level, 
which could have major implications for future maintenance of the system by the 
farmers. 
One of the issues that came up during the implementation was the compensation 
for the land needed for canal construction. The contractor said that, because of this, 
he had to stop the needed work occasionally as the farmers did not allow him to put 
construction material on their land. The farmers asked for rent for depositing the 
construction materials on their land. The engineer who assured the locals to request 
for the payment of compensation solved the problem. In his opinion, the engineer 
successfully negotiated with the farmers in this issue. Otherwise, the work would 
have been further delayed. 
According to the WUS chairperson, originally there was no provision for 
compensation. The government acquired the land occupied by the canal and did 
provide compensation for the land later on. However, farmers argued that not all the 
owners received the compensation33. Nevertheless, the owners of lands occupied for 
the construction of the main canal did receive the compensation. This was confirmed 
during the field observation as DOI did mark the area under its control in the main 
canal. However, there was no question of compensation for the land occupied by the 
branch canals. 
The system was completed in July 1986 at a cost of NRs 10.41 million. Farmers 
reported that they contributed 25 percent of the total cost. But the Project Completion 
Report (PCR) did not indicate that farmers made any contribution. Being a national 
level project it was selected, appraised, approved and implemented by the 
government (GEOCE, 1991.). Thus, it is unlikely that the farmers did contribute. The 
farmers' contribution could be accounted for in terms of labour contribution they did 
when they started the construction on their own and the land provided for branch 
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canal constraction. Also, the time spent by the farmers during supervision of 
implementation work could be considered as farmers' contribution. 
Evaluation of 1991 and 1993 
The DOI engineers did the evaluation of the completion of the work. The status 
report (WRTD, 1986) states the following: 
"The whole construction ofheadwork, main canal and distribution system under the contract 
No. 490-VI has been completed by the contractor ...and the completion certificate has been 
issued to him. The maintenance period starts from 1st July 1986 and will be valid up to 30th 
June 1987". 
The word distribution system in the report indicated the branch canals but not the 
field channels. The contractor had to repair the faulty construction during the 
maintenance period. The project was to be completed in 1983 but the design of the 
project was delayed due to the late employment of the foreign consultants according 
to the PCR. 
Regarding the evaluation of the project, many farmers neither knew about it, nor 
about the certification of the completion of work. However, some of the farmers 
reported that they were aware of the evaluation after the completion of the work. 
There was a clear distinction between the categories of the farmers who knew about 
the evaluation and those who did not know it. The then panchayat officials and local 
farmer leaders were aware of the evaluation. They reported that the focus of the 
evaluation was on the fact whether the canal became operational or not and whether 
all the lands received irrigation water according to the design. Some of those farmers 
said that they were not satisfied with the outcome of the evaluation, as it did not take 
into account the non-completion of the branch canals according to the design. The 
majority of the farmers also complained about the non-completion of the branch 
canals. They were mostly from branch canal 2, 3 and 4, who depend on field to field 
irrigation. The farmers reported that some of the powerful in the community did 
influence the construction of the branch canals by not providing the required land. 
This was due to the feudalistic social structure, as some large holders feared that the 
economic well being of small holders would threaten their status in the community. 
This was mainly between the users at the head reaches and the tail reach. The 
reported cases did occur in branch canal 3 and 4. In some cases, it was due to the 
family feud between the kins or with neighbours, especially at the tail end of branch 
canal 2. This shows that the linking loop became weak during the implementation 
due to non-cooperation among the farmers. This was largely due to the intention of 
some of the farmers to control irrigation water to their advantage. 
Since the government designed and implemented the project through the 
contractor, it was quite possible that all the farmers did not take part in the 
evaluation of the project. If the farmers were truly involved in the evaluation, they 
would never have certified the completion of the project because they were still 
complaining about the incomplete structures. The contractor did complete the main 
canal according to the design but he did not complete some sections of the branch 
canals. The design however, did not include the construction of the field channels 
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which the farmers thought was included in the design. The Regional Director at that 
time confirmed that there was no provision for the construction of field channels. 
Therefore, farmers were responsible for this. Thus, there were differences on 
perception of farmers and the government regarding field channels. It clearly 
indicates that there was a communication gap between the government officials and 
the farmers due to lack of intensive interface during the design of the project. 
The Asian Development Bank commissioned a Project Benefit and Monitoring 
Evaluation study through a local consulting firm in 1991. The report (GEOCE, 1991.) 
made the following observations. Key points from the study are now presented to 
show the changes anticipated by the intervention in water supply and a more 
systematic study of institutional changes follows later. 
Command area and water availability 
The targeted command area of 300 ha was not achieved. The area under perennial 
irrigation during the monsoon was only 161 ha whereas during the pre-monsoon and 
winter, the area under perennial irrigation was only 60 ha and 115 ha respectively. 
The District Irrigation Office (DIO) in its survey report estimated that only 200 ha 
and 150 ha of land received irrigation water for the monsoon crop and winter crop 
respectively. The User's Committee, however, estimated that only 100 ha receive 
irrigation water for the winter crop. The reasons for not achieving the targets are: 
• The soil is coarse in texture and porous in nature thereby reducing the water 
retention capacity of the land; 
• Most of the cultivated land adjacent to the canal remained unirrigated (GEOCE, 
1991) due to lack of tertiary canals and field channels. However, some of these 
lands are at a higher elevation than the full supply level of the main canal. 
According to the design, the farmers had to construct field channels, which were not 
constructed. This could be one of the reasons for the failure to provide irrigation 
water to all the lands as envisaged in the design of the project. The Project 
Completion Report (PCR), however, stated that the irrigation water was available for 
300 ha. The farmers did not cooperate with each other for the construction of the field 
channels although, the neighbouring farmers were willing to pay for it. It reveals that 
linking loop became disintegrated, which had implications in achieving the objective 
of the intervention. This was due to the fact that the farmers did not like to lose the 
land, which became more productive after the intervention. Therefore, not all the 
farmers did have equal access to the irrigation water. In other words, the benefit was 
not equally distributed among the farmers due to the location of the land. 
The farmers at branch canal 1 reported they receive sufficient irrigation water. The 
farmers from branch canal 2, who receive irrigation water through the outlet in the 
branch canal also reported that they did not have problem with the irrigation water. 
However, the farmers who have to depend on the field channels and the field to field 
irrigation reported that they have problem in receiving irrigation water during pre-
monsoon and in winter. This problem is more acute in the middle and tail end of the 
branch canal 2. The farmers in branch canal 3 and 4 also reported the same. The 
problem is more acute at the tail end. The farmers attribute this to the insufficient 
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availability of water in the canal and lack of sufficient field channels. This should be 
looked at from the point of existing power relations between the users. Most of the 
farmers, who complain are from the tail end having smallholdings. They cannot 
confront the users at the head reaches. From the viewpoint of intervention, it could 
be said that had there been sufficient interaction between the users and the officials, 
this problem could have been sorted out during the intervention. This could have 
avoided the control of the irrigation water by a group of farmers. 
Cropping pattern and cropping intensity 
There has been significant change in the cropping pattern in the command area of the 
Annapurna Kulo. This was mainly due to the availability of irrigation water. The 
farmers used to plant rice-maize at the head and middle of the command area before 
Annapurna Kulo. which falls under branch canal 1 and two. Now with the availability 
of irrigation water rice has been the main crop in the head and middle of the 
command area. However, rice is planted in only small area of the land at the tail end. 
The main cropping pattern in branch canal 1 and 2 is rice-wheat-maize, rice-wheat-
fallow, rice-vegetable-vegetable and rice-vegetable-fallow. However, the cropping 
pattern in branch 3 and 4 is rice-wheat-maize, rice-wheat-fallow and rice-fallow-
maize. The farmers from the branch canal 3 and 4 reported that they have been able 
to grow rice in the field, which used to have only millet in the past. They indicated 
that this has helped in meeting household consumption need, as rice is the main 
staple food. However, they have not been able to grow cash crops as the farmers 
from branch 1 and 2. 
The cropping intensity of Khet (the total cropped area divided by the cultivated 
area) was found to be 182 percent in Annapurna Kulo, which was higher than in the 
Chaurasi Kulo' (166 percent). The appraisal estimate however was 187 percent. The 
cultivated area increased by 43 and 36 hectares for paddy and wheat whereas the 
area under maize cultivation declined by 21 hectares. This shows a positive effect of 
the irrigation intervention. However, there has been no change in the cultivated area 
for vegetables and pulses in Khet (GEOCE, 1991). 
The other two studies (Shivakoti, 1992:20-21) noted that the cropping intensity 
increased by 75 percent only however, Maskey (1994:130) reported that the cropping 
intensity in the area was 185 percent. The low cropping intensities are attributed to a 
lack of support by agricultural services. With respect to the agricultural components 
one warehouse cum training centre and one Junior Technician (JT) and Junior 
Technical Assistance (JTA) quarter were constructed. However, the demonstration 
farm was not established. The farmers said that they did not receive adequate 
agricultural extension services from the project. This suggests that agricultural 
support services under the project were not effectively delivered. This also 
exemplifies that the programmes as envisaged during the design of the project were 
not implemented. The lack of emphasis on agricultural services from the project 
could also be due to the presence of the Lumle Agricultural Research Centre (LARC) 
which was implementing its programmes in that area during that period. 
Based on the information from the farmers the cropping intensity during the field 
study was found to be around 190 percent. However, this is not uniform within the 
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cornmand area. The cropping intensity in the farms receiving irrigation water from 
branch canal 1 and 2 is higher than in farms served by branch canal 3 and 4 due to 
insufficient availability of winter irrigation. The farmers at the tail end of these canals 
reported cropping intensity of 150 percent. It was also observed that the cropping 
intensity is much higher among the small farmers than the large farmers because of 
intensive vegetable cultivation due to the availability of irrigation water during the 
winter season in branch canal 1 and 2. This had implications for household income as 
well. The farmers who cultivated seasonal vegetables and potato reported that 
annually they used to earn between NRs. 30,000 to NRs. 70,000. The farm size 
reported is 0.4 ha to 1.0 ha. This is an additional income they could earn due to 
irrigation water. However, availability of irrigation water was not the only factor for 
cash crop production. The construction of all-weather road to Pokhara in 1992 had 
significant effect in encouraging the farmers in vegetable cultivation due to an easy 
access to the market. 
Crop yields 
The crop yield has changed marginally from 'without project' to 'with project' 
situations according to the PBME report. The crop yield for the main crop paddy was 
higher (2.35 mt/ha) in Annapurna Kulo as compared to the Chaurasi Kulo (2.26 
mt/ha). The study by Maskey (1993:140) found that the paddy yield for Annapurna 
Kulo was 2.48 mt/ha. Maskey (1993:138) found that the yield for paddy obtained 
from the crop aitting survey was higher than from the recall method. The expected 
output for Annapurna Kulo, which was included in the cost -benefit analysis, after the 
intervention however, was 3.4 mt/ha. The low production yield is attributed to the 
permeable nature of the soil resulting in a low water retention capacity. Besides, the 
farmers prefer to plant local varieties, which yield less than the improved varieties. 
Nevertheless, the irrigation water had positive effects on the crop yield. However, 
there is variation in the paddy output within the command area as reported by the 
farmers. The current production rate is about 2.5 mt/ha, which is close to the district 
average (DADO) at the head and middle of the branch canal 1, 2 and 3. The paddy 
yield reported by the farmers from the tail end and the branch canal 4 is about 2.0 
mt/ha. The variation is attributed to the availability of irrigation water in time, 
which affects the use of chemical fertiliser also. In this connection the Project 
Performance Audit Report (PPAR) prepared by the Asian Development Bank noted 
that the crop production was lower than expected because the rainfed area did not 
receive very much irrigation water and non irrigation inputs were not implemented 
(ADB/M, 1993). 
The yield of wheat and potato has declined which is attributed to the lack of 
adequate delivery of water and a decrease in the use of chemical fertilisers due to the 
high cost (GEOCE, 1991). This was in contrast to the findings of Maskey (1993) who 
stated that the yields of other crop wheat, maize and potato were higher in 
Annapurna Kulo as winter irrigation was available. It was found that potato is the 
major crop during winter and farmers are taking substantial benefit. Thus, the yield 
of potato has inceased in recent years. Farmers reported that they earn NRs 8000 net 
profit from potato cultivation in 0.25 ha of land. 
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Change in employment 
The PBME report stated that only 9 percent of the households were employed during 
the construction period. This finding support the view expressed by the contractor. 
He mentioned that most of the labourers were from the adjoining VDCs and also 
from districts adjacent to Kathmandu34. The project policy, though, was to provide 
employment to the local people. The reason he gave for this was that the locals were 
not interested in working as wage labourers. Some of the locals wanted supervisory 
work, which the contractor could not provide. The attitude of the people could be 
attributed to the social structure of the community. Most of the people were from the 
higher caste group with some education, which did not permit them to work as a 
wage labourer. Economically they were also in a better position. Consequently, the 
low paying job was not attractive to them. The studies (GEOCE, 1991; Maskey, 
1993:141) reported that after the intervention there had been an overall increase in 
the labour employment in agricultural activities as compared to the labour 
employment in the Chaurasi Kulo. The incremental labour however, did not 
substantially contribute to increase in the land productivity although there has been 
an increase in the total production due to the increase in the command area after the 
intervention. 
Farmers' perception of the benefit 
The most visible benefits after the construction of the Annapurna Kulo as reported by 
the farmers are: 
• Availability of an increased supply of irrigation water has enabled them to plant 
different crops, which was not possible before. For example the rice plantation 
has increased, which is the staple food of majority of the farmers. Thus, the 
nutritional status of the household has increased. 
• Possibility to grow winter crops and off-season vegetables has contributed to 
household cash income. The cash income of the small holders was almost 
negligible before the intervention. The small holders had to borrow from the 
money lenders for annual household expenses. Because of this there was greater 
dependency. Now it has been easy to support the family due to the increased 
household income along with some savings. Increased household income has 
contributed to the education of the children. The small and marginal farmers 
were always in debt. Now there has been decrease in their indebtedness. 
• The changes in the economic status of the small holders have contributed to the 
social equality as they no longer have to depend on the large landholder. Besides, 
the assets have increased due to rise in the land value, which is NRs. 170,000 for 
0.05 ha. 
• Reductions in drudgery as they do not have to contribute labour annually. The 
extra time they can utilise on other economic activities. 
• Reduction in disputes between the neighbours due to increased availability of the 
water. 
• No more sleepless nights, as they do not have to go out in the night for irrigation 
water. 
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However, the benefits are not equal to all the households. This may vary between the 
farmers depending on the location of the land. It was mostly the farmers from the 
head and middle reaches have benefited most. On the whole, farmers have benefited 
from the irrigation scheme. Before this scheme was implemented the farmers had to 
depend on the monsoon for planting. The farmers having lands at the middle of the 
branch canals 2 and 3 at present have mostly benefitted from the irrigation water, 
because before they were at the very tail end of the poorly functioning Chaurasi Kulo. 
One of the farmers from branch canal 2 reported that people were thinking before of 
migrating to other places due to the hardship faced for survival. The construction of 
Annapurana Kulo has changed these feelings. 
4.11.3 The issues of management transfer to the farmers after intervention 
Farmers' view in 1991/1992 
In the beginning the majority of the farmers reported that the Water User's 
Association (WUA) 3 5 would not be able to take care of the maintenance requirements 
(GEOCE, 1991). Similarly, the results of the opinion survey (DIO unpublished record, 
1992) for the turnover of the Programme were as follows: 
• The farmers from the head reaches from all branch canals expressed their 
inability to bear the expenses for all the maintenance required. 
• The farmers at the tail end from all branch canals said that they could bear a 
certain percentage of the maintenance cost. 
• The farmers from the middle reaches said, initially, that the government should 
provide funds for regular maintenance work. 
• The large land holders said that the Farmers' Irrigation Association (FIA) should 
take the responsibility and they would extend their co-operation. 
• The marginal farmers opined that FIA should do small maintenance work and the 
large works by the government. 
• The potential new users (about 100 households) said that the FIA should share 
regular maintenance work with the government. 
• The local leaders were of the opinion that operation responsibility of the canals 
should be with the FIA and the maintenance responsibility with the government. 
These findings are mteresting because the small, marginal farmers and potential 
users were positive towards bearing the maintenance cost, whereas the farmers at the 
head reaches and the big farmers did not like to take that responsibility. It could be 
argued that the maintenance cost is understood as labour contribution, which small 
farmers were prepared to provide. In that case, the large holders had to contribute 
cash, since they do not like to contribute labour. In the case of farmers at the head 
reaches, it could be said that since they have a reliable supply of water and less lined 
canals they do not like to contribute. 
The DIO officials concluded that the farmers were able to implement the regular 
maintenance activities, but they were not willing to. This is because the farmers had 
the following preconditions before taking the maintenance responsibility: 
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• There should be a re-survey of the command area and the capacity of the canals 
should be increased. 
• There should be desilting of the underground parts of the canals and complete 
repair in damaged sections of the irrigation system. 
• Irrigation facility should be made available for all the re-surveyed command area. 
The survey report stated that only 200 ha in the summer and 150 ha of land in the 
winter received irrigation water. 
• Branch canal 1,4a and 4b should be fully lined canals. 
• There should be an extension of branch canals 1,2,3 and 4 and their capacity 
should be increased. 
• The boundary of the acquired land should be fixed. 
• There should be control and maintenance of outlets. 
The DIO officials during the discussion with the researcher accepted most of these 
demands in principal. 
Maskey (1993:170-173), in his economic analysis of the operation and maintenance 
(O and M) cost, concluded that farmers would be able to pay NRs 100 per ha per 
crop. This was based on the water charge in other agency-managed irrigation 
systems, which are within a range of NRs 60 to 200 per ha. However, they would not 
be able to pay for the major maintenance cost. 
Farmers' view in 1997 
In 1997, the ownership of the irrigation system was with the government, although 
the farmers were also playing an important role in its management. The government 
had tried to turnover the irrigation systems to the farmers for its complete 
management, but the farmers were not ready to take-over the irrigation system. 
Farmers cited following reasons for not taking over the complete management. 
• The government had not completed the construction of the structures as 
stipulated in the design. As a result the area stated in the design was not 
irrigated. 
• There was water leakage in the headwork that should be checked. 
• Some of the slabs of covered canal had fallen apart and needed replacement and 
also the damaged wall of the tunnel needed repair. 
• The construction of the branch canals as per the design was not complete, which 
is essential to irrigate 300 ha 
• The government should impart knowledge on water use practices for the efficient 
use of the water, so that farmer could derive maximum benefits. 
According to the former Dhalpa, the construction of the branch canals was not 
complete and the construction of branch canals 2, 3 and 4 was short by 300, 900 and 
300 metre respectively36. The farmers from the tail end of the branch canal 1 said that 
they expected a complete lining of the branch canal, which did not materialise. In the 
beginning when the canals became operational, they were happy with the 
availability of irrigation water and did not ask for a complete lining. 
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One of the farmers from the tail end of the branch canal 1 whose name is DB also 
said that the works, as agreed upon during the discussion, were not implemented. 
He blamed the contractor for not implementing the work according to the contract. 
But the blame does not go to the engineer and the contractor alone, as some of the 
farmers at the tail end in branch canal 2 did not provide the land to extend the canal 
for fear of damage to their houses due to land subsidence problems. In this respect, it 
could be said that the design did not take into account the soil texture of the area. 
The contractor also confirmed that the branch canals were not completed. He said 
that the farmers, whose land could not be irrigated, did not provide the land for the 
construction of the branch canals. The project engineers tried to convince the farmers 
but they did not agree, according to him. Finally, the contractor was asked by the 
engineers to construct branch canals where there was no problem of land availability. 
That is why the completion report was issued while the project was not complete 
according to the design. Other reasons for the non-completion of the structures were 
as follows: 
• The irrigation policy of that time did not emphasise the peoples' participation to 
involve them in the design of the project. 
• Lac 1v of awareness among farmers to extend co-operation to the government 
officials in the construction of field channels. 
• Government officials did not foresee the problems during the design that would 
arise during implementation due to a lack of intensive interface between the 
farmers and the irrigation officials. This is because the construction of field 
channels was left to the farmers and it was assumed that the farmers would co-
operate with each other for the construction. Besides, the contractor did not seek 
the active involvement of the farmers during the implementation. 
• The Village Panchayat also could not play an effective role in estabUshing co-
ordination between agency, contractor and the farmer, as its role in the national 
level project was not recognised. Besides, the supervision committee formed to 
look after the implementation maintained good links with the agency officials in 
quality control, but could not maintain the linking loop of users to complete their 
part of the work. This was largely due to their failure in seeking users role in 
decision making in absence of good communication with them. 
• Lack of the feeling of ownership of the project on the part of the farmers. 
These farmer demands and their implicit acknowledgement by the DIO officials 
suggest that the turn over of the irrigation system in the near future is unlikely. 
4.12 The Water User's Society (WUS) of Annapurna Kulo 
As this was a central level project, there was no provision for farmers' organisation 
during the planning and implementation of the project. However, there was 
supervision committee during the construction. The project envisaged to form a 
farmers' organisation towards the end of the project to take care of the operation and 
maintenance and one of the objectives was to encourage farmers to construct the field 
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channels. A committee was formed in 1990 at the initiative of DIO and VP and some 
of the members were active in solving the disputes between the farmers but it had 
become non-functional (GEOCE, 1991). The elected VP members dominated this 
committee and the VP selected the other members (Shivakoti, 1992:18). It could be 
argued that the top-down created committee could not function in absence of the 
representation from the actual users in decision making of the committee. The 
committee was effective in mamtaining the link with the agency in pursuing it to 
carry out annual maintenance work. However, its link with users was weak. The 
committee never sought the user's participation in the decision making. Also, the 
users were not aware about the role of the committee. There was lack of 
communication between them according to the users. Thus, the committee failed to 
realise its objective and it did not exist any more. 
However, of late, there has been a change in the farmers' view over a period of 
time. The benefit derived from the irrigation water could have motivated them to 
change their mind. This means the preparedness to bear maintenance cost is an 
indication of the importance one attaches to the irrigation water. In 1992 the farmers 
formed the WUS of Annapurna Kulo according to its chairperson, who is also the vice-
chairperson of the VDC. He took the initiative in the formation of the WUS by 
convincing the farmers. He comes from ward 4 and has land in branch canal 2. 
Although, the VDC vice chairperson took the initiative, the committee has the 
representation from the users in all the branch canals. Because of this, this committee 
is more democratic. Further the activities related to the irrigation management is 
decentralised down to the canal level through the formation of Water Users Teams 
(WUT), which is discussed in the following sections. The name of the WUS is "Hemja 
Irrigation System Water Users' Society", which is registered at the District 
Administration Office for legal recognition37. This allows the WUS to approach 
government or other agencies for financial and material support. In absence of the 
registered WUS, the request to other agencies would be informal and would be 
considered individual. The organogram of the society is presented in figure 4.4. The 
objectives of the WUS are as follows: 
• To provide reliable irrigation water to the farmers by developing a proper 
distribution mechanism and to supervise the operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation canals. 
• To encourage farmers to increase agricultural production. 
• To protect the water rights of the farmers and to overcome irrigation-related 
problems through the joint effort of the farmers. 
All the water users and the future water users are members of the association. 
However, the tenants will be members of the association in case this land is rented or 
else the owner cultivator will be the member. The membership for all the farmers is 
compulsory. Nevertheless, not all the farmers have become members through the 
payment of the membership fee. Only 10 percent of the farmers have become a 
member. The organisation structure of the Society is discussed hereafter. The 
constitution of the society is presented in appendix I. 
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Farmers'Assembly 
The highest level in the Organisation is the "Farmers' Assembly". All the farmers 
receiving irrigation water are members of the assembly. The duties and the 
responsibilities of the assembly are: 
• To discuss and approve the annual report and the expenditure presented by the 
"Farmers' Association" 
• To discuss and approve the programme and budget for each year. 
• To discuss the problems faced by the farmers and to recommend necessary 
actions for implementation. 
The meeting of the "Farmers' Assembly" is held twice a year before the summer and 
spring crop respectively. The presence of 50 percent of its members is necessary to 
hold the meeting. 
Besides, 50 percent of the farmers of the "Water Users' Society" can call a general 
meeting. The decision of the majority is binding to all the farmers. Farmers reported 
that the meeting of this body was convened only once since the formation of WUS. 
Water Users'Team (WUT) 
The users from each branch canal can form a WUT consisting of 5 to 9 members from 
among themselves as provided in the constitution of the WUS. The tenure of the 
members is for two years. The Dhalpa will also be a member of the WUTs. One of its 
members is elected as the chairperson of the WUT. The responsibilities of the WUT 
are: 
• To ensure efficient use of the available water through proper distribution. 
• To operate and maintain the branch and sub-branch canals. 
• To collect water taxes from the farmers. 
• To help solve the problems among the water users. 
• To facilitate acquisition of land required for the construction of new structures 
and help in its construction. 
• To report to the "Water Users' Society", if any water users violated the 
constitution of the association. 
At present there are five members in each WUT except for the branch canal 2 that has 
nine members since it has a larger command area. The farmers in the respective 
branch canals elect the WUT members. The usual procedure is that the farmers from 
the branch canals gather in one place. Then the farmers who want to be WUT 
member would express his desire or some other farmers propose the name. If the 
nomination is more than the required number the election will take place. As of now 
these members have been nominated in consensus. The main criteria to be a member 
is that he should be able to give enough time to irrigation management activities, he 
is respected by the fellow farmers and he is interested in social services. The person 
does not receive any remuneration, but the respect from the fellow farmers. Not all 
the WUTs are working effectively. WUTs of the branch canals having problems with 
water allocation, regular maintenance and construction, are more active than the 
WUTs where such problems do not exist. In that respect the WUT of the branch canal 
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2 is more active. This WUT have devised the allocation and distribution rule at the 
tail of this branch canal. The WUT of branch canal 1 is the least active one. 
Representative Assembly 
It consists of all the members of the WUTs. The primary tasks of this assembly are: 
• To formulate necessary rules for operation and maintenance and implementation. 
• To approve the auditors report for the "Water Users' Society" 
• To prepare the annual programme of the "Water Users Society" and to present it 
to the "Farmers' Assembly". 
The executive body of the Society 
This is the executive committee of the WUS. The executive committee consists of nine 
members with a chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary and treasurer. Out of these 
nine members, the "Farmers' Assembly" elects five members, and the remaining four 
are the WUTs chairmen representing four branch canals. By ethnicity the committee 
had a representation of two Brahmins, six Chhetris and one Newar. This is also an 
indication of landholding distribution in the command area by ethnicity. The tasks of 
this society are: 
• To co-ordinate the activities of the WUTs. 
• To recommend and advise the Dhalpas for water allocation and distribution. 
• To obtain financial and technical support from the DIO and help WUTs to 
implement necessary construction and maintenance works or execute the works 
on its own. 
• To solve the problems of water allocation and distribution between the WUTs. 
• To implement the plans and programmes approved by the "Farmers' Assembly" 
and the "Representative Assembly". 
• To operate the funds of the assembly for construction, maintenance and other 
expenditures. 
• To present the auditor's report to the "Farmers' Assembly" and the 
"Representatives' Assembly". 
The executive committee of the WUS is the most powerful within the organisation. 
However, the provision of different tiers and the delineation of their work within the 
organisation indicate the democratic nature of the organisation. The role assigned to 
the WUTs is important for solving problems at the field level and it also reflects the 
decentralised nature of the organisation. However, only the executive committee of 
the WUS has the decision making role in financial matters within the policy 
framework accepted by the "Farmers' assembly". 
Since its formation, the WUS is effective in mobilising internal as well as external 
resources for the maintenance of the canals. Most important of all, it has been trying 
hard in creating awareness among the farmers for the need to maintain the irrigation 
scheme for their benefit. Very recently (1998), the WUS has started collecting 
information on the irrigated area with farmers' name38. 
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Farmers' Assembly 
Representative 
Water Users' Team 
Executive Committee 
One farmer from branch canal 1 said that he was aware of the formation of the WUS 
and as a farmer he was also member of the "Farmers' Assembly". However, he was 
not aware of the WUTs and its members nor about any meeting of the "Farmers' 
Assembly". He revealed that there was an Agriculture group and it consists of 31 
members. The agriculture group is the executive body of the farmers' co-operative. 
He was also not aware of the constitution of the WUS. The reason for this could be 
the fact that there were no major problems in this branch canal. Thus, the interaction 
between the WUT and the farmers is less. 
One of the WUTs members from the branch canal 1 reported that one of the 
frequently discussed matters in the executive committee is the non-completion of the 
structures according to the design. The WUS cannot solve this problem, as it does not 
have enough resources to complete the structures. DOI thinks that the project is 
completed and will not provide additional funds to complete it. The formation of the 
WUS shows that the users would like to maintain new links with the DOI and also 
the organisational control in irrigation system. This was evidenced through their 
Figure 4 .4 : Organogram of Annapurna Kulo Water Users' Society 
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4.13 Management of irrigation tasks 
4.13.1 Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 
As stated earlier, the Yamdi Khola supplies the water to the main canal. Since, the 
headwork has a permanent weir, the water to the canal is obtained throughout the 
year. However, the availability of water during the monsoon is high compared to the 
winter season. As noted earlier there is no shortage of water in the canal during the 
monsoon. The users do not have to put much effort and resources into system 
development, since the main canal and the branch canals also have a permanent 
structure. The activities related to the system development are confined to the field 
channels only. 
System water allocation varies with the cropping season. During the monsoon it is 
dictated by the system design as explained later. Availability of water in the main 
canal dictates the allocation during winter, spring and paddy transplanting period. 
The Dhalpa of DOI mainly does allocation and distribution. He controls the flow only 
at the head of branch canal. Farmers manage themselves within the branch canal. The 
availability of water in the main canal is the basis for the allocation of the water. The 
Dhalpa on the advice of WUS controls the water delivery in each of the canals 
according to the opening of the spindle gate. The WUS had developed an elaborate 
procedure in 1995 for the allocation and distribution of the water for paddy crops. 
There were two procedures developed separately for the planting season and after 
the completion of the planting. The following paragraphs describe and discuss them 
separately for each cropping season. 
Allocation during the period of paddy transplanting 
The number of ploughs employed in an area is the basis for the allocation of water 
for each branch canal for the planting season 0une 4-July 16), but not the area. For 
example, if the number of ploughs employed is higher in branch canal 1 than in other 
canals, then it receives more water. If all the branch canals have more or less an equal 
demand, then the allocation is on a rotation basis. The rotation is followed only if 
water supply is low and canal is not at full supply, which is usually the case during 
the planting season. This is important because, the availability of water in the main 
canal governs the allocation of water. This also implies the scheduling of planting in 
each of the areas. The duration of this period is from the end of May to end of June. 
This period is just before the onset of the monsoon. The water in the main canal at 
this time is not sufficient to allow planting simultaneously in all the areas. The 
rotation usually is for 48 hours to 72 hours. 
control of Dhalpa and carrying out of maintenance activities (see resource 
mobilisation in 4.13.4). This indicates that the users have been able to construct new 
linking loops, which were disintegrated during the intervention due to non-co-
operation among users. 
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Farmers demand more water at the time of planting. Thus, the demand should 
coincide with the availability of water. This requires scheduling of planting in each of 
the areas before water allocation. This is to ensure that all the farmers have access to 
enough water for planting. This means that no particular branch canal receives the 
water continuously. 
However, the water is not the only factor for the scheduling of the planting. The 
availability of labour and ploughs are also important in this respect. The farmers 
cannot start planting simultaneously even if they wanted. The exchange of labour 
and the plough or its hiring is the common practice in the village as all the 
households do not have enough labourers at that time. The farmers through 
consultation among themselves decide the area for planting. This was important in 
mamtaining the social cohesion and it also had made the water allocation task of the 
WUS easier. 
After the paddy transplantation 
There is no shortage of water during the monsoon, after the completion of paddy 
transplanting. Hence, the system operates in its full capacity. The system design 
dictates its system level water allocation during this period. It is to be noted that the 
capacity of the main canal reduces gradually as it moves towards tail end (table 4.5). 
This means that even if farmers wanted to follow delivery of water on rotation, the 
system design does not allow it. Because, the entire flow is not supplied to the branch 
canal located at the tail of main canal due to the reduced capacity of the main canal. 
Therefore, all branch canals receive continuous flow more or less during daytime. 
During the night-time, however, adjusting the gate at the head reduces flow in the 
branch canal 2. This action also necessitates flow adjustment even at the headwork. 
However, if availability of water in the main canal suddenly drops by any reason, 
flow in all canals is adjusted by adjusting Churi39. The Dhalpa does the adjustment 
under the direction of WUS. 
The procedure for the allocation of water after the planting (July 17-October 27) is 
also important, especially if the monsoon is not good. For this, the WUTs from each 
branch canal are responsible for collecting data on irrigated area from the farmers 
and they will have to send this to the executive committee by mid July. The executive 
committee will not be responsible for the allocation of water if the WUTs do not send 
their data in time. The allocation of water commences from mid July to end of 
October. The distribution to each of the branch canal is on a continuous basis. 
However, the area under irrigation governs the amount of water. If the group of 
farmers from a settlement area demands water in the night, the farmers and the 
WUTs should take the responsibility for any damage, due to the problem of land 
subsidence, likely to be caused by the irrigation water. Otherwise, the lands in the 
settlement area do not receive the irrigation water in the night. This case applies to 
the middle and tail end of the branch canal 2. For this reason these parts receive 
water only during the day. 
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Irrigation in winter 
The WUS has developed the procedure for the allocation of water during the winter 
also. The farmer's demand and the availability of water in the canal determine the 
allocation. The demand from the farmer from each branch canals determines the 
volume of water delivery for the winter crop (mid November to mid February). The 
water allocation is supplied on a continuous basis as long as the availability of water 
is sufficient to meet the farmer's demand. The water allocation is on a rotational basis 
for each branch canal if the water supply is not sufficient. The cropped area and the 
type of the crop determine the duration of the rotation. The executive committee 
makes the final decisions concerning the rotation on basis of proposal made by the 
WUTs. The water allocation is mainly for the branch canal 1 and 2, as the farmers 
grow winter crops, especially the potato and other vegetables. 
The water allocation to each branch canal from mid April to the end of May is on 
the basis of the type of crops planted in each block. The water level in the canal 
during this period goes on decreasing. Therefore, continuous allocation for each of 
the branch canals is not possible. Thus, water requirement for each crop was an 
important consideration for the distribution of the water. The demand for water in 
branch canals 1 and 2 is more in this period of time due to intensive vegetable 
cultivation as compared to the command area of other canals. The reasons for this 
are: 
• The farmers live near the farm land that enables close supervision of the farm. 
• The easy access to water by being at the head of the main canal. 
The Dhalpa reported that usually the gate is only opened by one to four churi of the 
gate for branch canal 1. However, there is a higher demand from the branch canal 2, 
where it is six churi openings of the gate. 
4.13.2 User allocation, system operation and water distribution 
Hereafter water allocation and distribution from the branch canal will be discussed. 
The allocation and distribution in branch canals will be discussed in detail. In branch 
canal 1, all the field channels of the Chaurasi Kulo in the command area of Annapurna 
Kulo are in use and none of the old structures are abandoned. The lands receiving 
field to field irrigation are very few in this canal because of the use of old field 
channels. One of the farmers from the middle of this canal who has 20 ropani of the 
land, of which 12 ropani is under irrigation, said that irrigation water was not a 
problem. He is planting paddy in all the fields during the summer. This person said 
that continuous irrigation is available in his field channel. He is planting wheat, 
mustard, vegetables and improved grass on 10 ropani of land during the winter. The 
farmers from the 16 field channels divide the irrigation water proportionate to the 
area under irrigation (mato muri) from the field channels, when the supply is limited. 
According to the Dhalpa the excess water from the field channels of branch canal 1 
on the western side flows to the river. Thus, they have to monitor the water 
allocation in this branch canal and they have to check the over flow to the river by 
closing the gate in the branch canal. The heavy flow of the water during the monsoon 
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destroys the bunds in the field and because of this, the farmers let the water flow to 
the river. One of the farmers at the middle of the branch canal 1 confirmed this. He 
was of the opinion that if there were enough field channels and had a complete 
lining, this problem would not have occurred. This would have helped in increasing 
the water delivery at the tail end of this canal. 
The distribution of the water during the winter is based on the cropped area and 
the type of crop. Each of the farmers gather together to distribute the water among 
themselves. Farmers receive water on a rotational basis based on the cropped area 
and the type of crop. The distribution of irrigation water is not a problem. This is 
because all the fields do not have the winter crop. One of the farmers from this 
branch canal said that he has winter crops only on 0.04 ha out of 1 ha. The 
availability of irrigation water, the compost manure and the labour requirement are 
the constraming factor for the winter crop cultivation. 
As in the main canal the capacity of the branch canal 2 reduces gradually towards 
its tail end. From the point of view of actual system operation this branch canal is 
divided into two sections. In the head reach it has two sub-branch canals off-taking 
from the branch canal. The first sub-branch canal is ungated. However, a cross 
regulator (vertical slide gate) has been installed in the branch canal immediately 
downstream of the bifurcation of second sub-branch canal. Farmers constructed the 
second sub-branch canal. The reason for the cross regulator is that there is a small 
village towards the tail end of this canal. This area does not receive water during the 
night due to land subsidence problems. In the second sub-branch canal there are 
several turn outs (locally known as Pyan), which provides irrigation water directly to 
the terraces. These terraces belong to either single farmer or the terraces belong to 
two to three farmers. At the tail end there are three sub-branch canals, which receive 
irrigation water from this branch canal. 
Allocation during the period of paddy transplanting 
The number of ploughs employed in an area is the basis for the allocation of water 
for each field channels for the planting season (June 4-July 16), but not the area. For 
example, if the number of ploughs employed is higher in sub-branch canal 1 at the 
head reach than in other canals, then it receives more water. If all the sub-branch 
canals have more or less an equal demand, then the allocation is on a rotation basis. 
The rotation usually is for 48 hours to 72 hours. This happens only if monsoon is late 
and the main canal cannot be operated in full supply. This is important because, the 
availability of water in the branch canal governs the distribution of water. This also 
implies the scheduling of planting in each of the areas. The duration of this period is 
from the end of May to end of June. This period is just before the onset of the 
monsoon. The water in the branch canal at this time is not sufficient to allow planting 
simultaneously in all the areas. 
Farmers demand more water at the time of planting. Thus, the demand should 
coincide with the availability of water. This requires scheduling of planting in each of 
the areas before water distribution. This is to ensure that all the farmers have access 
to enough water for planting. This means that no particular sub-branch canal 
receives the water continuously. During this period the sub-branch canals do not 
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receive water, as the flow capacity is not enough to reach to the tail reach. The users 
start planting when the branch canal have full supply during the monsoon 
After the paddy transplantation 
There is no shortage of water during the monsoon, after the completion of paddy 
transplanting. Hence, system operates in its full capacity. The system design dictates 
its sub-branch level water distribution during third period. It is to be noted that the 
capacity of the branch canal reduces gradually as it moves towards tail end. This 
means that even if farmers wanted to follow delivery of water on rotation, the system 
design does not allow it. Because, the entire flow cannot be delivered to the to the tail 
end due to the reduced capacity of the branch canal. Therefore, all sub-branch canals 
at the head reach receive continuous flow more of less during daytime. During the 
nighttime, however, adjusting the gate at the head reduces flow to the tail end. 
The procedure for the allocation of water after the planting Quly 17-October 27) is 
also important, especially if the monsoon is not good. For this, the WUT from branch 
canal 2 is responsible for the allocation of water. The allocation of water commences 
from mid July to end of October. The allocation to sub-branch canal at the head reach 
is on a continuous basis. However, there is rotation at the tail end. The total area 
receiving water on a rotation basis is 9 ha belonging to 66 users. The land is divided 
into 4 plots consisting of two plots of 3 ha each and 1.5 ha of two plots each. The 
rotation is for 24 hours. Thus, the two plots of 3 ha each receive irrigation water for 
24 hours. The remaining two plots of 1.5 ha receive irrigation water for 12 hours 
each. Four field channels serve these areas. Two field channels serve 3 ha each 
whereas other two field channels serve 1.5 ha each. Thus, each of the fields receives 
irrigation water once in three days. The users themselves at the initiative of WUT 
member from that branch canal however, worked out this arrangement. He himself 
is a user in this rotation system. This shows that organisational control is necessary if 
there is scarcity of water. This arrangement however, was possible due to effective 
social collaboration. Further, the necessity for this arrangement was also caused by 
the technical design of the system. Because, the farmers cannot bring more water 
even when the branch canal has a full supply due to reduced capacity of the canal at 
the tail reach. Nevertheless, the farmers at the head reach do no object if these 
farmers divert more water by blocking the flow to the sub-branch canal at the head 
reach. 
Irrigation in winter 
The demand from the farmer from sub-branch canals determines the volume of 
water delivery for the winter crop (mid November to mid February). The water 
distribution is on a continuous basis as long as the availability of water is sufficient to 
meet the farmer's demand. The water distribution is on a rotational basis for each 
terrace if the water supply is not sufficient. The cropped area and the type of the crop 
determine the duration of the rotation. Farmers however reported there are no 
problem of water distribution, as winter crops do not require continuous irrigation. 
Besides, winter crop is not planted in all the areas. 
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The flow of the water in the canal is hampered due to the deposition of silt in the 
covered canal, which is difficult for the farmers to clean. The problem is more acute 
in the siphon structure in this canal. Especially, the farmers were talking about the 
deposition of silt and also the garbage left by the farmers which was difficult to 
remove. 
The branch canal 3 could also be divided into two sections. They are head and tail 
reaches. The processes followed in the allocation and distribution of water is the 
same as described in branch canal 2. The lands at the head reaches have more or less 
continuous flow whereas there is rotation at the tail end. For example, if the area is 10 
ha and water is sufficient for 2.5 ha, then the land is divided into 4 parcels and each 
parcel receives water for 24 hours. The rotation could extend to 24,48 and 72 hours, 
depending on the availability of water. This means the rotation varies from 1 to 3 
days. The water delivery at the tail end in this canal is dependent on the wishes of 
the farmers at the head reaches. Farmers reported that the relationship between the 
farmers at the head reach and the tail end is not good. The farmers at the head 
dominate the farmers due to their socio-economic position in the community. The 
farmers at the tail end cannot quarrel with them. According to the farmers more 
water allocation in this canal affects the water delivery in the branch canals 4a and 
4b. 
The lands in the canals 4a and 4b also receive the continuous irrigation during the 
summer in the head reaches but there is also a rotation at the tail end. Farmers 
distribute available irrigation water in proportion to their land holding. The land is 
divided into 4 to parcels and each parcel receives irrigation water for 24 hours. 
Farmers at the tail end of the canal complain that they do not receive sufficient 
irrigation water during the planting season. 
Field to field irrigation is common in all the branch canals, since not all the fields 
are connected to field channels. The farmers from the adjacent fields decide 
themselves on the distribution of water. Providing irrigation water for field to field 
irrigation is through samaha. Samaha is also essential for the land, which provides 
irrigation water to the lower fields. The benefits of samaha as reported by the farmer 
in branch canal 2 are as follows. 
• It checks water logging in the upper terrace. 
• It checks the destruction of the bunds caused by water logging. 
Providing irrigation water to the lower field for planting is customary. The lower 
field receives irrigation water after the completion of planting in the upper field. 
Thus, the field adjacent to the canal has the first right to use the water. This suggests 
that a farmer depending on the field to field irrigation received irrigation water only 
when the upper terrace is full. None of the farmers who depend on field to field 
irrigation, reported that they had problems in getting irrigation water from their 
neighbours. This is indicative of the good social relationship existing between the 
farmers. In some instances, the farmers with the consent of the owner dig out 
temporary field channels from the adjacent field for bringing water to their field. This 
practice applies to the winter crops only. This is because all the fields do not plant 
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winter crops. The WUS however does not have any influence on this matter. This 
was an informal arrangement among the farmers. 
4.13.3 Conflict management 
Farmers told of some cases of disputes during the discussion. The reported cases of 
disputes are: 
• The farmers at the tail end complain that the farmers at the head are using more 
water than required. 
• Some farmers from branch canal 1 and 2 let the water flow to the river when they 
do not need it. 
• The farmers from the head claim that they should get sufficient water first before 
distobuting it to the tail end. 
• The farmers who had Khet before the intervention and were receiving irrigation 
water from Chaurasi Kulo argue that they should have the first right to use the 
water. Only then the farmers, who converted Ban land after the construction of 
the Annapurna Kulo should receive irrigation water. 
There were some disputes between the farmers and the Dhalpa before the formation 
of the WUS in 1992 regarding the water allocation from the main canal. Now there is 
no problem between farmer and the Dhalpa since the WUS decides on the allocation 
from the main canal. Beside, any disputes arising among the farmers and between 
the farmers and Dhalpa are referred to the WUS. Despite this there are disputes 
between the farmers at the head and tail in branch canal 3 with respect to the water 
distribution. But the WUS is not taking any initiative in this respect. The water users 
themselves should resolve the disputes according to the farmers. This was largely 
due to less availability of the irrigation water. The unequal social status between the 
farmers has also contributed to the disputes. However, the intensity of the conflict is 
not great due to the effective role played by the WUS in the aJocation and 
distribution of water. Secondly, the farmers did not have free access to the operation 
of the main and the branch canals, as Dhalpa is responsible for it. Finally, the field 
channels do not extend to all the fields that have made the farmers dependent on 
each other for field to field irrigation. The farmers in this respect would have to co-
operate and promote coexistence among each other in order to take benefit from 
irrigation water. 
The constitution of the WUS has the provision of various sanctions with respect to 
the wilful damage of various structures that could hamper the efficient operation of 
the canals. The provision of sanctions in the constitution is an implicit 
acknowledgement of the likely disputes among the farmers. It was mentioned in the 
constitution that any individuals and the water users would be charged for any 
wilful damage of any of the structures. The penalty for such damages will be the cost 
for its reconstruction or maintenance. Besides, an extra 5 percent of the cost of such 
damages will be charged and that will be kept in the maintenance fund of the WUS. 
Apart from the cash compensation, for the first time those involved will be warned 
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depending upon the nature of the fault. The person will not be allowed to use 
irrigation water, if he commits the fault repeatedly. 
The enforcement of the sanctions is decentralised. The WUTs can enforce the 
sanction under their jurisdiction. If the WUTs could not enforce them, then they will 
have to refer to the executive committee. In case the executive committee becomes 
unable to enforce the sanction, then it would seek the help from VDC, the District 
Administration and the District Water Users Committee. The case will be reported to 
the District Administration for necessary action along with the compensation in cash, 
if the offender is not a water user. The WUTs can spend the money collected from the 
penalty for repair and maintenance of branch canals, if it is under their jurisdiction. 
According to the chairman of WUS no cases of wilful damage have occurred as of 
now. However, there are many instances of damages inflicted on the structures due 
to negligence of the farmers. During the field visit near the tail end of the branch 
canal 2, there were depositions of silt and the garbage. This could be due to their 
dissatisfaction with the lack of sufficient irrigation water. There are no sanctions 
specified in the constitution for this kind of offence, about which the WUS 
chairperson was of the opinion that farmers should be aware of what they should do. 
It was clear that the WUS was helpless in this respect, although, it was effective in 
addressing the broader issue of management. Nevertheless, it was unable to check 
some of the acts of individual farmers that could have adverse effect in the long run. 
It may be because the full ownership is still with the government, and also the 
government provides funds for maintenance. 
4.13.4 Resource mobilisation 
When the farmers initiated the construction of the main canal in 1967, each of the 
households contributed four persons for one ropani of the land. The wage rate at that 
time was NRs 15. That meant the contribution was NRs 60 per ropani. In 1968 the 
government provided NRs 15,000 to continue the work. 
After the Annapurna Kulo was constructed the DOI provided NRs. 652,151 during 
the period 1988-1990 (GEOCE, 1991:19), out of which NRs. 302,651 was for the 
construction and maintenance. This means only 46 percent of the total budget were 
for the maintenance and the rest was for salary and miscellaneous expenses. This 
amount was insufficient to carry out necessary construction and maintenance as 
more construction work was required and the repairs of the structures were also 
pending (GEOCE, 1991:19). Thus, it can be argued that the insufficient allocation for 
maintenance ultimately would lead to further deterioration of the physical structures 
requiring major investments in future. This was evident during the field study in 
1997 as major maintenance of the main canal was required. 
In 1992 the WUS has made provisions for the mobilisation of the resources iorm 
different sources. They are: 
• Fee and penalty collected from the farmers. 
• Loans taken from financial institutions. 
• Donations and grants received from other agencies. 
• Funds provided by the HMG /N. 
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• Cash mobilised from the farmers. 
• Labour contribution from the farmers. 
It has provision for the mobilisation of farmer's cash and labour contribution along 
with the money obtained from the DOI to implement the construction and 
maintenance activities. However, the farmers have not contributed any cash or 
labour for the maintenance as of now. The farmers from all the branch canals said 
that they did not contribute any amount and labour for maintenance work. The WUS 
officials admit, that they have not yet mobilised cash and labour from farmers for 
maintenance work. The Dhalpa said that people used to contribute labour for canal 
cleaning before the construction of Annapurna Kulo. The farmers were contributing 
two mandays of labour per household (three mandays per ha) for the annual 
maintenance of the canal before the intervention. After the intervention people do 
not contribute for the annual maintenance (Shivakoti, 1992:19). People are not willing 
to contribute since the government is providing funds for maintenance. 
There were differences in the opinion among the farmers with respect to the 
contribution for the maintenance work. The farmers who said they would like to 
contribute were the ones who were receiving assured irrigation water. They were the 
farmers mainly from the head and middle of branch canal 1, 2, 3, and most of the 
farmers from a tertiary canal of branch canal 2. The farmers who were receiving field 
to field irrigation water and the farmers at the tail end said they would not like to 
contribute unless they had separate distributary canals since, they did not like 
dependency on other farmers. This shows that the lack of distributary canals has 
hampered the mobilisation of resources for the maintenance. This was deterring the 
resource contribution from other farmers also who were receiving the irrigation 
water. This is largely due to the non involvement of the farmers during the design 
and implementation of the project. Besides, at present the people have to contribute 
cash instead of labour, which they do not like to do. Nevertheless, it seems that 
farmers with the help of the WUS will take care of the simple maintenance even if the 
government did not provide the support to the farmers. Because, they do not like to 
lose the benefits they are receiving. However, the maintenance work of the weir, the 
covered canal and repair of large portions of the lined canals is beyond the capacity 
of the farmers. 
The incomes and expenditures of the WUS are presented in Table 4. 8. The 
resources from the DOI is decreasing over the period except for the year 1997/98, 
which was slightly higher than the previous year. But in the second year there was a 
deficit in the total accounts of the WUS because of the increased maintenance work. 
There is a positive correlation between the wage payment and the expenses for the 
maintenance work in this year. The government contributions have also declined in 
successive years as compared to 1994/95. It seems that the government is intending 
to hand over the management to the farmers through gradual disengagement. The 
WUS is aware of this and was managing the fund prudently. Evidently, the WUS 
was saving from the resources obtained from the government. This was important 
with respect to mamtaining continuity for regular maintenance. Nevertheless, from 
the sustainability point of view this was not encouraging. There should have been a 
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gradual increase in the internal resource mobilisation for operation and maintenance. 
But some of the farmers think that they should not contribute as the government was 
providing the money. The WUS raises money from among the farmers at present for 
the construction only. The construction of the sub-branch canal in branch 2 is an 
example in this respect. The farmers who were to become the water users contributed 
50 percent of the costs for the construction and the remaining 50 percent were paid 
by the WUS from the government contribution. The WUS raised the cash 
contribution on the basis of the land holding from the farmers. However, the amount 
of contribution is dependent on the type of work. The construction has been 
continuing for the last three years. It can be observed from the table that the expenses 
for the construction work are higher in the year when the users' contribution is also 
higher. The same applies to the case with the wage payment. Part of the farmers' 
contribution is for the bid money to get contracts from the government. The bid 
money under the heading 'deposit return' goes to the WUS saving fund after the 
completion of the work. 
According to the WUS chairperson, the mobilisation of the resources from farmers 
and DIO for the construction of sub-branch canals has been effective. There was no 
profit making intention. This is because, no outside contractor is employed and the 
farmers do the work on their own. This enables them to carry out more work with 
less money. It enabled the WUS to save money received from the government and 
that was kept in the maintenance fund. Besides, the farmers received the 
employment opportunity to earn cash income during the off-season. 
The WUS, according to its chairperson does not raise money from the farmers on a 
regular basis. Farmers contribute occasionally for repair and construction. The WUS 
is thinking of collecting water taxes from the farmers on a regular basis. This would 
help in creating a maintenance fund. The situation however, is deteriorating as 
contribution of the users is declining and stopped in 1997/98. Those farmers who 
have access only to field to field irrigation and those who have difficulty in receiving 
water do not like to pay regularly. 
Table 4.8: The income and expenditure statement of the WUS 
0 0 
en 
O 
Income (NRs.) Expenditure (NRs.) 
FY H M G / N Users Bank 
interest 
Deposit 
return 
Total 
income 
Maintenance Construction Wages Office 
supplies 
Misc. Total 
expenses 
Balance 
1994/95 449,171 33,246 3,516 - 485,933 89,565 115,305 5,650 1,859 4,000 216,379 269,554 
1995/96 175,289 6,215 - - 181,504 200,223 4,250 - 643 200 2 0 5 3 1 6 -23 ,812 
1996/97 115,143 1,800 15,0 89 - 132,032 83,258 - - - 500 83,758 48,274 
1997/98 142,061 - - 10,890 152,951 121,899 - 41,363 -
2,383 
165,645 
12,694 
Total 881,664 41,261 18,605 10,890 952,420 494,945 119,555 47,013 2,502 7,083 671,098 281,322 
Source: Audit report of WUS 
Note: 
• The maintenance expenses in FY 1997/98 also includes some expenses on the construction of the sub-branch canal from canal 2, according 
to WUS chairman. 
• The maintenance cost includes both materials and wages for the skilled labourers. 
• The wage expenses include only the wages paid to the unskilled labourers and the supervisor. 
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4.13.5 System maintenance 
Before the formation of WUS, the DOI was carrying out the maintenance work 
through the contractor. Now the WUS prioritises the works for annual maintenance 
in consultation with the WUTs and farmers and recommends this to the DOI. 
Afterwards it holds discussions with the irrigation officials on behalf of the farmers 
for determining the works to be implemented in a particular year. For the 
implementation of the works it enters into agreement with the DIO and undertakes 
the implementation of the activities as agreed upon. 
The WUS implements the work on wage basis through the local villagers. The 
constitution of the WUS stipulates that the WUS is responsible for the regular 
maintenance of the main canal in consultation with the farmers. However, the 
subcommittees for each of the branch canals can carry out necessary maintenance 
work in their respective branch canals. 
The WUS constitution specifies that the emergency maintenance of intake, covered 
canal and the main canal will be carried out immediately by the executive committee, 
even when government support is not available. The executive committee would 
mobilise cash and labour contribution from the farmers for immediate maintenance. 
At the same time, the executive committee would approach the DIO for the required 
finance of these activities. 
The maintenance provisions for the branch canals are also the same as above. But 
the WUTs are responsible for the immediate maintenance and will refer it to the 
executive committee for long-term maintenance. The provision to undertake 
immediate maintenance by the farmers themselves is significant and reflects the 
importance attached to the irrigation scheme. Further, it also shows farmers' 
awareness that government support will not come as and when required. 
The maintenance activities are fixed on priorities. The processes followed for 
undertaking maintenance activities were as follows. 
• The farmers request for the required maintenance activities to the WUTs. 
• The WUTs and the Dhalpa do the necessary inspection and recommend to the 
executive committee. 
• The executive committee decides on the issues. 
The first priority is for mamtaining the main canal and after that the branch canals. 
The extent of the loss (crop damage) occurred and expected loss in crop production 
were the main criteria for prioritising the maintenance work in the branch canals. 
The WUS did the maintenance of the gabion structure40 that was important to divert 
water to the canal according to the WUS chairperson. Most of the branch canals and 
also some sections of the main canal require repair. 
4.14 Governance and property rights 
The governance structure in the irrigation system has gone through major changes 
over a period of time. When there was one irrigation system, before the construction 
of the Annapurna Kulo, the governance structure was as discussed in Chaurasi Kulo. 
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The governance of the irrigation system is under the DOI as this new construction 
was implemented as an AMIS. The irrigation system was managed by the DOI 
through its employee Dhalpa. The Dhalpas under the direction of the DOI were 
responsible for drawing the operational rules. This was one of the reasons for 
disputes among the users and the Dhalpas, as users were not involved in the 
operation and maintenance of the canal. The fund for annual maintenance was also 
provided by DOI and annual maintenance work was carried out through the local 
contractor. The farmers through the formation of UC in 1992 partially took over the 
operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. The number of Dhalpa has been 
reduced from 4 to one, which prompted the farmers to take over the management of 
the irrigation system. This is a very positive development in the sense that the 
farmers are taking initiative in the governance of the irrigation system as indicated 
by the development of the operational rule by the farmers themselves. At present the 
role of DOI in the management of the irrigation system is limited to the annual 
maintenance fund and the salary of the Dhalpa. The presence of all three forms of 
rules - operational rules, collective choice rules and the constitutive choice rule are 
present. 
The water right of the users across the branch canal is dictated by the design 
structure as discussed earlier. In principle the water delivery is based on irrigated 
area. However, there were differences in the water access among the users due to the 
location of land. This is due to the fact that field channels are not in adequate density. 
The users were supposed to construct the field channels but the users having their 
land near to the branch canal did provide the land. The users at the head reaches and 
near to the branch canal have unrestricted access when the canal is on full supply. 
The users at the tail end however, have to follow a rotation. The water right is not 
proportionate to the land holding in the command area because they do not receive 
adequate water to irrigate all their land. The water right among the farmers was 
agreed on the basis of the designated command area of the irrigation system during 
the design of the project. Because of this, the farmers who had land within the 
command area of the irrigation system but who were not receiving irrigation water 
are taking the initiative to extend sub-branch canals. However, these farmers have to 
make investments in establishing their right on the irrigation water as indicated by 
the construction of the sub-branch canal. So, there is a mix of customary right and the 
right obtained through investment. 
4.15 Water control 
There have been major changes in the water control technology after the new 
construction. The construction of a permanent weir with sluice gates has enabled the 
farmers to regulate the water allocation and distribution in desired way. Further, it 
has reduced the annual labour required for the construction of the temporary weir. 
This has implications in terms of the social relations among the farmers as indicated 
by reduction in the labour force required for the construction of headwork of the 
Chaurasi Kulo. The provision of the gates in the branch canals has enabled new 
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control mechanisms in the allocation and distribution of the irrigation water. As the 
Dhalpa operates these gates, the involvement of the farmers in devising appropriate 
control mechanisms to distribute the water has been reduced. However, there has 
been no change in the traditional control structures at the field channels. 
The intervention brought new administrative control as the irrigation system is 
under the management of the DOI. This has developed a new relationship between 
the farmers and the agency (DOI). This enabled the farmers to obtain and mobilise 
the external resources for the upkeep of the irrigation system. However, lately there 
have been changes in the organisational control due to the emergence of new 
organisation of the farmers. The WUT with adequate ethnic representation have been 
effective in mamtaining social and political control among the users, as evidenced by 
the implementation of rotation at the water scarce area. This is likely to increase the 
social control of the irrigation system besides, the changes in the relationship 
between the agency and the farmers. This has been reflected in declining role of the 
DOI in the management of the irrigation system. Nevertheless, the lack of the 
mobilisation of internal resources by the farmers for the maintenance may deter 
complete user control of the irrigation system. 
But a group of users at the head reaches in some branch canals are effectively 
controlling the irrigation water due to their social and political influence and also 
poor social relations with the users at tail reaches. Lack of adequate density of field 
channels is also contributing to this situation. In this respect, the farmers near to the 
branch canals are in control of the irrigation water due to the weak organisational 
control of the WUS. Enforcement of effective social and organisational control is also 
lacking because all the farmers have not become the members of the WUS. 
4.16 Analysis and conclusions: Annapurna Kulo 
This case is an example of the major government intervention generated by the local 
initiatives taken by the farmers. The people at the tail end of the Chaurasi Kulo were 
unhappy due to inadequate irrigation facilities and initiated in 1967 the building of a 
new canal, with the help of peace corps volunteer, that should take water from the 
river. But they could not complete this canal even with the initial help of DOI. This 
reflects that external support is required when the technology and other resources 
available with the farmers are inadequate to implement major works. During the 
period 1983-86, a scheme using new technology with modern RCC structures such as 
the sluice gate, covered canal, main canal, aqueducts and the branch canals were 
constructed by DOI through a contractor. The government intervention was the 
result of the links between the farmers and the local institution (VP) and the one 
between the VP and the government. This shows that how the farmers were able to 
form a loop in accessing the external resources in order to take control of the water in 
their hand. This relieved them from their dependence on Chaurasi Kulo. However, it 
is remarkable that the design was not extensively discussed with all the farmers 
although it involved the constructing of a new irrigation system over the existing 
system of Chaurasi Kulo. 
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The lack of conrmunication led to several misunderstandings between the farmers, 
the DOI officials and contractor as reflected by the incomplete construction of branch 
canals and construction of field channels by the farmers. The farmers thought the 
work was to be accomplished by the DOI. But the DOI officials failed to 
communicate in convincing that it was farmers' work. As one farmer put it "he 
thought that the engineers will come back to complete the work" since he was not 
aware of the agreement on the design between the DOI and the contractor. As a 
result, the farmers were not willing to take over the irrigation system. This clearly 
shows that there was lack of clear planning, transparency and accountability during 
the design of the project. There was lack of required interface between farmers-VP-
government, which hindered the communication between the social actors involved. 
In this interaction the role of actual users were rninimised which led to the minimal 
participation of the farmers in terms of material contribution. The lack of 
involvement of the farmers could be attributed to the fact that the policy of the 
government in this period did not emphasise the farmers' participation, which is one 
of the flaws inherent in the blue print approach of development interventions at that 
time. The local elite and the VP officials were more influential during the 
implementation of the intervention. Nevertheless, the other users were also active in 
the implementation through their involvement during the construction. This 
indicates that the users were aware of their role in accomplishing the quality work. 
Further, their involvement was instrumental in making government officials more 
accountable. 
The allocation of the irrigation water to different branch canals is dictated by the 
technical design. Thus, there is less flexibility in changing the allocation through the 
organisational control. This indicates that the technical aspect was given more 
importance during the design than to its organisational aspect. Nevertheless the 
elaborate procedures developed by the WUS for the management of irrigation tasks 
shows its commitment towards the successful operation of the scheme through 
appropriate organisational control. The allocation and distribution of irrigation water 
for the planting season to different branch canals was a step towards minimising the 
likely disputes, which used to occur between users and Dhalpa before the WUS was 
formed. This was possible due to the flexibility in water control technology. This was 
crucial for obtaining the support of all the farmers. In this respect the Dhalpa is an 
important link between the WUS and the farmers because of his role in 
implementation of the decisions. The informal arrangement for field to field 
irrigation developed by the farmers for water distribution is noteworthy as it has 
contained the likely conflict that could have occurred due to the lack of field 
channels. 
The irrigation system is seen by the farmers as government property and therefore 
they expect adequate and timely water supply. But they are not willing to contribute 
cash and labour for the maintenance of the major structure since it was a complete 
new technology not known by the farmers until now. Remarkably, the farmers were 
willing to contribute to the construction of a sub-branch canal in branch canal 2 to get 
water supplies to the unirrigated land. The constraint in mobilising the internal 
resources for other maintenance activities is because the benefit distribution to all the 
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farmers is not equitable. For example, the benefit derived by the farmer near to the 
branch canal and the one receiving field to field irrigation and through rotation is not 
the same. 
Nevertheless, the WUS was successful in mamtaining the loop with the DOI in 
obtaining the resources for maintenance. At the same time the saving of money could 
be taken as the tacit acceptance of the future maintenance responsibility by the WUS. 
Regardless of its involvement in operation and maintenance, the maintenance of the 
covered canal and part of the main canal is difficult if not impossible for the WUS. 
The prioritisation of maintenance work reflects the realisation by WUS of its 
limitation in undertaking maintenance activities. In essence, the focus is on 
immediate maintenance so as to make canals operational. 
Due to the new technology the farmers cannot do all the maintenance with local 
labour only. For this they would have to hire a local contractor, which requires 
considerable amounts of cash. The expected gain from the irrigation system is so low 
as indicated by the PBME report that the farmers are not able to pay for its complete 
maintenance. As the increase in income of the farmers has not materialised as 
expected, it is questionable whether all the resources required for the future 
maintenance could be mobilised from the farmers. This means either the irrigation 
system should be fully maintained by the government or the farmers should raise 
money through water taxes as much as they can afford and government should 
provide the remaining balance for the upkeep of the irrigation system. Given the 
type of work required for maintenance, it seems more logical that all the farmers 
contribute in cash on a regular basis to create the maintenance fund and the WUS 
should implement the work through the contractor. 
The effort by the government to form a WUO at the end of the project reflects the 
government concern towards the sustainability of the project. However, the WUO 
did not produce the desired result. This is largely due to the two reasons. Firstly, the 
DOI had employed the Dhalpas for the operation of the irrigation system, besides, 
providing annual budget for the maintenance. As a result farmers were not 
interested in WUO. Secondly the WUO, which was dominated by the elected 
officials, could not involve the users in the decision making due to lack of proper 
communication. This indicates that the representation of actual users is an important 
factor for the sustainability of the institution. 
The formation of the WUS by the farmers from Annapurna Kulo in 1992 reflects 
their effort towards developing a governance structure for irrigation independent of 
other institutions and activities. Moreover it suggests that the development of an 
institution is a process which could be initiated by the people themselves who have a 
common interest in the preservation of irrigation systems. The gradual 
disengagement of DOI, as evident from the reduction in annual budgetary allocation, 
was a push factor for the formation of the WUS. 
One of the important implications of the intervention is the change in the access of 
the water users. Thus the access of the farmers at the tail end is not the same as the 
farmers at head reach. Firstly, the changes were brought by the government 
investment, which increased the command area along with the number of farmers, as 
reflected by the farmers who have converted Bari land to Khet land. Theoretically, the 
1 3 4 INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 
farmers at the head and middle should have easy access to the water. But the farmers 
at the middle of the command area who depend on field to field irrigation lack easy 
access to irrigation water due to the low density of field channels. Finally, the 
farmers at the tail end of branch canal 2 have been able to increase their access to 
water. They established their right through investment by constracting a sub-branch 
canal through partial contribution of their own resources. This implies that there is 
flexibility in including new users as long as they are willing to invest. However, the 
technology and the supply are affecting the access to irrigation water to some of the 
users. As a result some have unrestricted access where as other receive irrigation 
water through rotation. This was due to the technical design of the project and partly 
due to non-cooperation between the farmers. This shows that the linking loop 
formed by the users during the intervention became weak afterwards due to changes 
in the power relation between the users. 
The technology transformation was more prominent in the intervention, which 
contributed towards changes in the social and organisational aspect of the irrigation 
systems. The intervention brought substantial change in the various aspects of the 
control. The changes in the physical infrastructure of the irrigation system through 
new technology brought in new adrninistrative control by the DOI. However, the 
administrative control of the DOI is declining as evidenced by the reduction of the 
Dhalpas. This in effect led the users to initiate new organisational control. This shows 
the formation of a new linking loop between the DOI and the users as there has been 
a change in the objectives of these actors in relation to the irrigation management. 
Thus, the contacts between the users and the DOI will not be that intensive as they 
were in the past. However, the links between the users will be intensive due to the 
collective action for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. The 
social and political control is consistent with organisational control but not sufficient 
to ensure full technical control (it could not get all canals laid in as hoped). 
Timesheet - Annapurna Irrigation System 
S t a k e h o l d e r s Farmers WUS VP/VDC Dhalpa DOI/WRID/DI 
O 
Contractor Remarks 
Time N. 
1967 Initiated the 
construction of the 
irrigation system 
Initiated the 
construction 
of the 
irrigation 
system 
1968 Provided NRs. 
15,000 for the 
construction of 
the canal 
1976 Requested the VP 
for the construction 
of the irrigation 
system 
VP requested 
the 
government 
for financial 
and technical 
assistance 
Provided NRs. 
245,000 for the 
construction 
1983 Forced some 
changes in the 
official design 
during the 
discussion with 
government 
officials 
Awarded the 
contract for NRs 
10.41million for 
the construction 
under HTP 
(Asian 
Development 
Bank fund) 
Started 
construction of 
the irrigation 
system 
1986 Complained that 
the structures are 
incomplete as per 
the design 
WRID certified 
the completion 
of the work 
Completed the 
construction of 
the irrigation 
system 
1986 Co-operated with 
the Dhalpa for the 
operation of the 
system 
Started 
operating the 
system 
Took over the 
management of 
the system 
Operating the 
canal through 
the four 
Dhalpas. 
Besides, spends 
for canal 
maintenance. 
1992 Formed an WUS, 
which is officially 
registered. 
Came into 
existence and is 
mamtaining close 
contact with the 
DIO 
Functioning Continuing to 
manage the 
system and 
provides funds 
for annual 
maintenance 
1994-1995 All the farmers 
have not become 
the member of 
WUS 
Developed an 
elaborate plan for 
the allocation and 
distribution of 
irrigation water. 
Besides, it also 
negotiated with 
the DIO to provide 
the maintenance 
fund through it. It 
Functioning Continuing to 
manage the 
system Provides 
annual 
maintenance 
fund to the 
WUS. 
ON 
is carrying out 
maintenance w o r k 
t h r o u g h the 
farmers . 
1996 F a r m e r s are c o -
operat ing w i t h the 
W U S for the 
m a n a g e m e n t of the 
irrigation s y s t e m 
C o n t a u i n g its 
function. Besides, 
it constructed 1 4 0 0 
m e t e r of sub 
b r a n c h canal in 
b r a n c h canal 2 a n d 
90 m e t e r s of field 
channel . 
Contmii ing its 
earlier function 
h o w e v e r , i t 
r e d u c e d the 
annual 
m a i n t e n a n c e 
f u n d 
1997-1998 B e c o m i n g 
interested in the 
w o r k of W U S . C o -
operat ing W U S for 
the collection of 
users ' list. 
H o w e v e r , reluctant 
to contribute cash 
Prepar ing the list 
of users for raising 
annual 
contribution f r o m 
m e t h e m 
O n l y o n e 
p e r s o n is 
w o r k i n g in 
contras t to the 
four w o r k i n g 
until last year . 
R e d u c e d the 
n u m b e r of 
Dhalpa to one . It 
is continuing 
annual financial 
s u p p o r t to the 
W U S 
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Notes 
1 VDC is an elected representative body consisting of 11 members. The VDC has nine wards 
which elect one representative to the VDC and the other two members are the VDC 
chairperson and vice-chairperson. 
2 A local functionary who collected land taxes only on the Khet and oversaw the 
management of irrigation system. 
3 A local functionary who collected taxes only on Ban land. 
4 A government employee who operates the irrigation system. 
5 The purpose of my first visit to the village was to have first hand knowledge of the system 
and to understand the dynamics of irrigation management along with the existing status of 
the main canal. It was in the afternoon when the researcher arrived in the village. With the 
help of a local resident who was a high school graduate the researcher made a walk-through 
of the irrigation system. On the way I was mquiring about the prevailing practices of 
irrigation management. He was satisfied with the existing arrangement. He asked me to see 
village elders to know about the past management practices. He helped me in finding a place 
to live and eat. In the evening while I was having tea in a local tea shop, the villagers were 
mquiring about the purpose of my visit. Most of them asked if the researcher was a 
government officer from Department of Irrigation and the researcher explained the reason of 
his visit. That was a good opportunity to interact with farmers having different status and it 
was observed that they were enthusiastic in narrating what they knew about the irrigation 
systems. Interestingly, all asked me to see the Village Development Committee (VDC) 
Chairperson since the VDC was responsible for managing the irrigation system at present. 
The discussion also gave an opportunity to identify and collect the information about 
knowledgeable persons who could share information on the management practices over a 
period of time. I left the village after some time with a promise to come back again for an 
extended period. The second time I visited the village was for an extended period for a fully 
fledged study. 
6 There was some variation in the information published by the Cadastral Survey office, 
Kaski. The information shows that 501 ha is Khet, 284 ha is Pakho/Bari, 626 ha is Minaha-is the 
land covered by forest, foot trails, river and other public land. 185 ha is still to be registered 
with the office. Khet is irrigated land suitable for rice cultivation. Pakho/Bari is the upland, 
which is not suitable for irrigated agriculture. 
7 The local varieties are Pahele, Jadhan and Gurdi whereas the improved varieties are Khumal 
4, Khumal 9 and Radha 7. 
8 The research centre was established with the assistance from the British Government to 
support government of Nepal in agricultural research and extension. 
9 It is a national level programme directed towards the small and marginal farmers. The 
primary objective of the project is to increase farmers' access to the institutional credit 
through the group and to encourage them to undertake activities directly benefiting them. 
10 The scheme Annapurna Kulo is presented as a separate case in part HI. 
11 The figure is based on the list prepared by the VDC, which was submitted to the District 
Irrigation Office (DIO), Kaski for the purpose of intervention in irrigation system. The VDC 
secretary admits that there could be some cases of under reporting as the farmers will have 
to contribute to the rehabilitation according to the size of their land holding. 
12 The existence of large number of Mukhiyas was for facilitating the collection of land taxes, 
since they had to cover larger areas. 
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13 Some villagers opined that the Ditthawal ceased to function after 1977 only when the 
cadastral survey was carried out in the district and the villagers started to pay the land taxes 
to the Land Revenue Office. Thus, he continued to work until then beside the VP. 
14 The Birta system was abolished in 1959 through the Birta Abolition Act. With the abolition 
of the Birta the ownership of the land was vested in the government (Regmi, 1978: 27). 
However, Birta abolition was not a land reform measure and the Birta holders were allowed 
to retain the land, but they had to pay land taxes (Regmi 1978:361), which was not required 
before the Act. In this context, it seems natural for the Ditthawal to claim the ownership of 
the land as he was entitled to the proceeds from it for a long time (see next page). 
15 The Guthi is a trust for the maintenance of public property like irrigation canals and 
temples. See Regmi (ibid) for the details of Guthi system in Nepal. 
16 The study might have been conducted before the restoration of the multi party system in 
1990, but the report was published in 1992. 
17 At present each of the wards have five members including a woman since the amendment 
in local election by-laws in 1997. 
18 People still call it Jhara, which in the past was compulsory labour contribution as 
demanded by the state. In Nepal three forms of compulsory labour - Jhara, Beth and Began 
existed in the past. The labour was used for the public works such as maintenance of roads 
and bridges, reclamation of waste land and maintenance of irrigation canals. Jhara meant 
requisition of labourers from each family in the village for a certain number of days for 
public works. Beth meant the exaction of unpaid labour on a customary basis, while Began 
denoted the requisition of casual labourers for emergency requirements (Regmi, 1978:504). 
19 If the scheme is not feasible for rehabilitation the DIO returns the deposit money to the 
farmers. The cash deposit is also returned to the farmers after the completion of the 
construction. 
20 The first UC was formed during the detailed survey in 1994 under the chairmanship of 
the then VDC chairman. That committee was dissolved after the VDC election in 1997. 
21 During a visit to a village at the tail end these people were not around. Later on I met one 
of them in the main bazaar and we had a brief chat. He already knew the purpose of my visit 
from others. He happened to be one of the persons referred to by the farmers at the head also 
and he was the local leader of one of the political parties. In the VDC election in 1997 he 
became the chairperson of the VDC. Some farmers from the head and middle were also 
present. I informed them on the purpose of my visit. 
After listening to me he smiled looking towards the farmers from the head and middle 
"may be you already got the answer from these people, everything is all right. What else do 
the farmers from the tail end have to say. We are surviving at their mercy." The reaction from 
the farmers of the head and the middle was only a 'smile.' I asked for the right time to see the 
farmers at the tail end. It was around 6:0 p.m. in the evening. He said 'Namaste'(Nepalese 
word for greeting) and he left for his village after we decided to see each other the following 
morning. 
The following morning I went to their village. I saw him going to a nearby tea shop with 
four fellow farmers. In the village usually it is the practice that for morning tea they go to the 
teashop. During this morning meeting the discussion among the villagers covers a wide 
range of topics, from national politics to the important events in the village that sometimes 
include very personal matters. He proposed to have the discussion in the tea shop with a cup 
of tea. After a brief introduction with other fellow farmers and having briefed them about 
my visit the discussion started. I asked them to tell me about the past and present 
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management practices of the irrigation system. The discussion was unstructured. There was 
truth in what the tail ender said. The researcher during the field visit observed the blockages 
at the middle reach of the irrigation system, which caused excess water flowing to the river. 
22 While the discussion was continuing two people in the group were slowly talking to each 
other in low voice. They were saying "we have been deprived of our rights by our kin." Some 
of the people at the head and middle parts had kinship relations with the people at the tail 
end. It showed their dissatisfaction towards the people at the head and the middle reaches 
but they did not like to criticize them openly. At present the behaviour of the people at the 
head and the middle reaches is considered normal and there is no basis to challenge it 
because a rule for allocating water does not exist. In my opinion the explanation for their 
present behaviour is that recently, they had good monsoons. Therefore the need for water 
from the canal is not great as it was during the bad monsoon in earlier years. 
23 According to the estimate of the farmer the depth of the canal was 2.2 metre but now it is 
only 1 metre. 
24 Shivakoti (1992: 16) reported that the total cost of rehabilitation by DHTM was NRs. 
680/ha. This means the rehabilitation cost becomes NRs. 204,000 for 300 ha. He reported that 
there was no farmers' contribution. However, the farmers said DIHM provided only NRs. 
61,000 and farmers made a contribution in labour. The figure mentioned by the farmers 
seems to be accurate because that is a good amount of money and it had more value in 1961. 
25 He is a messenger paid by the VDC and the farmers for his services. He communicates the 
VDC instructions by announcing them in a loud voice in main places in the village so that 
every one will know this. 
26 The information was obtained from the hill irrigation status report published by Western 
Region Irrigation Directorate in 1986 and water management sythesis report of University of 
Colorado. The actual irrigated area was obtained through farmers 
27 The Dhalpas were operating the canal since DOI completed the construction. 
28 Officially known as Water Users Society (WUS). Here after it will be called WUS. 
29 The DOI report is not consistent in its presentation. In the turn over report there are 585 
users households. The Regional Irrigation Directorate (1990: 5) estimated the total users at 
620 households. The total number of households as reported by Shivakoti is 545 households. 
The figure provided by the Water Users Society is also an estimate, as it is compiling the 
complete list of the farmers. However, there is not much variation. The increase in number of 
users could be attributed to the changes in the ownership pattern over a period of time due 
to the law of inheritance. In this respect the figure provided by the UC is more appropriate in 
the present context, as it has extended the branch canals to serve more area which have 
added new users. 
30 Personal communication from Dr. Prachanda Pradhan 
31 The PBME report also included assessment of five other irrigation systems implemented 
under the Hill Irrigation Project. 
32 AMIS is under the management of DOI. The position of Dhalpa began immediately after 
the commissioning of the irrigation system. The Dhalpa is a DOI employee working under 
the supervision of DIO. The Annapurna Kulo was a new construction and its management 
was under DOI. Thus, the Dhalpas were employed to operate the canals. 
33 I met only one farmer who said that he did not receive the compensation. He had land 
adjacent to the main canal near branch 3 and he also complained that he received irrigation 
water only for planting. 
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34 The contractor is from Nuwakot, the adjacent district to Kathmandu. It is likely that he 
brought workers from his district. 
35 The evaluation report and DIO report used the terminology WUA and FIA respectively to 
denote the farmers user group. Officially the farmers group was registered as a Water Users 
Society (WUS). 
36 He was the only person who could confidently give the figure. Others said about the 
shortcomings but could not give the figure. 
37 The general condition and the format for the registration of the UC can be obtained from 
the District Adrriinistration Office. Accordingly, the users prepare the constitution in 
conformity with the objective for which the UC or society is formed. In this case the VDC 
vice chairman with the help from one of the persons in the village who is a legal practitioner 
drafted the constitution for the WUS. 
38 The WUS at present does not have a list of the farmers' names and their land holding. The 
process was initiated to raise membership charge to all the farmers and to provide 
membership certificates. The names and landholding of 350 farmers have been collected so 
far. The work is not going on satisfactorily as farmers reduced their landholding in their 
reporting. This is because, the farmers suspect that the preparation is for the collection of 
water taxes on the basis of land holding. 
39 The control structure has a threaded spindle gate. One full rotation of the wheel 
raises/lowers the gate by a certain height. Thus, the gap between each thread is used as an 
estimate to release the water. In local term the gap between each thread is called Churi 
40 Gabion structure is constructed to divert water to the canal. 
5. Ghachowk irrigation system 
5.1 Introduction 
This irrigation system is one of the oldest irrigation systems managed by the farmers. 
This system was considered ideal for the study as it provided an opportunity to look 
into the management practices, which evolved over a period of time. It made 
possible to compare traditional and state-introduced management practices, which 
were institutionalised for a given period of time, until replaced by others. Each of the 
institutionalised practices had its own characteristics in mamtaining the continuity of 
the management of the system. Further, the system was included in the first phase of 
intervention by the government in 1990, under the Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC) 
pilot project of the World Bank. The objectives (World Bank, 1990) of the project were 
to: 
• Establish a "sub-sector Programme" approach for future investment in the smaË 
irrigation schemes. 
• Apply the "demand driven" approach in the selection and implementation of the 
project. 
• Increase the farmers' participation to cover full operation and maintenance and 
share of the capital cost. 
The intervention included the rehabilitation of the scheme for improving the 
irrigation structures. 
The system was selected out of the list of irrigation systems supported by the 
government under the LLC programme in the Western Development Region of the 
Country. The first visit to the site was made before the initiation of the field study in 
order to get acquainted with the system and to get the opinion of the villagers on the 
proposed study. The information for the study was gathered by using a checklist that 
was followed by the focus group discussions and information from the key 
informants. The past and present VDC officials, the User's Committee (UC) officials, 
the farmers from different reaches of the irrigation system were interviewed. Also 
the engineers from the District Irrigation Office (DIO) and the contractor provided 
information. The information gathered from the field was supplemented by the 
information from official records and other studies. 
5.2 The environment of the system and context of the intervention 
5.2.1 The general environment 
The village 
The village lies in the hill region of the country. According to the villagers, the 
settlement in the village started before the unification of the country in 1769. The 
forefathers of one of the present inhabitants of the village, who was from the 
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Brahmin caste received the land, which is known as Birta, by pleasing the then rulers. 
The village is a two hours climb to the North of the Pokhara - Baglung highway, 
which is at a distance of 10 km. from Regional Headquarters of the Region. 
The VDC area is 1070 metres asl and lies at 83° 59' longitude and 28° 16' latitude. 
The mean annual temperature in the area is 20.8° Celsius and the annual rainfall is 
3849 mm. The moisture regime in the area is humid. The topography of the area is 
gently sloping and the village is stretched from north to south. The settlement 
pattern is clustered in 20 small hamlets having their own name. The total area 
adrninistered by the Village Development Committee (VDC) is 2079 hectares1. The 
land use pattern in the VDC area is as presented in table 5.1. 
Table 5 .1 : The land use distribution in the VDC area 
Types of land Area (hectare) 
Khet 255.0 
Pakho/Bari 268.0 
Mirtaha 1496.0 
Total 2079.0 
Source: Cadastral Survey Office, Kaski 
The table indicates that the cultivable land in the VDC area is limited, but the 
potential for irrigation development is high. It is likely that the area irrigated by the 
spring source is registered as Pakho/Bari. Thus, the khet land should be higher than 
reported. However, year round irrigation is not available in the village. 
Population and ethnicity 
There are 439 households in the village with a total population of 2710. The 
wardwise distribution of the household with ethnicity is presented in table 5.2. 
The average family size of the households is 6.17, which is slightly higher than the 
national average of 5.6 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998: 5). The male population 
(1418) is slightly higher than the female population (1292). The ethnic composition of 
the village is mixed. The Brahmins are in the majority (50 percent) followed by the 
Sarki (cobbler) (25 percent), Chhetris (15 percent) and others (10 percent). 
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Table 5. 2: The wardwise distribution of households and population with ethnicity 
Ward 
no. 
Households no. Population Male Female Major ethnic8 groups 
1 53 347 198 149 Brahmin, Chhetri 
2 34 213 115 98 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Magar 
3 55 292 153 139 Brahmin, Magar 
4 37 264 131 133 Brahmin, Magar, 
Newar 
5 51 317 157 160 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Magar, Damai 
6 72 373 197 176 Sarki, Chhetri, Brahmin 
7 23 207 112 95 Sarid, Chhetri, Brahmin 
8 78 444 226 218 Sarki, Chhetri, Gurung 
9 36 253 129 124 Gurung, Magar 
Total 439 2710 1418 1292 
Source: District Development Committee, Kaski (1995:99); and information obtained from 
theVDC. 
Occupation 
Agriculture is the main occupation of the people in the village according to the VDC 
information. Nearly 288 households are not food sufficient from agriculture 
according to the VDC estimate. The majority of the population is engaged in 
agriculture. However, 27 percent of the population has additional sources of income. 
Income from other sources include petty shops, government service, wage earning, 
remittances and pensions. The information of income from other sources is presented 
in the following table. 
Table 5. 3: Household income from other sources 
Categories Percent of total household 
1. Service 5.0 
2. Wage earning 10.0 
3. Pension and remittances 10.0 
4. Business 2.0 
Source: VDC records, 1998 
Some upper caste people are in government service, which is mainly teaching in the 
local school. A few of them are working in the government offices in the nearby 
town. Both the skilled and unskilled labourers earn income through wages. The 
skilled labour includes carpentry, blacksmithing, stone masonry and tailoring. The 
unskilled workers are working as wage labourer during the agricultural season and a 
few of them are working in nearby towns. 
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Land holding and land tenure 
Most of the farmers are owner cultivators and households use hired labour if there 
are no able members. There is no legal tenancy in the village and share cropping is 
also not common. In share cropping the owner provides the land and the tenant 
provides the labour, seed and the fertiliser. The product sharing is on a fifty-fifty 
basis. The share cropping is a contractual agreement between the two parties and it is 
usually for one season. Share cropping is rather rare also due to the small-holdings 
owned by the majority of the farmers. For the big owners it is more profitable to 
employ wage labourers than to provide land for share cropping because the land is 
productive. The prevailing agricultural daily wage rate in the village is NRs. 35-40 
with a meal. 
Putting land as collateral for taking a loan is prevalent in the area. This is a 
contractual arrangement between the farmers for some period of time. Interest in 
cash is not paid on the collateral land instead the earnings from the land is the 
interest. 
The upper castes hold a large portion of the irrigated land. Most of the lands 
within the command area belong to the Brahmins and Gurungs. The maximum 
holding is 20 ropani and the minimum is 1 ropani. However, some occupational caste 
farmers also have small pieces of land in the irrigated area, but this income from 
agriculture is not sufficient to support their family. There are only three landless 
families, out of which one is headed by a woman. 
The farming system and the principal crops 
The main crops grown in the area are paddy, wheat, maize and some potatoes. The 
main crop receiving irrigation water is paddy. There is a rice crop only during 
monsoon Qune-October) because irrigation water is not available for planting early 
rice (February-May)2. Farmers plant both traditional and improved varieties of rice 
and wheat. The cropping pattern in the Khet is rice-wheat-fallow, and rice-fallow-
maize. The cropping pattern for the Ban land is maize-millet- fallow. The cropping 
intensity was 175 percent at the time of this study. The production of improved 
variety of rice was 2.5 mt/ha whereas for wheat it was 1.8 mt/ha Vegetable 
cultivation is only for household consumption. The use of chemical fertilisers is 
limited to the wheat crop only. Livestock manure and the slurry from biogas is used 
as fertilisers. 
Livestock raising for milk is common among the households. Livestock farming 
on a commercial basis is not practised due to the distance from the market. However, 
some of the households are raising improved cattle. A few households are selling 30-
40 litre of milk to the government owned Dairy Development Corporation, since 
1996. The porters transport the milk to the motorable road daily. The milk selling is 
not profitable to them according to villagers. They are selling it, because the milk 
production is in excess to their household consumption. 
It is mteresting that the farmers do not work in the field on the day of the full 
moon and the dark moon and also on the days regarded as inauspicious according to 
the Nepalese calendar. If there is no rain in time, usually during late June the practice 
is to sacrifice a goat at the source of a canal. One of the ethnic groups namely 
Gurungs do not do any work on the day when there is a hailstorm, believing that it 
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will prevent another hailstorm. Also, farmers do not work at the field during the 
Hindu and Buddhist festival days following their religion. 
Migration 
Temporary migration for employment to India and foreign countries is prevalent in 
the village as evidenced by the pensions and remittances. Some of the households 
have their members working in the Indian and British army. Seasonal migration to 
India and other towns of Nepal to work as wage labourer is found among the lower 
caste group. There is no in-migration and out-migration in recent years. However, 
nearly 50 households of Gurung and Magar families in-migrated from other districts 
10-15 years before and have settled in the VDC. 
Physical facilities 
The District Development Committee (DDC) has been constructing a motorable road 
to another adjacent VDC. This has facilitated the accessibility to the VDC as the 
distance to the motorable road is now reduced. The villagers believe that the 
economic activity in the village would increase once public transportation is 
introduced on the road. This may encourage the people for vegetable production, as 
the transportation to the nearby town-Pokhara becomes easier according to the VDC 
chairman. The villagers believe that the completion of the road will also bring down 
the prices of the consumable goods brought from Pokhara. 
The VDC has 23 drinking water taps. However, some women in the village 
reported that there was shortage of drinking water as more water was diverted for 
irrigation. This is because the same source is being used both for irrigation and 
drinking water. Six wards (ward no. 4-9) receive their drinking water facility from 
the source of irrigation water. Villagers agree that the supply is not sufficient to these 
wards. On the other hand, it was observed that many tapstands were flowing for 24 
hours in ward no. 1-3. As a result there has been a tremendous wastage of drinking 
water. 
There are two Primary Schools and one Secondary School in the VDC. Twenty 
four percent of the total population are going to the school. The VDC estimates that 
90 percent of the children of school going age are attending school. However, only 
the students from higher economic groups complete the high school education. 
The village has an agriculture and livestock sub-centre but it is not functioning 
due to lack of government budget and staff. The agricultural services to the farmers 
from the sub-centre are minimal. The Agricultural Development Bank/Nepal 
(ADB/N) is providing credit on a group basis to the small farmers through its Small 
Farmers Development Project Office. 
The village has one sub-health post, which provides primary health care. 
However, for major treatments, the villagers have to go to Pokhara. The VDC has 
also one Post Office. In September 1997 the people from ward 1 and 2 received 
electricity through the financial assistance of Annapurna Conservation Area Project 
(ACAP)3, and some contributions were raised from among the villagers. The people 
from this ward had to contribute in cash for the installation of the electricity. For this, 
they negotiated with the VDC to provide RS. 700,000 out of its development fund. 
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Because of this, they would not receive any further assistance for other development 
works for the corning two years according to the VDC secretary. 
Existing social relationship 
The people in the village are satisfied with the relationship among the various caste 
groups owing to the interdependence in a small village society. The relationship 
between the people in the village can be classified into social relations, economic 
relations and political relations. In the social relationship ethnicity and kinship is the 
strongest one. The different ethnic groups are settled in clusters. This settlement 
pattern is indicative of the existing social and economic relationship among the 
ethnic groups, which is based on close co-operation. The immediate help in any 
social event and economic matters comes from the family members, although the 
nuclear family is replacing the traditional extended family. At the same time the co-
operation among various ethnic groups in any social event is the speciality of the 
village life. 
The caste system is still prevalent, although abolished by the Muluki Ain. It was 
evident from the separate places assigned for the higher caste and the lower caste 
people in a local tea shop. The lower castes have to wash the dishes from which they 
eat or drink whereas upper caste does not have to do this. Nevertheless, the lower 
caste can also have tea at the local shop. 
The economic relationship among various caste groups is based on the exchange 
of goods and services and borrowing money for social events and for economic 
activities. This type of relation is more prevalent between the rich and the poor than 
among the people of the same economic status. For example, all the households 
provide food grain on yearly basis to the tailor master and blacksmith4. In return, 
they provide the tailoring services and make agricultural implements for the 
households throughout the year. The dependence of an occupational caste group on 
a higher caste group is quite substantial in terms of financial matters. This economic 
interdependence is helping to maintain close ties among the various caste groups. 
Labour exchange during the time of planting and harvesting is practised among 
people from different ethnic groups. Snacks are provided to those who provide 
labour on exchange. But due to prevalence of the caste system, the upper caste 
people do not accept food from the lower caste household. In that case, food is 
provided from the household from which it is acceptable to them. 
Political relationships are becoming more active after the restoration of the multi-
party democracy in 1990. The people in the VDC seem to be more active in the 
politics simply because there are no other activities in which to be engaged. The 
political relationship becomes more open during the local election, which is 
contested on party ideology. The educated and the recognised party workers are 
more active in local politics. The general mass however, bases their selection of the 
candidate on the merit basis and kinship relation. However, ethnicity and kinship 
relation is more dominant. The representation in the VDC is an indication of the 
dominance of a particular ethnic group. The elected persons are from the high socio-
economic strata. The representatives in the VDC at present, are 7 Brahmins, 1 
occupational caste, one Chhetri, one Gurung and one Newar. The large number of 
occupational caste groups has only one representative in the VDC. Consequently, 
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5.3 The environment of the irrigation system 
5.3.1 The irrigation system 
This is a slope off-take irrigation system, and it is one of the oldest systems in Kaski 
district, in western Nepal. The villagers cannot say exactly when the irrigation 
system was constructed. But they are of the opinion, that the system was constructed 
before the unification of Nepal. The main source of water is Lasti Khola, which is 
spring fed. The command area expands from north to the south with a gentle slope. 
The water from this source is also used by the another irrigation system (Lahachowk) 
which is nearly 500 m downstream of this irrigation system. 
The physical system consists of three levels of canals. The main canal, which is 
known as Mul Kulo, is 1.7 km in length where it crosses a natural drainage via an 
aqueduct (see figure 5.1). It is a contour canal and irrigates only its southern side. The 
intake consists of a sluice gate to regulate the flow in the main canal. The design 
discharge of the main canal is 1.25 m 3 /s . The bed slope of the canal is approximately 
1:200. The whole length of the main canal is lined. Besides, there are three foot 
bridges on the main canal. 
There are five branch canals. The length of each branch canal is approximately 500 
metres, except branch canal - 5. Some parts of these canals are lined. No gated 
regulators are provided at the off-takes of the branch canals. The flows in the branch 
canals are adjusted on an ad hoc basis with the help of stone and mud, which is 
called ad hoc adjustment (Parajuli, 1999:38). In this practice the individual farmers are 
not allowed to adjust the flow or else the dispute may arise. Thus someone is 
assigned to oversee the adjustment of the flow. Basically, this practice is 
they do not have a major say in the implementation of the development 
programmes. However people believe that the differences in the political ideology 
have not affected the social and economic relationships between the communities. 
Yet, in some cases the individual relations between the people are affected by the 
political faith. The political factor prevails also during the allocation of the VDC 
budgets for development programmes5. 
On-going development activities in the VDC area 
The VDC is implementing other development projects through the development 
grant from the DDC and also through its own resources. The selection and 
investment in the projects (VDC, 1997) suggests that the priority is for implementing 
infrastructure projects. These include construction of village roads, construction of 
sub-health post buildings, VDC building, electricity extension in wards 1 and 2 and 
maintenance of the irrigation canal. These projects are implemented through the 
Users' Committee (UC) formed by the VDC. The VDC provides partial expenses and 
the Users' will have to bear partial costs. These small-scale projects are executed on a 
wage basis. The contribution from the users is only for trail construction, which 
ranges from 15 percent to 25 percent. The users' contribution is usually in the form of 
labour. 
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institutionalised. In this case the Pales are employed to adjust the flow in the canal 
and to the terraces. There are several field channels to provide irrigation water to the 
terraces. Field channels irrigate the individual plots. The existing field channels are 
not adequate in length and in number as exemplified by the practice of field to field 
irrigation. However, some outlets come directly from the main canal and the branch 
canals. The area irrigated by each of the branch canals is mentioned in the following 
table. 
Table 5.4: The branch canals and irrigated areas (ha) 
S. N. Branch Canal Command Area No. of Users 
(hectare) 
1 Branch Canal -1 6.0 50 
2 Branch Canal - 2 27.0 90 
3 Branch Canal - 3 18.0 72 
4 Branch Canal-4 4.5 29 
5 Branch Canal - 5 4.5 25 
Total 60.0 266 
Source: VDC land record in the command area. 
The table indicates that there is variation in the size of holding across the branch 
canals. However, the distribution of irrigation water is proportionate to the size of 
holding in the irrigated area. The farmers receive irrigation water on a rotation basis. 
Thus, the farmers do not have access to the fixed proportion of water on a continual 
basis. Rather the amounts of water to individual plots are determined by the 
availability of irrigation water in the main canal. 
5.3.2 The distribution of irrigated land by ethnicity 
The command area is 60 hectares. There are 266 users in the command area at 
present. However, 70 users have more than one parcel of land. In this respect, the 
average size of holding per household is 0.22 ha. The information prepared by the 
UC secretary after the approval of the project showed that the total number of users 
at the time of intervention were 220. This means there has been an increase of 46 
users after the intervention. The increase in the number of users over a period of time 
was due to the fragmentation of holdings among the brothers on account of the 
inheritance law. The distribution of irrigated land among various ethnic groups is 
presented in table 5.5. 
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Table 5 .5 : The distribution of size of holding by ethnic group 
Ethnic group (numbers) 
S.no Size of 
holding 
(hectare) 
Brahmin Chhetri Newar Gurung, 
Magarand 
other castes 
Occupational 
castes 
Total 
1 <0.25 36 (21.0) 26 (15.2) 6 (3.5) 73 (42.6) 30 (17.5) 171 (64.2) 
2 0.3-0.5 35 (47.9) 5 (6.8) 2(2.7) 28 (38.3) 3(4.1) 73 
(27.4) 
3 0.55-1.0 9 (45.0) 3 (15.0) 1 (5.0) 7 (35.0) - 20 (7.5) 
4 >1.0 - 1 (50.0) - 1 (50.0) - 2 (0.75) 
Total 80 (30.0) 35 (13.1) 9 (3.3) 109 (40.9) 33 (12.4) 266 (100) 
Source: VDC record, 1998. The figures in the parentheses are percentages. 
The above table indicates that the majority of the Gurung and Brahmin households 
have land in the command area. Previously, all the land in the command area 
belonged to the Brahrnins. In terms of users, the Gurungs are in the majority at 
present. The Gurungs bought the lands from the Brahmins6. However, the majority of 
the Brahmin households have larger holdings as compared to other castes In terms of 
distribution of the land, the Gurungs have land in the head reaches of the irrigation 
system. The Brahmins have land at the head reaches and also at the middle and tail 
end. Nevertheless, one clan group from the Bralirnin ethnic group, who was the early 
settler are most dominant in the local politics and other decision making in the 
village. The Gurungs feel that the Brahmins also dominate the decision related to the 
irrigation management. This was one of the reasons for the disputes between these 
two groups with respect to the irrigation management. The occupational castes have 
less irrigated land as compared to their number of households in the VDC. This 
shows that their access to the productive assets is limited. 
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Figure 5 .1 : Layout of Ghachowk irrigation system 
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5.4 Process of intervention and change 
5.4.1 The traditional management system up to 1960 
The management of the irrigation scheme in the past was under the JimmawaC and 
Mukhiya. In the past demand for irrigation water was less according to the villagers. 
The cultivated land in the area was called Trisale and Panchsale. That meant each 
parcel of land was cultivated either in three years or in five years respectively. It was 
because, the demand for food was less because there were less people. The available 
irrigation water was sufficient at that time due to the small size of the area under 
cultivation. Besides, the people at that time used to keep large numbers of livestock 
for which more grazing land was necessary. This practice continued till 1960. 
5.4.2 The management by the Village Panchayat (1960-1990) 
The village Panchayat, which came into existence in 1960, took over the management 
of the irrigation system. The VP introduced a new system of management in 1976 by 
employing four Pales" (watchmen) co-ordinated by the Kulo Samitf of VP to regulate 
the allocation and distribution of water to the farmers' fields on a rotation basis. The 
reason for the introduction of this system was to establish congruence between the 
irrigated land and the volume of water available in the canal. As stated earlier, some 
of the land, which were cultivated in 3 or 5 years were brought under cultivation. 
Thus, there was more demand for water. The farmers were not receiving irrigation 
water proportionate to their land holding in absence of any governing rule. Thus, the 
allocation rule was essential to resolve conflicts between farmers relating to water 
distribution to their respective fields. The allocation was based on the area each canal 
had to irrigate and the distribution was proportionate to the land holding after the 
introduction of the Pales. The Pales were responsible for water distribution to the 
fields as well. According to the Pale they were more effective when management was 
under the VP. This was because, people were afraid of the VP and Pales were given 
the authority to carry out sanctions such as oatting the bunds of terraces. 
The Pales became less effective during the intervention by ILC in 1990 because the 
construction activities were disrupting the water rotation practices. Nevertheless, 
Pales were functional during this time also. The political change in the country 
during the same time had rendered the VP non-functional. The VP was dissolved 
and the VDC was not yet formed. This created a vacuum in the local leadership 
which should have carried out the work and enforced the sanctions. It was not 
possible for the Pales to do so without any institutional backing. They continued to 
work under the guidance of the Users Committee formed under LLC. During the time 
of intervention, the UC meeting divided the land into 4 sections and assigned each 
section to one Pale. Presumably, the institution of Pale would have been abandoned, 
if the UC had not been in existence to guide them10. 
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5.4.3 The management by the Village Development Committee (VDC) since 
1992-1997 
The VDC replaced the VP after the general election under the new political system 
and continued the Pale system of management. Each year the VDC advertises the Pale 
positions. Anybody in the village can apply for this position. Usually, the person 
who does not have enough land of his own applies for the position. They command 
social respect as long as they maintain their integrity by being impartial in their job. 
Besides, the pale should be capable of arguing with the farmers who steal water and 
to report this to the VDC. 
VDC in its selection gives priority to the person who possesses these qualities. 
Those interested for the posts discuss among themselves and only four candidates 
apply for the work. There is an understanding that two Pales apply representing 4 
wards and the remaining two from other 5 wards as there are 9 wards in a VDC. The 
Pales mostly come from wards 3 , 4 , 5 and 6 since the command area of the irrigation 
lies in these wards. 
The Pale system is fixed for duration of three months each year i.e. from mid July 
to mid September because from mid September the water at the source decreases and 
only the farmers at the head reaches receive water. The VDC forms a Kulo samiti of 
four members from among the farmers and one VDC representative to supervise the 
work of the Pales and to receive the complaints from the farmers with respect to 
water disputes. 
One Pale has been continuing for the last 5 years. According to him he did not like 
to continue but the farmers requested him to continue because of his credibility. The 
reason behind his disliking of the job is that he had to quarrel with the farmers who 
are stealing water. Furthermore, he also had to argue at the time of collecting the 
wages. 
In one of the decisions of the UC, the Pales were asked to work from 6.00 in the 
morning to 6.00 in the evening. There is a variation in the working hours of the Pales. 
The change in irrigation rotation for each field determines their presence in the field. 
That is, more water in the canal means an early change of the rotation. The Pales 
usually would have to work two to three hours three times a day. They have to give 
more time during the planting season because the farmers demand adequate water at 
this time. Their job becomes difficult if the monsoon is not good. In that case the 
water in the canal would not be adequate to meet the demand of all the farmers. 
However, it becomes easier for them from the beginning of September. The water 
level in the canal decreases and they no longer have to serve the farmers at the 
middle and tail reaches. They can work on other activities as long as they fulfil their 
duty of Pale. The job is a contractual agreement between the VDC and the Pale. 
All the farmers except a few from the head reach, expressed their satisfaction with 
the work of the Pale. Further the decision for the continuation of the same Pale for 
another year is dependent on the recommendation of the farmers. Pales are aware of 
this and would not like to receive any complaint from the farmers. Sometimes, 
farmers complained that Pale did not check the water stealing. The Pales have been 
able to divide the water on a rotation basis depending on the volume of water in the 
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canal. The continuation of the Pale system without interruption for a long time 
indicates that the farmers do not have serious complaints against them. 
5.5 The irrigation interventions since 1977-1997 
5.5.1 First intervention by District Panchayat (DP)" in 1977 
Flood damaged the main canal at the head in 1977. The VP requested the DP to 
restore the canal. The procedure followed was the submission of request in writing to 
the DP by VP at the request of the people. Upon submission of the request, the DP 
sought clarification from the VP. The VP chairman and the VP secretary provided 
necessary clarifications to the DP. When the DP president was convinced it provided 
NRs. 4,000 out of its development fund budget12 through the Village Panchayat for 
repair work. The VP carried out the repair work through villagers. DP technicians 
were not involved in repair work, as the villagers were able to do the work on their 
own. This amount was spent on clearing the landslides, which had a damaging effect 
on the inlet of the main canal. Besides, culverts to divert rain water, between branch 
canals 2 and 3 were also constructed. The amount was spent on buying cement and 
paying wages to the skilled labourer and also to the unskilled workers who did stone 
crashing. The farmers provided labour for collection of stones, sand and clearing the 
debris deposited by the landslide. The VP supervised the work. The financial 
assistance sought from the DP reveals that farmers do not like to make cash 
contributions but only labour contributions. There had been no change in the 
command area as the major work was only to clear the debris and some repair works 
in the canal. 
This shows that the formation of local linking loop became easier as it was an 
affair within local government. The DP, which received lump sum grant from the 
central government had major role to play in local development as provisioned 
under District Administration Plan (DAP). Thus it provided resources as a lumpsum 
grant to the VP to carry out repair work. The VDC, Kulo Samiti, Pale UC and users 
successfully implemented the intervention due to strong loop existing between them 
besides the social, political and organisational control excersised by these actors. 
5.5.2 Second intervention of 1985 
Again in 1985 the government provided NRs. 600,000 in cash for major rehabilitation 
works. The processes followed were that the VP made the decision to request for the 
fund from the government. All the VP members were present at the meeting. The 
decision was made keeping in view of the inability of the villagers to raise funds 
from among themselves. The VP requested in writing for the fund through the DP 
and received the money on the recommendation of the DP. The DP had to 
recommend to the government for the fund as the VP had to maintain the link with 
the cer Aal government through the DP. The VP members took the initiatives for the 
rehabilitation. The then VP chairman told that he had to make several trips to the 
district headquarters to get the funding approved. It took three months to get the 
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fund approved according to hirn. The government provided the money through the 
DP to the VP. In this respect the DP played an active role in mamtaining the link 
between the users and the central government. The funding was approved before the 
design for rehabilitation. The DP was required to provide technical support for the 
rehabilitation, as the VP did not have its own technician. The Overseer13 from the DP 
did the survey and design in two days once the funding was approved. This shows 
that decentralised planning process was not properly followed. The reason for this is 
that the DP did not like to send the overseer for survey without becoming sure that 
the fund will be available as it had limited technical manpower. 
The VP called farmers meeting to form the Users Committee (UC), which was a 
precondition for receiving the money. This in fact was a construction committee 
because it was dissolved after the completion of the work. The Decentralisation Act 
of 1982 had the provision to form a committee for the implementation of projects by 
the VP and DP. The Act called such a committee Users' Committee (UC). But the UC 
should be permanent with a mandate to devise the working rules of its own and to 
maintain the system. The farmers nominated the members of the UC. There was 
consensus among the farmers as the members were nominated by mamtaining the 
balance among the ethnic groups and the social respect they commanded. The 
meeting formed a UC corisisting of 11 members. The main responsibilities of the UC 
were to mobilise the farmers' contribution and to inspect the contractor's work. The 
same meeting discussed the Overseer's report and accepted the work for 
rehabilitation. The UC prioritised the work for rehabilitation, keeping in view the 
available resources. The work started six months after the completion of the survey. 
The Overseer and the farmers agreed to the work for rehabilitation, according to the 
UC chairperson. 
The tasks accomplished then were the widening and deepening of the main canal 
and the canal lining at the beginning of the main canal. Besides, stone paving in some 
portions of the main canal and one culvert, required to cross the canal, was 
constructed. The types of work selected suggest that farmers give priority to the 
main canal. Their focus was on controlling the leakage, which is essential for 
increasing the water delivery to the fields. 
Initially, the UC decided to carry out the work on a wage basis. Due to the lack of 
skilled workers in the village the competency of the UC to execute the work was 
questioned by the DP and also by the villagers who were in favour of quality work. 
In the mean time, the 'would be' contractor, who was from the adjoining VP 
requested the UC for the work, since he had already received an assurance from the 
DP that he would get the work. According to a villager, no competitive bidding was 
called for the work. The contractor assured the UC on the quality of work. The DP 
played a decisive role in the selection of the contractor and implementation of the 
work. This shows how the political connection the contractor had with DP officials 
was important in establishing the linking loop to get the contract. Thus he was able 
to establish link both with the VP and DP officials. 
The contractor received the contract from the DP on the condition that he would 
pay the cash contribution on behalf of the farmers. It seems that the farmers could 
negotiate with him, as they were familiar with him as he was from the adjacent 
village. This familiarity to some extent contributed in awarding the contract also. It 
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was a general tendency in the village that the farmers would not like to make cash 
contributions. Farmers' opinion was that since the government had provided the 
money, they should not be making any contribution in cash. This reflects the 
negotiation and compromise between the contractor and the users through which 
both tried to take advantage of the intervention. Thus, the interface between them 
shaped the implementation of the intervention. 
They believe that the contractor should pay because he will be making a profit 
from the work. The farmers' understanding is that the cost estimate in the design is 
always too high. So, the contractor should share some of the profit with the farmers 
since, he got the job on the recommendation of the farmers. Some other reasons for 
not making cash contribution are that not all the farmers could pay in cash. Besides, 
there is a general feeling among the farmers that the cash should be kept for other 
activities like children's education, medicines and marriage. There was satisfaction 
among farmers as they did not have to make cash contributions. 
To implement the project, skilled workers were brought from outside and 
unskilled workers were hired from within the village. It took six months to complete 
the work and there were no major constraints during the implementation. The 
Overseer from the DP did the evaluation of the contractor's work, which included 
quality checking of the materials and if the work was accomplished according to the 
design. The Overseer consulted with the villagers about the work and they were 
satisfied with the work according to the UC chairman. This was due to the fact that 
UC members supervised the work on rotation basis. They even checked the ratio of 
sand and cement, as told by one of the members of that UC. As he put it 'we were 
conscious of what happens if something went wrong. What will our children say if 
we do not supervise properly and we will be cursed for our deeds'. The contractor 
also must be aware for doing good work since the villagers knew him as he was from 
the adjacent village. This indicates that the acquaintance between the villagers and 
the contractor is an important factor, as it will put moral pressure on him. The 
Overseer certified the completion of work based on technical measurement, which 
was also agreed by the UC and the villagers. The DP engineer approved the work on 
the recommendation of the overseer. After that the contractor received the payment 
for his work. This UC was dissolved once the rehabilitation work was completed 
since the UC in the opinion of the farmers was formed only to supervise the 
implementation work. The linking loop for this intervention was effective, as the 
people involved were local. 
5.5.3 Third intervention by the government under ILC programme 
This was the major rehabilitation of the irrigation system by the government in 1991 
under the financing from the World Bank, which is known as Irrigation Line of 
Credit (ILC). Various FMIS were supported for rehabilitation under this programme. 
The objectives were to raise agricultural production and farm incomes and increase 
food security; and increase farmers' participation to turn irrigation development into 
a demand driven process. This was sought by expanding area coverage and efficient 
use of irrigation water. Besides, the objective was also to improve the management 
efficiency of FMIS for sustained use of the irrigation scheme. This project emphasised 
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the participatory approach through the provision of farmers' involvement in 
planning, construction, operation and management of the irrigation system. 
The LLC implementation procedures envisaged to follow the 'project cycle' 
approach comprising of: 
• Reconnaissance and identification 
• Preparation and feasibility study 
• Farmer agreement 
• Appraisal and approval 
• Implementation, and development; and 
• Commissioning 
The direct participation of the farmers was envisaged in all phases of the project 
cycle except appraisal and approval. The overall implementation of the programme 
was entrusted to the WRID by DOI14. There was provision for appropriate 
institutional back up through the set up of the mobile team in WRID comprising of 
Divisional Engineer from WRID, the supervisor organiser from WRID and 
representatives from Regional Directorate of the DOA and ADB/N to oversee the 
implementation of the project. The inclusion of the representative from the DOA and 
the ADB/N was to ensure that necessary extension services and the credit would be 
extended to facilitate the irrigated agriculture. The DOA through its district offices 
were expected to intensify extension services in the areas where LLC projects were 
implemented. The mobile team was expected to provide technical support, guidance 
and training to the DIO staffs comprising one engineer, two overseers, one 
association organiser and some administrative personnel. The DIO staffs were 
entrusted to collection of basic data for rapid appraisal; preparation and 
implementation of minor rehabilitation. In terms of the role played by agencies it 
could be said that DIO in consultation with the farmers was mainly responsible for 
the identification to the commissioning of the project. However, the appraisal was 
the responsibility of the Regional Appraisal Committee (RAC). The Regional Director 
of the WRID chaired the committee. The other members of the committee were the 
Regional Directorate of the DOA and ADB/N. This committee was to scratinise the 
field reports for the rehabilitation or new construction of the irrigation schemes and 
recommend for their approval to the Approval and Co-ordination Committee (ACC). 
The Secretary of MOWR chaired the ACC. The other members of the committee were 
the Director Generals of the DIO, DOA, representatives from NPC and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). The organisational structure of the ILC suggests that the approval of 
the project was centralised. In that respect, there were chances of influencing the 
decisions by the politicians and the high officials. Nevertheless, the identification to 
implementation of the project was decentralised from DOI to the DIO with the 
technical and administrative support from the WRID. 
The farmers were required to agree on all the detailed features of rehabilitation. 
However, three alternatives were proposed for the farmers' involvement during the 
construction, which were to be agreed by the farmers during the signing of the 
contract. The followings were the alternatives: 
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• Construction under the direct responsibility of the farmers' UC assisted by DIO 
staff; 
• Construction under the direct responsibility of the DIO, with farmers' 
responsibility to construction specified for their contribution in the agreement 
between UC and the DIO; 
• Construction under DIO with farmers' contribution as a direct input into it. 
The farmers had to bear part of the capital cost for the rehabilitation and new 
construction. They could decide on how they would like to spend their contribution 
as provided by above alternatives. The formation of a UC was mandatory for the 
planning and implementation of the project. The UC was required to register with 
the government office to receive formal status. Group organiser was assigned in the 
village to mobilise and ensure farmers participation for the successful 
implementation of the project. 
The information published by the Western Regional Directorate of Irrigation15 
(WRID, 1990) shows that the estimated design cost of the Ghachowk irrigation scheme 
was NRs. 3,904,625. Out of this NRs. 3,318,931 was to be covered by HMG/N and 
World Bank, which is 85% of the total cost. The farmers were supposed to provide 
15% of the total cost, which is NRs. 585,694. Out of this 12.5 % was in the form of 
labour contribution and 2.5 percent in the form of cash which was NRs. 97,616. The 
cost per hectare for the rehabilitation is NRs. 19,523. The economic rate of return was 
estimated at 25 percent. The work was contracted out for NRs. 3,500,000". However 
the total amount spent was NRs 3,368,000 (DOI, 1997b). 
The works under the rehabilitation programme were the construction of a side 
intake, extension and widening of the main canal, which was 1.7 km and 
construction of 3.9 km branch canals. Besides, there was a provision for the 
construction of one aqueduct, one super passage, one escape and three foot bridges. 
However, farmers estimate that along with the intake with gate, only 500 metres of 
main canal, 750 metres of four branch canals were lined and one foot bridge with 
aqueduct was constructed. The rehabilitation work was expected to increase the 
volume of irrigation water during the monsoon. However, the rehabilitation did not 
increase the irrigation water for a winter crop. 
The construction of a permanent intake, extension and lining of the canals was 
supposed to increase the water availability through control of leakage and seepage. 
The headwork of the canal was temporary before the intervention of LLC. The design 
was changed before the implementation to include a head regulator, which was not 
in the original design. The provision of head regulator was made to control the silt 
flowing to the canal due to construction of permanent weir. During the field visit it 
was observed that the head regulator had not been operated for a long time. It was 
left open during the whole year. 
The design estimated that 200 ha of land in total in ward no. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 
Ghachowk VDC would receive irrigation water benefiting 300 farmers. 
Planning 
The government published a notice to coEect farmers' demand for rehabilitation 
work. According to the User committee members, the VP submitted the request for 
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rehabilitation to DIO through the District Panchayat (DP). The DIO forwarded the 
application to the WRID. The VP officials contacted the WRID who sent the survey 
team. The survey team consisted of engineers and overseers. The team contacted the 
Village Panchayat in January 1988 to discuss the survey. The Village Panchayat 
organised farmers' meetings with the survey team. According to the farmers 90 
percent of the villagers were present. The irrigation officials explained about the 
programme and the discussion continued. According to those who were present in 
the meeting, the main issue raised by the farmers was the insufficient availability of 
water for the area to be irrigated. However, the engineer who was involved in the 
survey recommended that the rehabilitation was feasible. This shows that the 
farmers' view was not taken seriously. As a result, the actual irrigated area is much 
lower than the planned one. This will be discussed later. The major works included 
were: 
• Excavation in the main canal; 
• Canal lining as per requirement and; 
• Construction of an aqueduct via a polythene pipe. 
The survey took place in March 1988. The Regional Appraisal Committee (RAC), 
which was formed for analysing the engineers' reports and to make 
recommendations for the approval of the project, recommended for the financing of 
the project. The RAC had representation from Regional Agricultural Directorate 
(RAD) and Regional office of Agricultural Development Bank. Their representation 
in the committee was to ensure agricultural support programme in the areas where 
rehabilitation of irrigation systems took place. However, the agricultural support 
programme was not extended as envisaged. The Approval and Co-ordination 
Committee of DOI based on the recommendation of the appraisal committee 
approved the project in November 1989. 
The engineer who was involved in the survey and the recommendation of the 
project admitted that there was social and political pressure to include the project for 
ILC intervention. The social pressure was from the farmers and the political pressure 
was from the elected Panchayat officials, including the Rastriya Panchayat member17 
from that area. He was asked to recommend the intervention and was assured that 
the Panchayat leaders would persuade the higher officials for the approval of the 
intervention. 
According to the secretary of the second UC, the design cost for rehabilitation was 
increased during the survey. There was no provision for a permanent intake and gate 
when the first initial survey team came to the village. But the farmers from the head 
argued that if they had to contribute, the intake should be permanent. He said that he 
convinced the irrigation officials on behalf of the farmers and successfully negotiated 
with other UC officials for the inclusion of a permanent intake with a gate. 
The insistence on the gate by the farmers at the head could be used for checking 
the flood water and the debris, which could have a damaging, effect on the canal. 
The provision of the gate could ensure the required flow of water and excess water 
would flow to the river. One of the important aspects in this respect is the water 
dispute between the Ghachowk and the Lahachowk. Thus, the permanent intake was 
also necessary to divide the irrigation water between Ghachowk and Lahachowk. 
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The Role of the Group Organiser (GO) 
The implementation of the project under the ILC Programme was on a participatory 
basis. To fulfil this requirement the government placed one group organiser in the 
village. He started his work in December 1990. His main tasks were to: 
• Orient farmers' group on the conditions and the procedures for applying for 
rehabilitation. 
• Assisting farmers' group in preparing the request. 
• Facilitating farmer in transforming the ad hoc UC into a formal UC. 
• Discussing rehabilitation details with the farmers and negotiating farmers' 
participation and cost sharing agreement with them; and 
• Training and preparing UC for operation and maintenance of the completed 
projects. 
The GO was a DOI employee. According to farmers, the GO had good social 
relations with the farmers. There were some farmers who did not like to give up their 
land for canal construction, as they were not convinced of getting irrigation water. 
But the GO convinced these farmers to give their land and was able to receive their 
co-operation for canal construction. But in these two years, he was not able to 
convince the farmers to contribute their labour, nor was he able to convince some of 
the farmers at the head end to contribute their cash18. The potential problem likely to 
occur out of this situation was solved by an agreement between the UC and the 
contractor. The GO could have any role to play, had there not been the agreement 
between the UC and the contractor. His role was limited to facilitation of project 
implementation. Also, he could not prepare the farmers for the operation and 
maintenance tasks after the intervention. The GO stayed for two years in the village 
after the formation of the UC to complete the rehabilitation and extension. But he 
could not influence the implementation of the project since he did not have any role 
in the decision-making processes. Thus, he was unable to check some of the 
anomalies, which is discussed below. However, he played an important role in 
mamtaining the loop between the users, officials and the contractor to accomplish the 
work. 
Implementation 
The agreement between UC and DIO was signed in February 1991 for the 
implementation of the project, which started in April 1991. At the beginning, the UC 
i* sisted on implementing the work by the villagers on a wage basis. In view of the 
:. nount to be invested and the financial regulation of His Majesty's Government of 
• ^pal (HMGN), the work had to be carried out on contract basis. As per the ILC 
piovision, the approval of the UC was required to sign the contract. Thus, the UC 
yielded to the pressure from the agency, as they were afraid that the project might 
not be implemented. Besides, the contractor persuaded the VP chairman at the time 
of Panchayat system and the UC chairman to receive the approval, according to the 
farmers. The VP was dissolved in April 1990 but VDC was formed in 1992. Now the 
UC chairman feels that "The UC would have been able to do the work and they 
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should have insisted on that'. This was just a pretext, as he was instrumental in 
giving the approval. 
The rehabilitation and extension was assigned by to a contractor from the same 
district on a competitive bidding. The final approval of the contract was done by the 
DOI on the recommendation of the UC and the RAC. It could be expected that the 
contractor used his influence at the district level to get the recommendation from the 
RAC. The work was contracted out following the government's financial regulation. 
According to the UC chairman, the committee did not object to that as they thought 
the government rule had to be followed. Further, he thought the contractor would 
work according to the design otherwise it would not be certified afterwards. 
The UC supervised the rehabilitation and extension work, according to its 
chairman. The UC meeting minuted that three members from each ward will 
supervise the contractor's work and will submit a written report to it. But this 
decision was never implemented, according to one of the UC members. The 
contractor sub-contracted the work. Only one person from the village got a petty 
contract for 200 metres of canal lining. Unskilled work was done by the villagers on 
wage basis and skilled workers were hired from outside. Some of the members of the 
UC felt that the contractor was using sub-standard materials (ratio of sand and 
cement) and the quality of work was being compromised by not properly following 
the design. They felt that the contractor had manipulated them. 
One of the farmers known as IB from the head told that the time when the 
construction work started was not appropriate. He had 10 ropani of land in the 
irrigated area. The construction according to him commenced in April whereas the 
planting of the main rice crop starts in July. According to him the construction work 
should have been started during the winter so that farmers could supervise the work 
properly. So, everything was done in haste. 
The project engineer and the mobile team of the WRID were not directly involved 
in the supervision of the work according to him. When asked he replied 'he was not 
aware how much money was obtained from the government and how much was 
spent'. It seems that most of the farmers did not care about the financial aspect. 
Instead they were more concerned about the planting. The contractor did not look 
after the concern of the farmers. Sometimes more labourers were brought for the 
work and sometimes very few did the work, according to him. This shows that after 
the first meeting of the farmers with the survey team, there was no communication 
between the UC officials and the users on the design and implementation of the 
intervention. In that respect, the decision making of the UC was not transparent, 
which was important for mamtaining the linking loop. 
According to the UC secretary, the whole contract was divided into two parts. The 
contract for the main canal and another branch canal was contracted out by the DIO 
to the contractor. The UC was given the work for constructing 4 branch canals on 
wage basis, which also included peoples' contribution of 12.5 percent. However, the 
UC's part of the work was also given in contract. He said that in fact some of the 
members of the UC put forward a contractor and worked themselves. According to 
him the earth work and canal lining to be done by the UC was carried out by others 
but it was not properly done. 
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During the construction, once again the design was changed to replace the 
planned polythene pipe by a concrete aqueduct to bring irrigation water to the 
extended area in ward number 6 as told by him. Since a concrete slab covered the 
aqueduct, it facilitated the movement of people from one village to the other. People 
asked for a concrete structure for which the DIO released additional money 
amounting to NRs. 248,000. However, officially there is no evidence of additional 
release of the fund. 
According to some farmers, half of the aqueduct fell down during the construction 
and some people got injured. The contractor paid the medical expenses. In addition, 
the UC dismantled some of the works done by the sub-contractors, as the materials 
used were sub-standard. The dismantling of the work suggests that the majority of 
the UC members were expressing their anger against some of their colleagues in the 
UC who were said to have connived with the contractor. The main contractor did not 
object to the reaction of UC members and directed the sub-contractors to use 
standard materials and to carry out the work as indicated in the design. Sub-
contractors also did not object to it. The repetition of the work suggests that the 
contractors were doing sub-standard work from the very beginning. Thus, they 
could not object to the dismantling of some of the works by the farmers. 
The sub-contractors also did not follow the design properly, according to some of 
the UC members, even after the farmers dismantled the work. The farmers had little 
leverage to press them because, they did not provide their part of the contribution. 
This issue would have come forward had the farmers insisted in following the 
design. In essence, some sort of compromise was necessary in this respect. 
The contractor was supposed to finish the work in one and half years time but it 
took two years to finish the work. It was because during the construction the work 
had to be terminated for a couple of months in order to use the not yet completely 
rehabilitated irrigation system for irrigating the main crop in 1991. Due to the delay 
of half a year, irrigation of the main crop in 1992 was also delayed by two weeks. The 
whole work was completed in April 1993. 
The people from ward no. 1 and 2 who were expecting irrigation water after the 
rehabilitation and where the canal never reached, had a different story to tell. 
According to the farmers from these wards the land in their ward was surveyed. The 
survey team came to their ward, they were assured that round the year irrigation 
would be provided after the rehabilitation to the area as well. However, their view is 
contradicted by the report prepared by the Approval and Co-ordination Committee 
for the rehabilitation of Ghachowk Scheme. It is specified in the report that the ward 3, 
4, 5 and 6 of Ghachowk VDC will receive the irrigation water. The request submitted 
by the farmers to the WRID also mentioned the lands in 3, 4 and 5 wards. The 
information published by the Regional Irrigation Directorate also does not say 
anything about the land to be irrigated in ward 1 and 2. 
The likely explanation for this is that the farmers' expectation might have been 
raised by the visit of the survey team. Naturally, the survey team had discussions 
with the farmers and the farmers would have requested for the irrigation water to 
their wards. Besides, the farmers from these wards were also expecting some benefit 
from that large investment in the VDC. The survey by the LLC team in their area was 
done only to increase the hectares of the land to be irrigated. This was essential for 
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project financing according to the farmers from these wards. In this connection it is 
important to note that the LLC implementation guidelines specified that the cost of 
major rehabilitation would not exceed NRs. 45,000 per ha (World Bank, 1990: 80) and 
not more than NRs. 20,000 per ha for the minor rehabilitation. The estimated cost 
shows that the project was for major rehabilitation. In this respect, the system with 
such a small command area would not have justified that scale of investment as the 
per hectare cost would have far exceeded the expected costs. This would not have 
made the rehabilitation feasible according to the cost criteria. This was evident from 
the fact that the cost per hectare becomes NRs. 61,000 for the 60 ha command area 
whereas it would have been NRs. 18,000 for 200 ha taking into account the total 
expenditure of NRs. 3,668,000 
However, the people from ward 1 and 2 were also not convinced that they would 
receive irrigation water. The farmers from these wards never requested for the 
extension of the canal to their wards under the project, nor were they convinced that 
this would happen. This was because the water at the source was not sufficient. 
There was no provision in the rehabilitation to tap new sources for increasing the 
volume of water in the canal. Besides, the users at the head reach did not like to lose 
the control of the irrigation water by extending the canal to ward land 2. 
Therefore the UC did not ask them to contribute after the survey. Because the 
contribution could have established their right to use water. That is the reason they 
thought that the available funds for the project were misused. At the very beginning 
the UC officials knew that the irrigation system was not to be extended to that area. 
The farmers from the presently irrigated command area claim that the canal was not 
extended due to insufficient availability of water. The implementation of the 
intervention suggest that the linking loop that was formed to bring the government 
intervention was disintegrated during the time of implementation. This was largely 
due to the formation of new loop between the influential UC officials and the 
government officials. The linking loop also became weak, as the VP was already 
dissolved and the VDC was not formed, which could have played effective role. 
There was no canal previously going to wards 1 and 2 before the intervention also. 
The lands in these wards are being irrigated through a spring, which rises during the 
rainy season. If the monsoon is delayed then the planting of paddy is also delayed. 
According to them, the farmers from the up-stream area were from the beginning, 
not in favour of providing irrigation water to their area because the irrigation water 
was not even sufficient for the presently irrigated area. 
But one of the decisions of the UC in 1992 stated that the lands in the ward 1 and 2 
will receive irrigation water for five days for planting which was delayed due to the 
late monsoon. This decision was made at the request of the farmers from these 
wards. A village trail was used to provide water, as there was no canal going to these 
wards. 
The UC, its role and farmers'perception 
The officials of the DIO asked the farmers to form again a Users' Committee (UC) 
which was a requirement for the intervention. Then after a few days later the 
villagers held a meeting to form the UC at the initiative of the Village Panchayat. 
According to the UC chairman, he was elected unanimously. He was also Vice 
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Chairman of the VP at that time. Some of the farmers from the head reach of the 
canal did not want him to be the chairman of the UC. A heated discussion took place, 
but the majority of the farmers elected him. This could be largely due to the influence 
of his position in the VP. 
As one teacher put it, the 'majority of the farmers did not actively participate in 
the discussion as they preferred to be indifferent, because it was dominated by the 
powerful VP officials in the village'. It did not make any difference to them who ever 
got elected, as they were not vying for the position. Basically, the argument was 
among those who were aspiring the position. Other members of the committee were 
elected on the basis of one representation from each ward (VP consisted of nine 
wards). 
The representatives from each ward were elected unanimously, according to the 
villagers. The UC had eleven members along with chairman, vice chairman and the 
secretary and was formed in November 1990. The UC was formally registered with 
the District Administration in January 1991, which was three months before the 
construction work began. Five members of the old UC were also members of the new 
UC. They were the people mostly admired by the farmers. They had established their 
credibility by successfully implementing the second intervention. Farmers believed 
that their representation in the UC would check mismanagement by other members. 
Mr. SS is one of the oldest members in the village. He is also economically better 
off which was evident during the visit to his house. He has land in the water 
abundant zone and also in water scarce area. He has 12 ropani of land in the middle 
of the irrigation command area. He was the Chairman of the first UC. The villagers 
appreciated his handling of the second intervention. He commanded the respect 
from fellow villagers as was evident during the talk with them. He told that the 
second UC did not provide adequate supervision of the contractor's work. The 
Chairman and the Secretary were not active and effective in providing leadership to 
the UC. In the past, the first UC co-operated with the villagers for supervising the 
work. This was not done by the UC under the LLC. He said involvement of the 
people would have prevented the sub-standard work by the contractor. Besides, he 
was of the opinion that the required technical supervision was lacking. The Engineer 
from the agency did not stay in the village but used to come only now and then. In 
essence he was not satisfied with the work done during the third intervention. 
According to him some of the members of the UC took sub-contracts during the tMrd 
intervention which was not fair from his point of view. They were covering their 
illegal activity by bringing people from outside. He strongly believed that one of the 
reasons for sub-standard work was 'that the contractor paid the contribution on 
behalf of those farmers who did not pay'. As the contractor came to work for profit, 
he had to deliver sub-standard work to cover the expenses paid for farmer's 
contributions. 
The Secretary of the UC Mr. BC was the former head of the village. Previously he 
worked as teacher. He was one of the knowledgeable and respected figures in the 
village. He has a small tea shop and also a rice mill. He has 5 ropani of irrigated land 
beside the homestead in the ward 6. He started saying that some of the UC members 
had a vested interest in the rehabilitation work and had the intention of obtaining 
undue benefits from the work, mterestingly, although he was the Secretary of the UC 
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he was not aware of how much money was paid to the contractor because the 
contractor was not paid on the recommendation of the UC. Only the then VP 
chairman, the UC chairman, the contractor and one Agricultural Junior Technician 
(JT) who came from that village knew about this. This indicates that the 
communication and decision making was not transparent. Further, the group of UC 
officials maintained the new liriking loop with the contractor to increase their 
adrninistrative control of the resources. 
The JT also took a contract although, being a government official he was not 
supposed to do this. He said 'the JT was so influential that he manipulated the whole 
construction work in collusion with the contractor and with the help of the UC 
chairman. Some of the examples he gave was the spacing of the iron rods for RCC 
(Reinforced Concrete and Cement) work. According to the design the spacing should 
have been 6 inches but they made it 10 inches. Similarly, the sand used was from the 
stream while in fact it should have been collected from the river because these sands 
contain less clay particles. As secretary of the UC he protested but nobody listened to 
him. 
It surprised him that the UC Chairman and the contractor were operating the 
account. He once raised the matter in the UC meeting and the UC decided that the 
UC Chairman and the Secretary would operate the accounts. At this the contractor 
threatened to withdraw from the work. Nobody said anything. There was also the 
question who would take-over his work, because the contractor had already agreed 
to waive the farmers' contribution in labour and accepted to pay for the contribution 
for some farmers at the head. He kept quiet, as other members of the UC did not 
support him. This shows that the interface between the users and the contractor 
ended in negotiation and compromise to maintain the existing linking loop. 
It is more likely that he also took benefit by being the Secretary, although he did 
not mention it. This is because it is quite impossible that he kept quiet if others alone 
were taking benefit. The circumstances in which he became the UC Secretary also 
confirm this. Besides, he was the former Pradhan Pancha and one of the 
knowledgeable persons in the village. 
Another UC member Mr. BG was one of the rich persons in the village with a big 
house. He was retired from the army and had a good pension. His children were in 
the town for their education. He was soft spoken. He was from the head reaches of 
the canal having 15 ropani of land. He was one of the five who was a UC member 
during the second intervention. He did not like to comment too harshly about others. 
In fact he seemed to be a man of integrity and honesty. He said that he even did not 
know the design and estimated cost and how much money came from the 
government. He asked for the details about costs in the UC meeting but that was not 
discussed. He was not even aware of the work the UC should do. He said that UC 
meeting had decided to implement its part of the work on wage basis. The decision 
of the UC was not fully implemented, according to him and 'no detailed discussion 
was ever held about payment and supervision of work done by the contractor'. He 
frankly said T did not know how these things were done'. He complained that since 
he was living far from the main centre of the village, sometimes he did not receive 
the information on UC meetings and knew the decisions only afterwards. Lack of 
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communication among the UC officials indicates that the decision making in the UC 
was manipulated to benefit some of the UC officials. 
This UC member was also critical of the timing of the implementation, which was 
just before the main paddy planting season. People were quite busy and did not have 
time for supervision. He Wmself did not pay much attention on what engineers and 
overseers did. According to him the contractors, engineers and the overseers were 
not open in their dealings. "I did not know how they did prepare the completion 
report. I may have signed the UC decision for the completion of work but I do not 
remember detailed discussions after the contractor completed his work". He asked 
for a clear account after the completion of the work but the chairman never answered 
the question. 
He also confirmed that some members of the UC had a vested interest in the 
construction work. He suspects that for this reason there was no detailed discussion 
on construction and payment to the contractor. This was evident in UC meetings as 
these members openly showed their interest in getting contracts according to him. 
He also said that the contractor paid the 12.5 % in labour contributions. He revealed 
to me that the design of the canal was modified. In the beginning the canal was dug 
out in a V shape but people did not like it because it required more land and they 
were not willing to provide so much of the land. When asked about the shortcoming 
in the area irrigated, he replied he was not aware that only 60 ha were currently 
being irrigated. It is amazing that farmers did not know what was going on in the 
village. 
Another member of the UC, KU said that the project was included at the request 
of the people via the VP to the DOI. He is well off in the village with a good 
agricultural income as 15 ropani of his land is near to the main canal. He was soft 
spoken and he commanded respect from other villagers. He is also politically active 
as evidenced by the local election of 1997 in which he became the chairman of the 
VDC. The people present at the meeting that was held for establishing the UC elected 
the officials of the UC. According to him in contrast to what other informants told 
there was no conflict in electing the UC officials. He was also one of the UC members 
from the second intervention. He said that he was offered the post of the chairman of 
UC but he declined it as there was no one to be trusted. Immediately after the 
formation of the UC, a meeting was convened and the main discussion was on how 
to spend the money (3.5 million NRs). The Engineers and the Overseers briefed about 
the survey, design and the cost estimate of the project. Heated discussions took place 
regarding the implementation procedure. Some of the members were in favour of the 
committee doing all the work themselves and some were in favour of contracting out 
all the work. Ultimately the committee opted for the contract. Most likely, the 
opinion of the DIO, that the UC did not have the skill and the capability to complete 
the work in a satisfactory way also influenced the decision. 
The researcher found that there were two contracts, while going through the 
minutes of the UC. One was for the contractor and one for the UC. The main contract 
was invited by the DOI. The UC also invited tenders for their part of the work. The 
reason, according to him, was that the committee felt that it would be difficult to 
mobilise peoples' contribution. Some of the people were saying 'why should we 
contribute when the government has already provided the money'. The work was 
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contracted out on the condition that the contractor would not ask for contributions 
from people. 
KU said "I realise that we should not have contracted out". We could have done 
more work ourselves with that amount of money. "The committee was weak in 
supervision and made mistakes in regard to the control of quality". People 
afterwards complained that the contractor did not do the work as was indicated in 
the design. The length of the canal sections that were lined were shorter than 
specified in the design. This was to be expected, as the contractor had to make up for 
the shortage of farmers' contribution. 
The question of farmers' contribution of 12.5% was the most important aspect in 
the decision of the UC. It was certain that the UC would not be able to mobilise this, 
as they were aware that farmers would not contribute to it. In that case there was the 
risk of non-completion of the work had UC decided to implement on its own. Thus, 
all the UC members agreed to the contract. This relieved them of the burden as the 
contractor had agreed to waive the farmers' contribution. 
He was candid in saying that two of the committee members took sub-contracts 
from the main contractor, which came to be known afterwards. He was saying that 
one had to believe the others and accordingly he signed rninutes of the meeting. He 
was sorry for not being able to discharge his responsibility properly. This was 
evident from his statement "I realise that one should not believe others when it 
comes to the financial aspect of this type of work". He had a different opinion from 
that of other members of UC regarding the functioning of the UC. He said that every 
matter of project implementation was discussed in the UC. The differences of the 
opinion could be due to his presence in all the meetings. The earlier respondent said 
that in many cases he did not know about the meeting. 
However, he did not know how the UC certified the completion of work. He could 
not recall any discussions in the UC in that respect. He believed that certification was 
done in accordance with the prevailing rules. He contradicted his earlier statement 
by saying that he did not believe that any committee members benefited from the 
project. UC members believed in the contractor according to him. At the same time 
he opined that the villagers learned the lesson for the future when he said 'we people 
should be more conscious and aware what can happen in this type of construction 
work'. 
He had difficulty in answering the question why the extended command area was 
60 ha instead of 200 hectare, as mentioned in the design of the project. He in fact was 
unaware of this. He came with a different version and said 'in fact the technicians 
convinced the farmers by saying that it will be easier to include the project if the size 
of area is larger and there will be more money available from the government. And 
also, if the cost of the project is too small, the government may not be interested'. 
Thus, all the villagers agreed to increase the command area in order to include the 
project for government financing but did not know the intention of the technicians. 
He did not know what happened to that increased amount of money if the command 
area was only 60 hectare. He advised me to contact the Chairman and the Secretary 
of the UC and he also said T am sure that they will not be able to tell you about this'. 
But finally he made a cautious remark 'Do not bring this thing out. It might create 
havoc in the village if people knew it'. All in the village were aware that there had 
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been manipulation in the implementation of the project but no one was prepared to 
question this openly. Presumably, they did not like to make it an issue, which was 
not possible to correct. Secondly, they did care about the harmony of the village, 
which could be disrupted. The UC members involved in the scam would not have 
been able to manipulate without the support from the technicians involved. The 
farmers now cannot take any action against these officials. However, one thing is 
sure that this would have been the major issue if farmers had contributed. 
One of the members of the UC who was also an elected representative of the VP at 
the time of request for intervention, told that the Village Panchayat requested for the 
government support. He had 10 ropani of land in the middle of the irrigation 
command area. He revealed that the intention of the villagers was to receive support 
from the government. He said that it was the DOI, which awarded the contract in 
consultation with the UC. In the beginning he tried to evade my question on why the 
outside contractor got also the contract for NRs. 15,00,000 which, was supposed to be 
done by the UC. He maintained that the contract was awarded to UC for this work 
and not to the outsider. He said that people gave their contributions and the 
contractor waived some of the contributions. This was not true as revealed by other 
UC members. Later on in the course of our discussion he confessed that the 
contractor did all the work. The reason he gave for this was that the UC did not play 
an effective role and were not interested in implementing the project on their own. 
He concurred with the views of the other members of the UC that the design and 
estimates were never discussed in the UC. The reason he gave for this was that the 
UC members did not have the technical knowledge. As for the completion report, he 
said that the UC accepted it on the basis of a technical report presented by the 
Engineers and the Overseers. He was saying that the UC members were aware that 
200 ha would not be irrigated as was promised during the time of the survey and 
also during the discussions with the officials from DIO. They accepted the project for 
fear of losing it. At the same time he consoled himself by saying 'at least there has 
been an increase in the area after the intervention'. 
The VDC vice chairman (at the time of this study) was not happy with the 
procedure of UC formation. He has 12 ropani of land in the head and middle of the 
irrigation system. He was of the opinion that the people from the head did not have 
an adequate representation as compared to their land holding. Those who were 
represented in the UC from the head reaches were also not active in defending their 
rights. According to him the farmers' meeting elected the chairman and the secretary 
and these officials proposed other members which the meeting accepted. This 
suggests that the UC chairman and the secretary proposed the persons, whom they 
thought could easily be manipulated. He was not aware that the contractor did not 
ask for people's contribution in labour. According to him, the farmer from the head 
paid their cash contribution and also provided their voluntary labour contribution. 
His statement regarding labour contribution is not true since all others said they did 
not contribute. 
The Head Teacher of the local school was of the opinion that the Department of 
Irrigation imposed the project design. He had 9 ropani of land in the middle of the 
irrigation scheme. Some people including himself argued against the project during 
the mass meeting because there was no provision to increase the water volume at the 
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source. The issue of contribution also came up, according to him. He argued that it 
was not possible for farmers to contribute for the cost. The main argument was why 
should farmers contribute for the cost of 200 ha while the actual area for irrigation is 
only 60 hectares. Considering the length of the canal in the design and the water 
volume it was only enough for 60 ha. He raised the issue by saying that he would 
take the contract and he also would bear the local contribution as well. But some 
local people challenged how could a Head Teacher accept the contract. In fact his 
intention was to raise the issue on behalf of the people to relieve them of additional 
burden. His argument however forced the UC officials and the technicians to 
consider the contributions. This could be one of the reasons for waiving the farmers' 
contributions. This also indicates the importance of the personality who could 
express the view on behalf of the farmers and could influence the decisions. 
The VDC chairman (at the time of this study) was very influential in the village 
because of his interest in the development work. He has nine ropani of the land in 
the middle of the irrigation scheme. He was a respected person. He said that he 
proposed for the formation of a supervision committee consisting of one 
representative from each ward. This cornmittee was meant for the supervision of the 
implementation. The reason for this proposition was that this type of committee in 
the second intervention was able to check manipulations by the contractor. But the 
UC was not interested in his proposal. He said that the UC members were guided by 
self-interest by making some profit out of the project. This could be the reason for not 
accepting his proposal. Thus, the lirtking loop between the actors (UC-Kulo Samiti-
User) was not effective as it was during the second intervention in 1985. However, 
the loop between some of the members of UC-VP and the contractor was strong, as it 
was guided by self-interest. Because of this some UC members were the sub-
contractors for the work. That is why the UC did not regulate the sub-contracting. 
This indicates how the so called leaders manipulated the decision making to fulfil 
their own interest. This contributed to the weakening of the existing linking loop, 
which was fundamental to the accomplishment of the intervention objectives. 
The completion report was prepared even before the work was accomplished, 
according to him. It was because the UC members who worked as contractors were 
in haste to get their final payment. He revealed that some of the UC members tried to 
take the main contract awarded by the DOI as well but could not succeed because 
they did not have the majority in the UC. According to him, the formation of the UC 
was also manipulated. A mass meeting was called and the whole day the discussion 
centred on other aspects, especially the benefits after the rehabilitation. The names of 
the future UC members were announced when it was already late in the evening and 
the people were in haste to conclude the meeting. 'People expressed their consent by 
clapping their hands and left the meeting'. 
In general, people were not happy with the way UC and contractor implemented 
the project. As one villager put it "the Engineers and the Overseers listened to the 
villagers but afterwards they did what they wanted to". Some were of the opinion 
that the work done for NRs. 600,000 in the second intervention and the work done 
for NRs. 3,900,000 were the same. But this is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it reflects 
the farmers' dissatisfaction. The work done was not according to the design such as 
construction/extension and lining of the branch canals as stipulated. 
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Another farmer said "the interests of the technicians and the contractor are the 
same and they always collaborate with each other to make a profit". Some villagers 
were not even aware who the UC members were. In one case in ward no. 6, the 
earthen canal was extended to cover some of the area within the command area but 
the canal was not lined. Instead they constructed a bridge with the covered aqueduct. 
This reflects the motives of UC member and the contractor. 
As stated earlier, the fifth branch canal which was extended to include some lands 
under the command area in ward no. 6 was providing water for planting only. Some 
farmers in this ward claim that during the intervention the farmers from that area 
made the commitment that they would ask irrigation water for planting only. Now 
these very farmers were asking irrigation water on a rotational basis. From the 
planting season of 1997 the farmers from this ward are also getting water on 
rotational basis. The decision to this effect was taken by the VDC on the request from 
the farmers. This is an example how the farmers establish their right on irrigation 
water. This was possible with the lapse of the time in which people forgot about the 
conditions agreed between the farmers. 
The above discussions suggest that the interface between the UC members was not 
intensive due to lack of communication. As a result the decision making was not 
transparent, which was made the linking loop weak. 
Evaluations of 1992,1993 and 1997 
The ILC project office sent one engineer to check the quality and completion of work. 
The engineer evaluated the work along with the UC chairman and other members of 
the committee. The engineer had no critical remarks of his own but agreed with the 
UC members when they objected to the quality of work in some places. The engineer 
directed to repeat the work but did not come back to check it again. Some farmers 
complained about the under completion of the work but that was not taken seriously 
according to them. The under completion of the work was also due to the fact that 
farmers did not contribute the required labour. Nevertheless, some farmers said they 
contributed labour by coUecting stones and by excavating the main canal. 
Change in the command area and households 
The cultivable command area of the irrigation system, as stipulated in the document 
published by the Western Region irrigation Directorate (WRID, 1990) is 200 hectare. 
Shivakoti (1992:6) also reported 200 hectares and the total number of households 650. 
The VDC record of 1975 indicates that 103 farmers had their land in the command 
area. The record of 1984 showed 139 owners in the command area. These households 
are from ward number 3, 4, 5 and 6. The area surveyed was 200 hectares. But the 
amount of cash contribution raised from the farmers shows that only 60 hectare 
could be covered. In the request letter for intervention in 1990, the total area 
mentioned by the farmers was 100 hectares and the total number of users were 310 
households. The actual irrigated area during the time of study was 60 ha. In this 
connection, the VDC record is more authoritative as the land tax is collected on the 
basis of these records. The increase in the number of households was due to the 
fragmentation of holdings among the brothers due to the inheritance law. 
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When I asked the UC chairman "why only 60 ha was covered within the 
command area instead of 200 ha", he strongly reacted. He said "Since available funds 
were already expended, it was not possible to extend the canal to downstream areas" 
which were supposed to be the tail end of the command area surveyed. He did not 
have the answer for how it was expended. He asked me to see the UC Secretary for 
the details of the account. The Secretary could give only the minutes of the meetings 
and said he could not find the account register. The VDC secretary was unable to 
explain the large variation in the irrigated area and the number of households. 
The actual increase in the irrigated area after the intervention from the Irrigation 
Line of Credit (TLC), was nearly 15 ha, as reported by the VDC secretary. The net 
increase, according to him, is from branch canal 2 ,3 and 5, which provides irrigation 
to 6 ha, 4.5 and 4.5 hectare respectively. The VDC secretary however, believed that 
the area could be slightly higher due to the under reporting by the farmers in absence 
of actual measurement. The actual increase was an additional 20 ha irrigated by the 
extension of canals, conversion of Bari land and checking of leakage according to the 
farmers. The owners of these lands benefited by converting their Bari land to the Khet 
land. 
Cropping intensity 
There has been no substantial increase in the cropping intensity after the 
intervention. Shivakoti (1992: 22) reported that the cropping intensity has increased 
by 37 percent after the intervention. But the study report by Irrigation Management 
Project (DOI, 1993: 42) indicated a mere increase of 8 percent in the cropping 
intensity. The farmers reported that there has been no substantial increase in the 
cropping intensity after the intervention. The cropping intensity at the time of the 
study was 150 percent. The low level of increase in the cropping intensity was due to 
a lack of crop diversification as the increase in the irrigation water was 
supplementary to the monsoon irrigation for rice cultivation and wheat cultivation 
during the winter. The failure to provide the year round irrigation by the 
intervention did not encourage for additional cropping. Besides, the agricultural 
support services were also lacking, although the project envisaged intensive 
extension services. 
Crop yields 
There have been increases in the crop yield after the ILC intervention. Farmers 
reported up to 25 percent increase in the crop productivity of paddy after the 
intervention. The IMP report (DOI, 1993) mentioned that the crop yield had been 
double after the ILC intervention. It reported that the crop yield after the ILC 
intervention was 3.0, 2.0 and 2.5 mt/ha for paddy, wheat and maize respectively. 
During the interview with the farmers it was found that there has been increase in 
the crop yield but not as much as reported by the IMP. The farmers reported that the 
crop yield of paddy and wheat increased by 0.25 and 0.3 mt/ha respectively. The 
actual yield of paddy and wheat was 2.5 and 1.8 mt/ha respectively. Farmers did not 
find any change in the yield of maize crop however, after the intervention. There was 
a variation in the crop yield between the farmers from the head and the tail end. The 
tail enders reported that there had been a marginal increase in the crop yield of 
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paddy, which was 2.0 mt/ha after the ILC intervention, which is a mere increase of 
0.10 mt/ha. However, they did not plant wheat due to unavailability of water. 
View of irrigation officials and the consultants 
The irrigation officials involved in the implementation of the ILC project admitted 
that there had been shortcomings in the implementation of the project. The detailed 
technical design was not as intensive since ILC project was a pilot project. The survey 
engineer and also one former official told me that the command area was not actually 
measured but was based on the discussion with the farmers. The area was inflated 
because of the political and social pressure for the inclusion of the project. This cost 
criteria in his view led to the increase in the area in order to make the project feasible 
for the rehabilitation. The farmers convinced the engineers to change the design and 
accordingly the engineer prepared the design and cost estimate to make it feasible. 
The survey engineer accepted this when he told that "he had to take into account the 
demand of the farmers as it was a participatory project. At the same time he had to 
ensure that the project is approved for the intervention" as there was political 
pressure to include the project. Because of this, the area was increased and farmers 
knew it, according to him. Thus, it was not fair for the farmers to blame the engineer 
as he was acting on the request of the farmers and the local politicians. 
According to him, the objective in assisting the old schemes was to remove 
bottlenecks through the improvement in physical structures considered important by 
the farmer. The process followed was: 
• Identification of constraints through discussions with the farmer. 
• General survey of the scheme for the identification of activities to be undertaken. 
• Project preparation based on the information collected from the field. 
• Project approval. 
• Formation of a UC. 
• Discussion with the farmers for the construction of the activities. 
• Cornrnissioning of the project. 
Monitoring and follow-up, which was one of the important aspects in project 
formulation and implementation, were missing in the whole process of the third 
intervention. The offices at the district and region could not provide adequate 
supervision because of the haste in the implementation of the project, according to 
him. This was due to the requirement to complete the project within the specified 
fiscal period. The mobile team of the WRID concentrated its attention in the areas 
where there were problems in the implementation. In this respect, the mobile team 
helped to resolve the conflict with the Lahachowk irrigation scheme. However, 
adequate supervision was lacking as exemplified by the lack of agricultural support 
services. Basically the project was target oriented and the achievement of the physical 
target was the primary concern of the officials involved, since evaluation of their 
performance was based on the achievement of the physical target. Thus there was a 
contradiction in the approach and the desired goal. This is because the participatory 
approach is process oriented, which requires constant dialogue between the users 
and the government officials to set the stage for the project intervention. The 
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emphasis on target achievement does not allow for closer interaction to prepare users 
for the project. As a result the design and estimates were also riot done properly 
according to the engineer. Once approved, the project was left entirely in the hands 
of overseer in-charge and the concerned engineer who had to supervise the work. 
The WRID officials did not have any answer to the high cost of the project. 
In that respect the required technical backstopping was missing. This was 
substantiated by one of the decisions made by the UC. The site-in-charge staff 
requested for necessary directives from the DIO with regard to the sand being used 
by the contractor, which was not of good quality. There was no reply from the DIO. 
There was no provision to turn over the management of the project in the FMIS. 
He was of the opinion that the formation of the UC was a project requirement for 
the rehabilitation of the scheme. But the government was not concerned about the 
effectiveness of the UC after the rehabilitation. In his opinion most of the UC 
members did not know their actual role. It was because the project did not have 
provision for training and no training was provided to the UC members. This was 
one of the reasons why most of the UC's ceased to function after the implementation. 
According to his observation the schemes which had UCs before the intervention 
were still functioning effectively. The UC formed for fulfilling project conditions 
were not functioning in most of the cases. However, some farmers from this scheme 
were sent to other FMIS to observe the management practices. The UC secretary 
confirmed this. During the discussion he appreciated the management of one of the 
irrigation systems he had visited. Nevertheless, they did not introduce it. 
The overseer who was involved in the implementation of the intervention of the 
Ghachowk scheme told that the pre-feasibility survey of the scheme did include the 
area from the ward one and two as well. Thus, the farmers from these wards 
complained during the implementation according to him. As the overseer was not 
involved in the design phase of the project, he was not in a position to answer the 
question of these farmers. The overseer justified the overestimate of the project cost 
by saying the amount was required for that type of work. This shows that the 
fulfilment of individual objectives by the local leaders and the government officials 
did weaken the existing communal linking loop, as the users did not take active 
participation in the implementation. Besides, some of the UC officials also did not 
actively participate in the decision making. This was largely due to the weak political 
control at this time. 
The overseer told that there was no co-ordination between the UC members and 
also decision making was not always unanimous. He was of the opinion that some of 
the UC members tried to impose their view on others. As a result some of the 
members were more active compared to the others because of their interest in getting 
petty contracts. He confirmed that some of the UC members took the petty contracts 
from the contractor. But in his opinion they did not make the profit as they lacked the 
professionalism. They, according to him, complained that the technicians did not 
help them to make a profit. Besides, these UC officials were under criticism from the 
users for not supervising the work of the contractor properly. 
The consultants (Sir William Halcrow and Partners Limited, 1997) studied 23 sub-
projects to evaluate the system performance and impact of the irrigation systems 
under the ILC project. However, this irrigation scheme was not one of them. Out of 
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these 12 were rehabilitation sub-projects in the hills and they had come up with 
following conclusions: 
• There had been a 33 percent overestimate in the design area for hill sub-projects. 
• There were systems, which were receiving inadequate water supplies due to 
design and construction deficiencies. 
• The average cost per ha for rehabilitation in the hills was NRs 59,000. 
• Farmers' average contribution in cash and kind varied from 10 to 14%. 
• UC's were active during the development works but now 5 out of 12 are dormant. 
• Projects had not made significant impact in the improvement of water 
management practices. 
• Main impact of the projects was on the reduction in the emergency maintenance 
cost which was halved for the hills. 
• There has been a change in the cropping pattern after intervention; some 60% of 
hill sub-projects had an additional crop. 
• Water availability has been increased. 
According to the officials, in view of the lessons learned from the ILC intervention, 
government effort is directed towards lessening the shortcomings in the National 
Irrigation Sector Projects (NISP)19. In this respect attention is paid to the preparation 
of rigorous guidelines for the upcoming projects. However, the effectiveness 
depends on its implementation. The guidelines prepared for the ILC project were 
also elaborate but in practice they were not followed. 
The Status of the UC in 1997 
The UC constituted under the ILC was not functioning during the study period. It 
had not renewed its registration annually with the District Administration, which 
was required for official recognition. The official recognition is important to receive 
the government support for maintenance work. It may not be important for the 
operation of the canals since it is an internal arrangement between the farmers. 
Evidently, the operation of the canal has not stopped, as VDC is working well. The 
VDC has maintained the continuity of the operation of the canal through the Pales 
under the Kulo Samiti. Farmers say that the UC did not function since the completion 
of the rehabilitation work. In this respect, the committee formed for the third 
intervention was more a construction committee. However on paper, it is still known 
as UC due to its registration in the government office. 
On the question why the UC was defunct, the UC chairman said " UC was formed 
to initiate and complete the construction work and that task was completed". Thus, 
his view on the role of the UC was limited to the completion of the construction 
work. All previous UC's had also been dissolved after the completion of the 
maintenance work. 
The agreement between the DOI and the UC specified that the UC would co-
operate with the DIO for the implementation of the project. Specifically, the UC 
would raise the farmers' contribution and supervise the implementation work. The 
UC would take over the management of the system after the completion of the 
project. Minor maintenance work would be done by the UC with the technical 
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assistance from the DIO if required. The DOI would provide technical and financial 
support for major rehabilitation if that is beyond the capacity of the UC. This shows 
that there were differences in the perception of the farmers and agency officials in 
viewing the role of the UC. The formation of the UC in the agency's view was to 
institutionalise the irrigation management practices in a sustained manner. The UC 
members on the other hand viewed the UC as a requirement for obtaining the 
government support and for supervising the construction work. Once it was 
complete there was no need of the UC. It also indicates that they did not like to take 
the responsibility of the operation and maintenance of the canal. 
Some of the farmers requested the VDC for the formation of a new UC in order to 
get up front money deposited before the intervention. The VDC called the meeting of 
the farmers but a new UC could not be formed. This was because of the lack of 
convincing proposal from the VDC. Besides, farmers were unaware of the processes 
to be followed for the dissolution of the existing UC. On the question why the VDC 
was not taking any initiative, the VDC chairman replied "VDC did not have the 
power to dissolve the UC, but current UC members could pave the way for the 
formation of new UC by resigning from their post". The need for UC is also not felt 
by the VDC, as it forms Kulo Samiti every year to operate the canal. 
The reaction of UC chairman to this was "we do not have any objection to the 
formation of a new UC". The irrigation policy also does not say anything about the 
dissolution of the UC if it becomes defunct. Some of the farmers were right in saying 
that "if the UC was dissolved the farmers would ask for the book of accounts of past 
expenditures, which was difficult for UC members to produce. In the same vein 
some farmers were joking that the "UC would be active if new funds became 
available". 
One of the members of the UC who earlier said that the work of the UC was not 
transparent, said that, there was no co-operation between the UC, VDC and the 
farmers. It was because the UC, according to him did not present the accounts of 
expenditures, so people did not have faith in the UC. He was in favour of 
reorganising the UC and said that the members should be elected irrespective of their 
party politics. He was concerned about the deterioration of the irrigation structure. 
His interest in reviving the UC was for regular maintenance of the irrigation system. 
He blamed the VDC chairman and vice chairman for not taking any action to make 
the UC effective. The VDC at the moment was not taking any initiative for the 
regular maintenance. Nevertheless, it had obtained money from the Member of 
Parliament for maintenance, which was on an ad hoc basis. 
Another important aspect in this respect was the VP/VDC's role in the 
management of the irrigation scheme, which had been continuous before the UC. 
The UC because of this, was not interested in asserting its role as specified in the 
agreement. If one looks at the current status of the UC no one in the village was 
concerned about it. The VDC was managing the canal through the Pale under Kulo 
Samiti. During the time of the rehabilitation also the Pale were working for the 
allocation and distribution of irrigation water. The farmers were more concerned 
about the availability of the irrigation water but not much concerned about who did 
it. It did not make any difference to them if the VDC or the UC looked after the 
scheme. Thus, due to the existence of traditional institutionalised practices, the UC 
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5.6 The fourth intervention 
The Member of Parliament20 from that constituency provided NRs. 15,000 to 
undertake minor maintenance work of the irrigation scheme in 1995. It is interesting 
to note that the VDC constituted a temporary UC to carry out maintenance work. SS 
who was the chairman of the first UC since the farmers liked the work under his 
supervision headed the UC. The reason given was that the UC constituted under the 
ILC project was not effective. The work completed was the repairing of the canal 
lining in the main canal near the head to check the leakage. Although the VDC gave 
did not have role to play in the operation of the canal. However, it could have 
established the link with the Kulo Samiti and VDC for the mobilisation of the users' 
contrbution for the maintenance of the irrigation system. 
According to the ILC procedure, the cash amount of NRs. 81,000 deposited by the 
farmers was to be returned to the UC as maintenance fund, but now no one knew 
where the fund was. The UC chairman said it was with the government. The UC 
could not get it released from the DIO because it did not take any initiative after the 
completion of rehabilitation. 
Politics had to do something with the ineffectiveness of this UC. As one member 
of the UC confirmed that the party politics had made it ineffective. The previous UC 
was formed during Panchayat system in the country and the UC chairman was the 
vice-chairman of the VP at that time. Since he did not held any official position after 
the change to multi party democracy, he did not have any interest in the effective 
functioning of UC. The UC was not doing anything because there was no profit. 
Women and their opinion about the project 
Women felt that the irrigation project did not benefit the women. Only a few sub-
contractors in the village made money from it. They did not know about the amount 
spent by the government. They were asked to contribute labour, which they did. 
They did not know that the contractor paid for farmers' contribution as well. Some 
UC members told them 'why do you need the details as we have kept the record for 
the contribution'. 
One woman put it "we made labour contributions as we were assured that there 
will be more water available after the construction of canal and its lining. They said 
that the rehabilitation work was not as promised in the beginning. However, they 
were not aware of the work as specified in the design. They asked the men about this 
but did not receive a reply from them. They complained that the branch canal 5 was 
not extended as promised. Therefore, there were more weeds in the field because of 
reduced availability of water and this added to their work as they had to do the 
weeding according to them. 
They were complaining that since some of the canals were close to the houses 
there was fear that water seepage might damage the foundation of their houses due 
to land subsidence. Thus, some farmers did not ask for water as their neighbour 
asked for assurances of compensation if the irrigation water damaged the house. 
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that committee the name UC, in fact it was only the 'construction committee'. This is 
because this committee did not continue after the completion of construction work. 
5.7 Management of irrigation tasks 
5.7.1 Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 
The farmers used to divert water by constmcting temporary headwork of stone, mud 
and twigs prior to the construction of the permanent headwork by the intervention. 
Due to the temporary headwork the farmers could not divert adequate water to the 
canal. The water used to flow to the streams through the leakage's in the headwork 
to the stream, which was used by the Lahachowk irrigation scheme downstream. 
Leakage through the main canal was also a problem since it was partially lined. 
Thus, the farmers used to put more labour for the construction of the headwork. The 
main and branch canals had to be maintained every year before the operation of the 
canal. Thus, the headwork construction and maintenance of the branch canals were 
the primary tasks of the users. 
A permanent headwork with gate has been constructed during the intervention of 
ILC. Besides, the main canal and the parts of the branch canals have been lined. This 
had made the water acquisition easier after the permanent headwork. However, the 
deposition of silt in the headwork is a problem. The silts used to flow to the stream 
before the permanent headwork. The provision of the spindle gate at the intake of 
main canal is also to check the mcoming silts to the main canal during heavy floods. 
The activities related to the water acquisition and system development is not an 
important task for the users. This shows how the technology had an effect on the 
activities of the users. However, keeping the infrastructure in good condition for the 
operation of the canal has been the primary concern of the farmers. This is because, 
the use of materials purchased from outside could have serious effect on the 
operation of the canal if the users could not maintain the system. 
The four Pales decided the allocation on the basis of the land to be irrigated from 
different branch canals. The Pales not only divided the water to different branch 
canals but also they were responsible for applying it to individual plots as well. The 
four Pales sit together and prepare the schedule for the allocation of water after the 
VDC selects them. The Pales were responsible for dividing the water from the main 
canal to different branch canals. The allocation is based on the mato muri (480, 2160, 
1440, 360 and 360 in branch canals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively). The Pales first take 
into account of the water available in the canal. Then they take into account of the 
land to be irrigated from each of the branch canals. More water is allocated to the 
branch canal 2 and 3, which have to serve larger areas. Accordingly the irrigation 
water is allocated to each of the branch canal. The water between the branch canals is 
divided using ad hoc structures of the mud and stone. The pales again sit together 
after 12 hours to see how much of the area has been irrigated by each of the branch 
canal. If they find for example, that certain area of branch canal 1 have not been 
irrigated but irrigation in terraces in branch canal 2 is about to be completed then the 
Pales adjust the flow to each branch canal. It is essential that all the terraces receive 
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adequate irrigation water. Thus, the allocation of irrigation water to the branch 
canals is frequently adjusted to meet the requirement of the area covered by that 
branch canals. However, the Pales adjust the flow to the branch canals during the 
day. The adjustment is either based on their experience or if they receive any 
complaints from the farmers. The Pales make an estimate of the water requirement of 
the area for the night. Based on their estimate they decide on the allocation to the 
branch canals. The following morning they take the stock of the situation and adjust 
the flows to each branch canal. 
This VDC has a dispute with the neighbouring Lahachowk VDC over the water 
use right at the source. The dispute went to court during the time of the third 
rehabilitation of the Ghachowk scheme, because of the construction of the permanent 
headwork. The farmers from Lahachowk were afraid that the permanent headwork 
would restrict the flow of water to their canal. Finally, the Supreme Court, in 1991, 
gave its verdict that the available water would be divided between the two VDCs. It 
was because, Lahachowk had also the right since it was also using the irrigation 
water in the past. The Lahachowk VDC had been able to establish their rights 
because the government rehabilitated their irrigation system before the rehabilitation 
of Ghachowk system. The Lahachowk challenged the case on the ground that if they 
had no right to use the water, the government would not have invested in 
rehabilitating their irrigation system. 
The court ruled that Ghachowk had the right to use two-thirds of the water at 
source, since it has 200 ha. (although actual command area is 60 ha.). The remaining 
one-third should go to Lahachowk VDC, which has 15021 ha. An outlet was provided 
at the weir to divert one third of water to Lahachowk. The former Pradhan Pancha 
was of the opinion that during the construction of the headwork there was also a 
dispute between the two VDCs. The people from the Lahachowk VDC destroyed the 
headwork for fear of receiving less water. Later on the dispute was settled through 
the discussions between irrigation officials and farmers from the two VDCs. The 
farmers from Ghachowk agreed to provide irrigation water to Lahachowk, complying 
with the court ruling. This shows that the introduction of the new control technology 
was required to solve the dispute of water right. 
5.7.2 User allocation, system operation and water distribution 
The first level allocation was at the branch canal and the second level of allocation 
was to the field channels. The Pales estimate the area under irrigation by different 
field channels in mato muri. Based on the mato muri they divide the available water to 
different field channels. The primary concern of the Pales is to ensure that available 
water is allocated to each field channels in a way that is sufficient to provide 
irrigation water to that area. The water aEocation to the field channels is also based 
on ad hoc adjustment. UsuaUy, 24 hour rotation is practised. However, based on the 
field requirement the aEocation to the field channels is adjusted daily. The Pale 
responsible for that branch canal decides on the aEocation. However, if adjustment in 
the branch canal is required to augment more water or reduce the water flow, then 
he consults with the other Pales. 
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The water distribution to terraces is also based on mato muri. The area to be 
irrigated by field channels was divided into several sub-sections. Then an estimate of 
mato muri in that section is made along with the estimation of the water in the field 
channel. Based on the estimation the water from the field channels was distributed to 
the individual fields. The distribution of water was proportionate to the land 
holding. The important aspect in this respect is that the farmers compare the water 
situation in their field with their neighbours to see whether they have received 
equitable distribution. In local term it is known as Bhijaune Palo (meaning the turn to 
keep the terraces wet). The distribution from the field channels was on rotation. The 
rotation is usually for 12 to 24 hours. Water distribution was on the basis of water 
availability and dry areas were given priority during the plantation. The Pales not 
only distribute water but they apply to the field also. The farmers are not allowed to 
change the distribution. This was required to avoid the conflict among the farmers 
and all the farmers receive irrigation water based on the mato muri. 
The farmers at the middle and tail end of the branch canals started seed bed 
preparation after the first monsoon rains in the beginning of July whereas farmers at 
the head start planting at this time. This was because they received water from the 
canal earlier and profited from the seepage from the upland area, which helped them 
for early seed bed preparation. The rotation schedule is enforced from the end of July 
when the main canal is full of water. The farmers from the head who had planted 
their field early demand a rotation from the beginning of July because their land 
would be deprived of water for one month. This was because the farmers from the 
head would not receive water unless all land gets a first irrigation to prepare 
planting. By this time the rice they had planted earlier was affected by drought. 
As the volume of water in the canal decreases the irrigation water supply to the 
land in the tail end is discontinued and only the land in the head received water. This 
usually happens from the middle of September. Since many of the farmers have land 
both at the head and tail, they prefer irrigation water to the crop at the head because, 
high yielding varieties are planted at the head reaches, which require more water. 
Not all the fields received water from the field channels. Field to field irrigation is 
common in all reaches of the branch canals because all the fields are not reached by 
field channels. The distribution of water from field to field is through Samaha. 
One of the practices was that no water was distributed to the fields close to the 
settlement area in the night for fear of land subsidence. As a result of porous soil 
there was the danger that the foundation of the houses would be affected. This was 
particularly the case for the lands which started receiving irrigation water after the 
intervention. These were the lands in the middle reaches of the canals where Ban 
lands had been converted into Khet lands and the lands in ward 6, which were in the 
settlement area. The Ban land, which was converted to the khet land started receiving 
water after rehabilitation only. 
Those having land at the head did not want the Pale whereas the farmers at the 
middle and tail want the Pale to regulate the water distribution rotation. This was 
confirmed by one of the Pales when he said that the farmers at the head reach did not 
want Pale. Because there was enough water at the head reaches of the canal and some 
parcels of the land received water directly from the main canal. One former UC 
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member whose land was on the head reaches of the canal was complaining that the 
Pales were not discharging their duties properly. 
He complained that the Pales divert most of the available irrigation water to the 
middle and tail reaches of the canal. Thus, they did not receive the required water. It 
was very natural for the farmers from the head reaches to complain about the Pales. 
In absence of Pales they would be receiving continuous irrigation at the cost of the 
middle and the tail reaches. This was confirmed by the Pale when he said that some 
influential farmers at the head wanted to have perennial water to their field and 
quarrelled with the Pale. However, the absence of Pales could contribute to an 
increase in the dispute among the farmers, as the norms would break down. 
The benefit of the Pale system was important for the farmers from the tail end to 
get a fair distribution of water according to their needs. Some farmers from the 
middle and tail reaches try to influence the work of Pale by bribing him, according to 
one of the Pales. This happens usually when the monsoon is late and the need for 
water is great for all farmers. This was the major constraint for the Pales in operating 
the system. One former Pale said that he left the job because he could not check the 
water stealing by one influential person in the village. He threatened him if he 
reported it. He did not report it out of fear of being beaten. He felt that it was a sin. 
Every year the VDC forms a committee of some VDC members for the supervision of 
the water allocation and distribution. The committee is known as Kulo Samiti. 
The Pales receive payment in kind. They collect paddy from the farmers after the 
harvest in November. Approximately, they collect 20 muri (1000 kg) paddy from the 
farmers with irrigated land, which they divide among themselves. The collection is 1 
ropani = 3 mana (0.94 kg for 0.05 ha of land). One of the Pales complained that owners 
cheat in giving the remuneration in absence of up to date land records. Some farmers 
from the head do not pay, saying that they do not need Pale and as it is up to the Pale 
to collect their fee there is little they can do about it. They do not get any support 
either from the VDC or the Kulo Samiti in this respect. 
Water availability has increased after the rehabilitation and some of the farmers at 
the head and middle reaches have been able to plant a wheat crop as well. This is 
because the leakage in the main canals has been controlled due to canal lining and 
also less time was required for irrigating the land as the water flow in the canal had 
increased. Since the water at the source itself is low, the farmers at the tail end were 
not able to derive the desired benefit as envisaged during the intervention. One of 
the UC members was saying that the water in the canal was available adequately for 
the last three years. This statement is very subjective, in the sense that it was 
determined by the location of land in the command area. 
5.7.3 Conflict management 
According to one of the Pale, water stealing often takes place. The villagers also 
confirmed this. The tail enders claim that the farmers from the head steal water. 
During my walk along one of the branch canals, one Pale was closing the outlet in the 
middle reaches of the canal from where the water stealing was taking place. The 
water stealing used to take place at night. Those who steal water do not divert water 
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to their field directly. Instead they divert it to an upper field and receive water 
through Samaha in order to protect their own field from the silt carried by the water. 
The Pale informs the stealing of water he had observed to the Kulo Samiti, which 
settles the complaints from the farmers in this regard. The same committee also 
looked into the task of the Pale if they observed irregularities in discharging the 
duties. But in fact it was the VDC that settled the complaints, according to the Pale 
and also the farmers. 
The committee first gives a warning to the farmers found guilty of stealing the 
water for the first time. If the same person commits the offence for the second time, 
he is penalised with a fine of NRs 150. The committee destroys 10 feet bunds of 
terrace of the field of those who do not pay the fine. It was becoming difficult for the 
Pale and the cornmittee to implement this practice, as influential farmers in the 
village do not like to pay the penalty. This shows that the VDC was weak in 
enforcing the norms. 
Recognising this in 1996, the VDC on the request of local youth club gave consent 
to penalise the water stealer. The youth club charged NRs. 50 for the first time when 
somebody was found guilty of water stealing. The cases of water stealing were better 
controlled since the local youths took the charge. However, the VDC withdrew the 
permission from the Youth Club as reported to the researcher during the visit in 
August 1997. It was because the youths did not properly utilise the money collected. 
The VDC expected the money to be spent on social work. Instead the youths spent 
the money on personal use. 
5.7.4 Resource mobilisation 
The Jimmawal used to mobilise the resources, usually labour, for the operation and 
maintenance of the system. The main tasks carried out at that time were the 
protection of canal through the required annual and periodic maintenance22. Canal 
cleaning was done once a year. The farmers contributed one man-day of labour for 
one ropani of land. Thus, the contribution was proportionate to the land holding. 
This level of annual contribution was sufficient for annual maintenance of the canal, 
according to the former VDC Chairman. The contribution was compulsory. 
Also the VP mobilised labour which was called Sithe Jhara once in a year for canal 
cleaning and repair work. The labour contribution was proportionate to the land 
holding. Sithe Jhara continued until 1989 until the ILC formed the UC for the 
rehabilitation of the scheme. The Sithe Jhara was compulsory for all the villagers. 
After the ILC intervention, those who did not have land did not report for work. All 
used to come before, because the water in the canal was used for drinking as well 
when there was no piped drinking water in the village. Those who did not have land 
would have to contribute one day of labour at that time. Shivakoti (1992: 19) 
however, reported that the annual contribution was one person per household before 
the intervention, which meant 2.25 man days per hectares. 
During the second intervention, farmers' contribution was in the form of labour 
based on the size of land holding. There were 139 users who did contribute in 
proportion to their land holding i.e. 6 labour days for 1 ropani of land. Besides, the 
farmers had to contribute NRs. 40,000 in cash23. The contractor paid the cash 
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contribution on behalf of the farmer according to the UC Chairman. The farmers' 
contribution was supposed to be 15 percent of the total cost. However, farmers did 
contribute some labour, which was mobilised for the collection of stones and sands. 
The UC was able to raise only NRs. 81,000 in cash instead of NRs. 97, 616 from the 
farmers during the third intervention. NRs. 81 per ropani of land was raised from the 
farmers. The cash contribution shows that the amount supposed to be collected was 
from 60 ha of land. However, nearly 20-30 farmers did not pay NRs. 15,000 from the 
head reaches according to the UC members. The argument put forward by these 
farmers was that they were already getting sufficient water. After the extension of 
the canal they had to share the water which might affect the availability of water to 
their field. Thus, according to them sharing of water and also the cash contribution 
was not at all beneficial for them. The UC requested the contractor to pay the missing 
fund out of his own pocket as this was a small amount. Farmers had to contribute 3 
labourers per ropani according to the UC chairman24. This meant labour contribution 
expected was from 135 ha of land. In my opinion, since the contractor managed to 
get the contract with sufficient margin he volunteered to bear the labour contribution 
as well. 
After the intervention some ward members sometimes were active in mobilising 
manpower. This was only when maintenance work was to be done at the headwork. 
In that case at least one person from each household should report for the work but 
there was no penalty system for those who did not report. It can be said that there 
has been change in the pattern of labour contribution after the intervention. Now the 
contribution was not proportionate to the land holding, but to the household. But it 
was not necessary that all would come. One of the UC members said that the Jhara 
was on voluntary basis i.e. no organised resource mobilisation was practised for 
operation and maintenance. The resource mobilisation at the time of study was 
almost non-existent. Shivakoti (1992: 19) however, reported that the labour 
contribution after the intervention had decreased, which is 1.5 man days per hectare. 
Sometime even children were sent who cannot work. Only to show that some one 
from the household had reported for the work. Thus, the VDC made the decision 
that Jhara would not be called on Saturday as school was closed on this day. 
5.7.5 System maintenance 
The major problems faced by the Pale after five years of canal construction were the 
deposition of silt in the canals which made it difficult to deliver the water: also silt 
entered into the fields. The water users had to clean the canal. The Pale complained 
that the field channels were not cleaned and maintained properly. Due to this the 
flow carrying capacity of the channels was reduced. Because of this the farmers 
complain that they did not receive sufficient water and they blamed the Pale. 
The condition of the main canal during field observation revealed that the canal 
lining was damaged in several places and leakage could be seen. The depth of the 
canal was reduced due to deposition of silt. Silt had been deposited in the paddy 
fields also. Before the construction of the permanent intake the silt used to flow into 
the stream. But now more silt entered the field because the level of intake was at par 
with canal level. This could be attributed to the change in the water control 
GHACHOWK IRRIGATION SYSTEM 183 
technology. In some places the field channels had been damaged by the people in 
order to divert water to their fields. 
The management of the system lies with the farmers after project commissioning. 
There were three types of maintenance. They were a) regular b) occasional and c) 
emergency. Regular maintenance was practised at the main canal only. Due to 
defunct UC the Kulo Samiti of VDC did the work to ensure that the water is available 
for irrigation. 
Occasional maintenance of the canal was done when an outside fund was 
available. The maintenance done from NRs. 4,000 and 600,000 and 15,000 are the 
examples of this. It was interesting that the farmers were paying the Pale but were 
not mobilising resources for regular and occasional maintenance. Raising some 
contributions from the farmers on a regular basis was required for strengthening the 
canal structure such as repair of lining as it required capital costs. It could be argued 
that they were not doing this with the hope that the government will come forward 
again for its rehabilitation. Also because, the system was operating and no major 
rehabilitation work was required immediately. 
5.8 Governance and property rights 
The VP and the VDC via the Kulo Samiti have played a major role in the governance 
of the irrigation system. It was the VP, which was instrumental in drawing the 
operational rules through the introduction of the Pale system and Kulo Samiti in 1976. 
The reason for the VP to step in for the governance of the irrigation scheme was to 
avoid conflict among the users in head and tail reaches. The reason for the conflict 
was insufficient availability of irrigation water due to expansion of cultivated area, 
which were cultivated in three or five years. For that reason the VP drew a set of 
rules for the allocation and distribution of water. This is exemplified by the practice 
that tail enders do not receive irrigation water from September. Besides, the VP was 
able to mobilise DP resources by establishing linkages with the DP and Member of 
Parliament as evidenced by first and second interventions. The third intervention 
envisaged a new institution (UC) for the governance of the irrigation system. The UC 
was able to maintain the linkage with the external institution in obtaining the 
resources and the implementation of the rehabilitation. It continued the operational 
rules, which was in practice during the time of VP. 
The property rights in relation to irrigation water in the irrigation system are 
proportionate to land holding. However, there have been changes in the 
constitutional choice rules during the intervention period due to establishment of 
property rights by new users. The owners of Bari land and also the lands at the tail 
end which were not receiving water before the intervention have been able to 
establish their right after the rehabilitation. The right was established through the 
investment for the rehabilitation. Some of the users had right for planting only as 
evidenced by the water allocation in the branch canal 5 for planting only. However, 
the situation has changed and they also have started receiving irrigation water based 
on mato muri since 1997. Hence, this could be seen as claimed property rights 
(Vincent, 1995). Beside, there has been a delineation of the property rights across the 
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5.9 Water control 
Traditional technology using locally available resources was in existence before the 
interventions. The third intervention brought major changes in the technical control 
of the irrigation scheme through the introduction of modern technology. The changes 
in the technical control brought changes in the pattern of social relationships at 
catchment and system level. This was evidenced by the inclusion of new users, 
which defined the new water rights among the users. Besides, the farmers no longer 
had to contribute their labour for temporary headwork construction. This had an 
effect in the user control of the technology as the users have to depend on the 
external resources for the upkeep of the system. 
However, there have been no changes in the organisational control of the 
irrigation scheme except for the brief period of intervention. The VP/VDC as local 
institution have been able to maintain their organisational control in the irrigation 
system. Their organisational control has been facilitated by virtue of their ability to 
maintain linkage with other institutions for the mobilisation of the resources. In 
absence of their ability to mobilise outside resources, it is doubtful if they would be 
able to maintain organisational control. Nevertheless, the users have also been able to 
maintain organisational control by paying the remuneration of the Pales. This 
system as a result of intervention. This could be considered as positive aspect of the 
intervention, as it lessened the likely conflict between the systems in future 
A few of them at the middle reaches at the time of intervention did not make the 
required cash contribution. They told that they would not convert the Ban land into 
Khet land. But, at present they are also planting rice due to the availability of water. 
Their argument is that they should have a share in the government investment. The 
people at the head argue that they should have first right to use the water because 
before the intervention they were the main users of water. The issue becomes more 
apparent during the employment of the Pale. But they cannot influence the decision 
as they are from different ethnic group. It should be noted that one clan group 
dominates the decision making in village politics through their representation in the 
VDC. They were the first settlers in the village and own large land holdings. The rice 
planting in the head is one month earlier than at the middle and tail end. The farmers 
from the head want to employ the Pale when the planting time in the head reaches 
can start. However, the Pales are employed from the time when the farmers from the 
middle and tail end start planting. This indicates that defined governance of the 
irrigation system is effective due to the properly defined water rights. 
Some of the UC members felt that the ownership of the system should belong to 
the government, because it had invested in it. Besides, they argue that the villagers 
do not take interest in maintenance, which became evident after the commissiorting 
of the project. In their opinion, major maintenance like checking water leakage and 
improving canal lining should be a government affair and only the canal cleaning 
should be left to the people. This is happening at present, since they are obtaining 
cash from DDC and Member of Parliament for minor maintenance. It seems that the 
process of intervention might have discouraged the people for maintenance. 
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indicates that the mobilisations of both external and internal resources are equally 
important for mamtaining the social and organisational control. The political control 
was lost briefly during the multi party period. However, effective social control did 
contribute to the continuation of management practices. 
5.10 Analysis and conclusions 
This case is an example of how various types of interventions are shaped and how 
the processes followed in each intervention did affect the outcome. The formal 
institutions VP/VDC played an important role in the management of the irrigation 
system. Besides, they played the role of intermediary between the farmer and the 
outside agency in each of the interventions in obtaining the resources and its use. 
However, the type of support determined their institutional role in the maintenance 
of a communal linking loop, which affected the intervention processes. The first 
intervention, which took place in 1977, was small in terms of investment and was 
merely focused on the facilitation of the water flow in the canal by checking the 
leakage in some parts of the main canal. The existence of good local links with the DP 
facilitated in obtaining the resources for the intervention. The interface between the 
VP and the users helped in mamtaining the strong linking loop in the 
implementation of the intervention and were able to achieve its objectives. This was 
due to the close interaction maintained between the users, VP and the UC members 
who facilitated in mamtaining the transparency and accountability in the 
implementation of intervention. Besides, the UC was able to maintain the control on 
the available resources. 
The second intervention of 1985 was larger in scale in terms of intervention and 
because of this the intervention was implemented through a contractor as was 
required by the DDC which was the funding agency. Nevertheless, the VP was able 
to monitor the work of the contractor effectively through the UC. The UC members 
acted responsibly by supervising the work of the contractor. However, there was 
negotiation and compromise between the UC and the contractor regarding the users' 
contribution. Nevertheless, it did not affect the quality of the work, as the contractor 
happened to be from the adjoining VP. This helped in mamtaining the required 
social control. As a result the objective of the intervention was accomplished. 
The users with the support from the VP and local politicians were able to form a 
linking loop to obtain government funding during the third intervention in 1989. It 
was a major intervention in terms of the investment. The design of the technology 
and construction were based on engineering norms. The provision of a steel spindle 
head regulator, construction of RCC aqueduct, and a permanent weir across the river 
are examples of this. Besides, the implementation of the intervention was based on 
rules and processes prescribed by the government and it was implemented through 
the contractor hired by the government. The users could not maintain the technical 
control on the resources available to them. This was exemplified by consent to 
contract out their part of the work also to the contractor. 
Nevertheless, the processes outlined were not properly followed due to the fact 
that the majority of the farmers desire to obtain government funding and avoid 
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making contributions. Besides, the officials' interest to include the irrigation system 
in the government intervention programme could have overshadowed the detailed 
interaction usually required. This was evidenced when officials involved in the 
project admitted that there was lack of proper sarutiny of the design because of haste 
in project implementation. The important aspect was the increase in the size of the 
command area. The inflated command area, in order to bring the project within the 
category of subsidisable project, not only reflects ineffectiveness of the whole 
planning process of government programmes but also how the congruence of 
interest between a group of influential farmers and the officials affects the outcome 
of the project. However, the government officials were not made accountable for this. 
So, this was an example of the misplaced use of government resources. 
The interest of some of the farmers in the group to attain their implicit objective 
i.e. to make money in collusion with the contractor enabled the contractor to 
manipulate the situation in his favour by waiving the farmers' contribution of 12.5 
percent during construction.. This resulted into lack of communication among the 
UC members and the decision making of the UC was not transparent. This allowed 
the contractor to use substandard material due to inadequate supervision by the 
engineers and by the UC during the implementation. Importantly, it also shows how 
various users committee members behave in a particular situation. Thus, the lack of 
transparency and accountability in the activities of the UC and the contractor 
contributed to the users' apathy towards the intervention, which had a negative 
effect to the achievement of the intervention objectives. This shows that the linking 
loop was disintegrated during the implementation and the users' control on the use 
of resources was lost. 
The formation of a Users' Committee in 1989 was envisaged in the government 
regulation to institutionalise the management of the irrigation system. This was 
assumed to be necessary to maintain the continuity of the benefit from the 
investment. This committee was also supposed to maintain the link with the agency 
after the implementation of the intervention. But there was a difference in the 
understanding between the users committee members and the government. The UC 
acted as 'construction committee' rather than 'users committee'. Because the 
committee ceased to function after the completion of the rehabilitation. The UC 
possibly never thought of continuing their role after the implementation since it did 
not develop any working rules for the management of the irrigation system during 
its period of two years. The discrepancy in the role expected from the UC and the 
actual performance could be due to the lack of a required educational process 
initiated before and during the intervention. Also a lack of monitoring of their 
performance and follow up action by the government, as the intervention focus was 
not on cost recovery from the investment. This could be largely due to the 
organisational control maintained by the VP in the management of irrigation system 
through the Pales under the Kulo Samiti of the VDC since 1976. Besides, it also shows 
that it is difficult to replace the role of existing institution by the new institution. In 
this respect, the government failed to take into account the existing irrigation 
management practices since the VP/VDC were involved in the management of the 
irrigation system for a long period and their role was more or less institutionalised. 
Therefore the UC became the duplication of the Kulo Samiti of the VP/VDC. 
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The small grant in 1997, which was not the formal intervention, had a cumulative 
effect on the better operation of the irrigation systems. The failure of the UC to take 
up its role led the VDC to constitute another UC for this fourth intervention, 
although the scale of work was small. This shows how the Imking loop, which was 
disintegrated after the third intervention was reconstructed to get the external 
resource. This further shows that the VDC is becoming more competent to keep the 
canal operational. 
The avaüability of external resources and also engineering biases determined the 
choice of technology and type of activities in each intervention. This was evident 
from the nature and type of activities carried out in each intervention, which were 
different from one another. It could be said that the more resources coming from 
outside the higher was the level of technological sophistication. If we compare the 
four interventions in terms of resource we can observe that the third intervention by 
ILC had a higher level of technological sophistication. 
The continuation of management of the irrigation system by the locally elected 
institution (VP/VDC) shows that it is difficult to replace the traditional institution by 
a new one. This is due to the acceptability of its governance role by the people. 
Generally, the system is well managed in terms of water allocation and distribution. 
It was possible because of the development and application of a set of working rules 
acceptable to all. This was also made possible due to the Pale system which was 
introduced in 1976 and which has been proved effective for more than two decades 
and has wide acceptance. As a consequence, the intervention did not affect the role of 
Pales, which were institutionalised in the Kulo Samiti of VP/VDC. As a result, they 
were continuing their role during and after the intervention. 
The appreciation of the Pale system by the farmers reflects their desire to avoid 
conflict among themselves. Further, it indicates that farmers are concerned for 
management cost. This is because the transaction cost involved in the replacement of 
the Pale system would be higher for the farmers. This system is time saving in terms 
of krigating their fields. Because, the Pale determined the water allocation and if they 
were not there, the users would have to organise themselves for water allocation, 
which would have created all kinds of conflicts. And also it is convenient for the 
farmers, as they do not have to wake up at night to irrigate their field. In absence of 
the Pale system the farmers would have to come to an agreement for water 
distribution and implement it. 
Another important implication brought about by the intervention is the 
establishment of property rights across the system and within the system. There has 
been a division of the water right between the two systems in different VDCs with 
the construction of the permanent intake. The farmers in the middle reaches who 
were able to convert their Bari land to Khet land derived the real benefits within the 
system. The farmers from ward 6 were also able to establish their right to use 
irrigation water on a rotation basis for rice planting from 1997. This is an example of 
claimed right acquired through the investment. The intervention of 1991 led to great 
disappointment of the farmers in ward 1 and 2. They were under the impression that 
they would also receive irrigation water. In the survey and design of the intervention 
a command area of 200 ha was mentioned. But as indicated earlier the irrigation 
officers did this to get a subsidy for the project. 
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The mobilisation and generation of resources on a regular basis for the 
maintenance of the irrigation system is lacking at present, which is essential for the 
continuity of the benefits. This is evident from the deteriorating condition of the 
main canal and some branch canals. Regular maintenance would have prevented 
this. This could also be attributed to the non-fuxictioning of the UC as it was one of its 
mandates. Moreover, the lack of activity on the part of the UC has prevented the 
return of up-front money deposited in the DIO office, which could have been used 
for regular maintenance. 
Regular and timely maintenance ensures the continued benefit from the 
technology used in the rehabilitation. But continuation of the increased benefit in the 
long-term is doubtful in absence of a maintenance fund as a result of an ineffective 
UC. At the same time VDC is also not effective in resource generation from the users. 
This shows that shared cost, which is one of the conditions for the successful 
operation of the canal is not in place, except for occasional canal cleaning. As a result, 
the users depend on the outside resource when it comes to the cash contribution. 
This is essential to avoid major maintenance, which require considerable financial 
investment. Some of the materials used are not locally available and farmers will 
have to buy them in cash. Farmers may not be able to generate the required resources 
in time of need. Since, resource generation on a regular basis is lacking at present 
farmers have already started talking about external funding for required 
maintenance. The resources obtained in 1997 for simple maintenance is the example 
of this. 
In overall, the effect of first two interventions did not change the control 
technology, as the objective was to operate the canal with existing technology. 
However, the third intervention had effect in changing the control technology of the 
irrigation scheme. However, it did not change the organisational control, as the UC 
could not function to replace Kulo Samiti. The economic impact of the intervention 
was not great, as there has been marginal extension of the irrigated area. The 
intervention however, was expected to have substantial economic impact given the 
size of the investment. But the hidden objectives of the actors, mainly the 
government officials and the local elected representatives did affect the outcome. In 
that respect the third intervention was not successful in achieving its objectives. The 
intervention rather created dependency on external resources. This could be 
attributed to the lack of adequate attention given to increase users' control in the 
implementation of the intervention. 
Timesheet - Ghachowk Irrigation System 
^ — Stakeholders Farmers UC V P / V D C Pale D P / DDC DOI Contractor 
Time ^ \ 
1785 
(Farmers were not 
sure of exact date) 
' Constructed the 
irrigation 
system 
1958 Until this date 
farmers 
managed the 
system under 
Jimmaxval and 
Mukhiya 
1962 Took over the 
management of 
the system 
1960-1988 Once in a year 
the canal 
cleaning was 
done by 
mobilising the 
farmers labour 
and materials. 
This was called 
Sithe Jhara 
VP introduced the 
Pale in 1976 for 
water distribution 
and allocation 
which is 
continuing till to 
day 
1977 
Intervention-1 
Implemented 
the 
construction 
work as 
contracted out 
by the DP 
Functioning Provided NRs. 
4,000 for minor 
maintenance 
work 
1985 
Intervention-2 
Committee 
formed to 
oversee the 
rehabilitation 
work 
consisting of 
11 members 
functioning Again provided 
NRs. 600,000 for 
major 
rehabilitation 
work. Survey was 
done by the 
overseer from DP 
Implemented 
the 
rehabilitation 
work 
1987 
Intervention-3 
Farmers 
requested for 
rehabilitation 
Requested for 
the government 
support for 
rehabilitation 
Functioning 
1988 Interacted with 
the survey team 
Extended 
necessary 
support to the 
survey team 
Sent survey 
team to the 
village for 
rehabilitation 
of the canal. 
1989 Gathered to 
form the UC 
Formed a 
committee of 9 
members with 
Chairman, 
vice-chairman 
and other 
members 
Called a mass 
meeting of the 
villagers for the 
formation of the 
UC 
Functioning Came up with 
a design for 
200 ha with an 
extension of 
fifth canal for 
the total cost 
of 3,904,625. 
Asked the 
farmers to 
constitute the 
UC 
1989-1991 Were supposed 
to contribute 2 
and half % in 
cash and 12 and 
half % in labour 
contribution. 
But they did not 
Helped DOI in 
contracting 
out the work 
and 
negotiated 
with the 
contractor to 
Functioning Contracted out 
the work in 
consultation 
with the UC 
Carried out 
rehabilitation 
work which 
include 
construction of 
gate, canal 
lining and 
O 
provide the waive extension of 
labour farmers' the canal and 
contribution contribution. 
Raised cash 
contribution 
but all did not 
pay and 
deposited 
NRs. 81,000 
with the DOI 
also did not 
raise farmers 
contribution 
1992 Some of the Helped DOI in Replaced VP Functioning Replaced DP after Completed the 
farmers certification of after the the introduction final check of 
benefited the introduction of of multi party the work done 
through the completion of multiparty system by the 
efficiency in the work and system contractor and 
delivery of the ceased to exist issued 
water and some after the certification 
by converting completion of for the 
Bari land into the completion of 
paddy due to rehabilitation work in 
the access to the work. Worked consultation 
irrigation water only during 
the 
construction 
of the scheme. 
with the U C 
1997 Not 
contributing 
cash to the 
maintenance of 
the canal 
Officially not 
dissolved but 
defunct 
TheVDC 
obtained NRs. 
15,000 for 
maintenance 
from 
parliament 
member 
Functioning 
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Notes 
1 The information published by the District Development Committee (DDC), reports that the 
khet is 203.84 ha and Bari is 131.89. DDC, Kaski, 1995:34 
2 Shivakoti (1992:22) reported planting of spring rice on 30 ha of land. However, none of the 
farmers reported about spring paddy. It is likely that some farmers at the head reaches of the 
irrigation system may have tried spring paddy immediately after the intervention. 
3 It is a national level organization working in the area of nature conservation. There were 
three committees formed by this project in the VDC. The activities implemented by the 
project were plantation, forest conservation, environment conservation and small-scale 
infrastructure development through the participation of the farmers. 
4 The rent is fixed, which is 45 kg. of paddy by the households having a pair of bullocks and 
22.5 kg. by the household having a single bullock to the tailor master and for the blacksmith 
respectively. However, the household having a single bullock will have to pay 32 kg. of 
paddy. Thus, the payment is based on the economic status of the household, which is 
measured in terms of number of bullocks in the household. 
5 One afternoon (in 1996), when I was talking to the VDC secretary at his office, some 100 
villagers including some VDC members arrived to complain against the allocation of 
Development Funds of the VDC made available by HMG/N on an annual basis for this fiscal 
year. Some of the projects selected were not the people wanted. One could observe the 
manoeuvering between different groups. The VDC chairman was on a delegation that time 
to the capital to request the government for the electricity to the village. The representatives 
were protesting the unilateral decision of VDC to allocate the funds. They were not satisfied 
with the selection of the projects to be implemented from that fund. Their main complaint 
was that the composition of the committee for the selection of the projects was not well 
represented amongst all the major political parties. They were complaining that the VDC 
representatives were neglecting them in the development programme. The election in 1997 
has changed the composition of the VDC, which has seven of its members from one party 
out of eleven members. 
6 The former VDC chairman told the reason for selling land to the Gurungs. The Brahrnins, 
according to him, were fond of milk. Because of this, they used to keep cows. In the earlier 
days the cows used to die of diseases, due to the non-availability of expert veterinary 
services. The Brahmins then would sell the land to buy a new cow. The Gurungs had a good 
income from the army services, which enabled them to purchase the land. 
7 The government used to nominate Jimmawal and Mukhiyas under him to collect land taxes, 
before the land record survey in the hills. Three to five percent of the collected revenue was 
provided to them for their services. Usually, they used to be the farmers with a large 
holding. Naturally, they would have greater interest in the maintenance of the canal. Besides, 
the Jimmawal also used to work as village head in settling disputes at the local level. In some 
places they were also called Ditthawal. 
8 Pales are locally employed whereas the government employee, who operates the canal in 
AMIS is known as Dhalpa. 
9 This is a committee constituted by the VDC annually to supervise the work of Pales. 
However, this committee is different from other UCs, which were constituted during the 
time of intervention. The primary objective of the constituting of Kulo Samiti is to ensure 
water allocation and distribution in that season based on existing rules. It receives the 
complaints from farmer for any irregularity in water allocation and distribution. This 
cornmittee also settles the disputes if there are any. The committee had 10 members for the 
season 1997. The number of cornmittee members is not fixed. It varies from season to season. 
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The farmers' complaints and effectiveness of the previous committee affects the number of 
representations. Some of the farmers would like to be in the committee if they felt that their 
grievances in the past were not addressed. However, the larger the size of the committee, the 
stronger it becomes in enforcing the norms. 
10 The VP was dissolved after the restoration of multi-party system in 1990 and the VDC 
came to existence only in 1992. Thus, during this period only the UC was formally in 
existence, which guided the work of the Pale. 
11 It is now known as District Development Committee (DDC) after the restoration of the 
Multi-party Democracy in the country in 1990. 
12 There was no direct financial grant to the VP from the government at that time. The 
government used to provide annual lumpsum grant to the DP to carry out small-scale 
development projects in the villages. These funds were distributed to the VPs on an annual 
basis. Besides, the VP had to request the DP for additional fund for emergency maintenance. 
13 Overseer is a junior engineer who assists the DP engineer in survey and design of the 
village level projects. Since the DP had only one engineer, it is not possible for him to visit all 
the sites. However, his approval of the design is necessary for the release of the funds. The 
DP engineer based on the field report of the overseer approved the final design- There are 
sub-overseers (junior level technician) also in DP, who provide necessary technical support 
for small-scale village level projects. 
14 The WRID and the DIO is the regional and district level functionary of the DOI. Their 
main tasks are to implement the policy decisions of the DOI besides, implementing activities 
as directed by the DOI. 
15 The report contains lists of irrigation projects financed under the various programmes 
including ILC in the Western Development Regions. 
16 The UC secretary gave this figure for the contracted amount. This could not be verified, as 
officially the contract amount was not available. 
17 The Rastriya Panchayat was the highest legislative body during the Panchayat system. 
18 The document of WRID dated February 1990, which reported the field implementation of 
the project noted that the farmers from the head reaches were not happy with the extension 
of the command area as they feared that there would be less water available to them. They 
felt they took the initiative for the rehabilitation but the benefit was going to the tail enders. 
Thus they were not extending necessary co-operation to the project. It is important to note 
here that the most of the farmers from the head reaches are from the Gurung ethnic 
community and at the time of intervention the Chairman of the VP was also a Gurung. Thus, 
it is more likely that they took the initiative for intervention with an objective of lining the 
main canal. The majority of the farmers from the middle and the tail reaches are Brahmin 
and Chhetri who constitute the majority in the villages. This exemplifies the network of 
social relations in which each of the community would like to further their interest. 
19 The rehabilitation under NISP is discussed in part II of chapter 4. 
20 The members of parliament were provided with NRs. 500,000 to implement small projects 
in their constituency. The money is basically, for mamtaining his hold in the constituency for 
election. The VDC members who have direct contact with the people could help him in 
rrmmtaining his influence. Since, election constituency consists of 6-7 VDC areas, he can 
spend the money wherever he likes. Thus, money provided was out of the discretionary 
fund of the Member of Parliament. 
21 The court decision was based on the command area mentioned in the DOI survey of the 
schemes. 
22 One old record available at the VDC shows that farmers contributed NRs. 222.00 in 1920 
for stone cutting for the construction of canal. 
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23 The VDC record shows that initially, NRs. 3,629.00 were collected from the farmers. Some 
of the farmers resisted the collection so, contribution from all the farmers were not collected. 
Consequently, the contractor was requested to waive the farmers contribution, which he 
agreed to. The already collected money was returned to the farmers. 
24 Based on the actual expenditure of NRs. 3,368,000, the 15 percent contribution made by 
farmers in monetary value becomes NRs. 505, 200. Only the cash contribution, which is 2.5 
percent becomes NRs. 84,200. The 12.5 percent of labour contribution become 7016 labour 
days at the rate of NRs. 60.00 wage per day. In monetary value the amount becomes NRs. 
421,000. Thus, the actual labour contribution expected was for 117 ha, if we take three labour 
days per ropani. Shivakoti (1992:16) however, reported NRs. 19523.00 per ha contribution 
from the farmers as part of 15 percent contribution. 
6. Tarkughat Irrigation Systems 
6.1 Introduction 
The irrigation systems are in Tarkughat VDC area in Lamjung district. This is one of 
the oldest systems developed and managed by the farmers in the district. The 
irrigation systems have variations in their governance and management practices. 
The systems were selected for the study to look into the differences in the 
management style and to see the effects of minor interventions in the physical 
system. These systems had minimal outside interventions in the distant past and 
were also important, as the intervention did not have major impacts on their 
management. 
It would have been useful to study a system fully managed by the farmers without 
any outside intervention. However, it was difficult to find such a system due to the 
involvement of several agencies in providing various types of assistance to Farmer 
Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS). The districts considered for the study were 
Parbat, Tanahu and Lamjung. The first step in this connection was the review of 
official documents. The inventory of FMIS prepared by the Water and Energy 
Commission Secretariat was useful in this connection. A visit to Lamjung district for 
preHrrtinary information collection on potential sites was useful in this respect. This 
helped in narrowing down the list of potential sites. 
Discussions with the DDC officials and other officials from various agencies 
working in the district helped in knowing the actual status of various FMIS in the 
district and helped in selecting five FMIS for preliminary field visits. Discussions 
with local people during the visit of five FMIS centred mainly on the historical 
development of the systems and different management practices evolved over time 
and the management practice at present. Accessibility, command area of the system, 
level of outside support received in the past, prevailing management practices and 
farmers' views on it were the criteria used for the final selection of the site. 
In his first visit to the Tarkughat VDC, the researcher explained the purpose of his 
visit to the local leaders and farmers. The farmers and the local leaders had different 
levels of interest and understanding about the work of the researcher. These 
differences in the understanding were due to the socio-economic position of the 
person, his education, his political mclination and whether he held an official 
position or not. Their initial understanding was that some agency was taking the 
initiative to provide financial and technical support for the rehabilitation of the 
irrigation system. Some groups of farmers thought the research on the irrigation 
system was only a pretext, but that the researcher was working for some political 
party. Mamtaining political neutrality was necessary, as party politics had affected 
many activities at local level. This meant not taking active interest in local politics as 
the researcher had to get support from all people in the village, but sometimes it was 
difficult. 
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Table 6.1: The land use distribution in the VDC area 
Types of land Area (hectare) 
Khet 121 
Pakho/Bari 259 
Forest 74.89 
Minaha1 267 
Total 721.89 
1 Minaha is the land covered by foot trails, river and grazing land etc. 
Source: Cadastral Survey Office, Lamjung 
Population and ethnicity 
The VDC has 532 households with a total population of 3174, of which 1586 (49.9%) 
are female. The wardwise distribution of the VDC is presented in Table 6.2. 
The average family size of the household is approximately 6.0. Ethnically, the 
VDC is a mixed community. Chhetris are the dominant ethnic group (24.8%) 
followed by the Newar (22.2%) and Brahmin (13.9%). From the occupational caste 
group the presence of Sarki (cobbler) is significant (12.4). Other caste groups in the 
VDC are Gurung, Magar, Damai (tailor master), Miyan (Muslim), Dura, Tamang, 
Gharti, Sanyasi and Gandharb (singer). Forty three percent of the total population is 
within the age group of 15-60, which constitutes active labour force. Thirty percent of 
the population is less than 15 years of age. 
6.2 The environment of the system and context of intervention 
6.2.1 The general environment 
The Village 
The village lies along the banks of Marsyangdi river. The village stretches from West 
to East. The settlement pattern in the village is clustered. One can reach the village in 
45 minutes from Kalimati on the way to Besisahar, the district headquarters of 
Lamjung. It takes two hours by bus from Dumre, which is on the way to Pokhara in 
Prithivi Highway, to Kalimati. The VDC area has ten settlements. The VDC area is at 
855 metre asl and lies at the 84° 21' longitude and 28° 08' latitude. 
The irrigable area of the VDC is only 16 percent of the total area. However, year 
round irrigation is not available. This shows the potential for the development of the 
irrigation for increasing the production and productivity. 
The average annual rainfall in the area is 2508 mm. The moisture regime in the 
area is humid. The total area of the Tarkughat VDC is 721.89 hectare. The land use 
distribution in the VDC area is presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.2: The wardwise distribution of households and population with ethnicity 
Ward no. Households no. Population Male Female Major ethnic groups 
1 56 314 167 147 Mixed community 
except Muslims 
2 55 286 144 142 Chhetri, Brahmins 
and cobblers 
3 61 357 182 175 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Muslims and Newar, 
Gurung 
4 56 312 147 165 Newar, Cobbler, 
tailormaster and 
Muslims 
5 70 379 183 196 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Newar and Cobbler 
6 66 351 188 163 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Newar and 
Blacksmith 
7 51 358 171 187 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Cobbler and 
Gandharb 
8 67 511 234 277 Chhetri, Newar and 
Blacksmith 
9 50 306 172 134 Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Newar and Gurung 
Total 532 3174 1588 1586 
Source: Village profile of Tarkughat VDC, Rural Development through self-help promotion, 
Lamjung. HMG/GTZ, 1995:6 
Occupation 
The main occupation of the people is agriculture. Seventy five percent of the 
households however, are not food sufficient for twelve months (ICIMOD, 1996:126). 
These households draw income from other sources. Wages, salaries, income from 
petty shops and remittances are other sources of income. The distribution of 
households earning from other sources according to the VDC estimate is presented in 
the following table. 
Table 6.3: Household income by other sources 
Categories Percent of total households 
1. Service 2.5 
2. Wage earning 30.0 
3. Pension and remittances 10.0 
4. Business 5.0 
The wage earning is through working in the village during the agricultural season 
and outside the village in nearby towns within Nepal and India during the non-
agricultural season. The pension and remittances are mainly from people working in 
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Table 6.4: Household distribution with size of holding 
S no. Size of holding (ha) Number of households 
1 <0.25 152 
2 0.25-0.5 148 
3 0.55-1.0 144 
4 >1.0 64 
5 landless 24 
Total 532 
Source: field survey 
There are no legal tenants in the village. However, Adhiya1 is prevalent in the village. 
Share cropping occupies nearly 15 percent of the land. Only the Khet lands are 
rented. The contractual arrangement for share cropping is for one year or two. The 
renewal of the agreement depends on the wishes of both parties. This means the 
owners have the right to evict the share cropper and can rent out to other farmers. 
The terms and conditions for sharecropping are that the owner provides land 
whereas the sharecropper contributes labour. The owner and the tenant share the 
cost of the chemical fertiliser and seeds equally. The owner and the tenant share the 
product 50/50 basis. The reasons for renting out and renting in as described by the 
farmers are as follows: 
• Those having big holdings rent out, as they cannot supervise the farming on their 
own because of their engagement in other activities. 
• The households having less able members also rent out. 
• Those having insufficient land to feed their families rent in. 
• Those having large families rent in although they themselves have sufficient land 
to feed their families. 
The first two reasons are most common. Hiring of wage labourers is common for 
those having fewer able members at home to do the job. In most of the cases the able 
member is working outside which enables them to pay for the wages. 
The farming system and principal crops 
The cropping pattern in the area is paddy based. The cropping pattern is different for 
Pakho, Bari and Khet. Pakho is for planting Khar, which is mainly used for roof 
matching and as fodder. Bari is for homestead and for cattle raising. The crops grown 
India. The semi-skilled workers in the village are engaged in the construction work 
during the non agricultural season. 
Landholding and land tenure 
Out of the total of 532 households nearly 85% belong to the category of marginal to 
medium farmers. The numbers of marginal (< 0.25 ha), small (0.25-0.5 ha) and 
medium (0.55-1.0 ha) is almost equal (27 to 28%). Only 64 (12%) households have 
more than 1.0 ha of land. The number of landless households in the village is 24 (5%). 
The land holding includes both Khet and Pakho/Bari. The household distribution with 
size of landholding is presented in Table 6.4. 
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in Ban are maize, millet, pulses and vegetables for household consumption. Maize is 
an important crop for household consumption as well as for livestock feed. The 
cropping pattern in the Khet is rice-fallow-maize, rice-vegetable-maize and rice-
wheat-maize. However, the last two cropping patterns cover only 10% of the total 
land. The cropping intensity is 160 percent. 
Rice is the principal crop in the area. Farmers are planting traditional and 
improved both varieties of rice2. The size of holding was found to be an important 
factor in the choice of the variety. Because, planting of traditional varieties involved 
some risk taking. The traditional variety has to be planted early in order to harvest it 
early (begirining of July-mid November), because of its susceptibility to the cold 
weather. This means an early monsoon is required for its planting. 
The planting of traditional varieties of rice are usually for household consumption 
as it tastes good and gives more strength, according to the farmers. It has also long 
straw, which is important as livestock feed. The yield of traditional varieties, 
however, is less than the improved varieties. Therefore, the choice of improved 
varieties is due to their high yielding capacity. 
Also, the improved varieties of rice are planted late and they mature early. 
Therefore, the farmers with big holdings have both traditional and improved 
varieties planted as they could take some risks. The farmers with smallholdings 
having large families preferred the improved varieties, which is important to meet 
the food need of the household. According to the farmers, the improved variety of 
rice, however, is labour intensive because more weeding is required. Also, it requires 
more manure and irrigation water at the early stage of planting. 
The District Agricultural Office introduced improved varieties of ricel2-15 years 
before. In individual plots the programme was not successful, as it was prone to 
insect attacks. It became successful when introduced in a block (7-8 ha). Since then, 
the farmers are planting improved varieties along with the traditional varieties. The 
average yield of the paddy in the area is 1.5 mt/ha and 2.0 mt/ha for the traditional 
and modern varieties respectively. 
The majority of the farmers were of the opinion that the use of chemical fertilisers 
is almost constant for the last 5 years, in the sense that its application is not 
increasing progressively every year. They cited the following reasons for not 
increasing its application: 
• There has been an increase in the acidity of the soil due to the use of chemical 
fertilisers. 
• Farmers lack knowledge in the use of appropriate combinations of various 
fertilisers. 
• It is not available in time as required. 
• The cost of the chemical fertiliser is increasing. 
• The increased use of livestock manure has reduced the application of chemical 
fertiliser. 
Farmers, however, admit that the use of chemical fertiliser for wheat is a must. 
Livestock has played an important role in the farming system of the village. The 
use of livestock manure as fertiliser is most common in the village. One of the 
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reasons for the reduced use of chemical fertilisers is the sufficient availability of 
livestock manure. Most of the owners having 10-20 ropani of land have bio-gas 
installed in their houses. Its slurry is also being used as fertiliser. The installation of 
bio-gas has helped in Hghting the houses and reduced the use of firewood in the 
household. The use of firewood is only for preparing livestock feed. Stall feeding is 
most common in the village because cattle is not allowed in the community managed 
forest. 
With respect to the agricultural services, the farmers will have to go to 
Sunderbazaar, Bhotewodar and Chakratirtha that are at a distance of 1-2 hours. The 
present policy of the government is that one agricultural sub-centre will serve 3-5 
VDCs. The sub-centre in Chakratirtha provides services to the farmers of the 
Tarkughat VDC. The District agriculture office in Besisahar informed that the sub-
centre has one JT, one livestock assistant and two messengers. The farmers can avail 
the services in two ways. The first is technical advice from the technicians at the 
office and secondly, technical advice during their visits to the village. 
The services for agricultural credit are also not very different. The office of the 
Agricultural Development Bank is in Chakratirtha VDC. However, the services of the 
bank are not satisfactory, according to the farmers. The major constraint for credit 
was the collateral, especially for the poor farmers who cannot offer collateral. For this 
reason, taking up loans from the rich in the village is more common, because the 
farmers do not require a collateral for small loans and these are easy to get. However, 
collateral is necessary for big loans. Usually, land serves as collateral for loans. On 
the side of the institutional credit a national level NGO is also working in the village 
with the support from the GTZ3. 
Before, there was no labour shortage in the village for agricultural work but the 
availability of labour is becoming a problem in recent years. This is mainly due to the 
Adhiya practice that came into effect in the last 10-15 years. Those having Adhiya first 
would like to finish their own work. Only those not having enough land are working 
as wage labourer. The prevailing wage rate for agricultural work in the village is 
NRs. 50 for the male and NRs. 34 for the female. For the non-agricultural work, it 
ranges from NRs 50-90. 
The contribution of women in agricultural work is significant. Except for 
ploughing, women are equally involved in all other agricultural work. Bringing 
compost to the fields and weeding are exclusively women jobs. The women who are 
also the household head have to take decisions related to the agricultural activities. 
But in male headed households, it is the men who take most of the decisions. 
There are two community forests managed by the villagers in which no fodder can 
be collected. The households have to collect the required fodder from the personal 
farm land and public lands. 
The community decides on the use of the forest products. The farmers get wood 
for agricultural tools and other forest products once in a year from the community 
forests. However, payment of cash is necessary for buying timber4. The users have a 
set of rules for the management and use of forest products. The forests are divided 
into four blocks. One block of the forest is pruned once in four years. This was 
necessary to preserve the forest. The forest is well managed due to the enforcement 
of the rules and adherence to it by the villagers. The farmers have a committee to 
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look after the management of the forest. The committee, through the public notices, 
informs the farmers about the set of rules and about the use of forest products. The 
total numbers of users in the community forests are 120 households. 
Migration 
According to the estimate 38 percent of the male population are working outside the 
VDC area (ICMOD, 1996:127). Working outside the country is mostly in India. The 
number of people working outside for longer periods is much less as compared to 
the people going for seasonal work. Usually people go out for seasonal work in 
December after the paddy harvest and come back for the next planting season of 
paddy that begins at the end of June. Thus, the wages and the salaries make 
significant contributions to the households. 
Physical facilities 
Almost 98 percent of the households have access to drinking water facilities. Most of 
the drinking water systems are community owned. Installation of drinking water 
facilities has been a priority of the local people. The government and also the VDC 
supported local initiatives for its implementation. The villagers are contributing more 
than 50 percent for the installations of the drinking water and the rest was provided 
by the VDC. The contribution of the individual household is not large as six to ten 
households contribute for the instaDations of the drinking water. Some of the 
households however, have invested on their own to have their private connection. 
One of the reasons for the rapid expansion of the drinking water facility is that the 
Water Resources Act of 1997 accorded first priority for drinking water in the use of 
water resources. Secondly, the installation of drinking water is possible with small 
budgets due to the use of polythene pipes. 
The VDC has five primary schools, one lower secondary school, one secondary 
school and one 10+2 education since 1997. The students from the adjoining VDCs 
also attend these schools. Forty five percent of the children of the school going age in 
the village are enrolled in the primary classes (ICMOD, 1996:131). The enrolment in 
the secondary classes however, is mostly from the upper castes. This means the 
dropouts among the children from the poor and occupational caste families are quite 
high. Also there are two sub-health posts and one police post in the VDC. There are 
no other government offices. 
There are two suspension bridges planned for the construction in the VDC. A 
suspension bridge is under construction with the technical and material support 
from the Swiss and German projects. The construction of the suspension bridge 
would benefit the villagers from ward number 2 and 3. The villagers are to 
contribute labour and some payment for the skilled labourers. Accordingly, villagers 
were collecting financial contributions locally. The contribution was voluntary. 
People contributed according to their socio-economic position in the village5. In the 
opinion of those engaged in coUecting the contribution, some villagers are not able to 
contribute as they are very poor and some can contribute more. The villagers 
received an assurance from the VDC for a financial contribution of NRs. 45,000. The 
villagers had to collect NRs. 54,000 besides the financial contribution from the VDC. 
202 INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 
Existing social relationships 
The existing social relationships among the people from different caste groups are 
good. Parma1, which is common in the village, has helped to mobilise the required 
labour. There is the practice of exchanging the use of oxen for ploughing for rice 
straw. This is particularly beneficial to the big owners who used to have more straw 
than required for their household. During the planting season the wage rate for a 
pair of oxen with a person for ploughing is NRs. 120 per day. 
There was some division among people due to party politics. The division was 
especially among and between the local leaders and the educated people. This 
becomes more open during the local election. In terms of ethnic representation the 
VDC have representatives from all the caste groups. The composition of the VDC 
shows that the Newars have 4 representatives followed by the Brahmins and Chhetri 
with two representatives each. Other representatives are one each from the Gurung, 
Miya and the occupational castes. This shows that the higher caste groups are still 
dominant due to their higher socio-economic position. 
The people from all walks of life in the village however, were urianimous that 
local politics should not constrain the development activities in the village. However, 
the villagers from different wards compete for the resources available from the VDC 
and like to protect their interests. For example, the villagers from ward 4 thought that 
the old market in the VDC will loose its importance after the construction of a 
suspension bridge. Thus, the villagers from that ward were not positive towards the 
construction of this bridge. One teacher from ward number 2 was saying that the 
villagers from ward 3 should contribute more as compared to the villagers from 
ward 2. He argued that the villagers from ward 2 will have to make contributions for 
the suspension bridge being constructed in ward 1 as well. They are in the middle of 
these two wards (1 and 3) and both bridges are equally important to them. 
On-going development activities in the VDC 
The allocation of the VDC resources for various development activities indicates that 
the focus is on infrastructure development, education and the health services. 
Installations of drinking water and construction of bridges had the highest allocation 
followed by the salary for the teachers and the scholarships for the students from the 
occupational castes. This allocation exemplifies the priority attached to education in 
the VDC. Besides, awareness creation about the community health and family 
planning had also received an allocation of VDC resources. The villagers had to 
contribute 25 to 50 percent of the costs for the development of infrastructures. The 
contribution includes both labour and cash in case of drinking water and bridges. 
6.3 The environment of the irrigation systems 
6.3.1 The irrigation system 
Irrigated land in Tarkughat is supplied by a total of 16 small local canals, which are 
slope-offtake systems. The users tend to discuss this area as if it were one system and 
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there is only one committee managing all these small sources. For canals 1-9 the 
source of the irrigation is the Dhand Khola flowing from north to south. The water 
source for canals 10-15 are springs and canal 16 receives its water from a river (the 
Dumre Khola). The farmers do not recall the time of their construction. Some older 
members of the community were of the opinion that the first settlers in the area 
constructed the systems. That was nearly 300 years ago. These irrigation systems 
have their specific command area. But the excess water from some systems 
supplement the irrigation water to other systems. Thus, the command area for the 
purpose of the study is defined as the total area irrigated by each sub-system. Two 
lined canals and 14 earthen canals carry irrigation water to the fields. Field to field 
irrigation is also in practice (see figure 6.1). All the canals were constructed at the 
same time. However, the difference is that some of the canals divert water directly 
from the stream and some were constructed to tap irrigation water from spring 
sources. 
The canals 1 and 2 have different headworks, and have been assisted by 
intervention. One is on the eastern (left) side of the river and another on the western 
(right) side of the river. After providing water for these two canals, the same river 
provides irrigation water for seven earthen canals to the lands further downstream to 
the south. 
The Canal 1 
This canal, named Dhand Kulo, lies on the eastern side of the Dhand Khola river. The 
water in the canal flows, via a gentle slope, from north to south. Before the present 
permanent intake was made the people constructed a temporary headwork to divert 
water from the river to the canal. They used materials that were locally available 
such as stone, mud and twigs. Now there is a permanent headwork of cement due to 
the intervention that will be discussed in section 6.4. At the outlet of this headwork, 
in the beginning of the canal, there is an iron mesh that must check the debris 
brought in by the river, which otherwise will block the canal, in which there are no 
other control structures. 
Near to the headwork there is a silt trap box for the deposition of the silt that 
passes through the iron mesh of the headwork. There is an escape for the overflow of 
the water after the silt trap box. The silt trap box and an escape are for checking flood 
water from fast flowing monsoon that can damage the canal. The water could affect 
the canal. The length of the lined canal is approximately 400 metres. The unused 
water from this canal goes to the field through an earthen canal. The irrigation water 
moves from field to field after that. 
There are 15 outlets on each side of the canal. However, the sizes of the outlets are 
not equal. The first outlet from the head to the field is at a distance of 100 metres. The 
distance between each of the outlets varies from one metre to ten metres. There are 
20 water users who have the exclusive right to irrigate their land from the lined 
portion of the canal, which comes to 2.5 ha. 
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Table 6. 5: Irrigated area from different canals 
Name of the canal Irrigated area (ha) Number of farmers Allocation method 
1. Dhand Kulo 2.5 20 Rotation 
2. Birta Kulo 3.5 11 Rotation 
3-9. Earthen Kulo 14.0 55 Rotation 
10-16. Earthen Kulo 12.0 63 No enforced allocation 
Field to field 3.25 22 No enforced allocation 
Total 35.25 171 
Source: Field study. The 1, 2, 3-9 and 10-16 are the numbers of canals as shown on the 
Figure 6.1 
The Canal 2 
This canal, named Birta Kulo, lies on the western side of the Dhand Khola river. This 
canal also had a temporary headwork before the construction of the present 
permanent headwork. The present cement headwork was constructed 2 years after 
the construction of headwork in canal 1. The headwork of this canal is nearly 300 
metres down from canal 1. In this canal there is also a silt trap box and an escape. The 
lined portion of the canal is about 300 metres. Another difference between the two 
canals is that this canal delivers irrigation water to the field directly from the canal 
and also through traditional Kulos. There are 11 water users who have the exclusive 
right to use the water from this canal. It irrigates an area of 3.5 ha. After the end of 
the canal the irrigation water is distributed from field to field. 
At the time of the visit to this area during the period November- March 1998, the 
canals were operational. The farmers at the head and middle of the canal were 
krigating wheat and vegetable crops. The iron meshes at the headwork of both the 
canals were not visible due to the deposition of silts. Farmers said that they cleaned it 
before the monsoon planting. Farmers do not clean the canal for winter crops since 
not all the farmers do plant winter crops and the requirement for water is less. Thus, 
there was no need to increase the volume of water as long as it was sufficient for the 
small area of winter crops. Maintenance of canal lining was required in some sections 
of the canal. Farmers seem to have maintained the canal well when considering the 
time they have been operating it. 
The earthen canals 
The remaining irrigated land receives irrigation water either through earthen canals 
or through field to field irrigation. There are three types of source from where 
earthen canals receive water. The first is from the streams called Dhand Khola and 
Dumre Khola, the second is the excess water from the lined canals, and the tiurd are 
the three springs that originate in the fields. There are 14 earthen canals for irrigating 
the land not covered by the lined canals 1 and 2. Earthen canals irrigate a total of 26 
ha of land. The remaining 3.25 ha receive water by field to field irrigation. The excess 
water from the lined and earthen canals is the irrigation water available for field to 
field irrigation. The areas irrigated by different canals are presented in the following 
table. 
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Figure 6.1: Layout of Tarkughat Irrigation System 
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6.3.2 The irrigated land and its distribution by ethnicity 
The total area of land within the command areas of the irrigation systems, which lies 
in Ward number 2 and 3 is 35.25 ha The irrigated land is along the Marsyangdi River. 
It has a gentle slope from north to south. The land in the irrigated area belongs to 171 
households. According to the farmers there are 20 farmers who have their land 
located in more than one place. Some of the farmers are cultivating 2.75 ha of land in 
the irrigated area as tenants, that is Guthi land7. Most of the farmers have their houses 
outside the farm land (Khet). 
This has implications for irrigating their land during the night. Those who lived in 
the farmland can take the advantage of night irrigation. The distribution of land 
holding among various ethnic groups is presented in Table 6. 6. 
The table indicates that the majority of the farmers have very small size of 
holdings. The Brahmin and Chhetri have a larger size of holding as compared to 
other castes. The upper caste is the dominant group in the village, as described 
earlier and distribution of landholding is indicative of that. 
Table 6. 6: The distribution of irrigated land by ethnicity 
S.no Size of holding (ha) Number of farmers Major ethnic group 
1 <0.5 160 Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar, 
occupational castes and Miya 
2 0.55 to 1.0 8 Brahmin and Chhetri, 
3 > 1 3 Brahmin and Chhetri 
Total 171 
Source: Users of irrigation system. 
6.4 The intervention in the irrigation system 
6.4.1 Rehabilitation by the Hill Food Irrigation Programme 
Planning 
The Hill Food Programme of His Majesty's Government of Nepal rehabilitated both 
the Dhand Kulo and Birta Kulo in 1987 and 1989 respectively. This was implemented 
as district level project. The District Panchayat (DP) was involved in the selection 
approval and implementation of the project. However, the government officials 
appraised the project. The objective of the rehabilitation was to increase the food 
production in the hill areas. Thus, the project made provisions for improved 
agricultural support services along with improvement of irrigation systems for the 
reliable supply of irrigation water. In addition, the construction of trails and bridges 
were the important components of the project. 
During the discussion with one of the District Agricultural Officers, who was 
involved in the implementation of the Hill Food Project in another district, he told 
me that the objective of the project was to overcome bottlenecks through the 
improvements of the physical system. The Regional Agricultural Directorate (RAD) 
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was responsible for the co-ordination of the project. A separate Project Office was 
established to co-ordinate its implementation. The District Co-ordination Committee 
(DCC) chaired by the DP president was to review the project plans, assign priorities 
for implementation and assist the DADO in the procurement of goods and services. 
The DADO was to co-ordinate the implementation of the project activities at the 
district level and submits its reports to the District Co-ordination Committee. The 
procedure followed for the selection and implementation of the project was: 
• The DADO published the notice about the project. 
• The users applied for the rehabilitation through the VP. 
• The DP8 received the application from the VP. 
• The DP presented the project plans to DCC. 
• The DCC with its recommendation presented the plans to the DP. 
• The DP with its recommendation presented the project plans to the District 
Assembly (DA)9 for the inclusion in the Annual District Development Plan. 
• The DA discussed and approved the project plans. It submitted the plan to the 
Regional Co-ordination Committee (RCC) of HFPP. 
• The RCC approved the project for implementation. 
Once the project was approved the project office sent an overseer for the survey of 
the scheme. The influence of the village level leaders and their rapport with the 
District Agricultural Development Officer was important for sending the overseer for 
the preliminary survey. The selection of the systems was based on the site reports of 
the overseer. He said that in most of the cases, the project was approved once the 
overseer made the survey. Besides, the influence of the village leaders on the district 
level leaders also played a crucial role in the approval of the project. According to 
him, the District Agricultural Officer had no other role, than to accept the project, if 
the report by the overseer was positive. This was because the District Agricultural 
Development Officer had limited knowledge of the technical details of the project. 
Besides, it was difficult to reject a project as the DP initially approved it. In addition, 
the local leaders could influence the members of the Co-ordination Committee. Since, 
the local elected representatives were responsible for the approval of the plans it was 
natural for some of them to influence the decision of the DA. 
The rehabilitation of Dhand Kulo and the Birta Kulo took place in 1987 and 1989 
respectively. Unavailability of funds was the main reason for the difference in time of 
two years for their implementation. Separate Users' Committees were established in 
1987 and 1989 because this was a requirement before the project got the finances. The 
Users' Committee consisted of seven members. The then Users Committee chairman 
also briefed the processes followed for the execution of the programme. This person 
belongs to the upper caste. He is also active in local politics. He is a respected person 
in the local community and was also influential at the District level as well, due to his 
active involvement in politics. In case of this rehabilitation also, it he did use his 
influence to get the project approved, which he admitted in course of discussion. 
According to him, the District Agricultural Office (DAO) was the executing 
agency for the rehabilitation of these irrigation systems. The villagers requested the 
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DAO for the rehabilitation through the District Panchayat (now it is District 
Development Committee). The DAO sent an overseer for the survey of the systems. 
The overseer prepared the cost estimate after surveying the system. The estimated 
contribution from the people was 20 percent of the rehabilitation cost. The overseer 
and the people discussed the design and the cost for rehabilitation. The overseer 
submitted the design and the cost estimate to the DAO, which approved the project. 
The costs estimated for Dhand Kulo amounted to NRs. 415,000 according to the 
design. The cost estimate was obtained from the then UC chairman. However, the 
UC chairman said he could not find the design and cost estimate for Birta Kulo. He 
estimated that the cost for the Birta Kulo was about NRs. 300,000. The records were 
also not available in the DAO. The DAO officials told me that there was a separate 
office created for the rehabilitation and that was dissolved after the completion of the 
project. 
Implementation 
The work began after the DCC and RCC approved the design and the cost estimate. 
The works accomplished under the rehabilitation were the construction of the 
permanent head works of cement, canal lining of 700 metres, silt trap boxes; and the 
escapes in both Külos. Also gabion work in one place was implemented to protect the 
Külos. 
Another member of the UC, who is currently the VDC vice-chairman confirmed 
this. This fellow is rich by village standards and also very active in social work. He 
commands good respect from the villagers, not only because he is rich and a local, 
leader, but also because he is helping to solve individual as well as community 
problems. According to him the UC entrusted the implementation of the 
rehabilitation work to its chairman. This was because the people did not like to 
contribute voluntary labour. People thought the approved amount would be 
sufficient for the completion of the work. The District Agricultural Officer confirmed 
that in most of the cases the villagers did not make their contribution. As the farmers 
provided no labour, the project was completed without their contribution. 
Obviously, the cost was over estimated or the contractor took the losses. 
The UC chairman frankly said that the water users wanted him to implement the 
work with the technical supervision of the overseer. He agreed that the people did 
not contribute their share. According to him "people are always reluctant when they 
have to make contributions in government projects"10. He did his best to do a good 
job with the available funds. The whole work was implemented with the funds 
provided by the government. In his opinion the project would not have been 
implemented if he or some one had not taken the responsibility. 
In the opinion of some villagers, that were not the water users, the UC chairman 
took the contract himself and profited from it. Thus, the exact role of the UC 
chairman was not clear. It is an example of village gossip that often blames the local 
leader. However, it is unlikely that he made a profit in view of his reputation in the 
village. The work accomplished was quite good given the present status of the 
irrigation system. The water users are also satisfied with the work done at that time. 
This was evident also from the fact that no maintenance work was required for 6 
years after the completion of the rehabilitation work. 
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The UCfor the Dhand and Birta Kulos 
The UC of the irrigation systems does not formally exist at present. The former UC 
chairman said it is not required. In his opinion the UC was for fulfilling the 
requirement of the rehabilitation. After the completion of the rehabilitation, the UC, 
which was registered, did not develop any procedures for the operation and 
maintenance of the system. This, however, had not constrained the operation of the 
system. At the moment officially there is no UC, because they have not renewed the 
registration. The mandate of the UC expires after one year unless they renew the 
registration. 
The water users are collectively managing the system in the absence of a formal 
UC. Farmers told me that resources required for the maintenance of the system are 
collected from internal and external sources. The collective decision of the users is 
very important in this respect. The collective decision making procedure was to 
invite the farmers in one place and to discuss the problems and solution, which was 
to be agreed upon by the majority of the farmers. The decision to convene a meeting 
usually takes place through their informal discussions among some of the farmers, 
who inform other farmers about the meeting. The resource mobilisation at present is 
being done on an ad hoc basis. Farmers cited following reasons for not having a 
formal UC: 
• The group size of the water users served by the lined portion of the canal is small. 
• They can discuss among themselves, whenever required due to small size of the 
group. 
• Farmers have been able to mobilise the resources required for simple 
maintenance. 
• The rehabilitation did not change the area under irrigation and the number of 
users, which would have affected the right of the users. 
• Major maintenance works requiring substantial external support have not been 
undertaken because it was not yet needed. 
In the opinion of the farmers, the need for the formation of an UC may arise when it 
would be a precondition for getting external support. There is a valid reason for 
saying so, because the envisaged role of the UC is for taking care of the operational 
and maintenance aspects of the irrigation system. In case of this system, the farmers 
are taking care of the operational and maintenance aspects by themselves and there 
are no serious problems in that respect. 
6.5 Management of irrigation tasks 
6.5.1 Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 
The irrigation water to the two canals is diverted through the permanent headwork, 
which was constructed during the rehabilitation of the schemes more than a decade 
ago. The users used to divert water through temporary headwork before the 
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construction of the permanent headwork. There are three main sources of water for 
irrigating the entire fields, they are: 
a) Dhand Khola with two lined canals and seven earthen canals 
b) Dumre Khola with one earthen canal 
c) Spring sources with five earthen canals 
Two different kinds of canal provide irrigation water from these sources. They are: 
a) Lined canals 
b) Earthen canals 
The other irrigated areas receive field to field irrigation. 
6.5.2 User allocation, system operation and water distribution 
The discussions hereafter will focus on the allocation procedures. There are three 
allocation procedures. However, allocation procedures from these canals are 
different. The users themselves distribute the water to their fields. There are no Pale 
or Dhalpa to allocate and distribute the water in this system. However, the users 
organise themselves to distribute water among themselves. 
Rotation 
Dhand Kulo 
The total area served by the Dhand Kulo is 2.5 ha belonging to 20 farmers. The 
farmers receive water on a rotation basis. One of the farmers who had 0.4 ha land in 
Dhand Kulo said that the land on both flanks of the Dhand Kulo is almost equally 
divided i.e. 1.25 ha on each side. According to him these lands had the first right to 
use the water from the river, which is diverted through the cement headwork Only 
the excess water from the canal was delivered to the earthen canal at the end of the 
lined canal. However, another farmer who had 0.15 ha of land served by the earthen 
canal contradicted this. According to him, there were no such rules that the user of 
earthen canal would receive the irrigation water only after the land at the lined canal 
received sufficient water. The owners of the land, which received irrigation water 
from the lined canal, imposed this rule. He said that because of this arrangement, his 
rice planting was delayed. He had to suffer more if the rainfall was not sufficient and 
mtime. 
All the irrigated plots receive water through separate outlets in the lined canal. If 
an owner does not have contiguous plots, separate outlets were provided to irrigate 
his land in different locations. The local measurement of land for irrigation is in mate 
muri. The water allocation for each parcel is according to mate muri. 
The owners on both sides of the canal decide on the allocation of the water. The 
allocation however, is based on the volume of the water in the canal and area to be 
served. Based on this principle, the water in the canal is divided equally over the two 
sides of the canal. This is because the land on the both sides of the canal is equal. The 
water for both sides of the canal is allocated on a rotational basis of 24 hours. This is 
the first level of allocation. 
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The second level of allocation is between the owners of the land on each side. The 
size of the holding (mato tnuri) and the water availability is the criterion for the 
allocation. The allocation of available water among the water users is proportionate 
to their land holding. The rotation is usually for 24 hours (5 p.m. to 5 p.m.). But this 
time can be adjusted depending on the availability of the water specially, during the 
planting season, when water requirement is high. In that case, the farmers divide the 
land in two blocks and each block receives water for 48 hours. 
In some seasons, the land to be irrigated used to be further divided into two blocks 
on each side of the canal, in order to increase the volume of irrigation water for each 
parcel of land. In that case the rotation was for more than 24 hours. This situation 
arose when the volume of water in the canal was not sufficient to irrigate the total 
land in 24 hours due to inadequate rainfall. The rotation is extended for 48 hours. 
This sort of arrangement evolved especially for the paddy crop. This was essential to. 
get all the fields wet in order to make them ready for transplanting. This flexibility 
was possible due to the small size of the group. 
Birta Kulo 
The area under irrigation by Birta Kulo is 3.5 ha and the owners are 11. The area 
under irrigation is not divided on the both sides of the canal like in Dhand Kulo. The 
canal passes along the foot trail and the irrigated lands are on both sides of the canal. 
Some parcels of the land receive irrigation water directly from the canal and some 
lands receive irrigation water through earthen field channels. The allocation of 
irrigation water is on a time share basis proportional to their land holding. The 
rotation is usually for 24 hours. 
The owners of the land decide on the allocation of water for each parcel of the land 
keeping in view the amount of water available in the canal. Not all the plots do 
receive water directly from the canal. The conveyance loss in this canal was also a 
little higher as compared to the Dhand Kulo as some of the plots received water 
through earthen field channels. The allocation principle is based on mato muri. The 
available water is divided among the water users proportionate to their land holding. 
There is less flexibility in the allocation of water in this Kulo as compared to the 
Dhand Kulo due to the fact that there are no separate outlets for each plot to be 
irrigated. However, water allocation is through ad hoc adjustment, in. which the 
users decide the amount of water for each field and increase or decrease the flow 
through the use of stone and mud. Thus, the water flow is adjusted keeping in view 
of the rotation of each user. The criteria used to estimate whether all the fields 
received water in proportion to their mato muri is to look at the level of water in each 
terraces. If some terraces have more water than the others, then more water is 
diverted to the field which is less wet. They adjust water allocation by using stone 
and mud. The rotation is usually for 24 hours. 
Earthen canals 
Another 14 ha of land in the irrigated areas belonging to 55 farmers also has the 
allocation practice based on the principle of time share proportional to their holding. 
The sources of irrigation water for these lands are spring sources and overflow from 
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Dhand Khola and Dumre Khola. The excess water supplemented the water from the 
spring sources. These lands receive irrigation water through 14 earthen Kulos. The 
area under irrigation from each of the Kulo varies. There is a minimum of 0.5 ha 
belonging to two users and 2.5 ha belonging to eleven users. For the rotation, 2 to 4 
parcels of the land were grouped together into one plot and each plot received water 
in a 24 hour turn according to one of the farmers, who had 0.25 ha of land and was 
among the 11 users. 
The area to be irrigated determined the size of plot. The mato muris are divided in 
even numbers. As for example if the land to be irrigated is 60 mato muri then it was 
divided into 3 plots of 20 mato muri each. Each of the plots had a 24 hour rotation (5 
p.m. to 5 p.m.). The irrigation water within the plot was divided on a time share basis 
proportional to their holding. Interestingly, if the irrigation water is to be divided to 
70 mato muri, the 10 mato muri is given water continuously which is known as Surate 
Palo, since it is not possible to allocate the water evenly on 24 hours rotation basis. 
The users decide how much of water is required to irrigate the land and accordingly 
they distribute the water. 
In all the Kulos each water user has the responsibility to bring water to his field in 
his turn. Stones and mud are used in the outlet in order to ensure proportional 
allocation of water for each field. 
Unregulated allocation 
Twelve hectares of land belonging to 63 water users served by the canals 3 , 5 and 10-
15 did not have allocation rules. These lands received too little water from Kulos that 
are spring fed and from excess water from the field to field irrigation. These lands are 
at the middle and tail end of irrigation system. These farmers were more dependent 
on the monsoon rain compared to the farmers served by the Kulos, which have a 
rotational allocation. 
If the monsoon was good they received more water from the spring source and the 
excess water from the upstream canals as well. The lands that are near to the spring 
source and received water for field to field irrigation do get more water. Thus, the 
location of the land was an important factor in deterrnining the availability of water. 
Some parcels of the land have to depend only on the spring source whereas some get 
water from field to field irrigation as well. Further, those having houses on those 
farmlands have a comparative advantage when no allocation rules exist. They would 
be able to divert water to their field in the night. However, the irrigation water meant 
for one particular field from a specific Kulo was not allowed to divert to another field. 
This means that there is established water right of each of the owners to obtain a 
certain amount of water based on its availability. 
In some cases water users sit together to divide the water to each of the fields 
according to the size of the plots. This is possible only when the water in the Kulo is 
abundant according to the water users. This does not apply to all the Kulos. The case 
reported was for 0.375 ha of land belonging to three water users. This indicates that 
group size and irrigated area were important for devising the allocation rules. In that 
case the equity aspect was better addressed, which was a precondition for 
application of rules. 
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The women who were also the household head had to face a lot of problems when 
there was unrestricted allocation according to one of the farmers. She was assured of 
irrigation water in case of rotation. 
Field to field irrigation 
There were lands that received irrigation water from field to field only. The total land 
in this category is 3.25 ha belonging to 22 farmers. These lands get excess water from 
lined canal when the canal has full supply and field to field irrigation from the 
terrace irrigated by earthen Kulos and spring sources. This is because these terraces 
are not connected to the field channels. However, there existed definite rules to 
provide irrigation water from one specific terrace to the others. The owner from 
whose land the water is flowing was not allowed to divert the water to other fields 
on his discretion. He was not allowed to divert the water to his own terrace even if he 
has land just below his upper field. This provision has protected the right of the 
farmer who did not have any means to receive water from other fields and Kulos. 
Another practice was that some of the terraces has to divide overflow water equally 
to downward fields, where field channels did not exist. 
All the farmers agree that the water availability increased after the rehabilitation 
of canals 1 and 2 due to the control of seepage loss through canal lining. The farmers 
who received irrigation water from the lined canals benefited directly. Nevertheless, 
the farmers who were receiving water through earthen canals and field to field has 
also benefited from the rehabilitation due to the seepage control, which increase 
irrigation water in the lined canal. This contributed in increasing the water flow in 
the earthen canal and also made more water available for field to field irrigation. This 
had been particularly beneficial to the farmers at the middle reach. 
The increase in water volume due to decrease in conveyance loss and seepage 
control was not equitably distributed to the farms in the middle and the tail end. This 
was due to the strict rule for allocation and distribution of the water for the fields 
from each of the canals. Further some of the lands received water from the canal and 
also overflow from another field. In that case these types of land were receiving more 
water as compared to other fields which had only one source. 
The winter crops planted in the area are wheat and vegetables. Only the land, 
which has an assured supply of irrigation water, is considered for these crops. The 
lands at the head of the two lined canals and land receiving water directly from the 
Dhand Khola have a winter crop. The lands served by the spring source and the field 
to field irrigation do not have winter crops. Unavailability of the irrigation water is 
the main reason for not planting winter crops. The vegetables planted are mainly 
onion and garlic for own consumption. 
6.5.3 Conflict management 
Farmers reported very few cases of dispute. The reported cases of dispute were from 
the areas where an enforced allocation rule does not exist and field to field irrigation 
is practised. In most of the cases water stealing was the source of conflict. Those 
living near to their farms used to steal water. According to the farmer who had his 
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home near to his field, water stealing occurred mostly at night. As a result of this, 
some of the farmers used to stay in the field during the night to ensure that the 
irrigation water is not diverted elsewhere. The farmers make an arrangement for the 
distribution of the water when there is the presence of more than one farmer. The 
intensity of the dispute is not great. People used to solve the problem through 
consultation. In some cases other water users had to mediate between the two 
quarrelling farmers. 
Some cases of water stealing had also occurred in areas where the allocation rule 
does exist. The nature of the problem is the same. In that case one who had stolen the 
water had to lose his turn for irrigation and the farmer from whom the water was 
stolen used that. In the past (10-12 years before) the penalty for water stealing was to 
destroy one foot of the bunds of the field. This indicates that the frequency of conflict 
was high in the past and also the penalty was strict. But now the penalty was 
abolished due to less occurrence of dispute. The lower number of reported cases of 
dispute at present suggested that the water availability has increased over a period of 
10 years. This coincides with the time when rehabilitation took place. 
6.5.4 Resource mobilisation 
There was a varying degree of resource mobilisation for the irrigation system. That 
was dependent on the nature of the Kulos and their maintenance requirement. The 
rehabilitated portion of the canal was costly to maintain because of the materials 
used. The cost for cement and the skilled labour require cash. This meant water users 
had to contribute cash as well if maintenance work was required. In that case they 
had to depend on external support as well. Other earthen Kulos could be maintained 
with materials and skill available locally. In essence the scale of resource mobilisation 
is dependent on the type and extent of maintenance work required. 
The farmers receiving water from the lined canals have mobilised resources both 
from external and internal sources. The farmers received NRs. 10,000 from the 
District Irrigation Office in 1994. Likewise, they received NRs. 3,000 and NRs. 2,000 
from the VDC in 1994 and 1996 respectively. The money was expended on the 
maintenance of the lined portion of the two canals. The resources mobilised 
internally are labour contribution from the water users. According to one farmer 
debris cleaning at the headwork was required annually. Sometime the work had to 
be repeated two or three times a year. All the farmers had to contribute to it. Usually, 
one person from each household reports for the work. However, not all the farmers 
do report. About 60-70 farmers report for work and one day is sufficient to clean the 
debris. Farmers were of the opinion that use of the cement made it difficult to 
maintain the system. In most of the cases the farmers are ready to contribute their 
labour but it is difficult for them to contribute in cash. 
It was clear that financial resources were mobilised from external sources and non-
cash resources were mobilised internally. Farmers felt that the cash component in 
resource mobilisation has increased after the rehabilitation of the system whereas the 
labour contribution has decreased. This was because, the farmers did not have to 
construct the temporary headwork annually as a result of permanent headwork 
construction. The labour contribution for temporary headwork construction was 10-
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12 days by 35-40 farmers. Some time the floods used to wash away the temporary 
headwork. In that case people would have to reconstruct it. 
There has been no change in labour contribution for canal cleaning and seepage 
control. The water users from respective Kulos contribute one day labour annually for 
canal cleaning. The labour contribution is on the basis of one person from each 
household whatever may be their size of holding. The explanation for this 
arrangement was that there is no significant difference in the size of holding served 
by each Kulo. Secondly, the work is not huge. The type of work determined the 
number of days for labour contribution. The person who has more land in a 
particular block takes the lead for the mobilisation of the resources required for the 
operation and maintenance of the Kulo. Cash contribution however, was in 
proportion to the size of holding. 
Water users said that contribution was equal from each household, but some 
variation was found. The water users from different Kulos had set the norms for 
labour contribution. Two sets of norms were prevailing. In some Kulos, all the water 
users will have to work for cleaning from the beginning of the Kulo to the end. In 
other Kulos, each of the water users works from the beginning of the Kulo up to the 
end of his land. This meant the water user who had the land at the end of Kulo was 
required to contribute more than his fellow who has land at the beginning of Kulo. 
6.5.5 System maintenance 
Farmers in canal 1 and 2 had to contribute their labour for the construction of the 
headwork before the rehabilitation of the canal. The construction of the permanent 
headwork and silt trap box had made the operation and maintenance of the canal 
easier. Farmers are regularly contributing for canal cleaning to make it functional. 
The external resources were used in repairing the canal lining and the canal bed. This 
was required to keep the canal operational and to increase water volume by checking 
conveyance loss. Among the external sources the DIO and VDC provided occasional 
financial support but not other agencies. The VDC had a regular development 
budget for nine wards and the representatives from this ward could opt for investing 
their part of allocation for canal maintenance. 
The lined portion of the canal, as described earlier is maintained on an ad hoc 
basis and is functioning well. The routine maintenance of the lined canal however is 
lacking. In absence of this, maintenance requirement will go on increasing as the 
canal becomes worn out year after year. Farmers do not seem to be interested in 
raising cash on a regular basis. They hope that external support can be availed 
through the influence of local leaders. Secondly, they think that mamtaining the 
canal structure is expensive and that is not possible from the meagre cash 
contributions of 31 farmers who have the first right to use the irrigation water. Other 
farmers who received irrigation water from different other sources including the 
excess water from the lined canal did not like to make cash contribution. This may be 
one of the reasons that these 31 also did not like to pay. 
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6.6 Governance and property rights 
The governance of the irrigation system was with the users. The intervention 
envisaged the UC for the governance of the irrigation system. Nevertheless, the UC is 
not functioning after the intervention. In that respect there has been no change in the 
governance structure of the irrigation system. The three sets of rule (as discussed in 
chapter 2) which are essential for the functioning of the irrigation system is working 
well in this irrigation system. This was possible due to the defined water right of 
each of the users. There has been no change in the water right of the users, since no 
new users were included after the intervention. The users are mobilising their own 
resources for the operation of the system, which is not based on the water share but 
based on customary practices. This shows that changes in the water right could have 
affected the governance of the system as new rules had to be developed. 
6.7 Water control 
The users were using locally available materials for the construction of the temporary 
headworks before the intervention. There has been a change in the technical control 
of the irrigation scheme through the construction of permanent headworks. 
However, the technical control did not affect the organisational control. But it did 
create new linking loops between the user and the external agencies for the 
mobilisation of external resources for maintenance. The users receiving irrigation 
water through the lined canal join together to obtain and mobilise external resources 
required for the maintenance of the irrigation scheme. In the past however, the 
operation of the canal was the concern of all the users as they used to assemble for 
the headwork construction. 
6.8 Analysis and conclusions 
This case was an example of farmers built irrigation systems with small interventions 
in 1987 and 1989 in two systems, which did not have significant effects on the 
existing governance structure. The intervention was successfully implemented due to 
intensive contacts between the government officials and the users and also the main 
work was the headworks construction. This was due to the fact that this was a 
district level project, which was implemented with the active involvement of the 
local institutions like DP VP and Department of Agriculture. Therefore, the 
formation of linking loop was strong due to the smooth good contacts in the interface 
between the actors. Besides, it was relatively easy to maintain the communal linking 
loop due to the small number of users receiving water from the lined portion of the 
canal. The intervention did not follow the processes as envisaged because the UC 
was formed only to obtain the resources from the government. As a result the 
management take-over of the irrigation system by the UC after its rehabilitation has 
not happened. Thus, it was clear that the establishment of water users association 
alone is not important to maintain the linking loop. Because of this the formation of 
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the linking loop of the UC disintegrated after the completion of the intervention. But 
its task were performed by the original communal linking loop of the farmers. 
The intervention created artefacts through new materials and strengthened 
transformative capacities (concrete headwork and concrete lined canals),which 
played an important role in the increase in the volume of water after the intervention. 
This has been particularly beneficial to the farmers at the tail end. Another positive 
effect was that the farmers at the head and middle of the two lined canals have been 
able to cultivate winter crops although in a small area. However, it did not affect the 
existing rules of the water allocation as the present users are continuing with the 
rules that were developed long ago by those who constructed the system. The 
improvement in the traditional technology had effects in redistribution of resource 
(water). It is not only the farmers at the lined canal but also those receiving excess 
water from the lined canal at the tail end have benefited due to increase in the 
volume of water in the lined canals of the two systems, which was essential to 
address the equity issue. The redistribution of the resource has a positive effect in 
mamtaining communal harmony and social cohesion in that respect. 
The construction of a permanent headwork contributed in lessening the annual 
labour contribution required for the construction of the temporary headwork. The 
construction of the permanent headwork and canal lining however has increased the 
need for cash for the maintenance of two systems. At present the irrigation system is 
well maintained and managed by the farmers and farmers are aware of the need of 
future maintenance. The maintenance of the irrigation systems after the introduction 
of the new technology is not beyond the capacity of the local knowledge, skills and 
resources. However, it is not the ability of the farmers but their unwillingness to 
contribute, especially in cash, which is the important aspect in this respect. This is 
partly due to the fact that in the past cash contributions were mobilised from outside 
for the maintenance of lined canals. Another important issue in this respect is the 
ownership of the irrigation system. However, farmers' feeling that the external 
resources should be mobilised for future maintenance requirement indicates that 
they feel less responsible. 
The governance system developed in the past was not disrupted by the 
intervention since, there has been no change in the water rights after the intervention. 
This suggests that there will be little effect on traditional management practices if the 
existing water rights are not affected by the intervention. The differences in the 
management within the various irrigation systems were the result of delineation of 
water rights of every user due to the differences in water availability in the various 
systems. As a result there are fewer disputes. The fact that traditional management 
practices could be continued is due to the smallness and simplicity of the irrigation 
systems (short main canals), which causes less disputes among head and tail users. 
Timesheet - Tarkughat Irrigation System 
"^Stakeholders 
Time 
Farmers UC V P / VDC DAO/DIO Contractor Remarks 
The farmers could 
not say when the 
system was 
constructed but 
opined that it could 
be 300 years before 
Constructed the 
irrigation system 
1987-1989 Requested the 
government for the 
rehabilitation of the 
canal. Participated 
in the discussion 
for the survey of 
the system. They 
did not contribute 
the 20% share 
Formed a seven 
member committee 
for the 
rehabilitation of 
Kulos. 
Forwarded 
peoples request 
to the DDC 
Sent overseer for 
the survey of the 
system. 
Rehabilitation of 
Dhand and Birta 
Kulos with 
permanent intake 
at the cost of 
300,000 and 415,000 
respectively. 
The chairman of 
t h e U C 
implemented 
the 
rehabilitation on 
contract basis at 
the request of 
the people. 
Completed the 
w o r k 
1989 Collectively 
managing the 
system and annual 
labour contribution 
for canal cleaning 
Was dissolved after 
the completion of 
the rehabilitation 
work 
1994 Continued the 
management of the 
system and 
obtained the fund 
Provided NRs. 
3,000 for the 
repair of the 
lined portion of 
Provided NRs. 
10,000 for the 
repair of the lined 
portion of the 
from VDC and the 
DIO for the repair 
of lined portion of 
the canal. 
the canal canal. 
1996-1997 Requested VDC for 
financial support 
for the repair of the 
lined canal 
Provided NRs. 
2,000 for the 
repair of the 
lined canal 
H 
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Notes 
1 Adhiya means share cropping in local terms. 
2 The traditional varieties of rice are Jhinuwa, Kamal jira, Madhesi and Mansara. However, 
Madhesi and Mansara are most common. The improved varieties are Gdkule, Bindeswori, 
Mansuli and Beeji. The Gdkule variety is popular among the farmers as it can be planted late 
and this does not affect its yield because it requires less irrigation water. 
3 Its target group are the poorest and socially backward in the village. However, the farmers 
from the upper caste group with good economic positions have also joined the groups. It 
works through the group and the main activity is mobilization of saving on a monthly basis 
from the group members and providing small credit to the group members. The group 
members decide on monthly savings and it's lending to the group members. This 
programme seems to have been beneficial to the poor farmers. However, the coverage of the 
programme is too small to have substantial impact on village economy. 
4 The members pay NRs. 30. 0 per cubic feet whereas the non member pay NRs. 60.0 for the 
same. 
5 The size of land holding and income from other sources, besides agriculture are the 
indicators applied by the villagers to determine the status of a family in the village. 
6 Labour exchange among the villagers is very common. It is practised among all the 
farmers. There is no ethnic barrier to it. The farmers who cannot go on their own will have to 
send hired wage labourers for labour exchange. 
7 The trust is in the name of local temple. 
8 The DP had eleven members representing 9 Haka (constituency) and one president and one 
vice president. 
9 All the chairman and vice-chairman of the VP in the district are the members of the District 
Assembly. 
10 He opined that the people comply with the conditions as agreed upon in NGO 
implemented project for fear of losing support. That is not the case with the government 
implemented projects. The NGOs are very strict in enforcing the terms and conditions as 
agreed upon before the implementation of the project. The people have a greater feeling of 
ownership in the NGO implemented programmes because of their contributions to in it 
according to him. 
7. Major findings and conclusions 
The objective of the present study was to understand social, administrative and 
political processes shaping development interventions through a study of 
programmes to assist FMIS in the hills of Nepal and to understand social and 
institutional changes brought about through these interventions, with special 
reference to water management practices. Understanding these processes was seen as 
essential for future effective and sustainable institution building at local level. In this 
respect three FMIS and one Agency managed irrigation system were selected for the 
case studies, which were discussed in chapter 4 to 6. The Agency managed system 
was evolving as a Jointly managed system. The research questions exarnined the 
forms of interventions, and the processes followed in the design and execution of the 
public interventions in irrigation systems. Other equally important questions 
involved the participation of actors at various levels and the interface between them, 
which shaped the outcomes of these interventions. Finally, the scope of the study 
included the effects of the intervention in terms of changes in the institutional 
arrangements after the intervention and its implications for water management 
practices. 
An attempt in this chapter is made to integrate the findings of the four cases 
keeping in view the theoretical concepts and the research questions presented in 
chapter 2. 
7.1 Intervention processes 
The processes followed in the initiation of the intervention were conditioned by the 
policy of the agency, which provided the assistance. Various strategies were applied 
in providing assistance to the FMIS as discussed in chapter 3. The government policy 
of seeking user participation in the decision making of project design and 
implementation was mixed during the 1980s, as indicated by the intervention under 
different programmes. For example, small-scale financial support for the 
improvement of the FMIS under SPWP, IRDPs and HFPP (Tarkughat) were 
implemented more or less on a participatory approach. The intervention of Tarkughat 
was implemented under the Department of Agriculture through its regional office. 
The irrigation scheme was implemented following the FIWUD policy, which 
recognised the role of the potential users and the DP/VP. Thus, the users obtained 
the support through their links to the VP/VDC. Besides, the direct financial and 
material support from the DP to the VP as indicated by the first and second 
intervention of Ghachowk was also implemented under a participatory approach. This 
was also largely due to the requirement for the preparation of District Development 
Plan and implementation of the decentralisation programme in the country in 1982, 
in which the role of local elected bodies was recognised in the government reforms. 
The processes followed in new constructions, like the Annapurna Kulo (HIP), were not 
based on a participatory approach. Thus, the project was appraised, designed and 
implemented by the DOI and is under its management since the completion of the 
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scheme. The users were not required to make contribution in its construction. Thus, 
the VP/VDC and the local users did not have direct role in its management. 
However, users are playing some role in its management since 1992. Users' 
participation in the decision making since the early 1990s was a precondition for the 
initiation of intervention processes as indicated by the third intervention in the 
Ghachowk irrigation system and Chaurasi Kub under ILC and NISP respectively. 
Nevertheless, the DOI/DIO engineers played crucial role in the design of the project. 
The requirement for the UC before the construction and the farmers' contribution in 
the capital cost of the project were visible aspects of the participatory approach. 
However, monitoring of these were lacking. In case of Ghachowk, the UC played an 
important role during the implementation of third intervention due to the effect of 
broader political change in the country on the VP/VDC. However, the VDC played 
an important role in mamtaining the link between the users, UC and the agency in 
case of Chaurasi Kulo. This shows that the VDC at present has much greater role to 
play in local affairs than the committee formed by the government agencies. The 
differences in the policy requirement did affect the interface between the various 
actors, who were directly or indirectly involved in the intervention. The close contact 
between the actors contributed towards the positive outcome of the intervention, 
whereas the rninimal contact between the actors had negative effect in the outcome 
of agency interventions. 
The intervention processes under various programmes indicate that the 
intervention was to be demand driven. The conditions were set to ensure genuine 
demand through the provision of signature of all the users and the deposits of up 
front cash in the later interventions. Theoretically, it was rigorously implemented in 
NISP, although users avoided it. Since the intervention in the Ghachowk was 
implemented as a 'pilot project' the provision was not strictly followed as reflected 
by the fact that the signature of all the users for the initiation of the project was not 
included in the application form. Also, the cash deposit was not included with the 
application. The cases indicate although the government made strict provisions for 
implementing intervention, it is not strictly followed (Table 7.1). 
7.1.1 The initiation of interventions 
The origin of interventions is often rather opaque. This is due to the different 
objectives of the various actors, which has to be harmonised before an intervention 
can be effectively started and will be sustainable. Important actors are: the users, 
local leaders, local and regional institutions, government agencies, and external 
donors. Hereafter, the various objectives (sometimes hidden agendas) and the way 
interventions were initiated will be discussed. 
The interventions in the irrigation systems have to be seen within the broader 
policy framework of the HMG/N. The main objective of these policies was to 
increase agricultural production that could lead to an improvement in the livelihood 
of the rural population and make the country less dependent on the import of food 
grains. Another objective of providing small-scale support was also to generate local 
employment. However, a hidden objective was to maintain political control or 
extend new political links and controls in local affairs. 
Table 7.1: Differences in intervention processes under various programmes 
^"-v. Irrigation systems Chaurasi Kulo Annapurna Kulo Ghachowk Tarkughat Remarks 
Intervention 
Processes 
(NISP) (HIP) (ILC) (HFPP) 
Initiation Users/VDC requested 
for the project with 
signature of all the users 
and up front cash 
deposit 
Users /VP 
requested for the 
project 
Users /VP 
requested for the 
project with 
signature of some 
of the users 
Users /VP 
requested for the 
project 
Local elected institution played 
leading role in submitting the 
request. 
Preliminary Survey DOI with farmers DOI with farmers DOI with farmers DADO with 
farmers 
Local elected officials and influential 
person participated 
Detailed survey DOI with farmers DOI DOI DADO In NISP farmers participated during 
the during the detail survey 
Design DOI discussed the 
design in detail with the 
farmers 
DOI discussed the 
design with some 
of the farmers 
DOI held 
discussion with 
some of the UC 
members 
Project office 
discussed the 
design with 
users 
Users had little influence in changing 
the design and there was no major 
changes in the design prepared by 
the DOI 
Approval of project DOI DOI DOI Project office 
Users participation UC formed but VDC 
was active in liasing 
with the DOI 
UC was active 
during the 
construction 
UC was active 
during the 
construction 
Users' contribution VDC paid the cash 
contribution on behalf of 
the user 
Not required Contractor and 
some new users 
paid the cash 
contribution 
UC chairman 
implemented 
without users 
contribution 
In all the cases the users did not 
made their part of the contribution 
Implementation Contractor implemented 
the project 
Contractor Contractor Users' committee 
(UC) 
UC gave contract to its chairman 
Users Committee Less active Users formed UC Not functioning Not functioning UCs acted as 'construction 
committee' 
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For the irrigation agencies and their officials in general the objective was also to 
achieve the annual target of the government. But for some of these officials the 
objective was to make profit. These underlying aims had an effect on the design of 
the intervention as some of the actors misrepresented the specific objective of 
intervention as reflected by the never achieved proposed new irrigated area in 
Ghachowk. This indicates the importance for the officials and their agencies to obtain 
as many interventions as possible. This will increase the workload for their agencies, 
the continuation of their jobs and the status of their organisation. This further reflects 
that the user had to compromise with the view of the officials to get access to the 
resources, which are controlled by the officials. Thus, the linking loop is formed to 
obtain and disburse the resources in which, the officials could influence the decision 
making because of their power to disburse the resources. 
During the Panchayat political system period (1960-1990) the village panchayats 
received small-scale support from the District Panchayats, in the form of annual 
lump sum grants from the government for local development. The grant of the DP to 
VP was based on the request from the VP for the development programme that they 
thought relevant. In their turn the members of the VP listened to the request of their 
political followers. Nevertheless, each of the actors had their own hidden objectives 
in initiating the intervention. In this way the elected officials could use these grants 
to realise one of their hidden objectives for mamtaining or improving their influence 
in their constituencies and for some of them the objective was to get the contract. This 
shows that the initiative for interventions started at the local level through users, 
local leaders and VP officials. The availability of resources from the DP induced the 
community to use their existing communal linking loops and to create links to attain 
their objectives. These actors could exercise their influence through the links they 
maintained with various other actors. For example, the contractor for the second 
intervention in Ghachowk used his link with the DP officials to influence the users to 
recommend for the contract by promising to waive the users' contribution. The users 
had genuine concern for this second intervention and there was negotiation and 
compromise in the interface between the users and the contractor. The acquaintance 
between the users and the contractor was crucial in forming the linking loop. The 
outcome of the linking loop was positive, as users were able to maintain 
organisational control on the activities of the contractor through proper supervision. 
At the same time, the contractor had administrative control over the users' labour. 
What was described before indicates that the government was indirectly involved 
in the development activities at the local level via DP grants to VPs. But at the same 
time, the government was directly providing small-scale support to the FMIS 
through various projects for improvement as reflected by the case of Tarkughat. For 
this programme the DP/VP were used as a vehicle for channelling the resources 
from DOA. In this way the government had some political control on local affairs, 
but users maintained control on the use of resources. Thus, the DP/VP acted as 
intermediary between the users and the government agencies in the initiation 
process of the intervention. The interface between the users of the irrigation systems 
and the DP/VP facilitated the strengthening of the 'communal linking loops' for the 
initiation of the intervention. However, the interface between the VP and the 
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governxnerit agency was more intensive than between the users and agency in the 
initiation of the intervention. 
During this period the government also initiated the construction of the new 
irrigation systems through the financial assistance from multilateral agencies as 
indicated by the Annapurna Kulo. The objective of these interventions was to expand 
irrigated areas to increase the food production in the hills. The initiation of these 
interventions was often based on requests of the potential users but further initiatives 
were mainly with the government in this type of projects. In this type of project the 
contacts in the interfaces between the government officials and the donor officials 
was more intensive in the pre-phase of designing the intervention than between the 
agencies and VP and the users. Thus, the initiation of the project was heavily top-
down, as the government policy categorised this type of project as central level 
projects, which were to be controlled by the government agencies. 
During the late 80's and in the beginning of 90's, there was a major shift in the 
irrigation policy of the government, which laid emphasis on the improvement of 
FMIS in contrast to the new construction of medium and large-scale irrigation 
systems. As a consequence various projects were implemented to assist the FMIS 
through the 'participatory approach', under which the farmers were to initiate the 
processes of intervention by seeking government assistance. With the publication of 
the notice for the upcoming interventions, the farmers were requested to send their 
request to the DIO/WRID. In this type of intervention the VP/VDC initiated the 
processes on basis of the request of the farmers. Thus, the VP/VDC played an 
important role in forming the linking loop between the users and the agency. 
Nevertheless, the VP/VDC had intensive contacts with the officials than between the 
users and officials. The government officials sometime helped them in administrative 
processes that had to be followed in order to obtain government support. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the initiation of interventions is complicated 
and not always very transparent due to the different and hidden agendas of all the 
actors involved. The official objectives of most irrigation projects were increasing of 
water supply in order to stimulate agricultural production and the improvement of 
the livelihoods of the farmers' families. Besides these objectives politicians at higher 
levels were interested to strengthen their influence on local affairs and, after the 
introduction of multiparty system, to support their followers in rural communities 
and so to improve their local power base. For the government agencies it was 
important to have as many projects as possible under their supervision because this 
made them more powerful in the governmental structure and secured jobs for their 
employees. For the members of the VP/VDC it was important to obtain government 
support for projects in their community in order to secure their status in the 
community and it also opened venues to obtain extra income via legal as well as 
illegal means. Finally the farmers were very much interested in a sufficient and 
secure supply of irrigation water for their crops. It made it also possible to obtain 
some extra income by making available their labour. After the intervention they also 
ventured to ask for government support for the maintenance of their irrigation 
systems, which in the past was done by themselves. The various contacts and 
interactions depended among others on the type and approach used by the various 
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actors in getting the intervention materialised. The influence of these overt as well as 
hidden agenda's on the interventions will be discussed hereafter. 
7.1.2 The design of interventions 
Once the initiative for the intervention is accepted in principle it moves into the 
phase of designing. The type of design depends very much on the type of 
interventions. The interventions in the AMIS/FMIS can be classified into: a) 
improvement of the existing situation through repair and maintenance, b) provision 
of more reliable supply of water through rehabilitation of the infrastructure; and c) 
expansion of the irrigated area through the new construction. 
Per ha cost for rehabilitation is higher than for new construction if, we make a cost 
comparison. The highest among the case studies is NRs. 119,166 ($ 1744 ha) for 
Tarkughat in 1999 price ($l=NRs. 68.30) compared to the cost for Annapuma, which is 
NRs. 33470 ($490 ha). For Ghachowk and the Chaurasi kulos, the costs per ha are NRs. 
56,133 ($ 821) and NRs. 60285 ($ 883) respectively. One of the reasons for the higher 
cost in case of the rehabilitated scheme is due to less irrigated area than the planned 
during the design of the rehabilitation. Thus, it lends support to the argument that 
the irrigated area is inflated during the design of the project in order to make it 
feasible for the rehabilitation in terms of cost per ha criteria. For example, the 
programme limit of the cost per ha for Ghachowk for minor rehabilitation was NRs. 
20,000 ($ 292). However, there was no cost limit for other projects. If we take into 
account the cost limit for Ghachowk, the intervention cost for all the projects are quite 
high. In other words the expected benefit is much lower than the cost of the project, 
which farmers will never be able to repay back. 
The cases suggest that the content of the design in the intervention was different in 
the government agency intervention that involved new construction (Annapurna 
Kulo) as compared to other interventions. The government intervention in Annapurna 
was the construction of a new weir with gate, an underground canal, aqueducts and 
the branch canals with gates for better water control in the irrigation system. Besides, 
the agency introduced new organisational control by appointing the Dhalpa. The 
designs that were aiming at rehabilitation as reflected by the third intervention in 
Ghachowk included the construction of a headwork with a gate, the lining of the 
canals without gate and the construction of an acqeduct. The works included in the 
improvement of the irrigation system were the construction of cemented headwork 
and lining of the two branch canals as indicated in Tarkughat irrigation systems and 
small improvements during the first and second intervention in Ghachowk. 
The type of intervention conditioned the involvement of the users in the design of 
the intervention. The users had a greater role in the design in case of improvement in 
the irrigation system, as reflected by the second intervention in Ghachowk and the 
intervention in Tarkughat. This was because the users had some sort of control on 
available resources. They used their existing strong linking loop to influence the 
design. In case of a new construction and rehabilitation the government officials 
designed the interventions and great emphasis was placed on the financial and 
technical aspects, which were not discussed at length with the users. However, in the 
interfaces between the farmers and the designers there were interactions about the 
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choice of technology and use of resources in Ghachowk. However, by and large the 
involvement of users in the design of the intervention was limited. 
The participation of various actors in the design of the interventions was varied 
due to the approaches followed in it. The Annapurna Kulo was designed by the 
government agency without complete participation of the future users, as the 
government policy at that time did not recognise the participatory approach in the 
design of the large-scale irrigation project. Therefore participation of the users in the 
design of the project was not sought. This had implications in the performance of 
linking loop during the construction, which affected the allocation and distribution 
of the irrigation water. As a result, some of the users have unlimited access to the 
irrigation water whereas other users did not have. This was largely due to the design 
technology and partly due to gradual disintegration of the linking loop during and 
after construction, as some of the users did not provide land for field channels. 
However, the formation of the users' committees in the Tarkughat irrigation system 
and in the third intervention in Ghachowk irrigation system led to greater 
participation. But still the interventions were designed at the government offices and 
were not fully discussed with the farmers. 
The cases suggest that the VP/VDC, UC and users were only partly consulted by 
the agency officials during the design of the intervention. As a result the knowledge 
of the users' was not fully utilised by the agency officials. In fear of losing the 
government support the users accepted in most cases what officials offered. There 
was dominance of outside knowledge over the knowledge of the farmers. The 
technical designs prepared by the agency officials however, were briefly discussed 
with other actors. The interface between the officials and UC members in the case of 
Ghachowk and the interface between the VP officials and the agency officials of the 
Annapurna systems led to some modification in the technical design. The users could 
influence the design to include a head regulator and the aqueduct in case of 
Ghachowk. 
The Tarkughat case however, reflects that the small size of the group with only 
minor objectives and simple technical design facilitated a strong communal linking 
loop in the interfaces among the farmers and between the farmers and the officials. 
As a consequence the users had a greater role in the decision for the design of the 
technology, which was implemented by the users themselves. This shows that the 
intensive links between the users increase their participation in decision making and 
can lead to the greater sustainabiHty of the intervention. As a result, the water 
management in Tarkughat is the best as compared to the other three systems. The task 
was also easier due to small size of the irrigation scheme. 
The contacts between the agency and the donors and various actors during the 
design of the intervention were shaped by the requirement of the users participation 
in the decision making as outlined in the later policies of the government. The scope 
of approaches for users' participation was also varied, as outlined in the government 
policies in chapter 3. For example, the IRDPs and ILO projects for the small-scale 
irifirastructure development were more participatory, in which the projects were 
implemented on the demand of the users. The users also shared some of the project 
cost. The users had greater control over the design. However, the cases indicate that 
the contacts in the interfaces between the users and the other actors were not so 
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intensive to reflect the 'participatory approach' as envisaged in the project document 
for Ghachowk, although the project was implemented on the demand of the users. The 
requirement of the formation of an UC before the intervention was to be 
implemented and its institutionalisation through official registration was to enhance 
the participation of the users in the decision making, especially for the governance of 
the irrigation system. However, the users avoided the required cash and labour 
contribution in later interventions. The contractor or the VDC paid on behalf of the 
users. In this respect, the participation of the users was absent in the interventions in 
Tarkughat and Chaurasi Kulo. Some of the new users paid their cash contribution in 
case of Ghachowk, whereas the old users did not pay and the contractor took the 
responsibility for it. In this respect the UC was not successful in ensuring the 
participation of the users as envisaged. 
The incomplete participation of the users in the design had also consequences on 
the maintenance of these system as will be discussed in section 7.1.3. 
The role of users and local institutions was limited in the design phase. This was 
even more the case when it came to the approval of the interventions. This approval 
was done mainly by the agencies, which provided the funds. In this respect the 
agencies involved were the MOWR, RAD and the DP/DDC. The approvals of the 
intervention were based on the evaluation of the field report by the 
overseers/engineers. This does not mean that behind the scenes, no political 
lobbying took place. 
There was also variation when it comes to the design of the intervention processes. 
In the processes followed for the new construction, the agency did the appraisal, 
design and approval of the project, which was not based on the participatory 
approach. However, the processes followed for the projects with participatory 
approach included involvement from the local representative of the users. Thus, 
there was variation in the role of the agencies involved in the processes of 
intervention also. For example, in case of Annapurna the involvement of government 
agencies - WRID, DOI and MOWR were high from the design to the execution of the 
project, although the VP took the initiative for intervention. In case of projects that is 
said to be with participatory approach, the agencies involved were the VP/VDC, DP, 
project office (in case of Tarkughat) of district/regional level offices and their 
respective ministries, as mentioned above. However, government agencies except for 
the Tarkughat were more influential in the design processes in the government 
interventions than the local representatives of the people. The design processes of the 
intervention for participatory approach suggests that the tier of agencies involved 
from the selection to the approval of the project had implication for the users' 
participation. The less the number of tiers that the users have to contact, the more 
participatory it would be due to closeness between the village and district officials. 
For example, third intervention in Ghachowk was less participatory than the second 
intervention of Ghachowk by the DP and HFPP intervention in Tarkughat. This was 
largely due to the decision making processes involved, which was more centralised. 
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7.1.3 Implementation of the interventions 
As mentioned earlier technical intervention in terms of changes in the physical 
infrastructure could be categorised into three types. They are the new construction, 
rehabilitation and improvement. This classification is necessary to understand the 
implementation of intervention and their modalities. The objective of the 
intervention determined the type and scale of financial, technical and the 
mstitutional involvement in its implementation. The magnitudes of the financial and 
technical assistance have affected the processes followed in the implementation of 
each intervention. This in turn has affected the interface between various actors and 
the decision making at different points in time. 
The other aspect of the intervention was the introduction of new agricultural 
technologies to increase production and productivity, which was one of the primary 
objectives of the intervention. All the three interventions implemented by the 
government agencies had provisions for the introduction of agricultural 
technologies. However, the introduction of new agricultural technologies was varied 
between the interventions. The implementation of the agricultural component as 
envisaged in the project design for Annapurna was not fully implemented. For 
example, the construction of warehouse cum training centre and other staff quarters 
were constructed but the planned demonstration farm was not established. This 
shows the focus was more on the construction aspects than on the extension. This 
also indicates that there was lack of co-ordination between the WRID and RAD. The 
intensification of extension services in Ghachowk during the intervention and after the 
intervention was poor. However, the introduction of improved varieties of paddy 
had positive effects in the case of Tarkughat. 
The Annapurna Kulo was a new construction, the interventions in Ghachowk and in 
Chaurasi Kulo were rehabilitation and Tarkughat was an improvement. The analysis of 
the cases indicates that the intervention for the construction of a new irrigation 
system has wider implications in terms of introduction of new technologies, financial 
resources and institutional requirement as compared to rehabilitation and 
improvement. There have been major changes in the social, technical and 
institutional aspects if we look at the intervention in Annapurna kulo. The 
introduction of new technology had effects on the introduction of new organisational 
elements as evidenced by the employment of Dhalpa and WUS. The involvement of 
DOI in the management of the irrigation system did induce the formation of new 
interface between the users and the DOI. The implementation of the intervention had 
also major social impacts as reflected by the increased access to the irrigation water 
besides, the changes in the social relation between the users in the old Chaurasi kulo 
and the new users in Annapurna Kulo. For example the right for water for planting 
only changed to unhindered access throughout the year for the tan enders. The 
introduction of technology was prominent in Ghachowk, as it did increase the access 
to the irrigation water to the tail enders also due to construction of new headwork 
and canal lining. However, there were no major changes in the organisational aspects 
except for the formation of an UC during the intervention. The division of water 
rights was the major social impact of the investment. The changes in the technology 
to better control of the water were prominent in Tarkughat. Thus, the cases indicate 
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that changes in the technology, such as permanent headworks and lined canals by 
using concrete, were prominent in all the interventions. However, the effects on the 
organisational and social aspects were varied as reflected in Annapurna Kulo and 
other irrigation schemes. The intervention of DIHM in 1962 and other politico-
adnoinistrative changes had a major effect on the institutional role of the Ditthawal, 
with implications for operational water management. 
Three sets of actors were most influential in shaping the implementation of the 
intervention: agency officials, the influential members of the VP/VDC/UC and the 
contractor. The majority of the users was left out in these processes. The irrigation 
agency played an important role by providing resources for the new construction 
and rehabilitation of the irrigation systems. The agency remained active during the 
time of implementation. It maintained intensive interaction with the UC officials and 
the contractor but the link with the local community in general was lacking. The 
officials of the VDC and UC were also more active in mamtaining intensive contact 
with the agency officials at the district level and the contractor than with the users. 
Their close link with them and the local politicians helped in implementation of the 
intervention without any hindrances. However, there was an exception in the second 
intervention in Ghachowk, in which users played an important role. There were 
differences in the nature of actions of these actors depending on the nature of 
interventions. For example the contractor in third intervention in Ghachowk ignored 
the complaints from the users regarding the use of sub-standard materials due to his 
close ties with some of the UC officials, who took a sub-contract with him. Because of 
this, the UC officials could not check the quality of the works of the contractor. 
Likewise, the contractor in the Annapurna Kulo could not accomplish some of the 
works mentioned in the design on the advice of the irrigation engineer, as he was 
unsuccessful in convincing the farmers to provide land. In contrast, the Tarkughat 
case reflects more intensive contact in the interface between the users and the agency 
officials. This was among others made easier due to the small number of users and 
their rather well functioning communal linking loops in two interventions. Thus, the 
cases suggests that the functioning of a linking loop is depended on the opportunities 
available to each of the actors in the decision making processes and use and control 
of the resources. 
The changes in the interface between the users themselves was observed after the 
formation of the UC resulting into the formation of a new loop among the UC 
members to attain the individual objectives as exemplified by the Ghachowk. This 
resulted into the breaking up of the original linking loop into new linking loops. This 
could be attributed to the influence of local politics also. This indicates power 
dynamics of the village wherein some people manipulated the outcome for their 
benefit by obtaining sub-contracts. Those users, who were in favour of good quality 
works, opposed them. However, their influence was limited, because some of them 
were at the bottom of the power structure in the society and some others opposed the 
VP leadership. This situation is partly the result of a lack of transparency maintained 
by the government officials and less involvement of the users in the decision making. 
This had implication in the continuation of the role of the UC, which was an 
important intermediary between the users and the DOI. 
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The analysis of the cases suggests that the forms of participation also varied. The 
most common form of participation for resource mobilisation was labour, land and 
time. The cash contribution was almost negligible. Because, the local people were 
unwilling and often unable to contribute cash. The condition of the intervention 
required some cash contribution as indicated by the Tarkughat, Ghachowk and 
Chaurasi Kulo cases. Some of the users in the Ghachowk irrigation system contributed 
cash at the initial stage for the deposit to the irrigation office. They were mostly the 
new users. But in all the cases except the Annapurna Kulo, the farmers pursued the 
contractor to pay for the contribution during the intervention. The negotiation 
between the farmers and the contractor is indicative of the effort to maximise the 
benefit by both sides. This sort of action has contributed in reshaping the outcome of 
the intervention, as the physical target of the intervention was not achieved. This is 
due to the fact that the users lost their social control on the implementation of the 
intervention. 
The contacts between the users and the agency officials involved in the 
implementation of the intervention were not intensive. This could be partly 
explained by the conflicting motives of the persons directly involved in the 
implementation of the intervention. The users tried to avoid the costs and the focus 
of agency officials was on achieving physical targets. Besides, the use of a contractor 
also blocked the contacts between the users and the agency officials. Thus, required 
interaction was lacking in the decision making processes. This indicates that either 
the training provided both to the agency officials and the users were not adequate or 
they did not internalise it. Especially in case of Ghachowk training on how to 
implement the participatory approach of intervention was provided to both the 
agency officials and the users. This is because, the government bureaucracy always 
believed in the top-down approach. The institutions created at the local level did 
play an effective role in obtaining government funding. However, they were less 
effective when it came to the implementation. This could be attributed to limited 
attention given to the social aspects during the implementation, which is important 
for the sustainability of the institution. 
The users lost the opportunities to influence the implementation through lack of 
own labour contribution. For example, the UC in Ghachowk decided to give their part 
of the work to the contractor, which they could have done themselves. The work was 
given to the contractor with a condition that they will not bear 12.5 percent labour 
contribution, as required by the project. But the users could influence the 
implementation in case of the Tarkughat because, the UC chairman took the 
responsibility for the implementation. This could be due to the fact that the amount 
of money for intervention was quite high. This indicates that disintegration of the 
linking loop, which was formed to initiate intervention, could diminish users' control 
in the implementation. Nevertheless, the users in Annapurna Kulo supervised the 
implementation of the project, which was helpful in controlling quality of the work. 
The analysis of the cases suggests that the UC failed to achieve the intervention 
objectives as far as new management of the irrigation scheme was concerned. This is 
reflected in the cases of Ghachowk and Tarkughat. This is because, the VP/VDC was 
managing the irrigation system in case of Ghachowk, and users were able to make 
collective decisions in case of Tarkught because of the small size of the system. This 
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shows the effect of maturity of the VP/VDC as an institution and importance of 
collective decision making in case of Ghachowk and Tarkughat respectively. The UC 
was also not necessary as the VDC and Kulo Samiti was taking care of irrigation 
management in Ghachowk and UC was not required in Tarkughat due to the small size 
of the system. Thus, the transaction cost involved in replacing the existing 
arrangement with UC would have been greater for the users. Therefore, most of the 
UC formed for the purpose of the intervention acted as a 'construction committee' 
and failed to function after the completion of the intervention. In this respect the 
objectives of creating institutions for the implementation were partially achieved, as 
they could not ensure the complete participation of the users after the 
implementation. However, the UCs, were active during the implementation of the 
interventions in mamtaining intensive interface with the contractor and the agency 
officials, but failed to embed necessary institutional arrangements for the 
management of the irrigation systems as they became obsolete after the intervention. 
The UCs could not maintain the confidence of the users due to the lack of the 
transparency in their activities in case of the third intervention in Ghachowk. In the 
view of the users UC seems to have been created for legitimisation of the activities 
implemented during the intervention. In essence, the creation of the UC is only for 
fulfilling official requirements for obtaining the funding. The only important aspect 
is that the UC created for the intervention was officially recognised before the 
intervention could be implemented. But the official recognition was not a sufficient 
condition for the functioning of an UC. 
The analysis of the cases reveals that the users have devised institutional 
mechanisms for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. The 
VP/VDC in Ghachowk have employed the Pale since 1976 for the operation of the 
irrigation system with the support from the users. Besides, it has constituted the Kulo 
Samiti to co-ordinate the works of the Pales. The VDC at present was capable of 
mobilising internal and external resource for the operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation system as evidenced by the payment to the Pales and the fourth 
intervention. This was the reason why the users were not interested in the 
functioning of UC constituted during the intervention. The DOI employed the Dhalpa 
for the operation of the system in Annapurna Kulo besides, providing maintenance 
expenditure. However, users decided to form a WUS to manage water at lower level 
and to liase with Dhalpa and to maintain link with the DIO to obtain necessary 
resources. The case of Annapurna Kulo reveals that when a UC is organised by the 
users themselves there is a greater guarantee that it will function more effectively. 
The users did not felt the need of the UC in case of Tarkughat because of the small 
number of users. 
In the past the local communities without government support did the 
maintenance of irrigation systems. This was possible due to strong local leadership, a 
considerable social control in the rather isolated villages that made the functioning of 
effective communal linking loops possible and the fact that technologies were used 
that could be maintained with local available resources. 
The three case studies of FMIS show that the local leadership has become 
fragmented, especially after the introduction of the multi party system. The social 
control has diminished due to the opening up of the rural areas. The interventions 
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introduced new technologies such as the concrete linings of canals and constructions 
that could not be maintained with local available materials. These political, social and 
technological processes have led that the communal linking loops of the past have in 
most cases disintegrated and are not functioning or only limited functional in the 
maintenance of irrigation systems. For example, there is no functional irrigation 
organisation in Chaurasi Kulo. All the interventions were possible thanks to 
government funding and this has made the farmers aware that in combination with 
the processes mentioned earlier, they could try to get also governmental support for 
at least a part of the maintenance costs. As a result of the three interventions the 
irrigation systems have become or made themselves more dependent on the 
government. 
Hence, the understanding and harmonising of the objectives by all the users is a 
precondition for the successful implementation of an intervention. The above 
findings suggest that the processes applied by the government agency could not lead 
to active participation of the farmers. This impeded the realisation of the objectives of 
the interventions in Ghachowk and Chaurasi Kulo when it comes to future 
independence and the sustainability of the irrigation system and their institutions. 
However, the primary objective of the intervention in Annapurna and Tarkughat was 
to increase the production. In this respect, the linking loop approach provided a 
framework for understanding the various objectives of the actors during the 
implementation of the interventions, and how these affected realisation of the 
objectives of the interventions. 
7.1.4 The effects of the interventions 
The effects of the interventions were largely the increase in the irrigable areas, 
improved water supply and reduction in maintenance demands. But in the case of 
the Annapurna and Ghachowk, it was less than promised. Besides, due to the 
permanent headwork and the canal lining, the labour contribution of the farmers for 
construction, routine and emergency maintenance of the canal have decreased as 
reported in the cases. The greater volume of water and more reliable supply in 
Annapurna and Tarkughat made more intensive agriculture possible such as 
vegetables. There was however, a serious problem in assessing the realised objectives 
in relation to the planned objectives because, the researcher was not able to obtain 
design reports on which the allocation of the money was based. So, there was also no 
insight on the cost-benefit calculations made in these documents. 
When it comes to evaluation, documents were available for Annapurna and 
Ghachowk. Their findings are mentioned in these case studies. The main conclusions 
were: there has been increase in the area, but not as anticipated in the design of the 
project. There has not been substantial increase in the cropping intensity and crop 
yield after the intervention in case of Ghachowk. However, there has been an increase 
in cropping intensity and crop yield in Annapurna due to the availability of irrigation 
water. Farmers in Annapurna kulo reported a wider impact of the irrigation 
intervention due to the increase in the household incomes. This was due to the 
extension of the irrigated area, which were not cultivated before due to unavailability 
of irrigation water. Thus, the greater water security in lower costs is important in this 
234 INTERVENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 
respect. The farmers with small-holdings benefited most due to the opportunity 
available for intensive cultivation. Besides, some individuals and groups derived 
benefit from the construction work during the intervention. 
7.2 Institutions, organisations and the process of irrigation 
The management of the irrigation systems requires strong institutions, because they 
have to manage the distribution of scarce resources and this can lead to various types 
of conflict. The governance of FMIS systems can be studied by looking at various 
rules-in-use. Ostrom (1992) sees institutions as rules-in-use, which define the rights 
and responsibilities of the water users. The layer of the rules-in-use are: operational 
rules, collective-choice rules and the constitutional-choice rales. These rales may 
change over a period of time due to external administrative and political 
interventions, changes in the environment for instance increasing scarcity of water, 
and changes in the physical infrastructure of the irrigation system. Also, changes can 
be made internally by the users as per their requirement. Ostrom (1992) has 
discussed how the sustainability of the FMIS, is shaped by the various conditions. 
These include a clearly defined set of users with shared cost and benefit, equal 
participation in the decision making; proper monitoring of the behavior of the 
members and effective sanction procedures applied from within the group; and 
rrurtimal external intervention in the design of the rules. 
Governance 
The analysis of the cases reveals that four institutions were important to the 
governance and the management of irrigation systems. Some of these institutions 
have a direct role and some of them have an indirect role. These four institutions 
were: a) the Ditthawal system, b) DUTM/DOI, c) VP/VDC/Kulo Samiti/Pale and d) 
UC. Among these institutions the D1HM/DOI, and UCs, were directly involved in 
governance of the irrigation systems whereas the Ditthawal system, VP/VDC are the 
institutions with a broader scope of activities. However, in case of the Ghachowk 
irrigation system the VP/VDC was also directly involved in the governance of the 
irrigation system. The role of the DIHM/DOI with respect to the governance of the 
irrigation in Chaurasi Kulo was temporal in nature through the development of 
collective-choice rules during the intervention period, and was still very strong in all 
aspects in Annapurna Kulo. 
The governance and management of the irrigation in Chaurasi Kulo during the 
pre-intervention time was under the Ditthawal system. The Ditthawal was a 
government functionary at the local level. Because of this he had the power to devise 
rales for a wide range of activities related to local administration. Because of this, the 
governance of the irrigation system was also under him and he could devise the rules 
for the functioning of the irrigation system and he was also entitled to collect land 
taxes. The users had little influence in the formulation of rales. In this respect, all 
three sets of rules-operational rules, collective-choice rules and constitutional-choice 
rules were defined. Ditthawal effectively implemented the operational-rales as he 
could apply the sanctions through the confiscation of the land. This institution was 
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instrumental in mobilising the internal resources and regulating the behaviour of the 
users, which was based on customary participation. 
The abolition of the Ditthawal due to political, social and economic interventions as 
indicated by the introduction of land reform, abolition of the Birta system, 
rehabilitation of the irrigation system by the DIHM and the introduction of VP 
suggests how the various forms of intervention affected the loss of collective-choice 
rules. The institutional vacuum created by the abolition of the Ditthawal was the 
beginning of the anarchy in the enforcement of the collective choice rules and 
operational rules resulting in the mis-management in Chaurasi Kulo. This also 
indicates that the continuity of a traditional institution or its replacement with an 
effective new institution is crucial for the management of irrigation systems. The 
farmers at the head and middle reach were not interested in devising new collective-
choice rule as the transaction cost would be too high. Further, they were waiting for 
new intervention as a platform to bring new institutions. 
The DIHM intervention in Chaurasi Kulo in 1962 further contributed to the 
deterioration of the operational rule due to the state control of the irrigation system, 
although for a brief period. However, the VP as a new institution could not relate 
control of governance to organisation of the operational-rules and was also 
ineffective in continuing the old practices under Ditthawal. The emergence of new 
linking loops and interfaces between the users, VP and the DIHM did not lead to 
developing and enforcing new rules, as the users were mainly interested in new 
relationships with the external agency, which was providing the support. 
Nevertheless, the VP tried to develop collective choice rules through the Kulo Samiti 
and enforcement of operational rules through the employment of Pale. This effort 
was successful for a brief period only. The construction of the Annapurna Kulo further 
contributed to the loss of social control in Chuarasi Kulo, as most of its users at the tail 
end of Chaurasi Kulo became the users of the new Annapurna Kulo. In the past these 
people were instrumental in putting pressure to the farmers at the head and middle 
as a group, when they used to arbitrarily control the flow of water. Another 
important factor observed from the cases is that the effective sanction procedures are 
important for the governance of the irrigation system as reflected by the Ditthawal 
system, which was lacking when VP was in control of the irrigation system. The 
Annapurna Kulo case also reflects that the government employee Dhalpa is playing an 
effective role in the governance of the irrigation system. In the later years the WUS is 
providing necessary support to them by drawing operational rules, as the DOI was 
gradually withdrawing. This was reflected in the reduction in the number of the 
Dhalpas. This shows that institutional arrangement was necessary for their effective 
functioning. The elaborate procedure for the operation of the irrigation system by 
drawing constitutional choice rule by the WUS, and their involvement in 
maintenance of the irrigation system with an operational rule, is indicative of the 
users desire to develop a governance structure. 
The control role of VDC in managing an irrigation system is varied. Some of the 
roles performed by the VDC were maintaining the linkage with outside institutions 
such as DDC and the DIO, mobilising external resources, facffitating the interaction 
among the people and mobilising internal resources. The VDC of Chaurasi Kulo is 
active in the initiation and implementation of the latest intervention. But it could not 
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develop rules for the governance of the old irrigation system. The Chaurasi Kulo also 
demonstrates that the conditions for the successful governance of the irrigation 
system such as clear allocation rules and enforcement of sanction are either not 
existing, or not recognised and violated. 
In case of the Chaurasi Kulo and the Annapurna Kulo we also find that the VDC is 
paying more attention to the Chaurasi Kulo than to the Annapurna Kulo as it has 
deposited the farmers' contribution for the latest intervention from its resources. 
Besides, the Annapurna Kulo has a WUS since 1992, which is mamtaining the linkage 
with the external institution whereas the VDC has to perform this role for the 
Chaurasi Kulo. 
However, the VDC of Ghachowk is effectively controlling the governance of the 
irrigation system through the development of constitutional choice rule and 
execution of operational rules through the employment of the Pales. However, the 
implementation of the operational rule in regard to internal resource mobilisation is 
weak. The Pale system has proved to be effective in the operation of the irrigation 
system, as the users do not have major complaints against them. In this respect, it 
should be noted that the UCs created for different interventions could not replace the 
VDC function in irrigation management. The differences could be attributed to the 
role expected by the people and the role performed by these institutions in the past. 
It is because the VDC has been performing this role for a long time and people expect 
it to continue this role. Besides, the VDC has power of political links, which it can use 
in obtaining resources from outside for the operation of the system. The governance 
system in Ghachowk reveals that the traditional system of governance is difficult to 
abolish, as the users are more accustomed to it. However the VDC is not effective in 
meeting other conditions for the sustainability of the irrigation system. For example, 
the internal resource mobilisation for the upkeep of the system has not been worked 
out. 
The VDC in Tarkughat however, is not playing an active role in the governance of 
the irrigation system. Because, the irrigation system is so small that the users could 
collectively manage the system, as there are no major issues to be addressed. Besides, 
the users in Tarkughat are adhering to the traditional operational-rules in the 
governance of the irrigation systems. However, the VDC's occasional support for the 
maintenance of the irrigation system is important for the continuity of the existing 
governance system. 
All the cases indicate that the presence or absence of accepted irrigation 
governance institutions and users' participation in the management of irrigation 
systems has strongly influenced VDC's role in the irrigation management. The 
differences in the role performance of the VDCs are also due to the differences in the 
role performed by the users in these irrigation systems. Besides, the personal actions 
by users to form an organisation e.g. WUS in Annapurna had effect in the role of 
VDC. 
The role of the UC in the governance of the irrigation system after the intervention 
was terminated in case of Ghachowk and the Tarkughat irrigation systems as the need 
for the UC was felt by the users only to be necessary to get government support. This 
was because other governance forums available to the users were more effective. 
However, the users of Annapurna Kulo have devised the governance structure and 
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are adhering to the operational choice rules. An UC was a necessity for the 
management of such a large and complicated system. 
The cases also indicate that the legitimacy of the institutions is established through 
the confidence of the users. The formal or informal status of the institution is 
secondary. The governance system in Ghachowk is working properly without any 
written rules and regulations whereas the UC created for ILC intervention, which 
was officially registered, is not functioning. The Tarkughat case also reflects that 
formalisation of the institution is not an essential factor for the governance of the 
irrigation systems. The important consideration in this respect is the smaller group 
facilitating the close interface between the users. Nevertheless, the formalisation of 
institution by developing written rules is important for dealing with the external 
environment. The case of the Annapurna Kulo indicates that the recognition of the 
institution by formal authorities has helped it in mobilising external resources. 
Without recognition it was impossible for the DIO to provide funding. 
Property rights 
The analysis of the cases suggests that the property right in the irrigation system was 
observed in two ways. The first was between the users across the system. The 
intervention in Ghachowk irrigation system led to the clarification and legal 
adjudication of the water rights. The matter was serious, as evidenced by the court 
ruling, which defined the water right between the two systems. This shows how the 
change in the technical control did affect the property relations across the system. 
The second type of property rights is between the users in the irrigation system in 
terms of rights to have water conveyed by the system. These case study show water 
rights can be obtained in two ways. The first one is that the owner can get water 
rights when he has land in the irrigation system that either was constructed by 
ancestors or a new construction of the government. Secondly, the users were able to 
secure water rights through investment as evidenced by water right of the Ban land 
in Ghachowk and construction of new sub-branch canal in Annapurna Kulo. The water 
rights practices prevailing in the case study area were irrigation water proportionate 
to the land holding, which was measured in tnato muri. The analysis of the cases 
suggests that there have been changes in the property rights after intervention due to 
the availability of more irrigation water. The changes were effected by introduction 
of new technology and the wider social and political changes. 
In the case study area all the users obtained their water right by the two ways 
mentioned above. In the Chaurasi, Ghachowk and Tarkughat, which were built by the 
ancestors of the present users one can speak of customary rights on water. For part of 
the users in Tarkughat systems there was a difference in the sense that farmers with 
land outside the command area could use the excess water from the lined canal for 
irrigation via unregulated systems of water allocation. 
The intervention in the Ghachowk system led to a slightly greater number of users. 
The old users of the system protested because, they were afraid that they would lose 
some of their water rights in the sense that less water will be available to them. But in 
the end it is significant that the old users did not challenge the rights of the new 
users. There had been a gradual expansion of the irrigated area as was evidenced by 
the conversion of the uncultivated land, which were cultivated in 3 or 5 years as 
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irrigated land. Besides, these lands belonged to the descendants of one family and 
they were allowed to expand irrigated area in the past. Further, none of the users had 
invested for the development of irrigation system in recent years except for labour 
contribution for occasional maintenance. The labour contribution was also not 
mandatory. In that sense there was no longer any defined hydraulic property rights 
(Coward, 1990:86). This indicates that the expansion of the irrigated area was 
possible as long as the irrigation water was available. Thus, the farmers who 
contributed during the third intervention for planting rights then claimed for the full 
fledged right for irrigation water. The VDC agreed to it. This shows that with the 
passage of the time, they used their social influence (by being the descendants of one 
family, who had control in VDC decision making) and also act of investment to 
obtain the right. Besides, it could be due to the fact that the investment for the system 
improvement came from the government in the end and did not affect seriously the 
volume of water available to other users. 
As a result of the construction of Annapurna Kulo, some users in the Chaurasi 
system lost their water rights from the Chaurasi Kulo and obtained new water rights 
from Annapurna Kulo. The remaining users at the tail end of Chaurasi Kulo were 
negatively affected due to this disruption in existing arrangements (Dani and Siddiqi, 
1987). With their limited number, it was even more difficult to defend their rights on 
water against the users at the head and the middle reaches even while they are 
continuing their contributions such as assisting in the annual repair of the headwork. 
This indicates that the contributions in the operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation system are not a sufficient condition for a fair access to irrigation water. 
Tail enders are in most irrigation systems in a disadvantaged position. This is not 
only due to the geographical location of their plot but also because often the farmers 
at the head have a strong economic and social position. This was also the case in 
Chaurasi Kulo. 
All the water users in the Annapurna Kulo could be considered as new users. 
Previously they had planting rights only in the old Chaurasi Kulo. However, there is 
differentiation in the water rights of the users in this system. This was evidenced by 
the fact that some of the users have more access whereas some of the users receive 
only field to field irrigation. The water right was partly defined by the technical 
design of the system (see 4.13.1), as all the available water cannot be diverted to one 
branch canal. The differentiation was also partly due to lack of co-operation among 
the farmers for the completion of the field channels. This shows that the users may 
not have equal right even in case of a new construction. Further, it reflects how the 
technical design could also have implications in the water right of the users. 
As the interventions in Tarkughat were an improvement and did not change the 
size and structure of the irrigation systems, there were no changes or discussions 
among the users as far as water rights were concerned. However, it should be noted 
here that the water right for field to field irrigation is also defined in this irrigation 
system. Thus, there has been some effect on the water right of the user, who depend 
on field to field irrigation. The terraces, which receive excess water from the lined 
canals, have been able to get more water after the intervention due to the increase in 
the volume of water in the lined canal. But the terraces, which receive excess water 
from the earthen canals, have not been able to get that benefit. 
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7.2.1 Management of irrigation tasks 
Water acquisition, system development and system water allocation 
All the irrigation schemes studied were using local skills and locally available 
materials for water acquisition before the intervention. Thus, the construction of 
temporary headwork before the monsoon was a routine work for the users in the 
irrigation system. The intervention constructed permanent headwork using modern 
technology. However, the technology used was varied. At present all the irrigation 
systems except Chaurasi Kulo have permanent headworks to acquire water from the 
Khola. System development was also part of intervention as evidenced by the canal 
lining of main and branch canals. Therefore, the intervention brought changes in 
water acquisition practices due to introduction of the new technology. In case of 
Annapurna Kulo, the users took the initiative for system development as evidenced by 
the construction of sub-branch canal from branch canal 2. In this respect the farmers 
linking loop was effective in introducing new control technology through the 
mobilisation of DOI and concerned users resources. However, the intervention did 
not have effect on system development at field channel level. Farmers are using the 
same field channels, which were developed in the past. 
As far as the past intervention in Chaurasi Kulo was concerned, there have been 
changes in system water allocation due to construction of Annapurna kulo. Annapurna 
Kulo has potential intake of 2.0 m 3 / s of irrigation water from the Yamdi Khola. This 
means the available water is divided between the two systems. Thus, the 
construction of the permanent headwork through the intervention increased the 
volume of water, made the availability of water more reliable and the water 
allocation in the system easier. The case of Annapurna kulo further reveals that water 
allocation within the system is controlled through the technical design. This had 
implication for the user allocation of irrigation water across the branch canals. 
Besides, there has been redistribution of users between the two systems, as the users 
at the tail end of the old Chaurasi Kulo have become the users of the newly 
constructed Annapurna kulo. 
As far as Ghachowk was concerned, the third intervention did change the system 
water allocation because a headwork was built in the small river. This led to a 
conflict with the irrigation system of Lahachowk. This was solved via the court, which 
allocated 2 / 3 of water to Ghachowk and 1/3 to Lahachowk. Ghachowk benefitted 
because the allocation was made for 200 ha as specified in the design of third 
intervention. The construction of permanent headwork and the canal lining has 
facilitated the operations of the systems in Tarkughat and the tasks of the users in 
system development have been made easier. As a result, less participation of the 
users was needed for the regular repair and cleaning of the canal. The 
discontinuation of system maintenance by the formal user group created by the 
intervention shows that the intervention did not achieve the objective of institution 
development, which is important for system development and maintenance and its 
sustainability without external assistance. 
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User allocation, system operation and water distribution 
The user allocation of water in the case study area is based on irrigable land 
measured in mato muri. Three types of water distribution practices are prevailing in 
the case study area. They are rotation, field to field and unregulated allocation. In the 
past the rotation system was effectively operating in the Chaurasi Kulo. This case 
shows that political and administrative changes such as the abolition of Ditthawal 
system and the introduction of VP undermined existing water practices governing 
the water allocation and distribution. The provision of Pale for supervising the 
allocation of water during the time of VP on the basis of availability of the irrigation 
water and area under irrigation indicates that the institutionalisation of allocation 
rules was perceived as necessary. Absence of the lack of effective organisational 
control by the VP led to the non-conformance of the operational rule by the users and 
as a result the Pale could not function properly. The other reason was that the VP for 
which they were working lacked authority due to the changes brought in the local 
administration by the referendum of 1980. This shows that it is difficult to revive the 
rules-in-use once they are lost. In absence of the operational-rules, the farmers at the 
tail end of the Chaurasi Kulo are not receiving the volume of irrigation water which 
they should have according to their rights. This was largely due to the change in the 
role of institutions due to adrninistrative changes. 
As noted earlier, the user allocation in Annapurna Kulo is also dictated by the 
technical design of the system, which does not allow aUocating all the water to one 
branch canal, if necessary. The rotation across the branch canals cannot be practised, 
as all the available water cannot be diverted to one branch canal, when the canal has 
full supply. Thus, this has affected user allocation in the branch canals. One of the 
reasons for the field to field irrigation in this system is due to the non-construction of 
the field channels by the users. The case of the Tarkughat system is different in the 
sense that the intervention did not affect changes in the principles for allocation and 
distribution of the irrigation water. However, the intervention facilitated the 
allocation and distribution by increasing the volume of water, which means 
increased access to the use of the water resource. 
We find variations in the effectiveness of the institutions in these tasks. The Pale 
system of Ghachowk, the UC and Dhalpa of Annapurna and the customary practices in 
Tarkughat were effective in the distribution of water. The Pale system under the 
authority of the VDC in Ghachowk was effective, as they were entitled to devise 
flexible rules through ad hoc adjustment for the distribution of water to the 
individual plots proportionate to the land and the availability of water. This indicates 
that flexibility in the allocation of water based on the principle of mato muri is 
important for the implementation of the allocation rules. This is because, the 
distribution is equitable, as indicated by the Bhijaune palo in Ghachowk. In that sense 
the traditional institutions were more effective in the enforcement of collective-choice 
rules and the operational rules with respect to the allocation and distribution of 
water. The development of the norms and acceptance of it by the actors were 
fundamental for the embedding of institutions. This is because the allocation and 
distribution of water in all the systems was consistent with norms and social control 
associated with it. 
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The size of the irrigation system was also important in determining whether the 
operational rules should be more formal or informal. The elaborate procedure of 
allocation and distribution for different seasons in Annapurna Kulo is an indication 
that the larger the system the more formal arrangements are required due to the 
operational requirement to meet the demand of individual users (Vincent, 1995). This 
was materialised by the appointment of Dhalpa by the DIO, which also supervised 
him. In a later stage the supervision was gradually taken over by the WUS. The 
separate distribution arrangement for the summer and winter crop reflects that the 
availability of water and the crop water requirement are the determinants for the 
users' allocation of water. The adequate supply of irrigation water for the planting 
was facilitated by the introduction of a new water control technology that made 
flexibility possible. Nevertheless, there is some distribution problems at the tail end 
due to non-availability of adequate water after planting. This was due to non-
cooperation by the users at the head. This indicates the disintegration of the linking 
loop, as fulfilment of individual objective was the primary concern of each farmer. 
This shows that the development and adherence to the operational-rules by each 
member, which is facilitated by the intensive interface between the actors, is 
necessary for the flexible and reliable access to the resources. However, the degree of 
social control on which the institutions can rely is also an important factor for 
ensuring equality among the members in the distribution of water resources. This 
was evidenced through the existing operational rules in Ghachowk, Tarkughat cases. 
However, this was weak in Chaurasi Kulo, as VDC is not doing any thing to address 
the problem of tail enders. 
Conflict management 
Three types of conflicts have been identified from the analysis of the cases. They are 
the conflict between the irrigation systems as reflected in the case of the Ghachowk 
system. The conflict was for the right over the use of a single water source (Lasti 
Khola) between two irrigation systems. The intensity of the conflict was very high as 
it involved court cases. The government intervention in the Lahachowk system prior 
to the Ghachowk system was the basis of conflict, as the users could claim the right on 
the source of the water. The conflict had an effect on the technological intervention in 
the Ghachowk irrigation system as the division of water has to be ensured through the 
introduction of a new water control technology (permanent weir). 
The second type of dispute is among the users. The intensity of the dispute in 
Chaurasi Kulo is higher than in other irrigation systems. The loss of traditional 
management practice as a consequence of abolition of Ditthawal and a weak VP 
unable to back Pales due to lack of any plan to introduce a water distribution 
schedule are the likely cause of the conflict. The conflict has resulted into the unequal 
access to water resources. Nevertheless, the expectation of a new intervention made 
it possible to maintain the social interface between the actors and the formation of 
informal linking loops between them has contained the disputes, so that the new 
intervention was not endangered. 
There are some disagreements among the users in Annapurna Kulo regarding the 
first use right of water between those who had Khet before the intervention and those 
who converted their Bari land to Khet. But the conflict is contained due to the 
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effectiveness of the WUS. Besides, the dispute between the users at the head and tail 
end is also reported in some branch canals. This was due to the inequal power 
relation between the users, as the head ender are the large land holders in some 
canals. Therefore, the WUS was not fully effective in this respect. 
The third type of conflict is between the agency and the users due to a lack of 
intensive interfaces during the planning and implementation of the intervention. The 
non-completion of the structures in Annapurna Kulo by the agency as a result of the 
refusal of the farmers to make land available for the complete construction of branch 
canals had implications for turning over the management of the irrigation system. 
Surprisingly the farmers now refuse to take-over the system unless the branch canals 
were completed. The agency would like to turn-over the irrigation system. However, 
users' demand is the complete repairing of the irrigation systems besides, providing 
irrigation water to targeted command area. However, the main reason for the user's 
refusal is that they would not be able to maintain the irrigation system. After the 
take-over they will not receive the annual maintenance cost. As of now the UC 
however, is successfully negotiating with the agency for mobilising the resources. 
This conflict is contained, as the users are afraid to lose the external resources, which 
have been mobilised by WUS. 
Resource mobilisation 
The farmers were undertaking simple maintenance through their own resources and 
sought external resources for the work, which they could not do on their own. 
Labour, material and cash are the main types of resources mobilised for the upkeep 
of the irrigation systems. The internally generated resources are the material and the 
labour. For example the construction of temporary headwork in Chaurasi Kulo and 
canal cleaning in Ghachowk and Tarkughat are through the labour resource 
mobilisation. The payment to the Pale in paddy on an annual basis in Ghachowk 
irrigation system is an example of material resource contribution. Cash is mobilised 
mainly from the external agencies like DIO, DDC and VDC for the rehabilitation and 
lately also for maintenance of the irrigation system. 
The internal resource mobilisation is gradually decreasing if we take into account 
the resources mobilised in the past. The changes in the pattern of resource 
mobilisation are caused by the changes in the water control technology e.g. the 
construction of permanent intakes and canal lining. The use of forest products, which 
was a must for the construction of the intake, is also declining as a result of this. 
Consequently, the labour contribution by the farmers has decreased. Evidently, the 
drudgery has been reduced as reported by the users in Tarkughat. Hence, the new 
headwork has not been repaired regularly and the cleaning of the canals was easier 
due to the construction of a silt trap box and the lining of the canal. The 
organisational strength of the users for resource mobilisation, which existed in the 
past, is declining after the intervention due to the reduced need for collective 
activities. However the users were able to form an informal linking loop to access 
external resources. But the dependence on the external resources has made their 
adrninistrative control on irrigation system weak. 
The pattern of resource mobilisation shows that the permanent structures of the 
irrigation systems make the user more dependent on external resources. The reason 
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for this is the reduced use of local materials due to changes in the water control 
technology. The use of cement and the requirement for skilled labourers has 
increased the cash component of the resource mobilisation. However, the users' 
unwillingness to generate necessary cash on a regular basis, although they have the 
ability to do so for simple maintenance, will be contributing in the future to the 
deterioration of main and branch canals. 
The decrease in the labour contribution has reduced the necessity of a communal 
linking loop between the users, but it increased the interfaces between the agency 
and the users. The analysis of the cases also indicates that some institutional set up is 
required for mobilisation of the external resources as evidenced by the role played by 
the VDC and the UC of Annapurna Kulo. Their role is important in facilitating the 
interface among the users and mamtaining the linkage with the outside institutions. 
The roles of formal institutions were important in resource mobilisation as evidenced 
by the involvement of the VDC and the DIO. Nevertheless, the leadership factor is 
also important in mamtaining the linkage with external institutions as exemplified by 
the role played by the UC chairman of Annapurna Kulo and the former UC chairman 
of Tarkughat systems in external resource mobilisation. 
System maintenance 
In all the irrigation systems it was found that users have to do both emergency and 
regular maintenance. The level of regular maintenance varied between the irrigation 
systems and also the level of involvement of the users. The regular maintenance of 
the main canal has been reduced after the intervention as exemplified by the 
Ghachwok and Tarkughat cases. However, farmers are doing the maintenance of field 
channels. The Chaurasi Kulo case reflects that the traditional practice of regular 
maintenance has been decreasing over a period of time. The loss of traditional 
institutions and the effect of intervention due to the change in the number of users 
have affected the maintenance of main canal. The changes in the number of users due 
to the construction of Annapurna Kulo also affected negatively the collective action, 
which was important for the regular maintenance of the main canal in Chaurasi Kulo. 
In absence of the regular maintenance there has been a change in the physical 
structure of the canal due to the deposition of the silt and the canal lining has not 
been properly maintained. As a result the availability of water for the tail enders 
diminished gradually. Besides, there has been decrease in the intake in due to lack of 
adequate labour mobilisation for headworks construction. 
The reported cases for emergency maintenance were from the Chaurasi and 
Ghachowk irrigation systems due to the floods and the landslides. The complexity of 
the technology has considerable consequences for the need for external resources and 
expertise. For example, the requirement for regular maintenance will be much 
greater in terms of resource mobilisation in the Annapurna Kulo than in the Ghachowk 
and the Tarkughat systems. This is due to the sophisticated technologies used in the 
system such as a type of weir that was constructed, the underground tunnel and the 
aqueducts for the Chaurasi Kulo system. 
Another important aspect is that the users' interests in maintenance have 
decreased after the intervention. In the past the users had to do system maintenance 
on their own but now the interventions of the government took that responsibility 
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more or less away from them. This is largely because funding for occasional 
maintenance is available from DIO, DDC/VDC and also from a Member of 
Parliament. In this respect, it could be said that the funding from other than DIO 
sources are means for political control. This shows that the users linking loop are 
formed in time of need and it disintegrates after the objective is achieved. This could 
be one of the reasons of loss of ownership feeling towards the irrigation system, 
when it comes to maintenance as was observed after all the interventions. This may 
affect institutional development. However, the maintenance of the irrigation system 
after intervention has been institutionalised in a different way. Internal resource 
mobilisation is weak in all the irrigation systems as the institutions created by the 
intervention were not functioning as evidenced by the Tarkughat and Ghachowk 
irrigation systems. Nevertheless, the VDC and the users are using government grants 
occasionally. In case of Annapurna, the WUS have been taking initiatives for the 
maintenance although on an ad hoc basis. The availability of external resources on a 
regular basis is an important factor for regular maintenance as presented by the case 
of the Annapurna system. 
7.2.2 Water control 
The intervention and introduction of new political institutions have brought changes 
in the case studies in all the three elements of water control (Mollinga, 1998) viz. 
technical control, organisational control, and socio-economic and political control. 
The cases indicate that in the past, the technical control of irrigation water was in the 
hands of the users due to the use of locally available technology and maintenance 
resources. Thus, the functioning of the irrigation management institutions and 
performance of their tasks was dependent on the traditional customary collective 
action. The authority structure at that time was instrumental in enforcing the 
required social control. The broader changes in the local admirustration through the 
introduction of new political systems such as VP/VDC and abolition of the Ditthawal 
system introduced new roles for the users, the local institutions and the outside 
agencies. The increasing role of the local institutions like VDC/DDC and the 
government agencies in irrigation water activities had both positive and negative 
effect on user control over water resources, which is an important factor for 
developing the appropriate rules for distribution of water (Mollinga, 1998). 
The cases also indicate that the administrative and social control in the 
implementation of the intervention was also important in achieving better technical 
control of irrigation system. The analysis suggests that full administrative and social 
control by the agency in the intervention of Annapurna Kulo did help in realising 
better technical control. Likewise, the full administrative and social controls by the 
users in the implementation of first and second intervention in Ghachowk was better 
in achieving technical control than the third intervention, which was a mix of control 
by users, agency and contractor. The same was the case with the intervention in 
Tarkughat. This was largely due to the effective organisational control in the hand of 
either the agency or the users. 
The system control was better during the time of Ditthawal in Chaurasi kulo but the 
users had representation control in the irrigation system. Ditthawal was able to 
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increase his control in irrigation water through the power vested by the government 
for land tax collection and confiscation of land, if users did not abide by it. The 
ineffectiveness of the VP/VDC led to actions by group of people to increase their 
social control in irrigation water. This shows that the changes in the organisational 
control could lead to changes in the social and political control, for example as the 
large farmers at the head are in control of water resources. This was because of their 
dominant role in the village politics. 
At the same time the construction of the Annapurna Kulo increased administrative 
and political control, as an agency took over the system. This was made possible due 
to the changes in the technical control of the system. The case of Ghachowk, shows 
that the VP was effective in introducing new organisational control through the 
employment of Pale. This checked the individual actions to control water and 
increased users' control in the irrigation system. Thus, the changes were effected in 
the social control of these irrigation systems through the changes in technological 
and political control of water, as reflected in the introduction of new technologies 
along with new financial resources and institutional mechanisms. In addition the 
opening up of villages, new income opportunities other than from agriculture and 
changing political structures at local level also contributed to the loss of social 
control. 
One of the objectives of the interventions was to introduce new or improved water 
control technologies to ensure flexible and reliable water delivery with increased 
supply. The water control technology used in interventions can be classified as 
simple, moderate and sophisticated in view of the technological and financial 
involvement in the creation of artefacts in the irrigation systems. This classification is 
made keeping in mind their sustenance through the resources within the local 
capability. The local capability is viewed in terms of financial, technical and the 
institutional capabilities. The financial capability is reflected in terms of the 
willingness and ability to generate necessary resources. The technical capability is the 
ability to acquire necessary materials and the required skills to carry out the work. 
The institutional ability is the existence of formal or informal institutions, which are 
capable of mobilising required resources-financial, technical, and human to 
accomplish the job. 
In this respect the water control technology used in the rehabilitation of Ghachowk 
system is moderate in the sense that the users can mobilise required resources for the 
system operation and maintenance. Only the gate at the intake and the acqeduct is 
beyond the financial and technical capability of the locals to maintain. When it comes 
to water control per se, there were no changes. The Pale continues to function under 
the authority of the VDC. The UC, active during the implementation of the third 
intervention stopped to function once the construction phase was finished. However, 
the bad implementation of the third intervention contributed to the weakening of the 
social organisation required for mamtaining technical and organisational control 
through mobilisation of necessary resources. 
The water control technology used in Tarkughat requires only simple technical and 
organisational control, which was made easier due to the small size of the systems 
and existence of social control in the rather isolated village. The local capability is 
enough to maintain the technology. 
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The technology used in the Annapurna system is sophisticated and is beyond the 
capability of the local people in all respects-technical, financial and institutional, if 
major maintenance is required. These changes reinforced the need for new forms of 
organisational control to maintain effective operations, as was evidenced through 
employment of Dhalpa and the formation of UC. However, some of the large land 
holders at the head of some branches effectively control the water at the cost of the 
tail ender. Thus, socio-political controls are insufficient to get the overall control 
necessary for effective and equitable operations of the irrigation system. 
Thus, the increasing dependence on external agencies for the sustenance of the 
irrigation system reflects that new linking loops have to be formed through interfaces 
between the actors involved in irrigation development. This indicates that the 
technical intervention is demanding new organisational control in the irrigation 
system. Together with other local government changes, they also bring into being 
needs for new socio-economic control. This can only work if there are effective 
working institutions and effective social and political negotiations. In this respect, the 
informal organisation of farmers in Tarkughat, the VDC through Pale in Ghachowk and 
emerging new organisation in Annapurna are playing important roles in the 
operation and occasional maintenance of the irrigation systems. 
The discussions and analysis of the cases suggest that the principles, in which the 
government interventions are based, are not effective in achieving its objectives due 
to the underlying motives of the people. One of the objectives was to make provide 
sustained benefit to the users in the long run. However, the users became interested 
in further interventions because of the opportunities available to them. Further, the 
interventions except for the new construction did not bring substantial changes in the 
irrigation tasks except for shift in resource mobilisation from local resources to the 
outside resources due to the change in control technology. However, the social and 
organisational control of the irrigation system has links to the changes in local 
politics. The new intervention in Chaurasi kulo, perhaps can provide a means to new 
political and organisational control to hydraulic control in future. 
7.3 Conclusions 
Limitations of the study and the methodology used 
The study focused mainly on the physical aspects of the interventions and the way 
they were implemented and the consequences for the local institutions. This was a 
rather narrow approach to look into the overall effects of intervention on production 
and livelihood, due to unavailability of the baseline data on production to compare 
with the present situation. The gap between the time the interventions were 
implemented and the study period made it difficult to locate all the local and 
regional officials who were involved in these interventions. This gap also made it 
difficult to lay hand on relevant project documents. This means that the case studies 
reflect mainly the views of the farmers, local leaders, members of the local 
institutions and some officials who were contacted. Therefore, only a limited analysis 
could be made of the interfaces between the government officials and the local 
populations. Also, the recollection of the actors was affected by the fact that the 
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intervention took place many years ago. Besides, some actors had good reason not to 
explain fully what they did in the past. For two schemes evaluation reports were 
available and these were used in the case studies of Annapurna and Ghachowk. The 
choice of the systems was made to look into the interventions by multiple 
institutions. The study also saw differences not only between objectives of 
interventions but also the intervention approaches of district versus technical 
agencies. The sites chosen for the study provided insights into variations in the 
intervention strategy, technologies, resource use and users response to it. In that 
respect the sites for the case studies were found to be appropriate for the purpose of 
the study. 
Concepts 
The concepts used in the study were useful instruments to organise and analyse the 
case studies. Among them the concepts of participation and the communal linking 
loop, were relevant to understanding interventions. Management, governance and 
control of irrigation were useful to understand impacts of intervention on irrigation 
systems. The concept of the communal linking loop was found to be useful in 
understanding the dynamics of relationships between the actors and how it shaped 
the interventions. Since the individual objectives might have changed, their action 
needs to be understood in relation to that particular event. 
Growing dependency 
A major finding of the study was that before the intervention users were able and 
willing to operate and maintain the irrigation system without outside support. 
However, after the interventions, there was a growing dependency on external 
resources for the maintenance. This was partly due to the way the intervention 
processes took place and also due to the changing local government finance. The use 
of foreign materials was one of the reasons as also indicated by other studies (DOI, 
1997; MOF1998). 
• When it comes to the initiation of the intervention the study shows that the users 
were active in stimulating VP/VDC to mobilise external support and they in their 
turn were active in pursuing government agencies to start interventions. In this 
respect VP/VDC were major actors in liasing with government agencies involved 
in the implementation of interventions. They were successful in creating links and 
developed communal linking loops to maintain contacts with these agencies for 
funding and execution. One of the problems encountered was that the actors 
involved had different objectives and sometimes even conflicting objectives. 
Besides, hidden agendas among profit seeking local leaders played a role in the 
interface between the actors involved. 
• When it came to the design of the interventions, there was little or no participation 
of the users. The consequence was that little or no use was made of local 
knowledge. The lack of participation and barriers in the interfaces made that the 
opportunities to harmonise the objectives of the various actors were scarce. The 
lack of understanding between the users and the government officials was also 
influenced by the users themselves, as their main interest was on how to avoid 
contributions. As a result, in the design of the interventions, the government 
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objectives were well represented but limited attention was given to the objectives 
of the users as the procedures outlined in the participatory approach were not 
properly followed as in other government interventions (MOWR, 1997). This has 
led in several cases to a loss of feeling of ownership by users, and their 
willingness to make available internal resources (Table 7. 2).The emphasis on the 
process approach as in FIWUD (Shrestha 1987) and in action research projects 
(WECS and EMI, 1990) in which farmers played an active role in the design and 
implementation of the public intervention was lacking in the interventions of the 
cases studied. The introduction of new technology like for instance in Annapurna 
Kulo, were of such a magnitude and complexity that the maintenance of the 
structures were way out of the capability of the users and automatically led to the 
dependency on external expertise and resources. 
• The per hectare costs of the irrigation systems are high in all the irrigation systems 
and highest of all is in the Tarkughat system and farmers would not be able to 
repay it back. This indicates that the users would have to depend on the outside 
resources when it comes to the major maintenance of the irrigation systems. 
The functioning of the irrigation systems 
The management of irrigation tasks among others the allocation of irrigation water 
was functiorung reasonably well except in Chaurasi Kulo. The poor functioning of the 
Chaurasi Kulo was the result of the gradual abolishment of the Ditthawal system and 
inability of the new local institution (VP) to take up the tasks due to weak 
enforcement of the operational rules for the operation of the irrigation system during 
the Pale period. Another problem that had to be faced in the Chaurasi Kulo was the 
over extension of the system what led to regular conflicts between farmers at the 
head and tail end. This considerably complicated the management of the irrigation 
system. The VP in Ghachowk and local leadership in Tarkughat were more capable to 
perform the irrigation tasks. These tasks were relatively easy due to enforcement of 
operational rules, besides, the irrigation systems were with a limited number of 
users. 
• From the middle of the 1980's the government required the formation of an UC 
before funding the implementation of interventions, with the exception of the 
central level projects. The analysis of the cases suggests that UCs were seen by the 
users only as vehicles for obtaining resources and government considered it as an 
arrangement for obtaining farmers resources. However, the government failed to 
pay attention to institutional development. This was also observed by Lam, (1994) 
who studied the performance of various FMIS and AMIS in Nepal. In small 
schemes like Tarkughat and Ghachowk there was no need for an UC because the 
traditional irrigation practices were sufficient for managing the systems. Another 
reason that the UCs were not readily accepted was that one of its tasks was the 
maintenance of the system. In this respect it is important to note the transaction 
costs involved in the replacement of existing institutional arrangements with new 
ones. 
Table 7.2: Comparison of interventions in relation to technology and irrigation management 
Irrigation systems Intervention programme Local government Irrigation 
management 
Current 
water 
functionary 
Technology change 
Chaurasi Kulo (FMIS) 1. Landslide 
2.DDC 
3.NISPofDOI 
VP 
VDC 
VDC 
Previously 
Ditthawal, then 
Kulo Samiti and 
now VDC and 
UC 
None 1. Canal rehabilitation after 
landslide 
2. Checkdam construction 
3. New intake, canal 
rehabilitation, new culverts 
and checkdams 
Annapurna Kulo 
(AME-Changing to 
joint management) 
1. Farmers with the help 
of Peace Corps 
volunteer 
2. Hill Irrigation Project 
of DOI 
VDC Emerging Water 
Users Society 
Dhalpa 1. Initiation of main canal 
construction 
2. New intake and main canal 
Ghachowk (FMIS) 1. Hood repair by 
District Panchayat 
2. Irrigation Line of 
credit of DOI 
3. Maintenance through 
fund by Member of 
Parliament 
VP 
VDC 
VDC 
Kulo Samiti 
under VDC 
Pales 1. Repair of flood damage 
2. Widening and deepening of 
canal Permanent intake, 
canal lining and extension 
of irrigated area 
3. Maintenance of canal lining 
Tarkughat (FMIS) 1. Hill Food Production 
Project of DODA 
VP None None Simple permanent intake and 
canal lining 
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For example, the users in Ghachowk did not like to abolish the Pale system under 
which it was possible for them to escape partly their contributions for maintenance. 
But the revival of UC would entail higher costs, as the farmers would have to 
contribute for all the maintenance cost of the irrigation system if the UC became 
effective in its role. Another reason why the UC in Ghachowk did not function once 
the project was completed was because of the lack of trust of the UC officials by the 
villagers. The users in Ghachowk were suspicious of the UC officials who handled the 
ILC intervention. The users felt that the UC officials did not represent their interests 
properly. 
• The users in Annapurna were aware of the gradual disengagement of the DIO as 
evidenced by the reduction in the annual maintenance fund made available by the 
DOI. Therefore they initiated a process, through the formation of a WUS, which 
mobilised available resources for simple maintenance activities, which could avoid 
higher costs in future. 
• The cases indicate that the fundamental reform of collective-choice rule due to the 
changes effected by the irrigation intervention in the governance structure 
contributed to increasing anarchy in 'rules in use', which was fundamental for the 
sustenance of the institution (Tang and Ostrom, 1993). There was little 
contribution in the design by the users due to confusion about who makes the 
rules. Thus, all three levels of rules were no longer synchronised and effective in 
the management of the irrigation systems. The study also shows that many aspects 
of 'conditions for successful schemes' (Ostrom, 1992), of which effective sanction 
procedures and shared cost and benefit are fundamental to the operation of 
irrigation systems, were violated due to a changing village administration. Most 
interventions also show that agencies were taking over constitutional-choice rule 
(policy) without adequate understanding of the village needs. 
• The study also reveals agency intervention in collective-choice rules due to 
changes in the physical layout of the irrigation system as indicated by the 
Annapurna Kulo case. This indicates that the introduction of a new water control 
technology can effect changes in the organisational control related to irrigation 
tasks. This in effect requires a more formal arrangement to perform irrigation 
tasks, as the control technology had effect on the organisational aspects of the 
irrigation. 
Besides, the cases of Annapurna and Chaurasi Kulos indicates that physical 
intervention leading to changes in hydraulic control have weakened/paralysed 
existing institutions. The changes in the hydraulic control were unsuccessful in 
mamtaining the continuity of the new institutions required to get funds for new 
interventions as evidenced by the non performance of UCs in Ghachowk and 
Tarkughat cases. However, the expectations of new interventions could allow a 
new nexus of technical, political and social control to emerge. 
The consequences of the political and administrative changes in the environment for 
the functioning of FMIS 
• This study shows that changes in general political and social control at the local 
level have led to the disintegration of old institutions as evidenced by the Chaurasi 
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Kulo case. At the same time these changes have given new options in resource 
mobilisation. 
• The changing of attitudes among the farmers with regard to the maintenance of 
the main canal of the irrigation system has to be seen in a larger context. In the 
past most villages were rather isolated and had little or no contact with the central 
government except for the collection of land taxes. In the past decades the role of 
the government has changed considerably. Via the expansion of the road system 
villages became less isolated and drawn into the national economy. This 
undermined the hierarchical social structure and the social control in the villages. 
The government became active in the provision of education and health services 
and in the provision of resources for the rehabilitation of local infrastructure 
including irrigation systems. This changed the view of farmers with regard to the 
role of the government and they were quick to ask and expect the government to 
'assist with' the tasks performed in the past by them. This growing dependency on 
the government affect in a negative way the mobilisation of local resources and 
have diminished the sustainability of the FMIS that have been rehabilitated by the 
government assistance. The availability of local funding and the maturity of the 
VDCs in obtaining external funding for simple maintenance have also negatively 
affected the local resource mobilisation, especially the cash, from the users. 
Future research 
As mentioned earlier one of the weaknesses of the present research is the detailed 
focus on the irrigation systems. Without complimentary data on the livelihoods and 
production patterns achieved by the intervention it was difficult to get an in-depth 
view on the daily way of life of the people after the intervention. But the focus was 
on the water delivery and institutional changes related to this. In this connection 
future research on irrigation intervention would be useful in the following areas. 
• To study the effect of interventions at the production and livelihood in order to 
understand intended and unintended impacts of interventions as it will help in 
understanding whether the final objectives of the intervention are achieved or not. 
• The analysis of the network of the actors who influence the process of intervention 
and its outcome need to be better understood as this knowledge in future will 
facilitate the creation of well-functioning linking loops of actors involved in 
development intervention. 
• Another area of interest could be the study of the government bureaucracy, 
funding agencies that shape the intervention and their outcome. 
To sum up, the processes followed in the irrigation intervention often have major 
implications for institution building needed for the sustainability of the irrigation 
systems. However, the changes in the irrigation institutions need to be viewed in the 
wider context of political, economic and social transformations, which had major 
effects on irrigation institutions, and how the tasks were performed by them. 
Keeping in view the growing number of government interventions emphasising the 
sustainability of the irrigation institutions, it is important that the design and the way 
of implementation is done in such a way that it will guarantee sustainable irrigation 
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institutions. This means that considerable changes are needed in the way the 
government at present is improving or rehabilitating FMIS. 
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Summary 
With the support from various donors, His Majesty's Government of Nepal has 
implemented support programmes with a view to transform water availability, 
improve production, and increase the institutional capabilities of farmers to develop 
and sustain efficient, fair and reliable irrigation management practices in irrigation 
systems in Nepal. In this respect, this study aimed to understand the social, 
administrative and political processes involved in the social and institutional changes 
brought about by development interventions at local level. This study focused 
mainly on the physical aspects of the interventions, the way they were implemented 
and the consequences for local institutions. 
The study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter consists of the nature of the 
problem, research focus and research objective. The various concepts and the 
theoretical framework along with the various methods used in generating 
information are presented in the second chapter. The socio-political and 
administrative environment of the country along with government policies and the 
priority in irrigation and agriculture development in different plan periods are 
discussed in the third chapter. The four case studies are discussed in chapters four to 
six. The case studies consist of the description of the general environment along with 
the presentation of the cases. The presentation is followed by an analysis of the case. 
The final chapter includes major findings of the case studies and conclusions. 
The changes in the government policy at various times have resulted in 
differences in the intervention strategies designed for various programmes. 
Moreover, there was no consistency in the intervention policies for various 
programmes at the same time. The government policy of seeking users' participation 
in the decision making of project design and implementation was mixed during the 
1980s, as indicated by the interventions under different programmes. For example, 
small-scale financial support for the improvement of the FMIS was implemented 
with a more or less 'participatory approach'. The processes followed in new 
construction projects were not based on a 'participatory approach'. However, users' 
participation in the decision making since the early 1990s was a precondition for the 
initiation of intervention processes. 
The study shows that the initiation of interventions is complicated and not always 
very transparent due to the different objectives and hidden agendas of all the actors 
involved such as: the users, local leaders, local and regional institutions, government 
agencies, and external donors. The initiative for interventions started at the local 
level. The users, local leaders and VP officials formed a linking loop to obtain the 
resources from in which, they were successful. The VP acted as intermediary 
between the users and the government agencies in the initiation process of the 
intervention. However, the linking loop did not function well during the design of 
the project, as the government officials designed the interventions and great 
emphasis was placed on the financial and technical aspects, which were not 
discussed at length with the users. As a result the knowledge of the users' was not 
fully utilised by the agency officials. The cases indicate that the interface between the 
users and the other actors were not so intensive to reflect a 'participatory approach'. 
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The implementation of the intervention could be categorised into three types. 
They are the new construction, rehabilitation and improvement. The objective of the 
intervention determined the type and scale of financial, technical and the 
institutional involvement in its implementation. The cases indicate that most of the 
UCs formed for the purpose of the intervention acted as 'construction committees' 
and failed to function after the completion of the intervention. In this respect the 
objectives of creating institutions for the implementation were partially achieved, but 
they could not ensure the complete participation of the users. Thus, the linking loop 
formed to obtain the government resources disintegrated during the implementation 
of the project. However, users with the help of the VP/VDC were quick to form a 
linking loop to obtain resources for other interventions. 
The analysis of the cases reveals that four institutions a) the Ditihawal system, b) 
DIO, c) VP/VDC and d) UC were important for the governance and the management 
of irrigation systems. The cases also indicate that the legitimacy of the institutions 
was established through the confidence of the users. The formal or informal status of 
the institution is secondary. The cases indicate that the fundamental reform of 
collective-choice rule due to the changes effected by the irrigation intervention in the 
governance structure contributed to increasing anarchy in 'rules in use'. Besides, 
there was little contribution in the design by the users due to an absence of 
constitutional-choice rule. The study also shows that many aspects of 'conditions for 
successful schemes' were violated due to changes in village aclministration. The 
study also shows that agency taking over constitutional-choice rule (policy) without 
adequate understanding of the village needs. 
The construction of permanent headworks and the canal lining has facilitated the 
operations of the system and the task of the users has been made easier. As a result, 
less participation of the users was needed for the system development, regular repair 
and cleaning of the canal. The users however lost the social control of the irrigation 
system due to the introduction of new technology and their dependence on outside 
resources was increasing. The user allocation of water in the case study area is based 
on irrigable land. Three types of water distribution practices are prevailing in the 
case study area. They are rotation, field to field and unregulated allocation. The cases 
indicate that the contributions in the operation and maintenance of the irrigation 
system are not the sufficient condition for a fair access to irrigation water. The degree 
of social control on which the institutions would rely was an important factor for 
ensuring fair distribution of water resources among the members. 
Three types of conflicts have been identified from the analysis of the cases. They 
are the conflict between the irrigation systems over the use of a single water source. 
However, the construction of the permanent weir did facilitate in defining the water 
rights between the irrigation systems. The second type of dispute is among the users 
due to weak institutional arrangements for the distribution of water. The third type 
of conflict is between the agency and the users due to lack of intensive interfaces 
during the plarvning and implementation of the intervention, which had implications 
on turning over the management of the irrigation system. 
The nature and extent of the participation by the users reflects that the 
interventions were not successful in seeking the active participation of the people in 
decision making due to a lack of an intensive interface between the actors involved in 
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the design and implementation of the interventions. The analysis of the cases 
suggests that the most common form of participation for resource mobilisation was 
labour, land and time. The pattern of resource mobilisation shows that the newly 
introduced irrigation technologies such as permanent structures of the irrigation 
systems make the user more dependent on the external resources. The cash 
contribution was almost negligible. The complexity of the technology has 
considerable consequences for the need for external resources and expertise. The 
increasing dependence on external agencies for the sustenance of the irrigation 
system reflects that new linking loops are emerging through interfaces between the 
actors involved in irrigation development. This indicates that the technical 
intervention is demanding new organisational control. 
In all the four case studies, the maintenance of the system after the interventions 
depended largely on external resources when it came to cash contributions. The 
newly introduced UCs were only functioning during the time of the intervention but 
were not functional in mobilising resources for the maintenance of irrigation system. 
This means a greater dependence on government support. When this is not 
formcoming the sustainabiHty of the FMIS is questionable. It is therefore necessary 
that in the future more attention be given by the government to the institutional 
aspects of intervention that aims at the improvement of rehabilitation of FMIS. 
However it was not only the intervention and the way they were implemented that 
led to a diminishing participation of the users in the maintenance of their irrigation 
system. The changes in the local, political, and administrative institutions, the 
opening of the villages via new roads lessened cohesion of the rural communities 
and opportunities were created or made accessible what led among others to a 
diminished social control. The provision of all kinds of facilities (school, health-posts) 
led farmers to look for new roles for the government e.g. to support them with the 
maintenance of the irrigation system. 
Samenvatting 
Met de hulp van verschillende donoren heeft Zijne Majesteits regering van Nepal 
programma's uitgevoerd met het oogmerk de beschikbaarheid van water te 
verbeteren, de landbouw productiviteit te verhogen en de institutionele capaciteit 
van de boeren te versterken opdat deze in staat zouden zijn in hun irrigatiesystemen 
irrigatie management praktijken uit te voeren die efficiënt, rechtvaardig, 
betrouwbaar en duurzaam zouden zijn. In dit kader was deze studie erop gericht 
inzicht te krijgen in de sociale, administratieve en politieke processen die invloed 
hadden op de sociale en institutionele veranderingen die teweeg werden gebracht 
door op ontwikkeling gerichte ingrepen op het lokale niveau. 
Deze studie bestaat uit zeven hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk gaat in op de 
aard van het probleem, de onderzoeksfocus en het doel van het onderzoek. De 
verschillende concepten en het theoretisch raamwerk alsmede de diverse 
onderzoeksmethoden die zijn gebruikt bij het verzamelen van materiaal worden 
behandeld in hoofdstuk twee. De sociaal-politieke en administratieve situatie in het 
land evenals de overheidspolitiek en de prioriteiten in de irrigatie en landbouw 
ontwikkeling in de verschillende plan perioden worden bediscussieerd in het derde 
hoofdstuk. De vier case studies worden besproken in de hoofdstukken vier tot en 
met zes. Deze case studies bestaan uit een bespreking van de omgeving waarin de 
interventies plaatsvonden en de beschrijving ervan. Deze presentaties worden 
gevolgd door een analyse. Het laatste hoofdstuk bevat de belangrijkste bevindingen 
en conclusies. 
De veranderingen die op verschillende momenten plaatsvonden in het 
overheidsbeleid hadden tot gevolg dat er verschillende interventie strategieën 
werden ontwikkeld voor de diverse programma's. Bovendien was er geen 
consistentie in het beleid in de programma's die op hetzelfde moment werden 
uitgevoerd. Het overheidsbeleid dat er op gericht was de gebruikers te laten 
participeren in de besluitvorming gedurende de opstelling van het project ontwerp 
en de uitvoering daarvan varieerde gedurende de tachtiger jaren zoals aangegeven is 
in de verschillende programma's die hierna worden besproken. Bijvoorbeeld bij de 
uitvoering van de financiële ondersteuning op beperkte schaal voor de verbetering 
van de door de boeren zelf beheerde irrigatiesystemen werd min of meer een 
participatieve benadering gevolgd. Maar bij nieuw te bouwen irrigatiesystemen was 
van participatie nauwelijks sprake. Toch was de participatie van gebruikers sinds het 
begin van de jaren negentig een voorwaarde alvorens eenn interventie proces mocht 
beginnen. 
Deze studie laat zien dat het begin van interventies een gecompliceerd proces is 
dat niet altijd doorzichtig is als gevolg van het feit dat de actoren die erbij betrokken 
zijn, zoals de gebruikers, de lokale leiders, lokale en regionale instellingen, 
overheidsorganisaties en externe donoren, verschillende doeleinden en verborgen 
agenda's hebben. Initiatie van interventies op het lokale niveau kwam van 
gebruikers, lokale leiders en Village Panchayat (VP) functionarissen. De VP 
bemiddelde tussen de gebruikers en de overheidsorganisaties gedurende de initiatie 
fase van de interventie. De case studies geven de indruk dat het de 
overheidsfunctionarissen waren die de interventie projectmatig uitwerkten waarbij 
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hun aandacht vooral uitging naar de technische en financiële aspecten en dat deze 
niet uitvoerig met de gebruikers werden besproken. Dit had tot gevolg dat de kennis 
die bij de gebruikers aanwezig was niet werd gebruikt. De case studies geven aan dat 
de contacten tussen de gebruikers en de andere actoren niet zo intensief waren dat 
gesproken kan worden van een participatieve benadering. 
Er zijn drie typen van uitvoering van een interventie: een nieuwe constructie, 
herstel en verbetering. Het doel van de interventie bepaalde de aard en de omvang 
van financiële, technische en de institutionele betrokkenheid van de gebruikers bij de 
uitvoering. De case studies geven aan dat de meeste gebruikers commissies (UC) die 
werden opgericht vooral functioneerden als 'constructie commissies en ophielden te 
functioneren nadat de uitvoering van de interventie was voltooid. Het doel om 
instituties te scheppen voor de uitvoering was óp deze wijze gedeeltelijk 
gerealiseerd, maar dit garandeerde nog niet de volledige participatie van de 
gebruikers. 
De analyses van de case studies tonen aan dat vier instituties van belang waren 
voor het bestuur en beheer van irrigatiesystemen: a) het Ditthawal systeem, b) DIO, 
c) VP/VDC en d) UC. De case studies geven ook aan dat de legitimiteit van de 
instituties gebaseerd was op het vertrouwen van de gebruikers. Van minder belang 
was het of het formele of informele instituties waren. De case studies tonen aan dat 
de ingrijpende hervorming van de 'collectieve keuze regel' als gevolg van de 
veranderingen die voortkwamen uit de interventie in een irrigatie systeem in de 
bestuursstructuur ervan bijdroegen tot een toenemende anarchie in de 'regels in 
gebruik'. Bovendien was er maar een geringe bijdrage van de gebruikers in het 
ontwerp van de interventie als gevolg van het ontbreken van de 'constitutionele 
keuze regel'. Deze studie toont eveneens aan dat de organisatie die de 
'constitutionele keuze regel' (beleid) overnam geen inzicht had in de behoeften die in 
het dorp bestonden. 
De constructie van permanente inlaatwerken en het met betonwanden bekleden 
van de irrigatie kanalen maakten de exploitatie van het systeem gemakkelijker en de 
taken van de gebruikers werden minder zwaar. Het gevolg was dat minder 
participatie van de gebruikers nodig was voor het geregeld onderhouden en 
schoonmaken van de kanalen. De allocatie van water aan de gebruikers is gebaseerd 
op het te irrigeren areaal dat ze bezitten. In het gebied waarin de case studies 
plaatsvonden waren drie typen van waterverdelingspraktijken: rotatie, veld tot veld 
irrigatie, en ongeregelde allocatie. De case studies tonen aan dat de bijdrage van de 
gebruikers aan de exploitatie en onderhouden van het irrigatie systeem nog geen 
zekerheid gaf voor een eerlijke verdeling van het water. De mate van sociale controle 
waarop de instituties konden rekenen was een belangrijke factor om te verzekeren 
dat er een eerlijk waterverdeling onder de gebruikers tot stand kwam. 
De analyse van de case studies laat zien dat er drie typen van conflicten kunnen 
worden onderscheiden. Er is het conflict tussen twee irrigatiesystemen over het 
gebruik van één enkele waterbron. Ten tweede kan er een dispuut ontstaan tussen de 
gebruikers over de verdeling van het water als gevolg van gebrekkige institutionele 
regelingen. Het derde type van conflict is dat tussen de organisatie die het systeem 
beheert en de gebruikers. Dit is het gevolg van het gebrek aan contacten gedurende 
2 6 8 INTER VENTION PROCESSES AND IRRIGATION INSmVTTIONS 
de plarvrüng en de uitvoering van de interventies hetwelk gevolgen had voor de 
overdracht van het management van het irrigatie systeem. 
De aard en de mate van de participatie van de gebruikers geeft weer dat bij de 
interventies niet met succes de actieve participatie van deze gebruikers is gezocht bij 
de beslissingen door de actoren die waren betrokken bij het ontwerpen en uitvoeren 
van de interventie. De analyse van de case studies suggereert dat de meest 
voorkomende vorm van participatie voor de mobilisatie van middelen was het geven 
arbeid, land en het beschikbaar stellen van tijd. Het patroon van middelen 
mobilisatie laat zien dat de geïntroduceerde nieuwe irrigatie technieken de bevolking 
meer afhankelijk heeft gemaakt van externe hulp. 
Bijdragen in geld waren praktisch te verwaarlozen. De complexiteit van de nieuwe 
technologie had belangrijke gevolgen en maakte dat de gebruikers meer afhankelijk 
zijn geworden van externe expertise en middelen. Deze toename van de 
afhankelijkheid van externe organisaties geeft aan dat nieuwe samenwerkings-
verbanden moesten worden gemaakt door het leggen van contacten tussen de 
actoren die betrokken zijn met de ontwikkeling van irrigatiesystemen. Dit geeft aan 
dat interventies van een technische aard ook vragen om een nieuwe vorm van 
organisatorische controle. 
In al de vier case studies was het onderhoud van de irrigatiesystemen, wanneer 
het om geldelijke bijdrages ging, in zeer belangrijke mate afhankelijk van externe 
middelen. De nieuw opgerichte gebruikers commissies functioneerden alleen maar 
gedurende de uitvoering van de interventies maar waren niet in staat om middelen 
te mobiliseren voor het onderhoud van de systemen. Dit betekent een grotere 
afhankelijkheid van overheidssteun. Wanneer die steun niet komt dan is een 
duurzaam voortbestaan van deze irrigatiesystemen onwaarschijnlijk. Het is daarom 
noodzakelijk dat de overheid meer aandacht heeft voor de institutionele aspecten 
van interventies die gericht zijn op de verbetering en onderhoud van door boeren 
beheerde irrigatiesystemen. 
Maar het waren niet alleen de interventies en de wijze waarop zij werden 
uitgevoerd die hebben geleid tot een vermindering van de participatie van de 
gebruikers in het onderhoud van hun irrigatiesystemen. De veranderingen in de 
lokale, politieke en administratieve instituties, het uit hun isolatie halen van de 
dorpen door de aanleg van wegen maakte dat de sociale cohesie van de rurale 
gemeenschappen verminderde. Ook werden nieuwe mogelijkheden voor de 
bevolking geschapen of werden bestaande mogelijkheden toegankelijker gemaakt 
waardoor de sociale controle afnam. Het beschikbaar stellen van vele soorten 
faciliteiten (scholen, klinieken) maakte dat de boeren de overheid een nieuwe rol 
toedachten, bijvoorbeeld bij het hun terzijde staan bij het onderhoud van de 
irrigatiesystemen. 
Appendix 
CONSTITUTION OF HEMJA IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
WATER USERS SOCIETY, 2049 (1992) 
Preamble 
Whereas the need for a Water Users Society has been felt in order to systematically 
meet the demand for water through its appropriate and timely supply from various 
branches within the irrigated area of the Hemja Irrigation Project, which comprises of 
one main canal covering the entire area of Ward Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9 of the Lower 
Hemja Village Development Committee of Kaski district in the Gandaki Zone of the 
Kingdom of Nepal, with boundaries comprising of the Seti river in the east, the 
Yamdi Khola in the south and west, and the Seti river and Sulastara and Muryanghat 
in the north, and branches 1, 2 , 3 , 4 , and 4A (Annapurna New Canal), and supervise 
the branches and sub-branches of the canal as well as its structures, increase its 
capacity, expand, repair and maintain its branches and sub-branches, and work 
according to the rules and policies of His Majesty's Government through 
coordination between the water user-farmers and the concerned agency of His 
Majesty's Government for raising food, fruit, and vegetable crops and thus becoming 
self-reliant and increasing the sources of income of farmers, now therefore, the 
following Constitution of the Lower Hemja Irrigation System Water Users Society, 
1992, has been framed and brought into force through consultations among and with 
the cooperation of the farmers of the area. 
Chapter 1 
Preliminary 
1. Short Title and Commencement 
(1) This Constitution shall be known as the Constitution of the Hemja 
Irrigation System Water Users Society, 1992. 
(2) It shall come into force on the date of registration of the Hemja Irrigation 
System Water Users Society, 1992, as an association under the 1977 
Registration of Associations Act. 
2. Definitions 
Unless otherwise meant with reference to the subject or context, in this 
Constitution: 
(a) Association means a Water Users Association. 
(b) Irrigated area means the irrigated area in Ward Nos. 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and 9 of the 
Hemja Village Development Committee of Kaski district in Gandaki Zone, 
with boundaries comprising of the Seti river in the east, the Yamdi Khola 
in the west and south, and the Seti river and Sulastara and Muryanghat in 
the north; the term includes the main, branch, and sub-branch canals. 
(c) Society means the Hemja Irrigation System Water Users Society formed 
under this Constitution. 
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(d) Canal includes the Annapurna main canal and other branch and sub-
branch canals, channels, etc. built for the supply and regulation of water 
under the irrigation system. 
(e) Irrigation (command) area includes the lands covered by the dams, canals, 
and structures under the irrigation system, as well as the entire area which 
has yet to be irrigated through the canal. 
(f) Irrigation Office means any project office, or the District Irrigation Office or 
the Regional Irrigation Directorate prescribed by His Majesty's 
Government for providing technical and other assistance to the Hemja 
Irrigation Project and the irrigation system. 
(g) Other agricultural agencies include the Kaski District Agricultural Office 
and its other faculties, the Agricultural Inputs Corporation, the 
Agricultural Development Bank, the Cooperative Society Ltd., and other 
agricultural agencies. 
(h) Water users mean farmers who utilize the water of the irrigation system 
within the irrigated area. 
(i) Farmers' Assembly means an assembly or meeting of farmers as 
mentioned in Article 9. 
(j) Ordinary member means an ordinary member of the Society as mentioned 
in Chapter 3. 
(k) Team means a Water Users Team as mentioned in Article 11 (a), which is 
formed under Article 11 on the basis of the water boundaries within the 
irrigation system. 
(1) Team Members mean persons chosen under Article 11 for different teams 
mentioned in Schedule (see 3. below), 
(m) Team Leader means a team leader or chief chosen under Article 11 (c) by 
members of each team from among themselves, 
(n) Representative Assembly means the assembly of teams as mentioned in 
Article 13. 
(o) Chairman means the Chairman of the Water Users Society formed under 
this Constitution. 
(p) Vice-Chairman means the Vice-Chairman of the Water Users Society, 
(q) Secretary means the Secretary of the Water Users Society, 
(r) Treasurer means the Treasurer of the Water Users Society, 
(s) Executive Member means a member or office-bearer of the Water Users 
Society. 
(t) Office-bearers include the office-bearers (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, 
Secretary and Treasurer) of the Water Users Society; or members 
assuming those posts. 
3. Seal of the Society 
The Society shall have a separate seal of its own for its identification and 
official business. The seal shall be circular in shape, with the words "Hemja 
Irrigation System Water Users Society, 1992" written inside the circle. 
APPENDIX 271 
4. Office of the Society 
The Society shall have an office in order to discharge its functions and hold 
meetings. The office shall be located within the premises of the Hemja 
Irrigation Project Office located in Ward No. 4 of the Hemja (Village 
Development Committee). 
Chapter 2 
Objectives 
5. Objectives 
The objectives of the Society shall be as follows: 
(a) The water of the Yamdi Khola, which flows through the Hemja Village 
Development Committee of Kaski district in the Gandaki Zone, and which 
is known upstream as Dhyangkhola, is being used under an irrigation 
system as a reliable and appropriate source of water for agriculture or for 
irrigation. The objective of the Society shall be to supervise and operate 
the entire structure of the system in order to supply water in an 
appropriate and timely manner. 
(b) To encourage farmers to increase agricultural production. 
(c) To make collective efforts for the protection of the rights relating to water 
and resolution of problems relating to irrigation of all farmers. 
Chapter 3 
Membership 
6. Qualifications for Ordinary Membership 
Every tenant, in the case of lands which are under tenancy rights, and every 
landowner, in the case of lands which are not under tenancy rights, who 
belongs to the Hemja Irrigation Project Area shall automatically be eligible for 
ordinary membership of the Water Users Society if he has attained the legal 
age, irrespective of whether he is a man or a woman. 
7. Acquisition of Membership 
(a) It shall be mandatory for every farmer who possesses the qualifications 
mentioned in Article 6 to acquire the ordinary membership of the Society 
by paying the fee specified in Article 8. 
(b) Every person who has acquired membership under Clause (a) shall 
automatically be a member of the Farmers Assembly, and also eligible for 
contesting for the post of Team Member. 
8. Membership Fee 
(a) Every ordinary member must pay every year the annual membership fee 
specified by the Hemja Irrigation System Water Users Society so as to be 
credited to its fund. 
(b) In addition to the membership fee mentioned in Clause (a), every ordinary 
member must pay an amount as specified by the Representative Assembly 
or as determined by the (concerned) Team in order to meet the expenses 
needed for the construction, operation, repair and maintenance of the 
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irrigation system, or for undertaking any welfare activities or meeting any 
contingency expenses, 
(d) The Representative Assembly shall have the power to make changes in the 
annual membership fee specified under Clause (a). 
Chapter 4 
Provisions Regarding Water Users Organization 
9. Farmers' Assembly 
All ordinary members within the irrigated area shall be members of the 
Farmers Assembly. The working procedure of meetings of the Farmers' 
Assembly shall be as follows: 
(a) Meetings of the Farmers' Assembly shall be held at least twice a year, once 
before the winter crop and once before the summer crop. 
(b) In case it is deemed necessary for any special reason to convene a meeting 
of the Farmers' Assembly in addition to its regular meetings mentioned in 
Clause (a), it may be convened in case at least 50 percent of the total 
membership of the Farmers' Assembly request the Chairman for the same 
in writing, explicitly mentioning the reason therefor, or in case the Society 
itself feels the need for holding such a meeting. 
(c) The venue, time and date of a meeting of the Farmers Assembly shall be as 
determined by the Society. 
(d) Notice of each meeting of the Farmers' Assembly must be issued at least 
10 days in advance, explicitly mentioning the venue, date, time, and 
agenda. 
(e) The quorum for a meeting of the Farmers' Assembly shall comprise of 50 
(percent) of its total membership. 
(f) In case the quorum mentioned in Clause (e) is not fulfilled in any meeting 
convened under Clause (d), another meeting shall be convened with an 
advance notice of at least three days. The presence of 25 percent of the 
total membership shall be deemed to have fulfilled the quorum of such 
reconvened meeting. 
(g) The opinion of the majority shall be binding at meetings of the Farmers' 
Assembly. 
(h) The Farmers' Assembly shall itself determine the working procedure of its 
meetings. Alternatively, such procedure shall be prescribed in the rules 
framed subject to this Constitution. 
(i) Meetings of the Farmers' Assembly shall ,be presided over by the 
Chairman of the Society, or by a person or office-bearer of the Society who 
is deemed appropriate for the purpose. 
10. Functions, Duties and Powers of the Farmers' Assembly 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Farmers' Assembly shall be as 
follows: 
(a) To hold discussions on and endorse annual reports and statements of 
income and expenditure prepared and submitted by the Water Users 
Society. 
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(b) To approve new year's programs and estimates of income and expenditure 
presented by the Representative Assembly. 
(c) To hold extensive discussions and consultations on the various problems 
of farmers, and make recommendations for the implementation (of 
decisions). 
11. Composition of Teams 
(a) In every Team, the ordinary members living within the concerned water 
boundaries shall choose at least five but not more than 9 members from 
among themselves. 
(b) In addition to the members chosen under Clause (a), each Team shall 
consist of an employee, office-bearer, or technician of the Irrigation Office 
as a Team Member representing that office. 
(c) The Team Members chosen under Clause (a) shall choose a Team Leader 
from among themselves. 
(d) Elections of the Team shall be held once every two years. 
(e) The working procedure relating to meetings and other activities of the 
Team may be determined by the Team itself, which shall be implemented 
only after they are approved by the Society. 
12. Functions. Duties, and Powers of the Water Users Team 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Team shall be as follows: 
(1) To construct, operate, repair, and maintain the branch canal, sub-branch 
canal, channels, field channels, etc. lying within its water boundaries. 
(2) To help in the supply of water in lands to be irrigated according to the type 
of crops, and make arrangements for supplying water to the water users. 
(3) To help in the collection of the irrigation service fee. 
(4) To recommend the deletion of records of lands which are not to be 
irrigated, in case it becomes necessary to do so. 
(5) To submit a petition to or lodge a complaint with the Water Users Society 
in writing explicitly mentioning all details in case anyone acts in 
contravention of this Constitution or causes any loss or damage by raising 
obstacles or voicing opposition to any action. 
(6) To resolve any problem arising among the water users of the area under its 
jurisdiction on the issue of supply of water. 
(7) To help farmers desirous of constracting new channels, field channels, or 
sub-branches in matters concerning the supply of lands for the purpose, as 
well as in other matters. 
(8) To issue necessary directives to the water users of its area in matters 
concerning the use of water for irrigation; it shall be the duty of the 
concerned water users to comply with such directives. 
(9) To implement the decisions and comply or make arrangements for 
complying with the directives of the Water Users Society, and exercise the 
powers delegated to it by the Society. 
13. Composition and Meetings of the Representative Assembly 
(a) There shall be a Representative Assembly comprising all the Team Leaders 
and members corning under the irrigation system. 
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(b) The Representative Assembly must meet at least twice a year. Provided 
that in case the Society deems so necessary, it may convene meetings of the 
Representative Assembly any number of times, fn addition, the Chairman 
must convene a meeting of the Representative Assembly in case one-third 
of the total number of members of the Representative Assembly request for 
such a meeting in writing. 
(c) The date, time, venue, and agenda of a meeting of the Representative 
Assembly shall be as decided by the Society. 
(d) Meetings of the Representative Council shall be presided over by the 
Chairman. During the absence of the Chairman, such meetings shall be 
presided over by the Vice-Chairman. In case both the Chairman and the 
Vice-Chairman are absent, the concerned meeting shall be presided over 
by an Executive Member of the Society chosen by the members of the 
Representative Assembly who are present at the meeting. 
(e) Notice of each meeting of the Representative Assembly must be sent to all 
the concerned explicitly mentioning its date, time, venue and agenda. 
Provided that in case any meeting cannot be held according to the notice 
issued for the first time, another meeting shall be convened with an 
advance notice of three days. 
(f) The quorum for a meeting of the Representative Assembly shall be deemed 
to have been fulfilled in case it is attended by two-thirds of the total 
number of its members. 
(g) The quorum for a reconvened meeting of the Representative Assembly 
shall comprise of 50 percent of the total membership. This rule shall be 
applicable only if the previously convened meeting had not been held due 
to lack of quorum. 
(h) The decision of the majority shall be binding at meetings of the 
Representative Assembly. 
(i) The other working procedure relating to its meetings shall be as 
determined by the Representative Assembly itself. 
14. Functions, Duties, and Powers of the Representative Assembly 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Representative Assembly shall be as 
follows: 
(1) To frame and enforce rules needed for the operation, repair and 
maintenance of the irrigation system. 
(2) To approve the audit reports of the Society. 
(3) To amend the Constitution of the Society according to need. 
(4) To formulate the annual programs of the Society and present them before 
the Farmers' Assembly for approval. 
15. Composition of the Society 
(a) There shall be established a Society comprising the following Executive 
Members in the Hemja Irrigation (Canal) System: 
(1) One representative or Team Leader of each of the Teams, who has 
been chosen as mentioned in Article 11(a), and 
(2) One technician representing the Irrigation Office. 
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(b) The Executive Members mentioned in Clause (a) (1) shall elect one 
Chairman, one Vice-Chairman, one Secretary, and one Treasurer of the 
Society from among themselves. 
(c) The office-bearers and Executive Members of the Society shall have a 
tenure of two years. 
16. Meetings of the Society 
(a) The Society shall meet at least once every two months. 
(b) If the Chairman so deems necessary, he may order that an emergency 
meeting of the Society be convened. An emergency meeting may also be 
convened in case one-third of the total number of Executive Members of 
the Society request the Chairman for the same in writing. 
(c) The Secretary shall convene a meeting of the Society on the date and at the 
time and place prescribed by the Chairman. 
(d) Meetings of the Society shall be presided over by the Chairman, and in his 
absence by the Vice-Chairman. In case both the Chairman and the Vice-
Chairman are absent, the concerned meeting shall be presided over by a 
person chosen by the Executive Members attending the meeting from 
among themselves. 
(e) Notice of each meeting of the Society must be sent to all its office-bearers 
and Executive Members at least three days in advance. 
(f) In case any meeting cannot be held according to the notice issued for the 
first time due to lack of quorum, another meeting shall be convened, and 
the quorum for such reconvened meeting shall comprise of 50 percent of 
the total membership. 
(g) The decision of the majority shall be binding at meetings of the Society. 
(h) The other procedure relating to its meetings shall be as determined by the 
Society itself. 
17. Functions. Duties, and Powers of the Society 
(a) To maintain coordination among the Water Users Teams. 
(b) To offer advice or make recommendations to the Site Engineer or 
technician in regard to the allocation of water. 
(c) To establish contacts between the Irrigation Office and the Teams, obtain 
technical and other assistance from the Irrigation Office, and supply them 
to the Teams, or mobilize people's participation in the programs of the 
Society. 
(d) To undertake repair, maintenance, and improvement works in the 
irrigation system by establishing contacts with the Irrigation Office. 
(e) To resolve any problem relating to supply of water among the teams 
coming under the irrigated area. 
(f) To have its decisions implemented by the Teams 
(g) To work in accordance with the plans and programs approved by the 
Farmers' Assembly and the Representative Assembly. 
(h) To spend in the name of the Society funds needed for the implementation 
of the plans and programs mentioned in Article 17 (g). 
(i) To submit annual statements of income and expenditure and other 
particulars and reports of the Society to the Farmers' Assembly. 
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(j) To delegate some of its powers to any office-bearer or Executive Member 
according to need. 
(k) In case the post of an office-bearer or Executive Member falls vacant before 
the expiry of its term, to fill up the vacancy by nommating any person as 
its member from among the remaining members of the Team represented 
by the concerned office-bearer or Executive Member; and chose a person to 
fill up the vacancy in the post of the concerned office-bearer as mentioned 
in Article 15 (b). 
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained above, in case the post of a member 
or office-bearer of the Society falls vacant, the Representative Assembly 
may fill up the vacancy by nominating a person belonging to the 
concerned Team itself or from elsewhere if it so deems necessary. 
Chapter 5 
Functions, Duties, and Powers of the Office-Bearers 
18. Functions, Duties, and Powers of the Chairman 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Chairman shall be as follows: 
(a) To preside over and conduct the meetings of the Farmers' Assembly, the 
Representative Assembly, and the Society. 
(b) To prescribe the venue, time, and date of a meeting of the Society. 
(c) To exercise his casting vote in the event of a tie in the course of voting at a 
meeting of the Society. 
(d) To represent the Society, or designate any office-bearer or Executive 
Member to do so. 
(e) To issue orders to convene emergency meetings of the Society. 
(f) To open a bank account of the Society with a provision to operate it jointly 
by himself and the Treasurer. 
19. Functions, Duties, and Powers of the Vice-Chairman 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Vice-Chairman shall be as follows: 
(a) To help the Chairman in discharging the functions of the Society. 
(b) To extend help in the absence of the Chairman. 
(c) To discharge the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the 
Chairman during his absence. 
20. Functions, Duties, and Powers of the Secretary 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Secretary shall be as follows: 
(a) To convene meetings of the Farmers' Assembly and the Representative 
Assembly according to the decisions of the Society. 
(b) To convene meetings of the Society as ordered by the Chairman. 
(c) To keep minutes of discussions and decisions of the meetings of the 
Society. 
(d) To submit annual reports of the Society to the Farmers' Assembly. 
(e) To authenticate the decisions of the Society. 
(f) To make necessary correspondence on behalf of the Society subject to its 
Constitution, polices, decisions, and objectives. 
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(g) ' To perform such other necessary functions as are prescribed or approved 
by the Chairman keeping the interests of the Society in view. 
21. Functions, Duties, and Powers of the Treasurer 
The functions, duties, and powers of the Treasurer shall be as follows: 
(a) To take custody of the cash and supplies of the Society and keep their 
accounts and records on a current basis. 
(b) To prepare annual budgets of the Society according to the budget 
prepared by the Representative Assembly, and submit them to the 
Farmers Assembly for discussions. 
(c) To keep accounts of income and expenditure of the Society. 
(d) To make arrangements for collecting fees, contributions, fines, etc. to be 
collected by the Society from its members. 
(e) To operate the bank account opened in the name of the Society together 
with the Chairman. 
(f) To supervise and regulate all activities relating to the financial 
transactions of the Society. 
Chapter 6 
Financial Arrangements 
22. Financial Sources 
The financial sources of the Society shall comprise the following: 
(a) Fees, fines, etc. collected from members. 
(b) Donations, rewards, financial assistance, grants, etc. received by the 
Society from any source. 
(c) Loans obtained by the Society. 
(d) Amounts received from the Irrigation Office. 
(d) Donations, rewards, grants, and loans from any foreign organization, 
association, institution, or individual shall be accepted only with the prior 
approval of the concerned agency of His Majesty's Government. 
23. Inventories of Movable and Immovable Property 
(a) The Treasurer shall keep the inventories of the movable and immovable 
property of the Society in the form prescribed by the Society. 
(b) In case the Society is dissolved for any reason and there is no possibility of 
its reconstitution, all its movable and immovable property shall accrue to 
His Majesty's Government. 
24. Fund 
(a) There shall be a fund for executing the functions of the Society. All 
amounts received in the name of the Society shall be credited to this fund. 
(b) The fund shall be operated through the joint signatures of the Chairman 
and the Treasurer. 
(c) All expenses to be incurred on behalf of the Society shall be borne from 
the fund established under Clause (a). 
25. Audit 
(a) The accounts and records of the Society shall be audited every year by an 
auditor appointed by the Society. 
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(b) It shall be mandatory to have the audit report of the Society endorsed by 
the Representative Assembly, 
(d) One copy each of the statement of income and expenditure and the audit 
report must be submitted to the District Administration Office and the 
Irrigation Office every year. 
Chapter 7 
Vacancies and Arrangements For Filling Up Posts 
26. Resignations 
(a) In case any office-bearer or Executive Member wishes to quit his post, he 
may submit his resignation to the Society. The post held by him shall be 
deemed to have fallen vacant only after the Society accepts his resignation. 
(b) In case any Team Member wishes to quit his post, he may submit his 
resignation to the Chairman of the Society through his Team Leader. The 
Chairman may accept such resignation only if he receives it along with the 
recommendation of the concerned Team Leader. 
27. Automatic Removal for Failure to Attend Meetings 
(a) In case any office-bearer or Executive Member of the Society remains 
absent from three consecutive meetings or from more than 50 percent of 
the meetings held in a year, without any satisfactory reason and prior 
notice, he shall ipso facto be deemed to have quit his executive post. 
(b) Any Team Member or Team Leader who remains absent from three 
consecutive meetings of the Representative Assembly without any 
satisfactory reason and prior notice shall ipso facto be deemed to have quit 
his post. 
28. No-Trust Motions 
(a) In case 25 percent of the total membership of the General Assembly table a 
no-trust motion against any office-bearer or Executive Member of the 
Society on the ground that he has not behaved in a manner befitting his 
post or failed to full fill his responsibilities, and in case the motion is 
passed in the Representative Assembly by a two-thirds majority, the 
concerned office-bearer or Executive Member may not continue in office. 
(b) In case 25 percent of the total number of ordinary members within the 
water boundaries of a Team, table a no-trust motion against any Team 
Member or the Team Leader, and in case the motion is approved by a two-
thirds majority in the course of voting, the membership of the concerned 
Team Member or Team Leader shall terminate, automatically. 
(c) A fresh no-trust motion may not be tabled against any office-bearer, 
Executive Member, or Team Member against whom a no-trust motion has 
already been tabled under Clause (a) and (b). 
(d) A fresh no-trust motion may not be tabled for one year against any office-
bearer, Executive Member, or Team Member against whom a no-trust 
motion tabled earlier had failed to be approved. 
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(e) Any member who has been removed from his post following the approval 
of a no-trust motion filed against him may not become a candidate in the 
by-election to be held for the same post. 
29. Disqualifications for Candidacy 
Any person who is physically or mentally ill so that he is considered to be 
incapable of understanding his functions or decisions or fulfilling his 
obligations in a responsible manner shall not be provided with an opportunity 
to become a candidate for the post of an office-bearer or Executive Member or 
Team Member of the Society. 
30. Continuation in Office 
Except when the term prescribed under this Constitution has expired, all 
office-bearers who leave their current post shall continue in their usual post as 
follows: 
(a) An office-bearer who has resigned under Article 29 shall continue to be an 
Executive Member of the Society. 
(b) An Executive Member who has resigned from his post under Article 29 (a) 
shall continue to remain a member of the Team represented by him. 
Provided that he may not become a candidate in the by-election to be held 
for the post of Team Leader. 
(c) Any Executive Member or office-bearer of the Society who is removed 
from his post under Article 27 (a) and Article 28 (a) shall continue to 
remain a member of the Team represented by him. Provided that he may 
not become a candidate in the by-election to be held for the post of Team 
Leader. 
31. Provisions Concerning Elections 
(a) In case the term of a Water Users Team expires under Article 11 (d), it 
shall be reconstituted through elections subject to Articles 11 (a) and 11 (c). 
(b) In case the term of the Society expires under Article 15 (c), it shall be 
reconstituted through elections according to Articles 15 (a) and 15 (b). 
Provided that the elections of the Society shall be held only after holding 
the elections of the Teams under Clause (a). 
(c) By-elections for posts which have fallen vacant under Articles 26, 27, and 
28 shall be held in the following manner: 
(d) By-elections of office-bearers of the Society shall be held from among the 
Executive Members of the existing Society under Article 15 (b). Provided 
that a person who has quit his post may not become a candidate in such 
by-elections. 
(e) In the case of an Executive Member or Team Leader of the Society, the 
post shall be filled up under Article 11 (c) from among the concerned 
Team Members. Provided that a person who has quit the post of Team 
Leader may not become a candidate in a by-election. 
(f) Vacant posts of Team Members shall be filled up in the manner mentioned 
in Article 11 (a). 
(g) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 31 (c), in case any member 
of a team leaves his post and in case the number of remaining members is 
sufficient to meet the minimum number prescribed in the Article, the team 
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shall continue to function in its present form, and it shall not be 
mandatory to hold by-elections to fill up the vacancy. 
32. Formation of Election Committee 
For the purpose of holding elections of Team Members, Team Leaders, 
Executive Members and office-bearers in a systematic and according to rules 
under this Constitution, an Election Committee comprising of three ordinary 
members shall be formed in the manner decided by the Society. No member of 
the Election Committee may contest for any post. 
Chapter 8 
Miscellaneous 
33. Amendment of Constitution 
In case it becomes necessary to amend any provision of this Constitution, a 
resolution to that effect may be presented by at least 25 percent of the total 
membership of the Representative Assembly. The concerned resolution shall 
be deemed to have been approved in case at least three-fourths of the total 
membership vote in its support. 
34. Power to Frame Policies and Rules 
(a) The Society may frame policies, rules or regulations subject to this 
Constitution. Such policies, rules, and regulations may be brought into 
force only after having them endorsed by the Representative Assembly. 
(b) The Society may delegate powers and issue directives to the Teams 
directly after having them approved by its meetings. 
35. To be Deemed to Have Been Formed Under This Constitution 
Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 1 (b) of the Constitution, the 
Hemja Irrigation System Water Users Society and the various Water Users 
Teams formed by His Majesty's Government under the 1988 Irrigation Rules 
before the commencement of this Constitution shall be deemed to have been 
formed under this Constitution, and the term of the said Society and Teams 
shall also be as mentioned in this Constitution. 
36. Inoperation 
All such provisions of this Constitution as those which conflict with current 
Nepal law shall be deemed to be inoperative to the extent of such conflict. 
37. Provisions Regarding Advisors 
In case the Hemja Irrigation System Water Users Society formed under this 
Constitution feels the need for appomting or obtaining the services of advisors 
belonging to any related field or institution,, it may make necessary 
arrangements for the purpose. Provided that not more than three persons may 
be so appointed as advisors. 
38. Amendment of Constitution 
(a) In case it becomes necessary to amend the Constitution of the Society, its 
Managing Committee (Water Users Society) shall prepare a resolution to 
that effect and convene an extraordinary meeting according to the 
Constitution for a debate on that resolution. 
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In case two-thirds of the total number of members attending the 
extraordinary meeting vote in its support, the resolution shall be deemed 
to have been approved by the extraordinary meeting. Provided that the 
approval of the Local Authority must be obtained before implementing 
such resolution. 
(b) Accounts to be Submitted 
The Managing Committee (Society) must submit the statements of income 
and expenditure of the Society along with the audit report to the Local 
Authority every year. 
(c) Scmtiny of Accounts 
The Local Authority may, if he so deems necessary, have the accounts of 
the Society scratinised by an officer appointed by him. 
(d) Dissolution of Society, and Its Consequences 
In case the Society is dissolved because of its failure to carry out its 
functions in accordance with its Constitution, or for any other reason, all 
its assets shall accrue to His Majesty's Government. 
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Hemja Irrigation Project Water Users Society Rules 2052 (1995) 
Preamble 
Whereas it is desirable to frame and enforce rules for the Water Users Society of the 
Hemja Irrigation Project subject to Article 34 of its Constitution, now therefore, the 
following Hemja Irrigation Project Water Users Society Rules, 1995, have been 
framed and brought into force: 
1. Regarding Supply of Water 
(a) In regard to the supply of water for irrigating the paddy crop, all branch, 
sub-branch, depot, and group committees must submit to the Main 
Committee the data of the irrigated area under their respective jurisdiction 
in the form prescribed by the Main Committee before the end of Asadh 
(July 16) every year. The Main Committee may withhold the supply of 
water to any branch, sub-branch, depot, or group which fails to submit 
such data, and the concerned branch, sub-branch, depot, or group 
committee shall itself be held responsible for any loss resulting therefrom. 
(b) Water for the paddy crop shall be supplied from Shrawan 1 0uly 17) to 
Kartik 10 (October 27). In case any branch, sub-branch, or group under the 
canal system demands water supply during night time, the concerned 
committee and users must agree to bear full responsibility for the same in 
case the concerned branch of the canal runs along paths leading to houses 
and settlements. In case any branch, sub-branch or group does not agree 
to bear such responsibility, the Main Committee may not supply water to 
it during night time. 
(c) During the period between Jestha 10 (June 4) and Asadh 31 0uly 16), 
water shall be supplied not on the basis of the area involved but on the 
basis of the plough units. In case the number of plough units is higher 
than the available volume of water in the canal, water shall be supplied to 
the concerned branches and sub-branches on a rotation basis according to 
the plough units. 
(d) Regarding Irrigation of Rabi (winter) Crops 
During the period between Marga 1 (November 17) and Magh 29 
(February 12), water shall be supplied on a rotation basis according to 
need. 
(e) Inasmuch as the volume of water available in the canal begins to decline 
from Falgun until Jestha (mid-February to mid-June), water shall be 
supplied during that period to all branches and sub-branches on a rotation 
basis according to their crops in case the users',demand for water is high. 
2. In Case Anyone Causes or Instigates Others to Cause any Loss or Damage to 
the Canal 
(a) In case any individual, user, committee or group causes or instigates 
others to cause any loss or damage to the headworks of the main canal, or 
the underground system, the main canal, or any branch, sub-branch, or 
depot of this irrigation project, the concerned committee may itself, in case 
such incident has occurred in a branch, sub-branch or depot, valuate the 
loss or damage, and realize the amount involved therein from the 
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concerned party keeping the loss or damage and the particulars of the 
incident in view, in addition to a fine at the rate of five percent of the 
amount involved. 
In case any loss or damage as mentioned in Rule 2 (a) occurs in any area 
under the jurisdiction of the Main Committee, the Main Committee shall 
itself take actions in respect thereto. In case the Main Committee fails to 
resolve any problem, it shall submit a petition requesting for action along 
with its recommendation to the concerned agencies, the Village 
Development Committee or the District Adrninistration Office and the 
District Water Resources Committee. In case any branch committee fails to 
resolve any of the above- mentioned problems, it shall submit a petition 
requesting for action along with its recommendation to the Main 
Committee. 
In respect to any loss or damage caused to the main canal or to any 
branch, sub-branch, etc. as mentioned in Rule 2 (a) above, a warning may 
be issued to the concerned group, individual or user for the first time 
keeping the nature of the offense in view. 
Anyone who repeats the offense, causes any loss or damage, or acts in 
contravention of the Constitution and the rules and regulations of the 
Society time and again despite efforts to convince him not to do so shall be 
deprived of the right to use the water if he is a user, and if he is not a user 
but any other individual or institution, the amount involved in the loss or 
damage shall be recovered from him/it along with a fine amounting to 
five percent of that amount, and, in addition, the District Administration 
Office shall be requested to subject him/it to administrative and judicial 
action according to current law. 
(b) The fines collected or compensation realized by a branch committee under 
Rule 2 (a) shall be credited as income, and may be used by the concerned 
branch committee itself. 
3. Regarding Regular Repair and Maintenance Works 
(a) The Main Committee shall formulate programs relating to the regular 
repair and maintenance of the headworks, the underground system, and 
the main canal, and undertake such repair and maintenance works. For 
this purpose, it may collect cash contributions from or utilize the labor of 
all the users (on the basis of their area). 
(b) The regular repair and maintenance works of the irrigation project and the 
task of keeping its branches and sub-branches neat and clean shall be 
carried out by the concerned branch, sub-branch or group committees. For 
this purpose, they may collect cash contributions from or utilize the labor 
of their respective users on the basis of their area. 
4. Regarding Emergency Repair and Maintenance Works 
(a) In case the headworks, the underground system, or the main canal of this 
Hemja Irrigation Project suffers a serious damage due to any natural 
causes thereby making it necessary to repair and maintain them, and in 
case no relief is likely to be available from the government immediately, 
the Main Committee of the Project shall hold an emergency meeting, 
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request all users to contribute cash or labor (on the basis of their area), and 
carry out repair and maintenance works on a provisional basis. 
(b) In case the irrigation project suffers a damage as mentioned in Rule 4 (a), 
His Majesty's Government or the concerned agency shall be requested to 
carry out repair and maintenance works on a permanent basis. 
(c) In case any branch or sub-branch of this irrigation system suffers a serious 
damage as mentioned in Rule 4 (a), the concerned branch or sub-branch 
committee shall meet immediately, collect cash contributions from and/or 
utilize labor of all the concerned users, carry out provisional repair and 
maintenance works, and request the concerned agency for carrying out 
repair and maintenance works on a permanent basis. 
5. Regarding Financial Transactions 
(a) In case it is deemed necessary to carry out repair and maintenance works 
in the Hemja irrigation system, or to conduct the other businesses, or 
establish a permanent fund of the Main Committee, all branch, sub-
branch, depot, and group committees shall collect funds in the manner 
prescribed by the Main Committee on the basis of their area. 
(b) In case any user or committee does not pay and tries to evade payment of 
the prescribed amount according to the provisions made under Rule 5 (a), 
he/it shall not be supplied water for any crop. 
(c) In case it is deemed necessary for a branch committee to collect funds from 
the users or groups under its jurisdiction for its own purposes as 
mentioned in Rule 5(a) and (b), and in case any such user or group does 
not pay and tries to evade payment of the amount prescribed on the basis 
of his/its area, the concerned committee may deprive him/ît of the right 
to use the water. 
6. Penalties 
(a) In case any individual, user, or group takes any action in contravention of 
the Constitution, the rules of the Society, or the decisions taken by its 
meeting, he/it shall be punished with a fine of Rs 100 for the first time, 
keeping the nature of his offense in view. In case he/it repeats the offense, 
he/it shall also be punished with an additional fine of Rs 100 every time 
he/it does so. 
(b) In case any user-farmer utilizing water from the irrigation system of the 
Hemja Irrigation Project acts or instigates others to act in contravention of 
the conventions and the rules prescribed by the Main Committee or any 
branch committee of the Society, or the Constitution and the rules of the 
Society, he shall be punished with the fine -and subjected to action as 
provided for in Rule 2 (a) and Rule 6 (a) of the rules of this Society. 
7. Regarding Expansion of Branches, Sub-Branches and Depots of the Canal 
(a) In case it is deemed necessary for the irrigation project to expand its 
branches or sub-branches, or open new depots within its command area, 
the farmer-users of the area where the irrigation canal is to be so extended 
must make available the land needed for the purpose. 
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8. Regarding Amendments in Rules 
(a) In case it is deemed necessary to make any changes or alterations in any 
provision contained in these rules, the general meeting of the Society may 
do so after having a resolution to that effect endorsed by a two-thirds 
majority of the (attending) members, and securing the approval of the 
District Water Resources committee. 
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